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This research investigates the impact of corporate governance reforms in Philippine 
institutions and firms. Literature reviewed looks at the macro and micro view of 
corporate governance theories and the prevailing business environment. The 
methodology of this research applies an ethnographic approach combining both 
deductive and inductive inquiries with a triangulated method using interviews, media 
articles and participant observation. Collection of the interview data occurred over four 
intensive months whilst in situ in Manila, Philippines. The data was then analysed using 
the NVivo qualitative analysis computer program. 
The results of my data collection and analysis are explained and distilled in six chapters. 
They are: 
- Chapter 4: Business and Corporate Governance Environment 
- Chapter 5: The Regulators 
- Chapter 6: Business Groups: The Owners of Companies 
- Chapter 7: The Board and Management: The Controllers of the Company 
- Chapter 8: The Government Financial Institutions 
- Chapter 9: Corruption 
The thesis concludes with a chapter on a summary of the research findings and 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
This research is concerned with investigating the impact of corporate governance 
reforms in Philippine institutions and firms. 
The Philippines is an island archipelago located in South East Asia with a population of 
90 million people and a nominal gross national income per capita of USD1,8901
In investigating corporate governance reforms in the country, the context in which these 
reforms have been implemented must take into account the pre-existing business-
economic condition: the Philippines is a developing country with underdeveloped 
institutions, a small private sector, a large public sector with a sometime predatory state. 
. In 
recorded history it was a colony for several centuries under Spain and then nearly half a 
century by the USA. In the period since the end of World War Two, it has suffered under 
various governments and one dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos. The country 
continues to be destabilised politically and economically. It is currently a democracy-in -
progress with the most recent presidential elections held in May 2010. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
This chapter discusses the literature reviewed for this research and is divided into three 
main parts: the literature on introducing corporate governance, existing corporate 
governance theories of the firm, and the business environment. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter discusses the qualitative method I applied in this research which is the 
ethnographic approach. Both inductive and deductive aspects of qualitative research 
were applied. Further, an account of the data collection is explained, while the use of the 
NVivo program for the data analysis is discussed. 
 
                                                     
1 World Bank (2010) Philippine spreadsheet from World Development Indicators Database, April 
http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYP




Chapters 4-9: The Results 
The results of my research findings are examined and explained in four chapters. 
Chapter 4 discusses the business and corporate governance environment and Chapter 5 
examines corporate governance regulators. Chapters 6 and 7 are the main corporate 
governance chapters that look at the private sector. Chapter 6 looks at the ownership 
factors, while Chapter 7 looks at the management factors. Chapter 8 provides an account 
of three government financial institutions and politicisation and the last result chapter, 
Chapter 9 on corruption, is the purely inductive result chapter of my research. 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The final chapter makes brief recommendations and the implications of my research for 
policy and practice. A summary of each chapter’s contribution to knowledge and 
limitation of the research is also accounted for. 
Appendices 
Supporting documents and data are included in the appendices. The appendices cover 
the research questionnaire, the list of organisations that participated in my research, the 
events and gatherings I attended whilst in the country, and the media articles collected. 
The structure of the thesis is summarised in the following table showing the elements of 






Table 1: Summary of Thesis 
Research investigation into corporate governance reforms in 
the Philippines 
Constituted 
elements of the 
research 
investigation 










Background to and 
introduction of 
reforms  








Impact on the 
regulators 
Institutional theory Chapter 5: The 
Regulators 
Impact on the private 
sector 
Business groups, family 
business research and 
corporate governance 
theories of the firm 
Chapter 6: The 
Owners of the 
Company;  
Chapter 7: The 











Corruption Predatory state, varieties 





The research investigates corporate governance reforms in the Philippines. The 
constituted elements of this investigation include the method, the prevailing business 
and corporate government of the country, the background and introduction of the 
reforms, the impact on regulators, the private sector, and government owned financial 
institutions, and finally the impact of corruption on the country. A conceptual 




Figure 1: Structure of the Thesis and Conceptual Framework of Philippine Corporate Governance 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 









Chapter 8: Government 
Financial Institutions 






Private Sector Firms 
Chapter 6: Business 
Groups: The Owners 
of Companies 
Chapter 7: The Board 
and Management: 








Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter 4: Business and Corporate Governance Environment 





Chapters 1-3 and 10 are the bookends of the results chapters. Chapters 4 and 9 relate the 
common business environment in the country. Government institutions and regulators 
are discussed in Chapters 8 and 5. Regulators in turn influence the corporate governance 
of private sector firms through regulation. The corporate governance of private sectors 
firms are looked at in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This is the conceptual framework of the thesis and the chapters are organised around 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter discusses the literature reviewed for this research. This review is divided 
into the following: 
1. Literature on Introducing Reforms 
This section defines, corporate governance, models, crises & reforms, politicisation, 
resource dependence, convergence theory and varieties of capitalism, and discusses 
institutional theory and the introduction of reforms through isomorphism. The literature 
in this section contributes to better understanding of results outlined in Chapters 4, 5 
and 8. 
2. Literature on Corporate Governance Theories of the Firm. 
Corporate governance has two aspects: ownership and control. This section contributes 
to further understanding of theories of corporate governance and is divided into two 
parts: 
a) The micro-view of the firm or general corporate governance theories: agency 
theory (I and II), stakeholder, resource-based view, board relationships. 
b) The macro view of the firm and ownership in Asia: literature covered looks at the 
ownership of East Asian Corporations, family business research and business 
groups.  
Literature in this section contributes to better understanding of results outlined in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
3. Literature on the General Business Environment 
Literature covered in this section includes the economic sociology approach, culture, 
predatory state, crony capitalism and corruption. The literature in this section 
contributes to better understanding of results outlined in Chapters 4 to 9. 
A framework of the literature covered in this research is outlined below and their 
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2.1: Introducing Reforms  
 
This section looks at a brief history of corporate governance reforms, institutional theory 
and politicisation and reforms in institutions. 
2.1.1 Economic Sociology View of this Research 
 
The approach of this research is based on the economic sociology view of the world. This 
research follows in the footsteps of Strachan’s monograph on family-owned business 
groups in Nicaragua (1976), Sales’ study of the merchant class or industrial bourgeoisie of 
Quebec (1979), Hutchcroft’s research on the Philippine banking sector (1998) and Kang’s 
comparative study on corruption and development between South Korea and the 
Philippines (2002). 
The main focus of this particular research is on the impact of corporate governance 
reforms on private sector firms and government and regulatory institutions.  Both 
institutional (regulatory) and organisational (private sector) views of corporate 
governance reforms are taken into consideration in this research. 
As defined by Granovetter and Swedberg, this research assumes that economic action is 
a form of social action, that economic action is socially situated and that economic 
institutions are social instructions inhabited and directed by humans (1992:6 as cited by 
Morris & Manning 2005: 132). The field of this research is concerned at looking at the 
phenomenon of corporate governance reforms as it affects individuals, groups and 
institutions and the impact on their norms and values. 
2.1.2 Defining Corporate Governance 
 
In this research, the simplest definition of corporate governances comes from the 1992 
Cadbury Committee into UK Corporate Governance which influenced corporate 
governance guidelines and principles worldwide: 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.” (Cadbury 1992) 
An expanded definition of corporate governance comes from the Chair of the 
Committee, Sir Adrian Cadbury: 




and social goals, and between individual and communal goals. The governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to 
require accountability for the stewardship of these resources. The aim is to align 
as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, of corporations and of 
society…Resources will flow to companies which inspire trust, through their 
approach to governance and through the integrity of those who manage 
them…The incentive for the adoption of [internationally accepted governance 
standards] by nation-states is that these standards will strengthen their 
economies and encourage business probity.” (Cadbury in Claessens 2003: vii) 
Therefore, corporate governance and its associated reforms are preoccupied with 
ensuring standards of behaviour of companies meet the expectations of society.  
2.1.3 Current Preoccupation with Corporate Governance 
 
The earliest notion of corporate governance can be found in the transnational and 
contractual relationships formed by the first multinational company, the Dutch East 
Indies Company (Frentrop 2003) while the foundation for the modern corporate 
governance movement was bolstered by the publication of Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means’ landmark book, Modern Corporation and Private which was a treatise on the 
impact of the separation of ownership and management control of the corporation.  
Renewed interest in corporate governance and responsibilities of corporations began 
during the 1980s in the wake of the privatisation of government utilities, financial 
liberalisation, deregulation (Clarke & Pitelis 1993; Loredo & Suarez 2000) and corporate 
crises (Cadbury Report 1992). UK Thatcherite policies saw the transformation of 
ownership of formerly-owned government utilities , - once considered public goods – 
transferred to private owners. Concerns about the accountability, or lack thereof, in 
these former state-owned firms established an ongoing interest in their corporate 
governance framework. Subsequent corporate scandals in the UK saw the formation of 
the Cadbury Committee which produced the highly influential and template for 
corporate governance reform: the Cadbury Report. 
Interest in corporate governance intensified in the wake of the East Asian crisis and the 
corporate scandals that engulfed the USA in 2001-2003 and Europe in 2001. The next 




highlighted the need and the paved the way for introducing and instituting good 
corporate governance to countries. 
2.1.3.1 East Asian Crisis 
For most of the 1990s, the East Asian growth was applauded by many commentators as a 
template for development (Amsden 1989, Gereffi & Wyman 1992, Kim, Y.C. 1995, Rohwer 
1996). Foreign investment grew in the form of capital flows. Between 1965 and 1991, the 
annual growth rate of East Asia was 6.5%. In comparison the annual rate of other 
developing regions were 2% for South Asia, 1.8% for Latin America and 0.2% for Africa. 
The region’s spectacular growth was described as a ‘miracle’ by the World Bank in an 
infamous 1993 report, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. The 
region was seen as the emerging third economic power in the world after the USA and 
Europe. 
In 1994, Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize winning economist and a New York Times 
columnist, wrote The Myth of Asia’s Miracle, published in Foreign Affairs magazine.2
The trigger of the East Asian was the currency devaluation of the Thai baht. As an Asian 
tiger, Thailand attracted foreign investment mostly to its manufacturing sector. The 
economy grew, and with it, a bubble ensued in the property and stock markets. 
Borrowings made in US dollars funded these markets. When the baht was devaluated; 
this triggered a meltdown in these two overheated and speculative markets. Currency 
speculators, the bane of any free market economy in crisis
 The 
article was a mix of political and strategic issues and while it dwelt on the rise of China, 
Krugman’s paper was one of the first to question the foundations of the East Asian 
miracle.  
3
Currency speculators moved on to the next Asian tiger and so the domino effect 
happened. In a matter of months, the economies of South Korea, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore experienced this onslaught to varying degrees. The 
, moved in and further 
devalued the baht (BBC 2002). With a floating currency, the Thai government let the 
currency fall further and investor confidence in the country was all but shattered. 
                                                     
2 A publication aimed at people in international banking and diplomacy circles. 
3 Infamously, the financier and currency speculator, George Soros made a near-billion pound bet 
on the devaluation of the British pound which sparked Britain’s own crisis and led to the fall of 




speculators hovered around the region as would a pack of wolves around an injured prey 
(Niederhoffer 1998). The crisis was a rude awakening for the region. 
Debt exponentially grew as the currencies weakened against the US dollar. Hailed as the 
next Japan and then the world’s 11th largest economy, South Korea was expected to 
weather this but was one of the countries most severely affected (Clifford 1997). The 
Philippine economy, on the other hand, lagged behind its immediate neighbours. In a 
region of tigers, the Philippines was East Asia’s “stray cat” (Vos & Yap 1996). The country 
felt the flow-on effects of the rising tide of investor confidence in the early 1990s 
(Estanislao 1997) but did not feel the loss as keenly as other countries when the investor 
tide receded.  
As an immediate measure, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was charged with 
saving countries that faced bankruptcy, poured money into the region and bailed out 
Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia (IMF 1998, 1999). The last, Indonesia, was the 
country hit the hardest and the ensuing political upheaval ended the two decade long 
dictatorship of its president, Haji Mohammad Soeharto (Forrester & May 1998). 
Post-crisis analyses are varied and many, ranging from the effects on the business 
environment (Backman 1999, Sheridan 1999), impact on global capitalism (Soros 1998), 
failure of international financial institutions (Stiglitz 2002), banking and financial 
systems (Cohen 1997, Delhaise 1998), regional implications (Lingle 1997, Gough 1998, 
Henderson 1998, McLeod & Garnaut 1998, Stiglitz & Yusuf 2001), and finally to post-crisis 
recovery (DFAT 1999, Segal & Goodman 2000). 
On the firm level, the crisis “uncovered a vast number of inadequate corporate 
governance mechanisms, ranging from insufficient disclosure and transparency, poor 
supervision by the board, and weak regulatory and legal entities” while on the 
institutional level, “monopolistic market structures, overexposure to foreign exchange 
risks and over-leveraged domestic financial markets” (Arsalidou & Wang 2005: 330). 
Weak legal institutions exacerbated the East Asian crisis. The countries worst affected by 
the crisis had inefficient judicial systems, weak or non-existent corporate governance 




2.1.3.2 Enron and US Corporate Crisis of 2001-02 
The poor corporate governance practices exposed in US corporations in late 2001 led to a 
national crisis of investor confidence (Clarke 2004a), an international crisis of confidence 
in corporations (Child 2002) and a philosophical crisis in market-based capitalism 
(Clarke 2004b). Confidence in corporate America imploded in a wave of false accounting 
(Enron and WorldCom), corporate looting (Adelphia, Tyco and WorldCom), fraud 
(Arthur Andersen), and inflated reports of stock performance (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch 
and Salomon Smith Barney). The US crisis  of the early 2000s showed poor corporate 
governance practices were not an exclusive affliction of developing countries. The 
seismic effects of Enron and WorldCom’s spectacular collapses questioned, amongst 
many other things, the reliability of America’s corporate governance system and then-
existing corporate and securities laws (Branson 2003). Such poor practices presented a 
“negative externality on the economy as a whole for any country.” (Claessens 2003: 20).  
The US reaction to these practices resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)4
Nevertheless, the SOX Act has broadly impacted the corporate governance and 
disclosure practices of other countries. The international reaction to SOX was received 
with heightened awareness of the deficiencies in a country’s corporate governance 
regime, but also of consternation and problems due to SOX’s international influence and 
 
which emphasised prescriptive methods to encourage good corporate governance. 
However, the administrative issues, resulting paperwork and financial costs of 
compliance with the Act have made this law unpopular and forced some companies to 
treat corporate governance as compliance especially with the requirements of internal 
control disclosure (Branson 2006, Bainbridge 2006, Coates 2007, Romano 2005). This 
legislation also did not prevent the systemic collapse of the investment banking industry 
in the USA in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which exposed the fundamental 
deficiency of corporate legislation – that they are retrospective, reactive to failures, and 
do not prevent the events of greed and hubris that followed corporate America in 2008-
2009. The main corporate collapses of Enron and WorldCom exposed the vulnerabilities 
of the internal risk processes of companies which SOX sought to address. In light of the 
GFC, the ambivalence towards SOX has been heightened and the question remains 
whether any future legislative measure can ever prevent further financial crises. 
                                                     





reach. SOX directly affected foreign companies listed on the American stock exchanges 
and this brought some of them in direct conflict with their home-country’s own 
company laws (UNCTAD 2003: 8-10). Nevertheless SOX has influenced many countries 
to rethink or establish their own corporate governance legislation.  
2.1.3.3 Europe’s Parmalat: The Collapse of a Family Business 
Across the Atlantic, Europe’s own Enron (Hooper & Milner 2003), the dairy corporation 
Parmalat of Italy, exposed the conflicts of interest that exist in a family-owned company 
in a globalised financial world: 
“…former ‘family dictatorships’ have been forced to rely upon external capital 
(such as establishing long-term credit relations with a bank or by partially going 
public). In the case of family firms, the introduction of governance often means a 
radical transformation of traditional management practice...[resulting] in 
increased transparency…in accounting, reporting, and control procedures, as well 
as the disclosure of other, previously hidden kinds of information....[T]his has 
resulted in families becoming more and more compelled to share their control 
with other agents, such as institutional investors, financial institutions, and also 
minority stockholders, who can exert much more influence over leadership 
succession strategies than in the past.”(Colli 2003: 69-70) 
In a different environment Parmalat’s nepotism and opacity could have been adroitly 
resolved. However, the corporation’s financial problems came on the heels of the 
corporate governance problems of Enron (2001) and the Dutch retailer, Ahold (2003). 
The financial markets were less forgiving when it was revealed that members of the 
Tanzi family, the founding family and owners of Parmalat, had been heavily involved in 
an elaborate €8B debt of a Chinese box which had the complicit agreement of the 
company’s banks. Parmalat is a watershed for Italian business culture and for publicly 
listed family-run conglomerates (Della Sala 2004; DiStaso 2004, Melis 2005). 
Also contributing to the crisis in European corporate governance were the practices of 
Dutch company Ahold with its accounting irregularities after bad acquisitions (De Jong 
et al 2005) and French Vivendi and the failure of its former emperor CEO Jean-Marie 





The crises in the US and Europe showed how “the behaviour of the corporate sector 
affected entire economies” (Claessens 2003:1) while the financial crisis of East Asia and 
elsewhere “the deficiencies in corporate governance endangered the stability of the 
global financial system.” (Claessens 2003: 2).  
2.1.3.4 Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009 
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009 was the most severe financial crisis since 
the Great Depression (Stiglitz 2010). In a way the three crises prior to this one were 
forerunners for the systemic failure that originated in the banking industry (Ward 2010). 
However, the outcomes from the regulation and reform from these three crises also did 
not prevent the GFC from happening. This shows the short-term memory and the 
imperfect nature of capital markets (Stiglitz 2010). The most immediate impact of the 
GFC is the shift in the balance of economic power from the USA where the crisis 
originated, to China, where its impact was minimal. (Stiglitz 2010) Similarly, 
governments intervened to nationalise and save some of their financial institutions thus 
re-introducing state-ownership to some sectors thus reversing decades of privatisation. 
Co-operation amongst the G-20 countries provided leadership out of the crisis and 
prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. However it is unclear whether the waves of 
post-crisis regulation can prevent another crisis on this scale (Johnson & Kwak 2010). The 
tension between the regulators (who want more regulation) and the regulated (who 
want less) mean piecemeal reforms will be the compromised result with the reluctant 
acceptance of the reality of the boom-bust cycle of global capitalism, and the realisation 
of whether avarice can ever be truly regulated. 
2.1.4 Cycles of Crisis and Reform 
 
This seeming cycle of crisis and reform was expounded theoretically by Clarke (2004b) 
that in the wake of crises, reforms and regulations comes into place – more in the hope 
that regulations would prevent the onset of another crisis. The following lengthy extract 
shows the essence of the corporate governance reform cycle: 
“Corporate governance crisis and reform is essentially cyclical. Waves of 
corporate governance reform and increased regulation occur during periods of 
recession, corporate collapse and re-examination of the viability of regulatory 
systems. During long periods of expansion, active interest in the conformance 




more concerned with the generation of wealth, rather than in ensuring 
governance mechanisms are working appropriately for the retention of wealth, 
and its use for agreed purposes. This cyclical historical saga revolves around the 
enduring agency and stewardship dilemmas of governance. Complacency 
concerning corporate governance during confident times compounds ensuing 
crises. Such dilemmas are universal in market systems, though internationally 
with different systems of corporate governance the unwinding of this saga has 
occurred at different times, for different reasons, and with different 
consequences…The reason corporate governance standards and reforms will 
increase in future as a matter of public concern is that more of the public will 
have more of their wealth invested in companies they will insist should behave 
responsibly. The volatility of markets is part of the cycle of risk and return, and 
the significance of corporate governance is to mitigate the most damaging 
outcomes whilst encouraging the most positive.” (Clarke 2004: 153, 160-161) 
The following perspective from UNCTAD notes the short-term memory of financial 
markets to remember the lessons from past mistakes: 
“Recent corporate failures have served as the impetus for efforts to improve 
governance practices. They have demonstrated that no country, regardless of its 
size and market tradition, is immune from governance problems. However, there 
is the risk that once the current market and economic malaise wears off, the 
importance of governance will be forgotten, or if it is not forgotten, that 
governance projects will be slowed or put on hold until the next crisis forces a re-
examination.” -UNCTAD (2003: 7) 
Unfortunately, the waves of crisis and regulation show the short-term memory of 
markets and the cyclical nature of global capitalism. 
2.1.5 Corporate Governance Models around the World 
 
Corporate governance systems around the world reflect the different structures of 
ownership in a country or region (Clarke & dela Rama 2006). The path-dependency 
theory of corporate governance describes how the legal and institutional foundations of 
the home country are fundamental: “companies do not exist in isolation but are 




summaries of the main features of the following corporate governance models around 
the world: Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-American, Germanic/Continental, Japanese, Latin and 
East Asian. 
2.1.5.1 Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American 
The Anglo Saxon or Anglo American corporate governance model is defined by the 
‘outsider model’ of widely dispersed shareholdings (Berle & Means 1933, Clarke 2004a, 
Ireland 2005). This model emphasises the separation of ownership and control of the 
firm. Managers are directly in control while owners (the shareholders) exercise control 
indirectly. Owners have little or no day-to-day control of the firm. The rise of executive 
or managerial compensation over the past 20 years is an issue. (Clarke 2007) In this 
model, the stock market reigns supreme. Boards are unitary with only a management 
board. Most boards have outside directors. In general, this model protects minority 
shareholders and emphasises shareholder value as the goal of the corporation with a 
short-term focus on wealth building (Clarke & dela Rama 2008). Countries that are 
categorised by this model are the USA and the UK. The former colonies of the UK such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa also fall under this model. 
2.1.5.2 Germanic 
In the Germanic model, there are usually two boards in a corporation – a supervisory 
board and a management board. The supervisory board is a stakeholder board with 
members from employee groups such as unions. It is an ‘insider’ model with banks 
playing an influential role (Rhodes & Van Apeldoorn 1998). Control is unidirectional. The 
stock market is less developed than the Anglo American model. This model has a long-
term focus on wealth building. Countries falling under the sphere of the Germanic model 
include are Germany, Austria and Switzerland. (Clarke & Chanlat 2009, Fliaster & Marr 
2006) 
2.1.5.3 Japanese 
The Japanese model is defined by an insider system of several companies being linked 
together and owning each other. Known as the keiretsu system, banks and institutions 
play an important ownership and strategic role in this model (Fliaster & Marr 2006). 
Boards are unitary and are dominated by managers, not directors. Minority shareholders 
receive little protection. This model emphasises stakeholder value and has a long-term 





In the Latin model, ownership is highly concentrated. Banks play an important role in 
the management of the firm (Rhodes & Van Apeldoorn 1998). Stock exchanges are 
relatively undeveloped. Minority shareholders are less protected and family firms 
dominate through holding companies. Countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Brazil belong to this model. (Clarke & Chanlat 2009) 
2.1.5.5 East Asian  
The East Asian model is characterised by family control and high ownership 
concentration (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000). Control and ownership is not 
separated. Most large firms are family-owned, and are usually not listed or partially listed 
on the stock exchange. Stock exchanges are relatively new and underdeveloped. Control 
is through pyramid structures and cross-holdings. There is a long-term focus on wealth-
building. In comparison to other models, firm and financial information is less publicly 
available. A small number of families control the economy and government officials 
directly participate in the control of the sector, suggesting the existence of crony 
capitalism. Countries belonging to this model include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. The Philippines definitively falls under this model. 
2.1.6 Corporate Governance Reforms: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
This section reviews the most influential principles of corporate governance and their 
impact. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a 
multilateral body representing the interests of its members: the developed countries of 
the world. A Business Sector Advisory Group in the OECD was set up in 1996, charged 
with setting up “minimum standards on corporate governance which should be followed 
by OECD countries.” (Dignam & Galanis 1999) Group members included corporate 
governance luminaries from the Anglo-sphere such as the UK’s Sir Adrian Cadbury and 
US lawyer-academic Ira Millstein. The members of this Group were “champions of the 
business lobby and charged with formulating behavioural norms for business in the 
international sphere.”5
                                                     
5 The sentence continues: “No consideration is given to the public in their deliberations and the 
view of the corporation as a private actor with limited responsibility to the societies in which they 
operate dominates the recommendations of the Advisory group.”  




By 1998, they were ready to deliver their standards. Coincidentally, the East Asian crisis 
was unravelling and so their deliberation gained importance as “the massive exit of 
global capital from the East Asian economies was a vote against corporate and financial 
malpractices in that region…[and] the Asian crisis may increase awareness of the dangers 
of an increased global economy and thus give initiatives designed to promote higher 
standards in that global economy more significance.” (Dignam & Galanis 1999: 396) 
In 1999, the first issue of the Principles of Corporate Governance were published. A 
revised version appeared in 2004 to reflect more fully the changes that have occurred in 
the corporate governance landscape especially after the corporate crisis in America 
(OECD 1999, 2004). 
These principles are the most influential standards of corporate governance and are 
based on the following six core notions: 
1. Effective institutional and legal framework to support corporate governance 
2. Corporate governance framework that protects and facilitates rights of 
shareholders 
3. Equal treatment of all shareholders including minority and foreign investors 
4. Importance of the role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
5. Importance of timely, accurate and transparent disclosure mechanisms 
6. Board structures, their responsibilities and procedures.6
The principles reflect “a global consensus regarding the critical importance of good 
corporate governance in contributing to the vitality and stability of our economies.” 
(Jesover & Kirkpatrick 2005: 127) 
 
Fairness, transparency, accountability, disclosure and responsibility are the measures by 
which governance practice can be assessed. The initial set of principles was designed to 
be relevant for any organised entity be it private, public, state-owned or subject to other 
different forms of control and ownership. The principles also provide a benchmark for 
monitoring of corporations’ behaviour and resultant improvement and development by 
interested parties such as investors and regulators (Jesover & Kirkpatrick 2005: 172, Iu & 
Batten 2001: 48) 
                                                     




While there are UN promulgations on behaviour of corporations such as the 1974 UN 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States7 and 2003 UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights8
In developed countries, most corporate governance principles are issued by stock 
exchanges and/or regulators closely following the elements outlined in the OECD 
document. The following extract from Australia’s corporate regulator, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) shows how the OECD Principles are seen 
as best-practice: 
 that codify corporate responsibility, they are not binding and 
do not have monitoring mechanisms in place (Pryles et al 2004: 126). In the absence of an 
enforceable corporations’ law that can be applied to any business entity worldwide, the 
OECD principles act as ‘soft law’ and are the default normative framework (Abbott & 
Snidal 2000, Branson 1999) The principles’ influence can be seen in the reformulation of 
a country’s corporate governance principles and unabashed reference on how the 
renewed principles adhere to, or are patterned after, the OECD principles. 
“[The principles] have been widely adopted as a benchmark for achieving good 
corporate governance in OECD countries and elsewhere. The Principles are 
intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments, such as Australia, in their 
efforts to evaluate and improve the regulatory framework for corporate 
governance, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, 
investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of 
developing good corporate governance.” (ASIC 2009)9
In developed countries, the principles act as “an aide memoire that emphasises and 
reinforces best practice”, while in developing countries, “the principles can act as a 
 
                                                     
7 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenElement accessed 14 
April 2010 
8 http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En 
accessed 14 April 2010; The major difference between the 1974 and the 2003 statement is the 
latter’s specificity in stating the obligations of the humans responsible for a corporation: the 
managers, the members of corporate boards, directors, executives and employees. The 1974 
Charter set the fields or boundaries of corporate behaviour (especially that of multinationals) in 
countries and their interference in a country’s affairs, while the 2003 Norms have placed 
accountability at the feet of the principals of the corporation. 
9 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byid/B285C74C43B87CBBCA256FDC00818039?opendocu




blueprint for the establishment of a modern, outward-looking confident economy.” (Reid 
2003: 237) The principles have been used extensively by the World Bank as a framework 
for policy dialogue to promote regional corporate governance reforms and roundtables 
in Asia, Latin America, Eurasia, South East Europe and Russia – that is non-OECD 
member countries.10
Thus, the OECD Principles have been promoted with powerful institutional backing to 
countries around the world regardless of their economic situation, cultural and/or legal 
system. 
 For example, an annual Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
has been held since 1999 of which the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is co-sponsor. 
The mandate behind the promotion of these principles to non-member OECD countries 
came from the G-7 with hopes that the roundtable would “improv[e] corporate 
governance in non-OECD member countries of the Asian region” while the participation 
of most Asian countries “confirm the adaptability of the [OECD] principles as a reference 
in varying legal, economic and cultural contexts.” (Jesover & Kirkpatrick 2005: 128). 
2.1.6.1 Criticisms of the Principles 
One of the earliest scholarly reflections on the principles was Dignam and Galanis’ 1999 
article, entitled Governing the World: The Development of the OECD’s Corporate 
Governance Principles. According to the authors, there were two main motivations for 
the principles: preoccupation amongst developed nation-states about establishing a 
minimum set of corporate governance for their private sector, and concerns about the 
responsibilities of multinational corporations in overseas markets (1999: 396). 
Thus, the principles provide a common set of standards for corporate behaviour that 
could be legitimised and applied to a company regardless of where they operated. The 
principles well-articulated the responsibilities of the board, however in other areas of 
societal interests such as employment relations, the principles did not “consider such 
issues in greater depth and to propose any possible solutions seem to suggest that 
employment insecurity is an irreversible condition and part of the acceptable costs of 
globalisation.” (Dignam & Galanis 1999). 
Present criticisms of the principles are based on the following issues evoking the 
unintended consequences of ‘standardisation’ or harmonising towards externally 
                                                     






1. The principles represent convergence towards the Anglo-American way of 
corporate governance and may be used as a tool to promote this way of reform 
regardless of its applicability or relevance. (Dignam & Galanis 1999, Iu & Batten 
2001)  
2. The Anglo-American way of corporate governance is culturally difficult to apply 
in countries which do not have the same legal tradition or economic situation 
and overlooks cultural nuances and present legal system of a country especially 
those not falling into ‘common law’ or Anglo-American legal sphere of influence 
(Branson 2001). 
3. The principles alter countries’ corporate governance systems to attract and suit 
foreign investors (Arsalidou & Wang 2005) 
 
As a general corporate governance guide, the OECD Principles are seen as a way of 
linking investor confidence with good corporate governance. Good corporate governance 
practices bring in investors and adherence to the OECD Principles are a way to ensure 
such acceptable practices are maintained. The East Asian crisis exposed the defects of 
the corporate governance practices in the countries affected. The high growth rates 
achieved by the East Asian countries in a relatively short period of time exposed the 
institutional weaknesses of the countries - the institutions of the countries had not 
caught up with the needs of foreign investors. In Western countries, the development of 
corporate governance institutions occurred over a long period of time, and indeed most 
developed countries have not adopted such institutions. In most East Asian countries, 
corporate governance institutions are new, and in some cases, unformed (Grindle 2004, 
Chang 2005). Whereas crises in corporate America showed systemic problems within 
industries and regulatory oversight was insufficient due to regulatory capture, in East 
Asia, the 1997 crisis showed the regulatory institutions were wholly ineffective and were 
bypassed or didn’t have the capability or resources to deal with the initial outflow of 
liquidity and its macroeconomic effects. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis provides evidence on how the above criticisms were present in 




2.1.7 Convergence Theory and Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The OECD Principles provide a useful example on how the theory of convergence works 
and the macroeconomic implications of their imposition within the varieties of 
capitalism debate.  
Convergence is “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in 
structures, processes and performances” (Kerr 1983: 3) through the application of 
imitative policies and development of economic systems. The OECD Principles are, 
arguably, an example of policy convergence i.e. moving towards formulating similar 
policies, in this case, in corporate governance. A more formidable example of policy 
convergence is the administrative consequences in the formation and consolidation of 
the European Union (EU) which led Unger to wonder whether policy convergence meant 
the end of policies (Unger 1997: 107). In countries where institutions have a long history 
and/or significant cultural value, policy changes are strongly resisted. Unger asks 
whether countries which do not adopt policies lose out in “international competition” as 
their performance cannot be measured by a particular standard. (1997: 107-108) 
The wider implications of a set of policies across the globe is system convergence where 
there “is the growing together of whole societies from initial points of extreme, if not 
polar, difference: the developed and developing, the industrialised and industrialising, 
the democratic and totalitarian, the capitalist and socialist” (Unger 1997: 101). Arguably, 
the failure of the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference11
System convergence is linked to the varieties of capitalism debate. The varieties debate 
takes into account that the “key building blocks for the global economy are countries 
and firms.” (Gereffi 2005: 160). In this thesis both institutional and organisational 
perspectives of corporate governance reforms are studied. 
 where government leaders from 
nearly all nation-states on the planet met in Copenhagen, Denmark to come up with a 
commonly accepted climate agreement was one example of moves towards system 
convergence. 
After the downfall of communism, Michel Albert, a former French insurance executive, 
wrote in his insightful book, Capitalism Against Capitalism, that Western society, in 
                                                     
11 UN Climate Change Conference, 7-19 December 2009 




general, was entering the third age of capitalism. The first age dealt with capitalism 
against the state (Albert identifies this with the French revolution and overthrow of the 
monarch in 1791), the second age was capitalism disciplined by the state (a century later 
in 1891with the industrial revolution in full swing in Western Europe and the USA), the 
third age was a time of competing capitalisms (1991) where the form of capitalism with 
“jungles of dog-eat-dog competition and naked greed” have triumphed and consequently 
being imposed as fit and acceptable to industrialised nations (Albert 1993: 256). 
Albert relayed the idea that countries with market economies faced the choice of two 
different types of capitalism: the Reagan-Thatcherite or Anglo-American model, and the 
non-Anglo model, here, the Rhenish or Franco-German model of capitalism. The latter 
model is also known as the relationship-based or network-oriented system (Moerland 
1995; De Jong 1997). Latin-based countries, Japan, and mainly East Asian countries that 
followed the Japanese model, have tended to share some characteristics with this latter 
form (Gilson & Roe 1993, De Jong 1997, Barca et al. 1999, Li 2003). China’s form of 
economic development has been largely state-led whilst co-opting market mechanisms. 
The following figure summaries the varieties of capitalism debate as largely being 
dichotomous by either choosing the market-led (Anglo-American) or non-market led 
(non-Anglo-American) model of development: 
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The debate over which form of capitalism will triumph resonates in the arguments for 
(Useem 1998, Hansmann & Kraakman 2001, Coffee 2002), and against (Moerland 1995, 
Branson 2001, Engelen 2002 and Rhodes & Van Apeldoorn 1998) convergence of 
corporate governance towards the Anglo-American model. In corporate governance 
practice, the rise of a shareholder value culture in countries previously undisturbed by it 
have been documented by Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) and Engelen (2002). The rise of 
this culture has also seen the erosion of traditional management-labour employment 
practices (in Japan see Takeshi 2001, in Germany see Beyer & Hassel 2002 and Lane 2006) 
and the emphasis on excessive executive pay (Clarke & Chanlat 2009). These are seen as 
troublesome trends towards Anglo-American corporate governance.  
For developing countries the implications of convergence theory go back the old adage 
of “who pays the piper calls the tune”. The OECD is a body set up by developed countries 
to represent and protect their interests. The widespread embrace of the OECD Principles 
by the development banks who are major funders of a developing country’s program 
shows that convergence is happening on the policy level, though culturally and socially 
resisted on the ground. Countries most closely identifying with the Anglo-American 
model of capitalism have adapted relatively pain-free to the OECD Principles. For 
countries who do not, such as the Philippines, their adoption of the Principles have been 
challenging. (see Result Chapters 4-8) 
2.1.7.1 Cross-Listings as a Sign of Convergence? 
An issue central to the corporate governance convergence debate is the effect of cross-
country multiple listings as standardising a singular, compliance-based form of corporate 
governance. Cross-listing describes the decision by a company to list in an overseas stock 
exchange so that it can access more capital than is accessible in its home country. 
Requirements of stock exchanges mean listed companies have to comply with the 
corporate governance standards of that particular stock exchange which directly affects 
the corporate governance structure of the listed company. 
The impact of cross-listings on German companies was studied by Beyer & Hassel and 
they found companies were conforming “to Anglo-American corporate finance practices” 
(2002:312). An example of such a company is Daimler-Benz which listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1993. After its takeover of Chrysler in 1998, the resultant transatlantic 




complying with US securities laws, accounting and auditing standards, and other 
corporate governance hard and soft laws. In addition, the US listing served as a 
“credibility-enhancing mechanism” for Daimler (Coffee Jr 2002: 1793-94).  
Davis & Marquis argue that compliance with stock exchange listing requirements is part 
of the cost for firms wishing to unlock the financial potential of their company in a 
market that appreciated their firm value. Therefore, any foreign company wishing to list 
on an American exchange are intentionally, willingly and tacitly change their corporate 
governance practices to suit the American financial and legal environment. The same 
applies in other exchanges, such as the listing by some New Zealand companies12
Davis & Marquis’ study also cautions international financial institutions (IFIs) who 
engage in the transplantation of corporate governance practices but do not consider the 
institutional resistance to this imposition: 
 on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in order to access a greater capital base than could be 
obtained by a sole listing in its home country. Thus, corporate governance convergence 
through cross-listings is also closely linked with the globalisation of stock markets. 
However, aside from standardising some financial elements in order to achieve the 
principal financial motivation, the Davis & Marquis study found most foreign companies 
listing on NYSE were not so willing to change their corporate governance practices. The 
structure of foreign firms was more likely to reflect the balance of power in their home 
countries and therefore “likely to be highly institutionalised and resistant to substantial 
change” (2005: 385). Thus, foreign firms attract higher prices than at home but remain 
unsullied by American corporate culture (2005: 384, 386). 
“With the right nudge from the IMF or other international advisors, nations 
might install American-style shareholder capitalism, with a realignment of other 
national institutions to follow. Yet if foreign firms that voluntarily list on the New 
York Stock Exchange continue to be imprinted by their home institutions, we 
have little reason to expect that those institutions themselves will easily shift 
directions.” (2005 386) 
Therefore, the case against convergence in corporate governance is stronger despite the 
proliferation of cross-listings (Davis & Marquis 2005). The Davis and Marquis study 
                                                     




echoes the results of Guillen’s (2004) survey of corporate governance convergence across 
countries.  
In Guillen’s study, the clearest indicator that corporate governance models were not 
converging is with the factor of a market (or lack thereof) for corporate control. While 
“the shareholder-centred model has historically been more susceptible to hostile 
takeover activity…[this] remains stagnant at relatively low levels [in developed countries 
while the] rest of the world remains largely unaffected by hostile takeovers” (2004: 235). 
According to Guillen the main cases against convergence are principally legal, 
institutional and political. These three factors alone “provide enough reason to cast 
serious doubt on the idea that there is convergence in corporate governance, whether on 
the shareholder-centred model or a hybrid” (2004: 239).  
For companies in the Philippines that have listed on a foreign exchange such as NYSE, 
the stricter disclosure regime of the NYSE than the PSE has improved their processes but 
fundamentally, the ownership structure remains the same. The case of PLDT and the 
effect listing on the NYSE has had on the company’s corporate governance practices are 
mentioned in Chapter 6. 
Convergence theory and the varieties of capitalism debate provide useful perspectives on 
how elements of corporate governance are symptomatic of the top-down, policy-level 
harmonisation of global financialisation. 
2.1.8 Institutional Theory 
 
“Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel 
themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of 
contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not 
supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all 
those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom 
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the 
justice of government.” -Adam Smith (1776) Wealth of Nations 
Institutions are the outcome of human organising and interaction. They are normally 
indigenous structures that are the result of social, economic, historical, judicial, political 




organisations to have order in a society, have more efficient economic activity and also 
reduce transaction costs and production. Institutions are made up of both “informal 
constraints” and “formal rules” and are a reflection of socio-economic motives: 
“Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, 
it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline.” 
(North 1991: 1) 
In organisation studies, institutions are studied in a population of firms or organisations. 
Institutional theory looks at the raison d’être of an institution’s existence and that they 
are essentially social constructs by fallible humans: 
“Institutional theory reminds us that interests are institutionally defined and 
shaped. Institutional frameworks define the ends and shape the means by which 
interests are determined and pursued.” (Scott 1987:508) 
Institutional theory also looks at the influence these institutions have on individuals or 
actors within, their influence on society beyond economic measures, and the reasons for 
their enduring persistence: 
“Institutions, whether conceived as groups or practices, may be partly 
engineered, but they have a ‘natural’ dimension. They are products of interaction 
and adaptation; they become the receptacles of group idealism; they are less 
readily expendable.” (Selznick 1957: 21-22) 
Some forty years later, Selznick reinforced the difference between the conception of the 
institution as an economic entity, and the institution as a social entity – the latter 
perspective providing the social relevance of the institutional theory: 
“An institutional theory of the firm is a voice of resistance to this culture of short-
sightedness, offers guides to thinking about corporate responsibility, and brings 
into question the goal of maximising profits or returns on capital. In this way, 
institutional theory speaks to issues of social concern and does so without 
accepting conventional models of organisation or the unreflective premises of 
management.” (Selznick 1999: 272) 
Factors placing pressure on an institution’s norms or practices come from three main 




organisational performance and practice of the institutions. Political pressures come 
about from the redistribution of power such as a change in government. Social pressures 
aim to alter current institutional practices to meet the public’s expectations such as 
increased environmental awareness. (Dacin et al 2002). Legitimacy is also an important 
perspective on the credibility of institutions (Eisenhardt 1988: 492, Greening & Gray 
1994: 470).  
Accordingly, boundaries of institutions are set by “admixtures of regulative and 
governance arrangements; cultural-cognitive conceptions of identity and a sense of 
"being in the same boat"; normative and ethical frameworks that provide common rules 
and standards; and interdependencies borne of technical connections or dependence on 
similar types of material resources.” (Dacin et al 2002: 51) 
This can be seen on the supra-national level in the influence of international 
organisations such as the UN on governments; on the national level, the influence of 
governments or the executive on their ministries or private sector institutions. 
Institutions can shape the structure of organisations within their circle through 
isomorphism. In DiMaggio and Powell’s 1983 paper, The Iron Cage Revisited13
There are three mechanisms through which this change occurs: 
 they 
defined a field of institutional theory where structures of institutions are shaped by 
isomorphism – a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. Their theory of 
institutional isomorphism helps “explain the observations that organisations are 
becoming more homogenous, and that elites often get their way, while at the same time 
enabling us to understand the irrationality, the frustration of power, and the lack of 
innovation that are so commonplace.” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 95) 
1. coercive isomorphism stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy (such as a government replacing a democratically elected one through 
force) 
                                                     
13 The iron cage refers to Max Weber’s nightmare of the bureaucracy: “the iron cage…through 
which economic labour receives its present form and destiny…a system which inescapably rules 





2. mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty (financial 
bubbles are an example of such mimicry, that is, “following the herd”) 
3. normative isomorphism, associated with professionalisation. (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983: 150) 
 
Institutional isomorphism allows us to understand “how organisations conform to 
standards established by external institutions” and why “large organisations are more 
likely to be targets of institutional actors (e.g. regulatory bodies), and are more likely to 
provide the models imitated by other organisations. (Greening & Gray 1994: 470, 490) 
In particular, Chapters 4 and 7 relate the impact of institutional isomorphism and its 
unintended consequences on organisations (and individuals) affected by corporate 
governance reforms. 
2.1.8.1 Building Corporate Governance Institutions 
While corporate governance institutions in Western countries are well-developed and 
entrenched (Roe 2008), the defects of East Asian regulatory institutions in light of the 
1997 crisis provoked major capacity building efforts by multilateral development banks 
to address institutional weaknesses in developing countries. As Lazonick aptly put it: 
“History shows, that the driving force of successful capitalist development is not 
the perfection of the market mechanism but the building of organisational 
capacities.” (1991: 8) 
Similarly, the importance of the institutions of the law and regulation in studies of 
societies was also expounded by Edelman & Stryker (2005). Laws and enforcement 
thereof provide institutional legitimacy to the state but also certainty to society. Laws, 
regulations, government policies and official edicts oil the wheels of commerce by 
providing boundaries in the field. The absence of these tools is an obstacle to a well-
functioning society as social norms are poor substitutes for legitimate social actions. 
Supporting the importance of the law in economic development also comes from La 
Porta et al’s 1998 study on Law and Finance which tracked the historical evolution of 
legal development across different jurisdictions.  
On September 11 2001, the same date that prominent institutions in the USA were 




launched entitled, Building Institutions for Markets (World Bank 2001).This report is a 
treatise on the importance of building institutions in developing markets divided into 
three parts, each focusing on the sectors of the economy with institutions: firms, 
government and society. 
Building institutions for firms include institutions for farmers, corporate governance 
institutions and financial system development. Building institutions for government 
include political institutions, judicial reform efforts, promoting competition and 
regulating infrastructure. Building institutions for society include integrating informal 
and formal “norms and networks” institutions, and ensuring the independence of the 
media. The following table summarises the different issues for institutions in each sector: 
Table 2: Institutions for Building Markets (World Bank 2001) 
Firms Government Society 
 Secure and transferable 
rural land institutions; 
accessible rural financial 
institutions; institutions for 
agricultural technology and 
innovation 
 Corporate governance 
institutions, laws and 
formal intermediaries 
 Financial regulation for 
bank-based or market based 
financial systems, foreign 
investment, e-finance and 
financial services 
 Business associations, rating 
agencies and foreign 
financial institutions 
 Political institutions 
dealing with corruption 
and taxation 
 Judicial systems over 
efficiency and cost; 
Judicial reforms over 
corruption 




 Designing and 
Regulation of 
infrastructure to deliver 
services to the poor 







 Respect for the 
media’s 
independence, 
quality and reach 






The importance of corporate governance institutions for firms or the private sector was 
articulated in this report. The report defines what corporate governance institutions and 
why they are necessary for a country’s economy: 
“Corporate governance institutions are...the organisations and rules that affect 
expectations about the exercise of control of resources in firms. Well-functioning 
governance institutions allow entrepreneurs to invest resources and create value 




well as with the entrepreneur/manager. These institutions therefore determine 
the expected returns to committing resources in firms. Where governance 
institutions are weak, the emergence and growth of firms are discouraged. 
Governance institutions include traditional corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as the board of directors and corporate and bankruptcy laws; product 
market institutions such as regulators responsible for competition; labour market 
institutions; capital market institutions, such as financial intermediaries; and the 
judiciary.” (2001: 55) 
Corporate governance institutions encourage investment, enforce contracts, promote 
transparent and timely information, mitigate uncertainty and provide long-term 
benefits. Conversely, economic crises tend to intensify the weakness of a country’s 
corporate governance system: “weak governance in these firms has been associated with 
financial and economic crises, which can have severe consequences for poor people.” 
(2001: 73) 
A criticism of the institutional-building efforts of the World Bank is its perspective that 
institutions are created solely to protect property rights (Bardhan 2005, Sindzingre 
2005). Such “property rights reductionism” is problematic when “the relationship 
between property rights and economic development suffers from a number of 
conceptual, theoretical and empirical weaknesses.” (Chang 2005: 7). Chang argues 
property rights are “not something good in itself.” In practice, developing countries must 
choose which property rights to protect and under which conditions because it is 
impossible for them “to protect all existing property rights at all costs.”(2005: 11). While 
protection and recognition of property rights form the basis of Western law and 
commerce, property rights are more malleable especially in some developing countries 
where there is a high incidence of poverty and income inequality such as the Philippines. 
According to Chang, institutions serve and promote economic development through 
their administrative function, learning and innovation, and income redistribution and 
social cohesion (2005: 3). Chang’s last point on income redistribution recognises some 
cultures that favour social cohesion and harmony over that of individuals and protection 
of property rights at any cost. 
2.1.8.2 Institutions and Economic Development 




found in Lin and Nugent’s Institutions and Economic Development (2005). Lin and 
Nugent look at the reality and struggles of institutions in developing countries. More 
often than not, developing countries are politically unstable and institutions have to 
work around this instability. The text box below is my personal observation of an event 
that showed the importance of a working bureaucracy despite political turmoil. 
Text Box 1: A Foreign Investment Forum 
At a World Bank foreign investment roundtable, the head bureaucrats from India, 
Pakistan and six other South Asian nations were discussing ways to tackle the problems 
of corruption, rent-seeking, and politics that made bureaucracies inefficient, timely, 
costly and unresponsive to people’s needs. As the conference was held during a period 
where tensions between India and Pakistan were high, the Pakistani delegate addressed 
the roundtable: “We all face similar problems. We know what they are. We know there 
are also many political problems that prevent us from instituting reforms. Despite wars, 
health epidemics, here we are sitting and sharing our experiences. Our politicians may 
disagree with each other but we have a job to do and we are all members of this region. 
Other sectors of the society may not function well, but we have to ensure our sector 
does.” –personal observation 
 
Institutions influence the pace and level of economic development, while economic 
development can trigger institutional changes (Lin & Nugent 1995: 2303) Institutions in 
economic development are divided into two types: market and non-market. Market 
institutions deal directly with contracts, commodity and factor markets. Usually, they 
are government institutions such as courts, securities commission, stock exchanges, and 
economic ministries. Non-market institutions are the firms and communities. Both 
market and non-market institutions complement each other due to their 
interconnectedness and interdependency with each other. (Lin & Nugent 1995: 2312) 
Where there is underdevelopment, the most important institutions are “the family, the 
tribe and the kin group” (Lin & Nugent 1995: 2313). When rich countries undergo 
economic crises or economically regress, these familiar institutions are rediscovered 
because they are innate. In developing countries, strong family or kin ties are a safeguard 
for mutual survival, and insurance against hunger or starvation. (Lin & Nugent 1995: 
2317) 
In the absence of a strong welfare state, citizens rely on social welfare that may be 
provided by the company, but most importantly, by the family. This may explain why the 




Concurrently, when an individual achieves monopolistic political and economic power, 
the county’s institutions suffer in the pursuit of self-interest: 
“The weaker the linkage between the ruler’s wealth and the growth of national 
income, the more likely a myopic wealth-maximising ruler bestowed with 
absolute personal power (e.g. Marcos in the Philippines) might be tempted to 
eschew property rights in favour of maximum surplus extraction. Rulers may be 
especially inclined to predatory taxation and other conditions unfavourable to 
economic growth when threatened.” (Lin & Nugent 1995: 2337) 
Thus, institutional reforms in developing countries with absolute rulers are difficult to 
verify due to the power struggle that can exist between a president and the bureaucracy 
(Lin & Nugent 2005: 2338). Typically, the former usually prevails over the latter and a 
heavily politicised bureaucracy is the result. 
2.1.9 Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Similar to institutional theory, resource dependence theory also focuses on the external 
effects of political and institutional factors that impact the strategic practices of an 
organisation. Resource dependence theory deals with the “ecology of the organisation” 
and this perspective seeks to understand how these entities are managed and controlled 
as “[o]rganisations are inescapably bound up with the conditions of their environment.” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 1) 
The formation of business groups in the Philippine private sector as the best form of 
organising is best understood through the lens of the resource dependence perspective. 
The business group structure is a deliberate response to the external pressures of an 
organisation. The idea of organisational survival “to acquire and maintain resources” 
(1978: 2) has manifested itself with the conglomerate structure or group affiliation in 
order to withstand the political turmoil of the country and provide a bulwark against a 
predatory state. Chapter 6 looks at the relationship between business groups and the 
state. 
For government and regulatory institutions, the resource dependence perspective 




fields. That is, government institutions are far more responsive to changes in the political 
field than the socio-economic environment: 
“When organisations are regulated by the state, the economic environment 
diminishes in importance as the importance of the political and administrative 
environment increases. Both attention and behaviour shift accordingly. The 
decisions of consumers become less important than the decisions of lawmakers 
and government agents.” (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 203) 
Chapters 4, 5 and 8 of this thesis analyse how government institutions in the Philippines 
- which do not follow the Westminster-style independent bureaucracy typically found in 
the UK or Australia - behave and respond to new policies and directives of their political 
masters. 
Finally, Corbetta and Salvato (2004) contribute to the resource dependence perspective 
by looking at the role of the board in family-owned firms. The authors studied how a 
board’s resources shapes the company’s resources and contributes to its success (or 
failure). The board provides advice, knowledge, legitimacy, facilitates internal and 
external company communication and relationships:  
“This resource role is played by board directors mainly through their social and 
professional networks and through interlocking directorates....The board of 
directors is hence seen as the place where conflicting interests are mediated, and 
where the necessary cohesion is created” (2004: 124) 
Consensus-building is a fundamental feature of boards – a dysfunctional board rarely 
works and a conflicted board has a flow-on effect to the rest of the organisation. 
Philippine boards are extensively discussed in Chapter 7. 
2.1.10 Politicised Institutions 
 
According to Kay, politicisation refers to “…the reaching of decisions on matters within 
an agency’s or program’s functional competence through a process that is essentially 
political and that does not reflect technical and scientific factors in the decision process; 
and ... the taking of specific actions on issues within an agency’s or program’s 




position rather than attempting to reach an objective determination of the issues.” 
(1980:7 in Momani 2004: 900) 
Politicisation of the bureaucracy in developing countries is a common, albeit 
problematic, phenomenon (Ilchman & Uphoff 1998: 30-48). Where a working 
bureaucracy exists, the institutions will have to work around the whims of the 
incumbent and vice versa. Such a scenario can end up in a catch-22 situation where 
institutional reforms cannot be initiated at all due to the fear and uncertainty changes 
might bring to the pre-existing power-political structure. (Lin & Nugent 2005: 2340) 
The impact of a politicised bureaucracy results in the “primarily loss of confidence in the 
fairness of government institutions.” (Peters & Pierre 2004: 8) In the context of the 
Philippines, there is a history of politicisation in the civil service compounded under the 
tenure of Marcos. It has been rare for instances of impartiality to occur within the 
bureaucracy since the end of the dictatorship.  In a study of the performance appraisal of 
the civil service in Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, Vallance found the 
Philippine bureaucracy as highly politicised, fundamentally traumatised, and debilitated 
by a culture of patronage: 
“Under Marcos, the distinction between politics and administration became 
increasingly blurred as the president appointed undersecretaries from the ranks 
of elected legislators. Patronage in the civil service became entrenched during the 
Marcos regime and notions of civil service neutrality were irreparably damaged. 
Despite President Aquino’s vow to ‘de-Marcosify’ the Philippine civil service 
(Carino 1989:214), the trend of politicisation has continued. Under President 
Ramos it is estimated that slightly more than half of all senior civil servants in the 
Philippines are political appointees (Santa Tomas 1995: 272 in Vallance 1999: 82).” 
In a comprehensive 2003 report prepared by the World Bank and the ADB for the 
Government of the Philippines on improving the efficiency of government organisations, 
politicisation was singled out as a significant obstacle in the effective functioning of 
government. In a section on ‘Strengthening the Public Administration, and under the 
heading ‘Institutional Weakness’, the report articulated the main problems of a 
politicised bureaucracy in the Philippines: its function “too much as an adjunct of the 
political executive”, hierarchical culture, emphasis political influence and patronage, 




making some sections prone to graft and corruption (World Bank and ADB 2003: 106-
107). To be effective, institutional development requires political will, a relatively de-
politicised bureaucracy, and a culture that is willing to be responsive and adapt to the 
changing needs of the country.  
Politicisation of the Philippine bureaucracy hinders the country’s performance and 
frustrates meaningful economic development. Chapter 8 of this thesis looks at the 
politicisation of government financial institutions. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Theories of the Firm 
 
This section looks at the general corporate governance (that is ownership and control) 
theories of the firm. There are many perspectives of corporate governance theories of the 
firm (Ho 2005) but this research focuses on three:  agency, stakeholder and resource 
dependence/resource-based view. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
The use of agency theory to explain the phenomenon of corporate governance is well-
established. It is widely cited and is adapted extensively across all social science 
disciplines. The application of agency theory is commonly represented in studies of 
corporate America where the research looks at the relationship between principal and 
agent – mainly the financial principals (such as shareholders represented by the board of 
directors), and the managerial agents (that of executives and managers).  
The modern origins of principal vs. agent conflict can be found in the debates that 
occupied American legal scholars, Edwin Dodd, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in the 
aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street Crash. Berle and Means book, Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, was concerned with: “the growing concentration of economic power 
and increased dispersion of stock ownership made the public corporation in which a 
separation of ownership and control had taken place central to economic activity in the 
US.” (Clarke 2004a: 3). On the other hand, Dodd was occupied by the transformation of a 
business corporation into “an economic institution which has a social service as well as a 
profit making function [and] directors of large corporations must become trustees for an 
institution, rather than be mere attorneys for the stockholders they had to develop a 




(Ireland 1996: 292) Today, Dodd’s arguments can be seen as laying the foundations for 
the stakeholder movement. 
In economics, Ronald Coase’s treatise entitled14
Fama and Jensen’s paper echoed Berle and Means 1933 book, which in turn influenced 
Claessens et al’s 2000 paper on ownership and control in East Asian corporations. 
Alchian and Demsetz looked at ownership structure and structure of contracts (1972: 
794), while Jensen and Meckling reviewed the contractual nature of the firm, the agency 
costs involved in undertaking a business and the limitations of a firm in society (1976: 311, 
357). Inevitably, issues arise over the application of the contracts “when a) the desires or 
goods of the principal and agent conflict and b) it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.” (Eisenhardt 1989: 58) 
 Nature of the Firm (1937) focused on 
property rights and was the result of “the introduction of a new concept into economic 
analysis, transaction costs, and an explanation of why there are firms.” (Coase 1991) 
Coase’s ideas re-emerged in the 1970s, when several economists from UCLA Amren 
Alchian and Harold Demsetz and from the Chicago school Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen 
and William Meckling, expanded the arena of agency theory into their field with several 
influential papers on the theory of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz 1972, Demsetz 1983, 
Fama & Jensen 1983, Jensen & Meckling 1976). The theory of the firm observed that that 
firms are made up of a series of (individual) contracts between employer and employee, 
shareholder and manager, director and manager, and supplier and buyer: 
In the organisational field, studies explored the reality of the principal-agent relationship 
in the boardroom. During the same period, Harvard Business School management 
professors Myles Mace (specialisation in entrepreneurship), Alfred Chandler Jr (business 
history), Jay Lorsch (organisational behaviour) with co-author Elizabeth MacIver, in a 
series of publications analysed the managers of “many large corporations who have 
dominant control over business affairs without sufficient accountability or monitor by 
their board of directors” (Alkhafaji 1989: 45). This was the era of the managerial 
hegemony of American corporations.  
Mace (1971) provided a guide for directors on what to do, analysed “how triumphant 
                                                     
14 Coase was awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics “for his discovery and clarification of the 
significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and 





CEOs [selected and] controlled the board of the companies they ran” (Clarke 2004a: 8), 
and how directorships are “an accolade than an obligation – ornaments on a corporate 
Christmas tree” (Lorsch & MacIver 1989). In his 1977 book, The Visible Hand: The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business, Chandler describes how “a sub-species of 
economic man” - the manager - with the function of “administrative coordination and 
allocation…assumed command in the central sectors of the American economy.” This 
paved the way for the golden era of triumphant management which continues today. 
Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards published by Lorsch and 
MacIver in 1989 looked back at the research on directors and found “directors are less 
sanguine about their power and capacity to govern. While they don’t see themselves as 
pawns of management, they acknowledge a number of constraints [including] the 
superior power of management, particularly the CEO-Chairman.” (Lorsch & MacIver in 
Clarke 2004: 108) 
In 1989, Kathleen Eisenhardt crystallised the relevancy and applicability of agency theory 
across a spectrum of social science research disciplines in a well-cited précis of the 
theory: Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. According to Eisenhardt, “Agency 
theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems of 
cooperative effort.” (1989: 72). However, she also points out the inherent limitations of 
the theory: 
“Agency theory presents a partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also 
ignores a good bit of the complexity of organisations. Additional perspectives can 
help to capture the greater complexity.” (1989:71) 
In trying to understand the ‘greater complexity’, the challenges in agency theory’s 
applicability has become more obvious with its widespread use in the past decade where 
concentration of ownership is a major factor in determining the separation of control in 
principal-agent relationships. Given major American listed corporations have widely-
dispersed ownership and generally do not have a dominant owner-manager, this 
ownership composition does not hold in other parts of the world including the 
Philippines. A later section discusses concentration of ownership. 
2.2.1.1 Limitations of Agency Theory in Developing Countries 
In countries where family-owned and managed corporations dominate, the premise of 




“Clan control implies goal congruence between people, and therefore the reduced need 
to monitor behaviour or outcomes.” (Eisenhardt 1989: 64) 
Nevertheless studies of corporate governance have expanded internationally, 
consequently broadening the theory’s scope and audience. Despite the sometime 
anomaly of agency theory’s application, there is persistence in its use in studies where 
ownership and control is one and the same (see Schulze et al 2001). This section looks at 
the application of agency theory in Asia and where family ownership is dominant. 
Tsai et al (2006) applied an agency theory perspective to the CEO tenure of two different 
groups of Taiwanese firms: one family-owned, the other non-family-owned. They found 
that “the turnover of family CEOs is about half that of non-family CEOs; poorly 
performing family CEOs are more likely to be dismissed than non-family CEOs; family 
CEOs are more likely to enhance corporate value”(2006: 23-24, 26). The last result goes 
against the trend of studies that stated separation of ownership and control produced 
better corporate performance. They find that family control serves as the crucial 
monitoring factor that is generally absent in widely-dispersed ownership corporate 
forms: 
“Agency theory is not applicable to family firms because self-interest and 
information asymmetry are not factors. Family control seems to serve as a 
monitoring system that substitutes for CEO bonding. We have shown that 
agency theory is applicable for non-family firms but unsuitable for family firms” 
(2006: 26). 
Dharwadkar et al (2000) looked at the failure of privatisation in emerging economies 
from an agency theory perspective. The weak corporate governance structures within 
companies and lack of recognition of property rights in the external environment of 
most emerging economies resulted with an agency problem unique to developing 
economies - that of expropriation: 
“Expropriation occurs within the weak governance context when large or 
majority owners assume control of the firm and deprive minority owners the 
right to appropriate returns on their investments. Thus, traditional agency 




unique agency problems arising from principal-principal goal incongruence.” 
(2000: 660) 
Young et al (2008) supports the principal-principal problem of owner vs. owner value 
expropriation to differentiate this from the traditional Western agency problem of owner 
vs. agent. Supporting this principal-principal conflict, Villalonga and Amit have 
described this as Agency Problem II to describe the awkwardness in agency theory’s 
applicability in the situations documented above. Where Agency Problem I deals with 
the classic principal-agent problem of the despotic manager controlling the board, 
uncontrollable remuneration and ineffective monitoring popular in Anglo-American 
countries, Agency Problem II covers the asymmetrical relationship of the controlling 
shareholder, close monitoring and the issue of expropriation. (2006: 387) 
Agency theory remains a powerful and influential theory to study corporate governance. 
However it is proving to be problematic to apply this theory in countries where firms 
have high ownership concentration. The practical limitations of the theory’s applicability 
in non-Anglo-American countries such as the Philippines can be found in Chapter 7 of 
this thesis.  
Researchers must appreciate ownership differences as a major factor in determining the 
usefulness of classical agency theory. Failure to acknowledge the differences underlying 
the suitability of agency theory may see the proverbial round peg being hammered into a 
square hole – that is, the popularity of the theory is such that one may overlook other 
corporate governance theories that are more relevant and applicable.  
The other theories of corporate governance that follow may provide the perspectives that 
may capture the complexity inherent in the effective management of corporations in 
developing countries. 
2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 
In contrast to agency theory, the stakeholder theory of the firm is inclusive, and the 
participants are not limited to the contracts and transactions between principal and 
agent. According to Clarke, the use of the term “stakeholding” can be traced back to 
1708, which means to “have a stake in an event, a concern, to have something to gain or 




“groups who have a direct interest in the survival of the organisation and without their 
support the organisation would cease to exist. This includes shareholders, management, 
board of directors, employees, major suppliers, major creditors, major consumers, and 
the government.” (Alkhafaji 1989: 36)  
The stakeholder theory of the firm was first used by the Stanford Research Institute in 
1963 “where stakeholder analysis was used in the corporate planning process by Igor 
Ansoff and Robert Stewart.” (Clarke 2004a: 194 and see also Freeman et al 2010: 30-32). 
Then, as now, contrasting opinions exist on what makes an individual or group a 
stakeholder of a company. The economist Milton Friedman took a severe view of 
stakeholders beyond financial ones: 
“[F]or corporate officials to do anything other than to make as much for their 
stockholders as possible would not only be inefficient but constitute a 
fundamentally subversive doctrine capable of undermining the very foundations 
of our free society.” (Friedman in Ireland 1996: 296) 
However, the corporation “solely as an economic enterprise is not feasible. It would 
virtually eliminate those stakeholder interests that are not profit-oriented” (Alkhafaji 
1989: 106) and this links it with the path-dependency view of the corporation by Bebchuk 
& Roe’s on the social embeddedness of the corporation (1999). Blair cautions the 
shareholder value orientation of Anglo-American corporations at the expense of its 
obligations to society at large:  
“To those who believe that corporations must serve some larger social purpose, 
governance reform proposals from the finance and market myopia camps might 
do damage to this larger social purpose if they tilt too strongly toward compelling 
corporate executives and their boards of directors to focus exclusively on 
maximising shareholder returns.” (Blair in Clarke 2004a: 174-175) 
However, the notion of stakeholder capitalism which “encompasses reframing the 
relationship between finance and business; reforming workplace relations; transforming 
the welfare state and the benefit system; reformulating macroeconomic policy; and 
reconstructing the democratic system” (Clarke 1998) is unrealistic as a view of the 
corporation as “humane, social, truly democratic and equitable…is not socialist but 




Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, a useful way of defining who is a 
stakeholder is by examining the various contractual and community relationships of a 
corporation. As outlined in the table below, contractual stakeholders are shareholders, 
employees, customers, distributors, suppliers and lenders. Community stakeholders are 
consumers, regulators, government, pressure groups, the media and local communities: 
Table 3: Contractual and Community Stakeholders (Clarke 1998: 187) 














In my research, I asked my interviewees their stakeholders. Some of them drew a 
distinction between their contractual stakeholder (financial) and community (non-
financial) stakeholders supporting the dichotomy in Clarke’s table above (see Chapter 6, 
Stakeholders section). 
The above table also clarifies the difference between the two theories of the firm. Where 
agency theory sees the firm as a series of contracts, stakeholder theory sees the firm as a 
series of relationships. (Clarke 1998) 
Ultimately, companies can choose who its stakeholders are, and whose interests they 
want to serve. Known as the stakeholder enterprise strategy (Freeman & Gilbert 1988), 
one stakeholder group can be part of, or overlap with, another, and one stakeholder 
group’s interests can conflict with another. Stakeholder theory broadens our view of the 
corporation allowing us to see organisations as complex systems made up of competing 
groups. 
In an influential paper on stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston (1995) examine the 
three types of stakeholder theory: descriptive or empirical, instrumental and normative. 
The descriptive or empirical describes and explains past, present and future states of 
corporate characteristics and behaviours (1995: 70). The instrumental type is used with 
the descriptive mode to identify connections or lack thereof, “between stakeholder 




profitability and growth” (1995: 71). Finally, the normative stakeholder type identifies the 
“moral and philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of corporation” 
(1995: 71) reminiscent of the debates between Dodd and Berle on the corporation and its 
responsibilities. (Sommer Jr. 1991; Dodd 1932; Berle 1932) 
As stakeholder and agency theories dominate conceptions of the firm, dual theoretical 
perspectives to corporate governance approaches are becoming common. Freeman and 
Evan state that it is “desirable to consider a framework for the firm as a series of 
multilateral contracts among stakeholders” (1990: 354). However, such an approach 
“would require a fundamental shift in managerial objectives away from shareowners and 
towards the interests of all stakeholders.” (Donaldson & Preston 1995: 80) 
Agency theory’s narrow approach that simply examines the firm within the constraints of 
instrumental financial considerations is counterweighed by the broad church of 
stakeholder theory. As John Donne poetically wrote, no man is an island entire of itself. 
By the same token no corporation lives in splendid isolation. 
2.2.2.1 Stakeholder Theory in Asia 
Perhaps due to the embryonic corporate governance research in Asia, stakeholder 
relationships in Asia are neither well-studied nor well-understood as seen through 
Western eyes.  
In Japan, incomplete information, and a hierarchical business culture that emphasises 
learning by monitoring compounds “the inability to write contracts for stakeholder 
relationships which expressly provide for all possible contingencies, because of the 
difficult of foreseeing future scenarios, and inability to perfectly enforce those 
contracts.”(Nottage 2001: 263).  
David Lea (1999), in his study of the Bougainville separatist crisis in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), relates the unrealistic expectations of “the imposition of further duties through 
legislation and moral pressure which arises in a third world context” in managing 
stakeholder relationships. According to Lea, the Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto 
provided a compensation package to villagers near its PNG Panguna copper mine. 
Despite establishing “trust funds for the people who were most affected by the 
mine…suspicion remained that the company was making vast amounts of money which 




argues “that when general imperfect duties to promote the public good are expected of 
business, it may become impossible for business to avoid disappointing certain people 
who will then perhaps unreasonably attribute ethical and moral failure to the 
corporation” (1999: 159). Lea further sees the use of stakeholder theory as a tool where “it 
can often be prescriptively uninformative and proscriptive redundant…[and] stakeholder 
theory may be used as an excuse for government to abdicate both its supervisory role 
and the responsibility for necessary collective goods.” (Lea 1999: 161-162) 
The role of government in third world countries is a pivotal one. The absence of 
government cannot be filled by the private sector alone as the latter does not have the 
legitimacy and isn’t sufficiently capable - ideologically and operationally otherwise – to 
completely discharge its stakeholder responsibilities to fulfil wider community 
expectations. Functional government, rather than a functional private sector, is 
overwhelmingly far more important for a developing country than a dysfunctional 
government. Lea illustrates the consequences of delineated responsibilities in a third 
world country with a weak government and a strong corporation. This scenario 
resonated with some interviewees in my research (see Chapter 6). 
In examining stakeholder theory in developing Asian countries, Darryl Reed employed 
the normative approach (2002). As there are deep-seated cultural, institutional, legal, 
managerial, ownership differences between Western and Asian economies, Reed 
suggests “supplemental normative principles” for corporations in these developing 
countries when applying stakeholder theory in Asia. The three principles are: 
a) the responsibility to respect acts of public autonomy (even when not legitimated 
through a formal democratic process) 
b) the responsibility to fulfil obligations not taken up by other actors (e.g. 
government) 
c) the responsibility to address problems of historic injustice. (2002: 184-185) 
 
Reed notes further that a corporation’s responsibility in a country where there is a weak 
government are further magnified “on the grounds of morality” (they provide superior 
economic opportunities in terms of investment and employment) and “authenticity” 
(they portray themselves as socially responsible) (2002: 185-186). 




country by and large have engaged in stakeholder relationships especially given the wide 
gulf between the haves and have nots in the country – there is an inherent obligation on 
the former to contribute to the community and address issues of poverty. Programs of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) are well established in the country such as 
providing infrastructure (work-sanctioned days off to build homes for the poor), and 
scholarships for students who are socio-economically disadvantaged. 
The analogy of the Philippine corporation as an extended family takes a far more 
significant and socially embedded function in society. During my fieldwork, I was privy 
to the different ways of addressing the needs of an organisation’s stakeholders. The 
relationship between an employer and employee in the Philippines is far more socially 
inclined. As religion is an important part of the society, companies have their own 
chapels and places of worship. In shopping malls, masses were conducted daily. Work 
stopped for the conduct of daily masses and prayers in-house at 9am, 12pm and 3pm. I 
was also made aware of social clubs within companies such as dance competitions, 
photography and art competitions. Chapter 7 examines stakeholder relationships in 
more detail. 
2.2.2.2 Pension Funds as Important Stakeholders 
A particular stakeholder of a corporation that is growing in importance is the pension 
fund (Davis & Steil 2001). A pension fund is no ordinary shareholder but a major 
institutional investor that may wield its influence and considerable shareholder power to 
promote a particular cause or issue as part of their fiduciary responsibilities (Hawley & 
Williams 2000) Indeed, pension funds worldwide are increasingly becoming important 
players and corporate governance reform activists15
In the case of Australia, regulatory reforms in the 1980s saw mandatory participation for 
all working citizens and their employers to contribute a proportion of salaries to a 
superannuation fund. As a consequence of these reforms, a highly developed regime of 
 (Palmiery 2002, Gillan & Starks 2000) 
In the case of government-originated pension funds, these institutions have been the 
result of government reforms aimed at outsourcing the financial and retirement needs of 
a country’s ageing population. In countries with well-developed pension schemes, the 
portion of private sector participation in managing the superannuation and pension 
funds of citizens are substantial. (Davis & Steil 2001) 
                                                     
15“Pension funds over the years have grown substantially in size. Worldwide, the estimated total 




retirement financial planning and numerous funds developed. These funds are active 
participants in the capital markets and their participation has contributed to the 
development and culture of the financial markets. The investments by institutional 
investors in public companies have dispersed share ownership to the wider populace: 
Over half of the population directly - and indirectly through their pension funds – own 
shares; rendering Australia with one of the highest share ownership rates in the world. 
(Stapledon 2001) 
With greater participation in the capital markets, shareholder activism has grown on 
both the retail and institutional level with strong engagement with companies. The 
Future Fund is Australia’s largest managed pension fund with assets of AU$66B as at 
December 2009 (Future Fund 2010).The Fund was established to finance the pensions of 
government employees. It is government owned with an independent board. With 
financial globalisation, the Future Fund, similarly to other pension funds in the 
developed world are seeing their investment role move beyond national boundaries. The 
size of these funds is evolving to the stage where they are termed sovereign wealth funds 
with the ability to invest in other markets around the world and are the “major state-
owned players of the 21st century” (Johnson 2007, The Economist 2008d). Such funds are 
taking advantage of opportunities brought on by the global financial crisis to invest in 
highly capitalised companies (and sometimes, countries) in distress.16
However, countries in different stages of development have had different experiences in 
terms of autonomous decision-making towards investments by pension funds. The 
Philippines is a developing country with a developing capital market. Share market 
participation is small and exclusive. Nevertheless, the country has two significant 
institutional investors, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social 
Security System (SSS). Both are government-owned pension funds.  
 As institutional 
investors, the pension funds can significantly contribute towards shareholder democracy 
and capital market development. (Hawley & Williams 2000) In recognition of the role 
corporate governance plays in ensuring pension funds are as well governed as the firms 
they invest in, the OECD has released guidelines on pension fund management (OECD 
2006b) and pension fund governance. (OECD 2009c) 
                                                     
16 For a list of sovereign wealth funds that have played a rescuer/investor  role in the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis, see the following Financial Times webpage: 




These two funds cover approximately 74% of the labour force or 31% of the total 
population which places the country in a respectable position in the East Asian region as 
the following table indicates: 








% of labour 
force 
Members as % 
of total 
population 
Hong Kong 2,832 95.5 79.4 41.2 
Indonesia 14,000 42.7 14.0 6.6 
Malaysia 5,070 n/a 45.5 19.8 
Philippines 8,925 n/a 74.0 31.0 
Singapore 1,324 77.0 56.6 31.2 
South Korea 17,070 n/a 73.0 37.1 
Thailand 10,351 72.0 29.0 16.8 
 
However, the next table below shows that compared to its neighbours, the assets of these 
two institutional investors ranked second last out of eight countries in 2006: 
Table 5: Assets of Institutional Investors in East Asia (Ghosh 2006:130) 

















China 28.0 1.6 136.0 7.9 27.0 1.6 191.0 11.1 
Hong Kong 38.0 22.9 9.0 5.4 465.6 280.3 512.6 308.6 
Indonesia 5.4 2.1 10.5 4.2 11.1 4.5 27.0 10.9 
Malaysia 70.0 59.2 21.0 17.8 23.0 19.4 114.0 96.4 
Philippines 7.9 9.2 2.7 3.1 1.4 1.6 12.0 14.0 
Singapore 68.0 61.2 33.0 29.7 28.0 25.2 129.0 116.0 
South 
Korea 
161.0 21.4 133.0 17.7 186.0 24.7 480.0 63.8 
Thailand 20.0 12.0 17.0 10.2 19.0 11.4 56.0 33.6 
TOTAL 398.2 11.8 362.2 10.8 761.0 22.6 1521.7 45.2 
 
The country’s pension funds are yet to match the financial leverage of its neighbouring 
countries and while: “[t]he assets of institutional investors in East Asia have grown over 
the past few years and at the end of 2004 amounted to USD1.5T or around 45% of GDP” 
(Ghosh 2006: 129), sitting on USD7.9B or nearly 10% of GDP, these two funds have some 
way to go to accumulate the significant institutional investor funds of South Korea 
                                                     
17 NB: For South Korea, National Pension Scheme only; Malaysia: Employees’ Provident Fund 




(USD161B), Malaysia (USD70B) and Singapore (USD68B): Chapter 8 discusses the 
organisation, structure, stakeholder role and corporate governance activism of these two 
funds.  
2.2.3 Resource-Based View of the Firm 
 
The resource based view of the firm has its origins in Edith Penrose’s influential tome 
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959, 2010), which posits the firm as a collection of 
productive resources (2010: 21-23, 58-77). In the 1980s, the rise of resource-based 
perspectives in strategic planning saw a more extensive exploration of this view of the 
firm. (Pitelis in Penrose 2010: xxxv; Wernerfelt 1984, Porter 1980, 1985) 
The relevance of the resource-based view of the firm for business groups in developing 
countries was highlighted in Mauro Gillen’s seminal work, Business Groups in Emerging 
Economies: A Resource-Based View (2000). The resource based view of business groups 
provides reasons for their affiliated firms to be widespread and dominate across a 
diversity of industries (2000: 368-369) and their advantages over foreign competitors 
(2000:376) due in large part to “asymmetric trade and investment conditions.” (2000: 
368) 
However, unlike the institutional view of business groups the resource based view of the 
firm does not see business groups “as substitutes for markers that fail, but rather, as an 
organisational form in competition against foreign MNES, and non-diversified firms 
lacking the capability to enter multiple industries.” (2000: 376) That is, the resource 
based view gives business groups a superior advantage to others due to their 
conglomerate structure and allowing a sharing and cross-over of resources between 
companies within a business group. (See Table 7 for more detail on the theoretical 
perspectives of business group development). 
However, this view of the business group as highly protectionist may overlook some of 
the historical reasons for their establishment, growth and persistence. The other side to 
the resource-based view of a business group in a developing country is where the 
internal resources of a firm interact with the external environment. Indeed, the resource-





For Philippine business groups, the internal resource-based view of the firm poses the 
following question: how are resources administered (or protected) within a predatory 
state environment?  
Under the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, there were moves by the 
President to expropriate businesses owned by conglomerates and transfer them to his 
cronies. Where majority ownership in a firm was below 50%, the firm was more prone to 
being taken over by the President’s cronies. Seeing this move, the strategy by some of the 
family-owned business groups was to attract a foreign investor to take a minority interest 
in a business to offset the political risk of expropriation. The raison d’être being if Marcos 
expropriated the business, a foreign government would intervene and put pressure on 
Marcos not to expropriate the business. There was a belief that a foreign government 
would interfere to defend the ownership stake of the foreign shareholder.  
Thus, cultivating relationships with foreign investors was one way to offset the bulwark 
of the state. This allowed business groups to diversify and apply its resources to ensure 
the survival of commercial operations during a period of instability. At the nadir of the 
Marcos dictatorship, for one business group, an owner’s contacts in foreign governments 
that carried influence in the country were used to pressure the dictator not to 
expropriate that well-connected owner’s company’s assets. This was indicative of the fear 
and paranoia in the private sector. From this perspective, a business group used every 
possible resource to ensure the continued existence of the firm.  
A resource-based view of the firm justifies the continued dominance of family business 
groups in unstable, developing economies - in effect, should a fickle government come 
into power with the view of expropriating company assets, the business groups are big 
and diversified enough to survive such a political move. This is one reason why the 
ownership strategy of business groups in developing countries such as the Philippines, is 
to ensure majority control is consistent and an explanation for their reluctance to 
relinquish majority ownership. In the Philippines, minority ownership makes a firm 
vulnerable to state-backed expropriation. 
The relevance of the resource-based view of the firm in the Philippines is explored 
further in Chapters 6 and 9 where the private sector defensively behaved during the 






Theoretical literature on company boards distinguishes between exogenous issues (in the 
domain of agency, resource dependence and stakeholder theories) which look at how 
boards relate to its external shareholders, and endogenous issues which look at insider 
relationships within the board (Corbetta & Salvato 2004). Boards are “at the apex of the 
internal governance system, [are] responsible for corporate leadership and strategy, 
recruiting top management and monitoring managerial performance.” (Song and 
Windram 2004: 198) This section looks at the relevant board literature for my research 
with supporting data in Chapter 7. 
2.3.1 The Chairman-CEO Relationship 
 
The role and nature of the relationship between the CEO and Chairman is pivotal in the 
board. If the CEO and Chair roles are unified, this is commonly referred to as CEO 
duality and power is heavily concentrated:  
“The power of the chairman added to the power of the chief executive presents a 
formidable combination.” (Cadbury 2002: 110) 
CEO duality may lead to what Finkelstein and D’Aveni point out its double-edged sword: 
“forcing boards to choose between the contradictory objectives of unity of command and 
[CEO] entrenchment avoidance.” (1994: 1080) 
Where the roles are separated, the Chairman must decide whether they are an executive 
or non-executive chair. For UK and Australian corporations, there is a requirement to 
explain why or why not the roles of Chair and CEO are united. The premise behind this 
is that concentration of power with a CEO that has both roles may prevent objective 
decision-making to the detriment of the company and may overburden the person with 
responsibility. As Cadbury points out: 
“The separation of the two roles builds in a check and a balance. Chairmen are 
responsible for ensuring that their boards take account of the interests of the 
shareholders and that they carry out their supervisory functions conscientiously. 
Chairmen, who are also chief executives, have to be scrupulously clear in their 
own minds when they are acting as the one and when as the other, as they move 




all concerned to divide the roles rather than the individual. When someone who 
holds both positions is determined on a course of action, which perhaps entails 
high risks for the company, who is to challenge their judgement?” (2002: 110) 
For Philippine corporations, the roles are normally combined. Or if they are separated, 
then the two individuals come from the same ownership interests or from the same 
business family typically with a father-son combination. This duality is a reflection of the 
business being an extension of the family with the family’s “identity or reputation” 
intricately linked to the business. (Gersick et al 1997: 37) 
2.3.2 Board Composition and Independent Directors 
 
A board is normally composed of the corporate elite with a combination of executive 
(employee of the firm) and non-executive (non-employee of the firm) directors. The 
introduction of outside independent directors into Philippine boards was nominally the 
introduction of this distinct Anglo-American form of corporate governance. 
The presence of outside directors on a board gives non-controlling shareholders a voice 
in that they provide the monitoring mechanism inside the board. In Anglo-American 
corporations, outside directors have been found to be “more vigilant than directors with 
other firm affiliations because: 
1) They focus on financial performance which is a central component of monitoring 
2) They are more likely than insiders to dismiss CEOs following poor performance, 
and 
3) Protecting their personal reputations as directors gives them an incentive to 
monitor. ” (Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994: 1081-1082) 
However, for non-Anglo American corporations, outside directors on family-owned 
businesses may not be as welcomed. Lansberg & Perrow’s study of Latin American 
companies showed that the personalistic and insider business culture made business 
families paranoid about the presence of outsiders on their board raising issues of 
“confidentiality and security.” (1991: 143). Results in Chapter 7 support attitudes displayed 
in Lansberg & Perrow’s research. 
2.3.3 Board Committees 




right. These committees “lead to greater efficiency, expediency and flexibility” with their 
use allowing “greater input from and objectivity among members.” (Kesner 1988: 67). 
Each board committee “contributes in a specific way to the overall governance 
framework of the board of directors.” (Bilimoria and Piderit: 1994: 336) 
In an American study, Kesner identified the four most common, influential and powerful 
board committees in a company were the audit, nomination, compensation (or 
remuneration) and executive committees. (1988:87) In the Australian corporate 
environment, the most frequently cited committees were audit, remuneration, 
nomination and risk management. (CCG 2007: 42) 
2.3.3.1 Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the most important board committee as it oversees the “adequate 
functioning of internal control mechanisms, monitoring and focusing on reviewing 
financial risk and risk management. The audit committee helps determine indicators of 
problems and address these problems, mitigate possible damage and enhance 
shareholder value.” (Haron et al 2005: 118). It has been aptly described as the “workhorse 
of corporate governance.”(Miller 1999, Grace & Haupert 2006: 63) 
The audit committee is nominally the first committee established on the board, is the 
most active, and is a critical function in how the internal and external relationships of 
the board are engaged and conducted with the board’s stakeholders. (Song & Windram 
2004: 196) Audit committees are generally expected to discuss matters relating to 
“financial statements and reporting, audit planning, internal control and evaluation” and 
are expected to focus on “compliance with standards and regulatory bodies, probing 
material items and undisclosed liabilities.” (Al-Mudhaki and Joshi 2004: 33). 
The audit committee is a crucial corporate governance function and financial market 
regulators emphasise its importance in company operations and require their 
establishment (Goodwin 2003: 65). The audit committee is the principal gatekeeper to 
“safeguard integrity in financial reporting.”(ASX 2007: 11). 
In Anglo-American corporate governance, it is common to have independent directors 
wholly comprising and chairing this all-important committee. (ASX 2007: 11, UK FRC 
2008: 17). Empirical researches have also found that financially-literate (Al-Mudhaki & 




committee. (Song & Windram 2004: 203, Beasley 1996: 458, 463) 
2.3.3.1.1 Internal and External Auditors 
Helping the audit committee in properly discharging its duties is the role of the internal 
auditor (Bishop III et al 2000: 50, 51). The internal auditor is integral to the internal 
control system of a company (Carcello et al 2005: 119). An independent audit committee 
with members cognisant of the latest financial accounting standards complement and 
supports the role of the internal auditor (Goodwin 2003: 264). Leadership from the audit 
committee is pivotal in supporting the internal audit function. (Zin & Subramaniam 
2007: 894). 
The integrity of financial statements is crucial in the operations of a company. If the 
language of business – that is, the numbers – cannot be trusted, then what can be? The 
external audit function plays a pivotal role in sustaining this paradigm. The institutional 
recognition of having an external auditor sign off a company’s financial statements 
completes the verification process. (Power 1997, Holm & Laursen 2007). However, this 
verification process has also its downside and may undermine the efficacy of financial 
statements. Generally, if external auditors accept the information given to them by the 
owner, and this information is verified even if the data is false, the blame can be shifted 
to the auditors if corporate malfeasance is eventually uncovered. 
2.3.3.1.2 Auditor Rotation 
Auditor rotation is gaining currency to mitigate auditing-related risks such as auditor-
capture. The practice of mandatory auditor rotation was motivated by a 2003 study from 
the US General Accounting Office (GAO). This study was in response to public concerns 
after the spectacular collapse of Enron and the complicity and multiple conflicts of 
interest it had with its auditors, Andersen (US GAO 2003: 8). The 2003 study was 
inconclusive and ambivalent on the effectiveness of auditor rotation to improve the 
integrity of financial statements. (2003: 13) In this regard the debate on the effectiveness 
of auditor rotation has more to do with perception and rotation in theory is supposed to 
diminish the conflicts of interest between external auditor and company. This practice 
seems to have gained currency and some institutional backing despite insufficient 




2.3.3.2 Risk Management Committee 
A risk management committee is normally formed to exercise the board’s oversight 
function in managing “uncertainties about events and/or their outcomes that could have 
a material effect on the goals of the organisation.” (Subramaniam et al 2009: 319)  
These uncertainties can include internal company risks such as those relating to the 
operational performance and financing of the company. External risks relate to the 
organisation’s relationships with its stakeholders, such as those pertaining to the supply 
chain, industry regulation and managing political risks with governmental organisations. 
(Remo 2007, Economist 2008, EIU 2008)  
A risk management committee determines and evaluates the risk management strategies 
and operations of a company, assesses its financial reporting and ensures compliance 
with existing laws and regulations. Members of the risk management committee are 
expected to discuss the functions and a company’s approach towards risk with senior 
management, and ensure the adequacy of risk mitigation procedures. (Subramaniam et 
al 2009:320) 
2.3.3.3 Nominations Committee 
As the name suggests, the nominations committee is tasked with identifying potential 
candidates for a board directorship. Research on nominations committee have been 
neglected in favour of the audit committee as the committee is seen as an adjunct to 
other committees. However, it plays an important role in determining diversity and 
composition of the board (Ruigrok et al 2006). For Philippine corporations, it has 
become a pivotal board committee in determining and short-listing independent 
directors (see results in Chapter 7). 
2.3.3.4 Executive Committee 
An executive committee generally consists of senior managers of the company. The 
committee is tasked with “internal agenda setting and strategic governance in times of 
crisis. For the effective performance of these functions, members are called on to be 
extremely familiar with the internal functioning of the company.” (Bilimoria and Piderit 
1994: 349) In case of emergencies, the committee also serves “as a stand-in to act in lieu 
of a full board when immediate actions are needed” and therefore plays the role of the 
board “in counselling the CEO on ideas...and overseeing other board committees.” 




committee as the CEO (as manager and owner) sit on this committee (for more detail 
see Chapter 7). 
2.4 Business Groups 
 
This section looks at concentration of ownership in East Asia and in particular the 
corporate form of family-owned business groups in the Philippines. 
2.4.1 Concentration of Ownership 
 
In developing countries, ownership is highly concentrated. Ownership concentration is a 
manifestation of economic control (see Berle & Means 1933, Sales 1979 for classifications 
of control). In the ground-breaking study by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) of 
2,980 East Asian listed corporations, they found more than two-thirds of firms are 
controlled by a single shareholder. In the Philippines, the top 15 families control 55% of 
corporate assets, and 46% of the GDP. The table below shows the percentage of 
concentrated ownership across the region ranging from Japan where only the top 15 
families control 2.1% of that country’s GDP to Hong Kong where the top 15 families 
control over four-fifths of that island state’s wealth: 
Table 6: Concentration of Family Control in East Asian Corporations (Claessens et 





% of total value of listed corporate assets 
that families control (1996) 













2.36 6.5 26.2 32.1 34.4 84.2 
Indonesia 4.09 16.6 40.7 57.7 61.7 21.5 
Japan 1.04 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.1 
Korea 2.07 11.4 29.7 36.8 38.4 12.9 
Malaysia 1.97 7.4 17.3 24.8 28.3 76.2 
Philippines 2.68 17.1 42.8 52.5 55.1 46.7 
Singapore 1.26 6.4 19.5 26.6 29.9 48.3 
Taiwan 1.17 4.0 14.5 18.4 20.1 17.0 
Thailand 1.68 9.4 32.2 46.2 53.3 39.3 
 
According to the 2002 World Development Report, there is a link between high 
concentrated corporate ownership and the efficacy of legal protection in countries. That 




This view complements and supports resource dependence theory and the resource 
based view of the firm in developing countries: where there is an unstable political 
environment, the conglomerate form is the preferred method of organising. Investors in 
weak institutional environments also play a premium on firms who are part of 
conglomerates due to the perception that “concentrated ownership delivers great 
benefits when those owners in control have appropriate incentives and when owners 
outside the firm have more leverage” (World Bank 2001: 58).  
The other side to this is that the treatment of minority shareholders is a pressing 
corporate governance issue in countries with concentrated ownership (see also Agency 
Theory in this Chapter). Even where the prevalence of business groups is a private 
response to weak government institutions, the concentration of wealth in a few people, 
families or groups is a “formidable barrier to policy reform” and could negatively affect 
“the evolution of the legal and other institutional frameworks for corporate governance 
and the manner in which economic activity is conducted.” (Claessens et al 2000: 110). 
Chapter 6 of this thesis looks at the evidence of having concentrated forms of ownership 
in the Philippines as a response to an unstable environment. 
Concentration of ownership in the private sector of the Philippines and most of East Asia 
is manifested in the widespread corporate form of business groups. Granovetter’s 
definition of business groups is applied here:  
“One can consider as business groups those collections of firms bound together 
in some formal and/or informal ways, characterised by an 'intermediate' level of 
binding…they are the outcome of investments by a single family or small number 
of allied families who, once having acquired the component companies, keep 
them together as a coherent group among which personnel and resources may be 
shifted as needed. Yet the individual companies continue to keep some separate 
identity.” (2001: 69-70) 
Family-owned business groups dominate the private sector landscape of the country, and 
the region with Japanese keiretsus and Korean chaebols (Chang 2003).  
2.4.2 Relationship with the State 
 




organising in the region has been a source of rigorous debate. A variety of theories 
proffer different perspectives to their enduring existence. Chung looks at six different 
theories – institutional, failure, transaction cost, resource-based, social capital and 
agency – to provide perspectives on business group development in developing 
countries. The table below summarises these theoretical perspectives, with the relevant 
theories applied in this thesis - institutional, resource-based and agency theories - 
discussed extensively in the previous section: 




Institutional theory asserts that highly diversified business groups create 





Market failure theory, concurring with institutional theory, argues that 
external markets can fail due to inefficient market mechanisms, legal 
impediments, and lack of trust  
Transaction 
cost theory 
Transaction cost theory argues that internal business transactions lower 
transaction costs because they avoid costs associated with contracts, 




Resource-based theory asserts that BG-affiliated companies have 
opportunities to acquire and accumulate valuable resources, such as 
industry entry skills, trained employees, managerial skills, export-related 





Social capital theory proposes that intra-firm networks such as BG 
companies are social capital that can facilitate value creation. 
Agency 
theory 
Agency theory argues that because BGs are owned and managed by 
founder families, agency problems are minimised between professional 
managers and shareholders. 
 
In studies of business groups in developing economies, their relationship with the state 
is fundamental. The relationship business groups have with the government of the 
Philippines defines and influences the manner in which these companies operate. This 
research is no exception and seeks to contribute to wider knowledge of business group 
formation and operation in a developing economy. 
In the case of the Philippines, the country has less than satisfactory regulatory 
institutions. Carney supports this notion by proposing four hypotheses of business group 
development in Asian business groups: institutional voids, life cycle, state-led 




the country’s situation – that of business groups filling the institutional void (Carney 
2008: 598) with the provision of infrastructure which is normally the realm of the state, 
and the proliferation of crony capitalism in the post-dictatorship era which has allowed 
the persistence of some business groups. 
Unlike other countries in the region such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the 
Philippines did not have an ‘interventionist state’ (Fligstein 1996) where the relationship 
between business groups and government were mutually beneficial, united by a common 
goal towards greater economic development and providing a distinct form of Asian 
capitalism (Granovetter 2001: 71 73). Instead, the state has played a dysfunctional role 
similar to the case of business groups in Indonesia (Granovetter 2001: 97). Yet 
dysfunctional business-state relationships are far from unidirectional as business groups 
with enough extraterritorial might and political connections can play a pivotal role in 
overthrowing the elected government of the day as in the case of the Chile’s Allende 
government (Zeitlin et al 1974: 120-121). Indeed, some Philippine business groups actively 
supported the overthrow of Marcos in the dying days of his dictatorship.  
With a dominant public sector and government executive, business groups create a form 
of organising that tries to mitigate uncertainty. The Philippines has a developing capital 
market, and the lack of trust in judicial remedy is widespread (See Chapter 9: 
Corruption). By being part of a business group, transaction costs between affiliated 
companies are lower and being part of a group may help overcome market failure 
problems, allows the transfer of managerial talent across businesses, and share other 
resources between affiliated companies (Kim et al 2004: 28)  
The might of business groups and conglomerate power also allows competitive 
advantage over single firms. As business groups dominate industries, being affiliated 
with a business group allows a company access to the network and resources available 
within that group. Being part of a business group builds up and consolidates the social 
capital amongst members. 
In terms of structure, business groups in the country are vertically integrated reflecting a 
great degree of control by owners (Khanna & Yafeh 2007:333) and Leff saw their structure 
as substitutes for the imperfections in the capital market (1978: 672). While business 
groups may be the most efficient form in an inefficient market, because of their scope and 




with foreign ownership restrictions in developing economies – in most cases - 
unilaterally favouring domestic participants.  
As Guillen point out, in sectors where foreign investment is restricted, domestic business 
groups that have proliferated under such protectionist policies will be reluctant to lose 
this ‘asymmetrical’ position. Foreign entrants have little choice but to collaborate with 
them, thus ensuring the continuation of the status quo of the dominance and 
entrenchment of business groups (Guillen 2000: 376). 
The ambivalence towards the domination of a few select groups was provocatively 
looked at by Khanna & Yafeh in their 2007 article called “Business groups: paragons or 
parasites.” The authors conclude that both types of business groups exist: business group 
paragons are the ones who have a good reputation premium and practice good corporate 
governance (Carney 2008: 597) while the parasitic business groups rarely practice good 
corporate governance and depend largely on the largesse of their political connections 
(see Faccio 2006) and superior contacts to sustain the viability of their companies 
(Fisman & Khanna 2004: 621). This parasitic view of business groups provide support for 
Carney’s hypothesis that some business groups emerged due to the reciprocal nature of 
crony capitalism. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter on the section on agency theory, the common 
principal-agent problem common in Anglo-American countries are not present in the 
Philippines as most owners are they themselves part of management. In most cases, the 
control of business groups has not been decoupled from the owners.  
2.4.3 Concentration of Control and the Holding Company 
 
Concentration of control is manifested in the importance of the holding company in a 
business group structure and how the holding company effectively controls other 
companies. A phenomenon known as cross-shareholdings allows this complex 
ownership form to have a major shareholder to control a company or sets of companies 
even if the owner holds less than the majority stake18
                                                     
18 Almeida & Wolfenzon (2006) discuss the more aggressive form of cross-shareholdings, known 
as pyramidal ownership.  
. While not limited to business 
groups in emerging economies, cross-shareholdings are more common in the business 




between a control-based business groups as opposed to an ownership based business 
group with the former applying in the case of Philippine corporations: 
“A Control Based Business Group (CBBG) is a collection of legally independent 
companies, which were formerly business units of an Ownership Based Business 
Group (OBBG), bound together under the control of a founder family or 
managerial elite by means of interlocking ownership (cross-shareholdings) 
(Chang 2003; Claessens et al. 2000). In this structure, founder families or 
managerial elites hold or control relatively insignificant amounts of bona fide 
ownership shares of their affiliated companies. But, they can inflate their 
controlling shares by means of cross-shareholdings. When equal amounts of 
investment dollars are cross-shared between affiliated companies, there is no net 
increase in invested capital, and yet it gives the controlling stakeholders effective 
controls over their affiliated companies. Although the amount of cross-
shareholdings is not necessarily equal, the purpose of interlocking ownership is 
to inflate the controlling shares for founder families and managerial elites.” 
(Chung 2005: 68) 
This issue of cross-shareholding of related interests has had a long history. In 1932, in 
their study of holding companies of major utilities in the United States, Bonbright and 
Means pointed out the fundamental conflict of interests between the dominant 
shareholder, its subsidiaries and minority investors. The majority owner will normally 
exercise control through the holding company which in turn executes strategy by taking 
into account the entire financial health of the business group: 
“…one of the serious weaknesses of the holding company lies in the fact that 
there is so often a conflict of interests between the holding company, as the 
dominant stockholder, and the minority stockholders in its subsidiaries. This 
conflict is generally due to the fact that the holding company is willing to 
sacrifice the profits of any one of its subsidiaries if in so doing it can increase the 
profits of the entire group of properties under its control.” -Bonbright and Means 
(1932: 343) 
The strategy of the holding company behaving as the asset manager allows a highly 
vertical and centralised control over a diversified group of assets or companies. While 




instability and rapid structural change” (Leff 1978: 667), opaque holding company 
activity directing a web of cross-shareholdings was a factor in family-owned collapses 
such as that of Parmalat in Italy (Clarke 2007). In the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian 
Crisis, Korean chaebols were pressured to reform to improve transparency in cross-
subsidiary activities and to simplify these corporate complex structures (Chung 2005, Li 
et al 2006).  
The strength of business affiliated business group transactions can also be the source of 
its weakness. In an era that emphasises transparency, related party transactions of 
business groups must be able to withstand such scrutiny. 
2.4.4 Central Role of Banks 
 
A core aspect of a business group’s structure is its bank-based model of financing. 
Having a bank at the centre of a business group allows a highly controlled form of 
financing to mitigate the effects of inefficient capital markets and high transaction costs. 
The bank-based model of financing is not new. Lamoreaux’s study of 19th century New 
England documented banks of kinship groups were at the core of financing affiliated 
firms as this provided stability, strength and long-term investment horizons (1986: 659, 
666). Sales’ study in Quebec also found that the intense concentration of banking and 
industrial capital allowed investment in developing large projects (1979: 296).  
The parallels between business groups in developing economies and the then developing 
economy of the north-eastern part of the American continent extends to issues of 
business risks and longer-term perspective on strategy (Lamoreaux 1986:653) However, 
unlike New England kinship groups, there is a high cost of entry in establishing a bank in 
the Philippines (1986: 653,667). While kinship groups were able to contribute to the 
industrial development of New England, the narrow pool of capital and prevailing 
institutional weaknesses in the Philippines give rise to a certain amount of inflexibility 
that prevents the same thing from currently occurring in the country.  
Nevertheless, business groups will remain the dominant form of organising in the region. 
Reforms in the private sector will need to take their dominance into account as they “will 





2.5 The Family Business and the Business Family 
 
Business groups in the Philippines are normally owned by families. A strong family-
orientated culture permeates both the private sector and public sector spheres of the 
country with the dominance of business families paralleling the dynastic political 
families (Dumlao 2006: 38-39). 
Therefore, a substantial part of my research unveiled the impact of family dynamics, 
business family and family business relationships. This section looks at the literature of 
the specific issues facing family businesses and business families. The first half looks at 
internal family-related issues, while the second half deals with the external relationship a 
family has with the business. 
2.5.1 Owners in Management 
 
There are seven stakeholders in a family business (Sharma & Nordqvist 2008). They are: 
1. Passive family members and non-owners not involved in the business 
2. Non-family employees  
3. Non-family owners not involved in the operations of the business 
4. Active family members, owners and employees 
5. Passive family member-owners not involved in the operations of the business 
6. Employee-owners and not members of the family 
7. Active family member employees but not owners (Sharma & Nordqvist 2008: 78-
80) 
The stakeholder groups correspond numerically in the following three-circle Venn 
diagram which contains the three dimensions of family business ownership – family 






Figure 4: Seven roles of internal family firm stakeholders (Sharma and Nordqvist 
2008: 79) 
 
Sharma and Nordqvist’s model is a useful way to understand the different categories and 
interactions of family and non-family members in the family business. For a family 
member who is both an employee and an owner (no.4 in the figure), his/her role in the 
business family is pivotal as s/he represents both management and ownership interests. 
Family member-owners involved in the business also display the continued operational 
interests of owners as control is not decoupled from management control (Davis 2008: 
141). 
2.5.2 Importance of Family Values 
 
Family business literature is replete with management challenges facing a business 
family. The journal Family Business Review19
“family businesses are value driven…[pervading] every aspect of a family 
business….The family’s values are the company’s culture.” (2008: 2-4)  
 provides a comprehensive account of such 
challenges. However, at the core of what makes a family business different from a non-
family business is the notion of values. Family values are fundamental to the family 
business. Cultural and core values distinguish a family-owned business group from their 
non-family counterparts. As argued by Ward: 
                                                     













The endurance of family values in a business is also a reflection of the family as society’s 
most fundamental unit and reliable form of ‘security’ blanket in an insecure, unstable 
environment: 
“…the family is perhaps the most reliable of all social structures for transmitting 
cultural values and practices across generations.” (Gersick et al 1997: 149) 
Non-family firms tend to focus on short-term, transactional, financially driven goals; 
while family-owned firms tend to emphasise the long-term, intangible and collective 
goals (Ward 2008:5). A strong family culture also “affects the relationship between family 
power and the agency/control of the board role in family firms.” (Corbetta & Salvato 
2004: 129) 
Family firms have a natural fit in the collectivist culture of the Philippines. 
2.5.3 Sentimental Value of Ownership 
 
For business families, their members have some form of sentimental or emotional value 
attached to the business (Zellwegger & Astrachan 2008). This value can be shaped by 
their upbringing or their experience firsthand of what it means to be a business family 
member. Below is a table by Birley (1986) displaying the four manifestations of emotional 
ownership of a family business from weak detachment to strong attachment and 
belonging; and from positive affiliation to negative resentment: 
Table 8: Four Manifestations of Emotional Ownership in Family Firms (Birley 
1986: 36) 













Positive Deep sense of belonging and 
shared fates 
‘I feel strongly about the family 
business: it makes me proud. The 
success of the business is my 
success.’ 
Superficial, happy go-lucky 
‘I’m happy it’s there but I don’t 
care that much. It does not 
define who I am.’ 
Negative Disillusioned and rigid fusion 
‘The family business gives me pain, 
but I can’t free myself from it. It is 
part of who I am.’ 
Superficial rejection 
‘I’m not bothered with the 
family business, and I don’t feel 




Emotional ownership also manifests itself when it comes to succession when sentimental 
attachment may hinder an objective attitude towards successful succession (Davis 2008: 
142). 
2.5.4 Succession in Family Businesses 
 
Arguably the most difficult internal business family issue is that of succession or handing 
over the business from one generation to another (Ward 2008: 3). Andrea Santiago’s 
2000 study of the ‘Succession Experience in Philippine Family Businesses’ provide an 
excellent insight into how Philippine business families deal with this issue. Santiago’s 
study points to the importance of family values in determining successful succession: 
“When the family adopts a succession process that is consistent with the values 
by which they live, the chances that the succession will be smooth increase, 
regardless of whether there was formal planning.” (2000: 15) 
Santiago’s research also found Filipino-Chinese business families were more likely to be 
guided by the Confucian values of seniority and harmony (2000:16). Her research support 
Chau’s investigation with the succession approaches between co-parcenary traditions 
which are identifiable with Chinese business families and observed primogeniture 
traditions which she identifies with Japanese business families. According to Chau (1991), 
Chinese families tend “to share ownership among siblings when starting a family 
company…[and] practice a coparcenary (joint heirship) approach to ownership 
succession which divides ownership among each generation relatively equally.” (cited by 
Gersick et al 1997: footnote 8 in 56). Chau’s insight provides a perspective on how ethnic 
Chinese businesses view succession and the issues that go along with it.  
The succession process can be an emotionally difficult issue for business families as a 
person’s mortality is recognised and this is rarely a pleasant topic. Succession is a volatile 
subject that can easily divide family members. During my fieldwork, several business 
families were in conflict principally due to succession and some of their struggles were 
played out in public (Calderon 2007, Salverria 2007). Succession in the family business 
brings to a head simmering non-related business issues and are a test of the functionality 
(or dysfunctionality) of a business family. As pointed out by Ward, succession also brings 
to the fore family values that will be transmitted to the next generation which will be 




For outside board directors on a family-owned firm, “it is of utmost importance that 
[they] are aware of potential conflict of interest issues [on succession]” (OECD 2006: 12), 
but the long-term future of a family business largely depends on how succession is 
managed by family members. 
2.5.5 Family Council 
 
The existence of a family council becomes pivotal when dealing with contentious issues 
such as succession as it is a mechanism that mitigates “internal strife and disruption” 
that may affect the company. (OECD 2006: 12) The following definition of a family 
council is provided by Gersick et al: 
“A family council is a group who periodically come together to discuss issues 
arising from their family’s involvement with a business. The fundamental 
purpose of a family council is to provide a forum in which family members can 
articulate their values, needs and expectations vis-à-vis the company and develop 
policies that safeguard the long-term interests of the family. (1997: 237-238) 
Aside from succession, family councils are an important body for business issues and 
family-related discussions. Family councils can be formal mechanisms where issues, 
concerns and/or grievances can be aired amongst the working members, non-working 
members, owning-members and/or extended members of the business family.  
Family councils are normally present in business families that are large, extended and 
multi-generational. Where the company is largely family-owned, then the family council 
exerts its influence on the business with representation normally through the positions 
of Chair, CEO and/or Executive Directors.  
Family councils are a pivotal governance mechanism and their existence and role must 
be appreciated to understand the corporate governance of family-owned business 
groups. Chapter 7 looks at where family councils fit in Philippine companies. 
The next sections look at the two other main challenges that business families face are 
that of financing and the professionalisation of management. 
2.5.6 Financing 
 




internally normally through their banks. However, when business groups become large 
and more complex, seeking external sources of finance to fund future investments 
become a pertinent issue. Going to market or listing on the capital market for family-
owned business groups can be an emotionally charged decision. The step of listing is a 
paradigm shift as the family business is taken to another level: opening up to outsiders 
and placing the family and the business to scrutiny. 
When family businesses list, aside from the financial motivation, ownership and 
emotional considerations are normally taken into account. Listing may also not receive 
the unanimous support of all family members and the costs of intra-family conflict may 
outweigh the benefits of listing (Gersick et al 1997: 54). For families that have managed 
to continue the business for several generations, the main ownership issue of multiple 
shareholders may be the catalyst for going public as some family members may wish to 
cash in their ownership stake. (Gersick et al 1997: 54-55) Being removed from the 
founder-entrepreneur generation, remote attachment to the business is a compelling 
argument for going public. For families that are in the founder-entrepreneur and first 
generation stage, unlocking the value of the family business is a strong financial 
motivation that will allow the company to expand and to attract outside investors. 
From a business portfolio point of view, listing provides a more objective, discerning 
capital market assessment of the value of a group’s companies. Having a controlling 
owner behind a business group means there is an ultimate oversight of a diverse 
portfolio of assets. For the ultimate owner/s (and in some cases, managers) of a business 
group they can assess which listed assets are performing; which company has the highest 
market value; the best projections for future opportunities; and which companies have 
the best, competent managers running the company.(McVey 1992:14) 
Nevertheless for those business groups who are brave enough to jump through the 
hoops, listing on the stock exchange has a profound effect on the company with the 
financial rewards outweighing the administrative obstacles. For families, listing can 
profoundly alter their relationship or attitude towards the business. Listing is like the 
double-edged sword - on the one hand, listing can be the catalyst in renewing interests 
amongst owners while providing a good injection of liquidity for the business; on the 




certain amount of control and privacy as the family interests in the business are 
scrutinised by outsiders. (Davis 2008: 140) 
2.5.7 Professionalisation and Professional Management 
 
Another sign of maturity and development in a family business is the introduction of 
professional managers. Professional family business management is defined as having 
the “means [of] an in-depth enough understanding of the owner family's dominant goals 
and meanings of being in business (i.e., cultural competence) to be able to make 
effective use of relevant education and experience (i.e., formal competence) in a 
particular family business.” (Hall & Nordqvist 2008: 63) 
Dyer posits three ways in which professional management skills can be introduced into 
the company: 
1. Professionalise members of the owning family so they have the expertise to 
takeover the business 
2. Professionalise non-family employees currently working in the business and 
upskilling these internal candidates; or 
3. Bring in outside professional management talent” (1989: 227-228) 
The first two options are evolutionary and incremental, while the third option is 
revolutionary and signals a significant change. 
The family business literature is replete with accounts and challenges of 
professionalisation as business families realise the natural limitation for internally grown 
management talent (see Hall & Nordqvist 2008, Dyer 1989 and various articles on 
professionalisation from Family Business Review). Professional managers in a business 
may also improve professional conduct practices and counterbalance the “familiarity” 
and “familiness” of family businesses as excessive informality in the family business may 
“lead to unprofessional practices in order to avoid family conflicts.” (Ward 2008:5) 
On the board appointment level, it has been argued that for non-listed firms, competent 
professional outside directors (that may have pre-existing links with the company) is 
preferable over wholly independent outsiders who have no connection to the owner-




The career development path of professional managers in family businesses must also be 
considered as generally family owners try and ensure the senior executive roles are filled 
by family members or owners’ representatives. The issue of nepotism is central in family-
owned businesses and resentment may be fuelled amongst outside professional 
managers who see the careers of family member employees who have not the same 
qualifications and competence as they progress due to their connections rather than 
talent. (Donnelley 1988) Where there is excessive nepotism in place, this will place the 
family business under pressure (Gersick et al 1999: 4-5). Policies regarding mentoring, 
grooming and/supporting of family employee members by professional managers may 
help clarify the latter’s roles and career opportunities in a family business. (Gersick et al 
1997: 128) Similar to listing, professionalisation is a long-term strategy for the viability of 
the business and its owning family.  
2.6 Culture 
 
This section discusses pertinent literature on culture in the Philippines. 
Hofstede’s (1984) landmark research provides a summary on culture’s constituents. 
Hofstede focused on four dimensions of national culture that were a result of his 
research into 40 countries which included the Philippines. These four dimensions are: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism-individualism index and 
masculinity-femininity index (1984: 72, 118, 148 & 190). The aggregate view of all these 
dimensions provides a better appreciation of what makes a national culture distinct from 
another.  
2.6.1 Power Distance 
 
In Hofstede’s power distance index (PDI), the Philippines was considered the country 
where there is “an extremely high PDI score” out of all countries surveyed (1984:102). The 
country topped this index with a score of 94/100 ahead of Mexico (81/100), Venezuela 
(81/100) and India (81/100).20
                                                     
20 In the second edition of his book, Hofstede had Malaysia’s power distance score at 104/100 with 
the Philippines second (2001: 127). 
 The average power distance score was 51/100 with Australia 
having a low power distance score of 36/100 (1984:77). The consequences of a high power 
distance culture in organisations include greater centralisation and a hierarchical 




in a high power distance culture is marked by strong dependency needs, autocratic or 
paternalistic rule and the acknowledgment of authority. (1984:259) 
Arce and Poblador provide support for this delineation of the superior-subordinate 
relationship. In their study, company managers were encouraged to employ “their own 
men” thus creating divided loyalties within a company. Superiors protected subordinates 
who were found guilty of malfeasance, in return superiors commanded loyalty and work 
efficiencies from subordinates. Policies against nepotism were also not enforced. (1977: 
12). Hofstede mentions the colonial legacy in the Philippines and India included 
organisations that were set up by colonial rulers that strongly emphasised a hierarchical 
culture (1984:101-102). Similar to the British experience in India, the Americans did not 
emphasise democracy or equality in Philippines government bureaucracies under their 
colonial rule. Instead, the Americans chose a few selected elites thus failing to practice 
democratic principles advocated by them and reinforcing the country’s stratification. 
The failure to dismantle this hierarchy by local managers after independence ensured 
this form of organising continued. Indeed the top 7 countries in Hofstede’s power index 
were all former colonies. 
2.6.2 Low Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
In Hofstede’s index, the country scores 44/100 of which the mean is 64/100. It is also 
lower than Australia which scored 51/100 (1984 122). This places the country as one where 
the culture tolerates a lot of uncertainty and ambiguity (if not actively embracing it). 
This is perhaps encapsulated by a comment made from one interviewee who stated: “We 
thrive in crisis.” Given the disruption in the country’s economic well being for the last 50 
years, the ability to live with uncertainty is a trait of the Filipino. This is linked to the 
strong collectivist culture in the Philippines where the family takes precedence above the 
state as the state has proven to be untrustworthy. This is also perhaps a reason why 
family-owned business groups are the most common form of organising in the country 
(see arguments made by Morck & Yeung 2004 on trust and family control and previous 
section in this chapter on Business Groups). 
Interestingly, Hofstede also points out that the spiritual aspect of the country may have 
something to do with the level of tolerance for ambiguity (1983:136). While Hofstede 




the Philippines did. Both have strong Catholic cultures and suffered severe historical 
political-economic disruption at the time the study was conducted. Indeed, religion in 
the Philippines is strongly embedded and there is an element of certainty in the 
religious/spiritual side of the country, which perhaps allows the tolerance of the 
uncertainty on the state/civil side.  
2.6.3 Collectivist 
 
This dimension looks at the extent a country’s culture is individualist (emphasising the 
individual or self) or collectivist (group-oriented) (1984:153). In Hofstede’s index, the 
Philippine has a collectivist culture scoring 32/100 in the individualism index which had 
a mean score of 51/100. This index is topped by the USA at 91/100 and followed by other 
Anglo-oriented countries: Australia (90/100), Great Britain (89/100), Canada (80/100), 
Netherlands (80/100) and New Zealand (79/100) (1984:158). The distinguishing features 
for a highly collectivist include the importance of the family and loyalty, a ‘we’ 
consciousness, identification based on one’s place in the social system, and the 
fundamental role of group membership and group decision-making. (1984:171). 
Responsibility belongs to a group rather than an individual, equally, achievement is 
emphasised collectively rather than individually. 
A highly collectivist culture for organisations emphasises loyalty and sense of duty, 
insularity with promotion largely based from the inside and done on seniority (1984:174). 
Accordingly, the collectivist culture of the Philippines complements the high power 
distance index. Together, this provides explanations for the common form of organising 




This index is perhaps the most maligned, misunderstood and controversial out of all the 
other Hofstede indices. In justifying the use of this index, Hofstede explains: 
“This dilemma is the relative strength of nurturance interests (relation with 
manager, cooperation, atmosphere) versus assertiveness interests (earnings, 




are traditionally more ‘feminine’ versus those that are traditionally more 
‘masculine.’ (1984:190) 
In Hofstede’s index, the Philippines is considered a high masculine oriented country 
with a score of 64/100 ahead of Australia at 61/100. The mean is 51/100. Japan tops this list 
at 95/100 with Scandinavian countries at the other end. (1984:189) For this index, 
Hofstede clusters the Philippines with other former colonies of the US and UK (that of 
India, Hong Kong, Singapore) as providing the reason why these countries are 
“masculine risk-takers.” (1984: 219) 
A masculine culture in organisations means a career-oriented culture, higher job stress, 
more industrial conflict, and fewer women in more qualified and better paid jobs; 
therefore women in more qualified jobs are very assertive. (1984:208) 
This index does not refer to gender representation but rather on the stereotypical 
attributes of male versus female characteristics. Indeed, the Philippines by far has the 
highest representation of women on senior management level in public government 
bureaucracies anywhere in the world (The Economist 2007) therefore this index does not 
reflect this gender achievement. However the interviews I conducted with women do 
provide support for Hofstede’s reasoning that women in more qualified jobs are more 
assertive.  
2.6.5 Hofstede’s Indices in the Philippines 
 
Hofstede’s research provides some basic generalisation of Philippine cultural norms. In 
summary, the Philippines according to Hofstede’s study has a very strong hierarchical 
culture that thrives in an uncertain environment. The country is also highly collectivist 





Table 9: Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions in the Philippines 
Index Highest Power 





























94/100 (51) 44/100 (64) 32/100 (51) 64/100 (51) 
 
Combining two of the indices – that of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, the 
Philippines typifies the Southeast Asian country as the top right shaded cell in the 
following table shows: 
Table 10: Four Combinations of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance 
(Hofstede 1984: 216) 
Small Power Distance 
Weak Uncertainty Avoidance 
Countries: Anglo, Scandinavian, 
Netherlands 
Organisation Type: Implicitly structured 
Implicit model of organisation: market 
Large Power Distance 
Weak Uncertainty Avoidance 
Countries: Southeast Asian 
Organisation type: Personal bureaucracy 
Implicit model of organisation: Family 
Small Power Distance 
Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
Countries: German-speaking, Finland, 
Israel 
Organisation type: Workflow bureaucracy 
Implicit model of organisation: Well-oiled 
machine 
Large Power Distance 
Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
Countries: Latin, Mediterranean, Islamic, 
Japan, some other Asian 
Organisation type: Full bureaucracy 
Implicit model of organisation: Pyramid 
Following from Hofstede’s assessment, the following chapters in this thesis provide 
support on why the implicit model of organising in the Philippines is based on the 
family. The cultural elements of the country provide a reason for - and complements - 
the enduring dominance of family-owned business groups in the country and in the 
region. 
2.6.6 Conflict Avoidance – An Additional Cultural Element 
 
While Hofstede’s study is remarkable, his perspective on culture based on four 




Hofstede’s model of national culture and called it “profoundly problematic.” Davel et al 
(2009) tries to address some of Hofstede’s oversight by looking at a more extensive 
plausibility of culture’s impact by studying the cultural perspective of business and 
management across continents. Specifically, their study includes the problems of the 
classical approach towards intercultural management and understanding, the place of 
ethics in a globalised world, and specific aspects of cross-cultural management in 
different societies. 
This thesis does not intend to engage in cross-cultural debate (as it would be beyond its 
scope), nevertheless, Hofstede’s model provides a basis where some understanding of 
culture can be notionally made with certain caveats as I found during my field work. 
Thus, providing a local understanding of Filipino culture comes courtesy of Teehankee 
(2004). Teehankee points out the nexus of Asian and American influences inherent in 
Filipino culture with strong elements of Confucian culture infused especially in Chinese-
Filipino owned business organisations. These elements include a paternalistic authority 
presiding over the organisation, succession and treatment according to family 
relationships. Lee-Chua (1995) also emphasises the importance of familism, personalism 
or familiarity that determine business conduct in the country.  
Related to Hofstede’s individualistic-collective index is the measure of self-reliance-
reciprocity (see Jocano 1980). Individualistic cultures tend to be self-reliant but in the 
Philippines, reciprocity or plainly put: “I scratch your back, you scratch mine” is part of 
belonging in the culture: “Reciprocity highlights the Filipino concern for 
interdependence or being part of a network of social obligations by debts of gratitude (or 
utang na loob).” (2004: 196). Failure to reciprocate is intricately linked to that other 
cultural notion of losing face (or hiya). 
Hofstede catalogued the country as being able to live with high uncertainty. 
Additionally, the country also tends to rate highly on avoiding conflict and 
confrontation. High conflict avoidance in the Philippines is encapsulated in the concept 
of smooth interpersonal relationships (or SIR) which is a variant of the Confucian 
concept of social harmony and is part of social acceptance in the Filipino context (Lynch 
1981). Social acceptance is also encapsulated in “getting along” or pakikisama. Several 




The highly collectivistic nature in the Philippines may blur the lines between work and 
leisure, professionalism and personalism (Teehankee 2004: 220-221). The degree of social 
acceptance also moves along a hierarchy akin to the Maslowian hierarchy of needs (1943) 
where the self-actualisation equivalent is being one with the other. Reproduced in the 
following figure is this path of social acceptance adapted from Lapeña’s 2002 model: 
Figure 5: Path of Social Acceptance adapted from Lapeña (2002) cited in 
Teehankee (2004: 225) 
 
Integrating the perspectives provided by Hofstede and Teehankee, the main cultural 
underpinnings of the Philippines are summarised in the table below: 
Table 11: Integrating Hofstede and Teehankee's Cultural Dimensions in the 
Philippines 
High Power Distance and Elitism Conflict Avoidance and Social Harmony 
Live with Uncertainty and Volatility Collectivist and Family-Orientation 
 
The culture of the Philippines emphasises high power distance and a highly elitist 
culture; conflict avoidance and social harmony, the ability to live with uncertainty and 
volatility, and a culture that appreciates the collective and the importance family plays in 
society. Chapter 4 provides evidence for these cultural elements, in particular, the irony 
of a collectivist culture that is at the same time exclusivist or elitist. 
2.7 Corruption 
 
This section reviews pertinent literature on corruption. Chapter 9 looks at the evidence 

















“…behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; 
or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit) and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).” (Nye 1967: 419) 
For Rose-Ackerman, “corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap. 
It represents the illicit use of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. ” (2008: 
330), Gupta and colleagues looked the contribution of corruption towards income 
inequality and poverty (2002) while Xin and Rudel notes corruption emerges where 
“market economies are small or economic exploitation is great, governments collect few 
taxes and pay their public servants little. Under these circumstances, officials use their 
power to supplement their incomes through corrupt transactions”. Coupled with the lack 
of trust present in corrupt environments, this “mistrust probably elevates the amount of 
corruption that citizens perceive among their public officials.” (2004: 298). 
Corruption, in the Philippines, is sadly endemic and unpredictable. This is not to say 
corruption has always been present in the country. Indeed, Strachan’s study of 
Nicaraguan business groups showed the corruption in Nicaragua made investors favour 
the Philippines in the shipbuilding industry:   
“Corruption also had an immediate and negative impact on the development of 
local industries…[Nicaraguan shipbuilding companies] in spite of some excellent 
natural comparative advantages, lost out in competition to the Philippines due to 
government corruption, administration inefficiency, the abuse of labour, climate 
and pirates. To this day, governmental corruption remains a fact of business life 
in Nicaragua.” (Strachan 1976:113) 
This passage will be familiar to those who are doing business in the Philippines. But this 
may also provide a perspective the country’s climate of corruption has lingered for far 






While corruption is prevalent in East Asia (Gill and Kharas 2007: 313), there is increasing 
focus on the degree of its predictability to affect the effective functioning of governments 
and economies.  
Lee & Oh (2007) classified the variances of corruption in 12 Asian countries according to 
its pervasiveness and arbitrariness. They noted two countries in particular – Indonesia 
and the Philippines - were affected by political corruption that occurred during their 
dictatorships. Their study lends support to the belief that while these two dictators were 
in power, blame could be centralised as corruption itself was centralised. In effect, 
corruption perversely was predictable during this period (2007: 100-101). However, once 
the dictators lost office, unpredictable corruption reigned supreme and it is this 
variability that has had the detrimental effect. Hutchcroft’s 1998 work which looked at 
the applicability of Weberian bureaucracy in Philippine institutions and its limitations21
                                                     
21 In particular this following passage looks at the constraints in visualising a working Weberian 
polity in the Philippines: 
 
“In employing the patrimonial framework, however, it is important not to obscure four critical 
differences between the postcolonial Philippines and the economies societies and polities 
analysed by Weber many decades ago. First, except during the Marcos years, the postwar 
Philippines has not had the clearly identifiable central ruler that Weber, expected to see in 
patrimonial polities. Instead, a nominally strong president of relatively short tenure must make 
major accommodations to “local patrimonial lords” who possess economic power and assume 
quasi-military and quasi-judicial functions in their localities, and are represented at the national 
level in a power legislature. Even under Marcos’ relatively more centralised form of 
patrimonialism, the entrenched power of the oligarchy greatly limited his scope of action. Second, 
Weber would not have imagined the strengthening of patrimonial features in a modernising 
economy. Particularly strange, from his standpoint, would be the existence of a decentralised 
form of patrimonialism in the midst of a money economy well integrated by trade and modern 
communications. Third, Weber’s notion of historical progression does not anticipate the 
‘neopatrimonialism’ that comes in the wake of a more ‘rational-legal’ colonial state. He probably 
would have considered it especially anomalous to find patrimonial features in the ex-colony of the 
world’s most advanced industrial power...The fourth difference is the most fundamental one, and 
is closely related to the other three caveats as well. Simply put, Weber’s patrimonial polities were 
far more self-contained than the postcolonial Philippine polity. On a deeper level, one can say 
that the major reason that patrimonial features in the Philippines diverge to such an extent from 
those found in Weber’s polities lies in the contrast between the external factors that shape the 
Philippine polity and the external environment in which Weber’s polities existed. One cannot 
begin to explain the perpetuation and maintenance of the Philippine state without a careful 
examination of the particularities of its colonial heritage and postwar international environment. 
Precisely because Weber did not anticipate the colonial and post-colonial conditions that help 
perpetuate the existence of weak states, he would not have anticipated anything quite like the 
postcolonial Philippine state. Indeed, the Philippine state does not even fit Weber’s basic 
definition of a state; it lacks an effective monopoly over violence and taxation, and it is too weak 
to maintain control over much of its territory.” (Hutchcroft 1998: 41-42) It must be noted that this 




noted that it was the “great variability of corruption” and less its prevalence that has a 
more serious effect on economies. He argues: 
“…corruption per se is not incompatible with advanced capitalism; indeed one 
can think of myriad examples where the two thrive simultaneously. Rather, it is 
the highly variable corruption that most impedes ‘the development of rational 
economic activity.’ (1998: 41) 
Arbitrariness is also linked to undermined investor confidence (both local and foreign) 
as it creates uncertainty which is detrimental to long-term planning and economic 
development. (Hutchcroft 1998: 253) 
Unpredictable corruption also has an effect on the bureaucracy. Where other countries 
in the region have had bureaucratic corruption, this did not hinder positive economic 
development (see Leff’s 1964 discussion), but the politicised bureaucracy in the 
Philippine has not been able to do the same due in large part to the unpredictability or 
uncertainty of political will. The experience of corruption in Korea (Kang 2002, Dalton 
2005) was more predictable with the tendency for public officials to leave businesses 
alone after paying facilitative fees upfront:  
 “…in the Republic of Korea, although corruption was pervasive (at the time of 
writing in the early 1990s), the person paying the bribe was assured of getting the 
government good that was being paid for and would not need to pay additional 
bribes.” (Gill and Kharas 2007: 327) 
Gill and Kharas also argue centralised corruption worked better as decentralisation 
created uncertainty (2007: 32, 34). The next sections look at the following forms and 
categories of corruption. 
2.7.2 Low-level Opportunistic Pay-Offs 
 
According to Rose-Ackerman low-level opportunistic pay-offs “lead to the inefficient and 
unfair distribution of scarce benefits, undermine the purposes of public programs, 
encourage officials to create red tape, increase the cost of doing business and lower state 
legitimacy.” (2008: 330-331) Not so dissimilar from the traditional principal-agent 
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problem present in agency theory, Rose-Ackerman adapts this to describe the problems 
inherent in the activity of bribing where the principal is the secretary or minister, and 
the agent is the official who is the subordinate (and independent) of the principal: 
“Frequently, bribes induce official to take actions that are against the interests of 
their principals, who may be bureaucratic superiors, politically appointed 
ministers or multiple principals such as the general public. Pathologies in the 
agency/principal relation are at the heart of the corrupt transaction.” (Rose-
Ackerman 2008: 330) 
Low-level opportunistic payoffs occur in the following generic situations and 
summarised in the figure below. 
Figure 6: Summary of low-level opportunistic payoffs (adapted from Rose-
Ackerman 2008) 
 
The first category that allows opportunistic pay-offs is when there is a ‘scarce public 
benefit’ which allows officials the discretion to “assign” this benefit to the one “with the 
highest willingness to pay and the fewest scruples will get the benefit in a corrupt 
system.”(Rose-Ackerman 2008: 330) 
The second category allows officials to render benefits to those who are qualified (such 
as those who are recipients of disaster relief) but monitoring of the officials is imperfect, 
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hence officials may be able to collect bribes and kickbacks to those who are both 
qualified and unqualified. Lack of monitoring or controls give the officials a tremendous 
amount of discretion to be exercised. (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 330) 
The third category, delays in the bureaucratic process, is manifested in long queues that 
deal with administrative matters such as procuring or buying a licence (driver’s, business 
etc). These administrative hurdles or barriers provide “Incentives for corruption arise as 
applicants try to get to the head of the queue or manoeuvre through a complex set of 
requirements. To exploit their corrupt opportunities, officials may create or threaten to 
create more delays as means of extracting bribes.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 330-331) 
The last category is nominally to do with government programs that by their mandate 
provide a source of revenue: “Some government programs impose costs e.g. tax 
collection or possibility by the police. Officials can then extract pay-offs in return for 
overlooking the illegal underpayment of taxes or for tolerating illegal activities such as 
smuggling of both contraband and ordinary goods that are subject to rationing. Even if 
people are not evading the rules, officials demand pay-offs in exchange for refraining 
from arresting them on trumped-up charges.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 331) 
Chapter 9 looks in detail examples of low-level opportunistic pay-offs in the country. 
2.7.3 Grand or Systemic 
 
Grand or systemic corruption is corruption on the systemic level affecting the whole of 
government. In grand corruption, accumulated corruption of low-level opportunistic 
pay-offs have become institutionalised. Instead of being seen as an anomaly, it is part of 
life: 
“[Systemic corruption] implicates an entire bureaucratic hierarchy, electoral 
system, or governmental structure from top to bottom…when corruption reaches 
the highest levels; it is also likely to prevail lower down as a way of buying the 
support of petty officials.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 330) 
There are three features of grand corruption. This form of high level corruption is 
characterised by a branch of government being a mere bribe-generation machine; having 
a corrupt electoral system; and government contracts being politicised highly influenced. 




an indication of a profound malaise and “can be more deeply destructive of state 
functioning bringing the state to the edge of outright failure and undermining the 
economy.” This is true especially for “a post-conflict state that is already fragile can be a 
breeding ground for high-level malfeasance.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 331) The following 
figure shows the effects this type of corruption has on the public sector, the country’s 
citizens and the cost to government: 
Figure 7: Grand or Systemic Corruption (adapted from Rose-Ackerman 2008) 
 
While the Philippines is not a post-conflict state like Afghanistan or Iraq, various and 
bloodless coups d’état over the years especially from sections of the military have created 
an unstable and fragile nation-state. This gradual descent into dysfunctionality has 
permeated sections of the bureaucracy, the electoral system and at the same time, 
strengthened the hold of oligarchical political families while further disempowering the 
majority of the populace. 
The next section provides a background on forms of systemic corruption present in the 
country: judicial, electoral and in bidding for government contracts. 
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2.7.3.1 Judicial Corruption: Les Cahiers de Doléances 
“Fortunate is a land that lives in confidence under the rule of law, with elected 
parliaments, uncorrupted officials and independent judges.” 
- Former Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby in Marr (2009b) 
In pre-revolutionary France when the power of the King was absolute, les cahiers de 
doléances - or formal lists of grievances – were a way to let the absolute ruler know of his 
subjects’ discontent.22
On grievances of a legal bent, “the cahiers were highly detailed in dealing with legal 
matters because they were clearly intended to provide the Crown with the necessary 
information and the political mandate to initiate reform legislation. The specific 
accusations of judicial corruption in the cahiers are all the more significant in view of the 
fact that a high proportion of deputies [cf. congressmen or members of parliament] were 
legal officials or legal practitioners of some kind.” (1988: 98) 
 In Sawyer’s study of les cahiers de doléances submitted under the 
reign of Louis XIII, the grievances “contain articles of all kinds suggesting fiscal, legal and 
social reform…and requested the king to solve almost every major financial, 
administrative and social problem in the realm (Sawyer 1988: 98, 102)  
Of position and power, the grievances evoke the stratified society of the time and the 
lack of trust in the interpreters and decision makers of the law as “the large number of 
articles concerning judicial abuses and corruption…focus on problems that many of the 
deputies must have witnessed first-hand – irregularities in procedure, ineffective 
procedures, nepotism, the excessive venality of judicial officials, the costs of litigation, 
delays and subterfuges engendered by the appeals process, and improper conduct on the 
part of a wide range of judicial officials – from presidents and sergeants-at-arms to court-
appointed trustees handling property sequestered by the courts.” (1988: 103-104) 
The insular and incestuous circle of the judicial elite was reflected in the “venality…of 
judges and legal officials using their public offices for private gain. Nepotism, fraud, 
subversion of due process, and abuse of influence were other ways in which judges, 
lawyers and lesser officials worked the system to their advantage. The nobility and clergy 
painted a grim picture of judicial tyranny in jurisdictions where a single family or faction 
had gained control of the local sovereign court.” (1988: 107) 
                                                     
22 A more comprehensive history and content analysis of “les cahiers de doléances” submitted in 
the years immediately before the 1789 French Revolution can be found in the magisterial work by 




Other instances of corruption described in the cahiers were fraud, extortion, 
incompetence, abuse of influence, illegal procedures and improper dispensations (1988: 
109). In the end, history is the judge of these cahiers. 17th century France was an unstable 
environment wracked internally by religious wars and externally by conflicts waged 
against Habsburg dominance of Europe. The powder keg that was feudal France erupted 
150 years later with the storming of the Bastille. A terrible beauty was born that forever 
changed the political landscape of Europe. 
The cahiers provide an insight in the populace’s discontent, however the content of these 
documented grievances share thematic criticisms in the current Philippine legal system. 
History will again be the judge on how the present legal grievances in the country are 
(un)addressed. The problems in the Philippine judiciary show the systemic corruption 
present in this branch of society. 
Figure 8: Branch of the Public Sector is a Bribe-Generating Machine 
 
Chapter 9 looks in detail examples of systemic corruption in the judiciary in the 
Philippines and observations from the private sector on how it affects the perception of 
the country as lacking the rule of law. 
2.7.3.2 Elections  
The second type of grand or systemic corruption is manifested in the electoral system 
with a nominal democracy as the following figure shows: 
Figure 9: Nominal Democracy may have a Corrupt Electoral System 
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In contrast, in the Philippines, presidential and senate elections are prime opportunities 
for corrupt behaviour to present itself. An example of the corruption of the electoral 
process is over the issue of vote-buying which has long been documented in the 
Philippines. In 1978, Rose-Ackerman noted the Philippines as exemplifying this type of 
corruption:  
In the case of its federal election in 2007, the results of the 
voting were known by the end of the day with the country electing a new Prime Minister. 
By all intents and purposes it was a successful election. The administrative body was 
successful in its role as it did not make nor was it the source of any news (except to 
pronounce the results of the voting). 
“The best contemporary example is the Philippines: Direct per capita campaign 
expenditures are the highest in the world and in addition, 10-20% of the 
electorate is reported to sell its vote; wealthy elites provide most of the campaign 
funds in the hope that individualised benefits distributed at election time will 
prevent the poor from organising to dislodge the wealthy from power.” (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 38) 
The administrative body, the Commission for Elections (COMELEC), in some cases was 
and made the news. Results of the voting in the 2007 Philippine senate elections were 
not known until at least some weeks afterwards. Chapter 9 looks in detail the 2007 
elections and its aftermath. 
2.7.3.3 Bidding for Government Contracts 
The third type of grand or systemic corruption is bidding for government contracts as 
the figure below shows: 
Figure 10: Government Contracts allow Influence-Peddling for High-Level 
Politicians 
 
Out of all the three types of systemic corruption, this type of corruption actively engages 
                                                     
23 http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/index.htm accessed 23 March 2009 
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the private sector. Grand corruption brings “the state to the edge of outright failure and 
undermining the economy.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 331): 
“…governments regularly contract for major construction projects, allocate 
natural resource concessions and privatise state-owned firms. High level 
politicians can use their influence to collect kickbacks from private firms. If the 
conflict destroyed a country’s infrastructure, this type of corruption will be a 
particular risk because of the high costs (and the potential for high kickbacks) of 
the reconstruction effort.” (Rose-Ackerman 2008: 331) 
Corruption in Philippine infrastructure projects is rife and this is where most private 
sector participants of this research lamented the state of dysfunctionality in their 
relationship with government counterparts. 
2.7.4 Effect on Poverty and Corporate Governance 
 
Corruption contributes to the large presence of the informal sector of the country. 
Where a predatory state “squeezes the formal sector without pity and without limit” an 
informal economy follows (Marcouiller & Young 1995: 630). The high presence of the 
informal economy in the country is only matched by corruption’s poignant effect on the 
country’s poverty. 
Endemic corruption and endemic poverty are intricately linked. Poverty increases 
corrupt activities while corruption contributes to poverty. According to Xin and Rudel, 
poverty creates opportunities for corruption and engenders such a culture (2004: 298): 
“When market economies are small or economic exploitation is great, 
governments collect few taxes and pay their public servants little. Under these 
circumstances, officials use their power to supplement their incomes through 
corrupt transactions. A culture of corruption emerges from these impoverished 
settings.” (2004: 298) 
Corruption’s vicious cycle is well-documented in various studies (Heidenheimer & 
Johnston 2008) that show how it is detrimental to growth, inefficient allocation of public 
resources and deterrence of foreign investment. (Gupta et al 2002: 24)  In an extensive 
quantitative study on how corruption affects income inequality and poverty, Gupta et al 




“Corruption can affect income inequality and poverty through various channels 
through various channels including overall growth, biased tax systems, and poor 
targeting of social programs as well as through its impact on asset ownership, 
human capital formation, education inequalities and uncertainty in factor 
accumulation.” (2002: 25) 
Thus, Gupta et al’s study supports the business group theories of market failure and 
resource dependence as high ownership concentration in the private sector is 
symptomatic of endemic public sector corruption. (2002: 26). Their study also indicates 
how a small increase in corrupt activity has a significant negative effect on the poor 
(2002: 37). Corruption’s effect on poverty cannot be understated. To address poverty in 
the Philippines, corruption must be tackled: 
“Policies that reduce corruption will most likely reduce income inequality and 
poverty. The evidence gives support to political economy considerations that 
benefits of corruption and bribing public officials are captured primarily by the 
rich and better-connected individuals.” (Gupta et al 2002: 38, 40) 
Corruption and poverty go hand-in-hand. Corruption is symptomatic of a society that is 
unequal and unstable.  
Finally, there is emergent literature on the impact of corporate governance and 
corruption. In a 2005 paper, Xun Wu suggests that improved corporate governance 
contributes to addressing and even reducing corruption. Wu states that increased 
transparent practices may provide a catalyst to corruption’s stranglehold and break up 
the vicious cycle: 
“Corporate governance can well become a critical ingredient to break a vicious 
cycle of bribery and corruption. This vicious cycle starts when firms are forced 
into bribery practices because of a high level of corruption, but widened 
participation of firms in bribery practices further feeds into the perception of 
high corruption, which in turn makes the bribery practices even more 
uncontrollable. The analysis of the linkage between corporate governance and 
corruption suggests that the improvement in corporate governance may be a 
catalyst to break the vicious cycle of bribery and corruption. Companies with 




higher valuation in the market….better corporate governance also helps reduce 
bribery practices at the firm level, which potentially can further increase the 
valuation of firms. At the country level, improvement in corporate governance 
may help a country with high level of corruption to partially offset the negative 
impacts of the perception of corruption on the flow of capital (both financial and 
human), and the additional capital induced by good corporate government serves 
as catalyst for further improvement in both corporate governance and the 
governance of the public sector.”(2005:168-169) 
Wu’s point that practising good corporate governance rewards the practitioners is 
supported in a 2002 McKinsey and Company Global Investor Opinion Survey which 
found there was higher valuation for better governed companies in corrupt 
environments. The premium investors would pay for a well governed company in the 
Philippines was an average of 22%. (McKinsey 2002: Exhibit 4) Similar results were found 
by Durnev and Kim in their survey of 859 companies in 27 countries, supporting the 
financial link of well-governed companies in not so well-governed countries: 
“…an individual company’s reputation for effective governance and transparency 
scores is more important than the surrounding legal environment in determining 
its value; or to put it another way, companies can rise above their legal 
settings.…[C]ompanies with higher governance and transparency scores 
command higher values—and that this governance valuation effect is more 
pronounced in countries with weaker legal systems. These results send a 
powerful message of hope to companies, investors, and policymakers in emerging 
economies with limited institutional protection of minority shareholders. 
Companies that establish and maintain reputations for good governance and 
transparency are likely to be rewarded by investors with higher valuations.” 
(Durnev & Kim 2007) 
Chapter 9 looks at the impact of corruption on Philippine society and how corporate 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter discusses the method I have undertaken for this research. The following 
table summarises my research methodology: 
Table 12: Summary of Research Methodology 
Research Design Qualitative – Ethnographic style approach combining 
deductive (hypothesis testing) and inductive inquiries 
Research Question What is the impact of post-1997 corporate governance reforms 
in Philippine institutions and Philippine firms? 
Data Collection and 
Method  
Triangulation: Interview Questionnaire, Media Articles and 
Participant Observation  
Unit of Analysis Corporate governance institutions and firms in the Philippines 
Data Analysis Computer program: NVivo 
 
My research design is an ethnographic style approach combining both deductive and 
inductive aspects of qualitative research. With regards to the deductive method, my 
research contributes to different theories and their further development by testing 
hypotheses rather than generating them. With regards to the inductive aspects, I used 
elements of ethnographic research to place those hypotheses development within the 
context of the wider, richer business environment. I collected data using the triangulated 
method of in-depth interviews, collection of media articles and personal participation. 
My unit of analysis was corporate governance institutions and firms and I analysed the 
data using the computer program, NVivo. 
3.1 Previous Research 
 
In designing the research, it is useful to provide a brief summary of previous research 
that have briefly touched on corporate governance in the Philippines. Quantitative 
research into corporate governance in the East Asian region after the crisis is substantial 
(see Claessens, Djankov & Xu 2000, and Mitton 2002). Pertinent post-crisis Philippine 
country studies I have come across include a monograph by the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) East Asia Analytical Unit called The Philippines: 
Beyond the Crisis (1998) and an edited book called The Philippine Economy by Balisacan 
and Hill (2003). 




the rich and poor and studies into ethnic Chinese-Filipino businessmen and their over-
representation in the economy (Datt & Hoogeveen 2003; Armstrong et al 2001; Jomo & 
Folk 2003). Echanis (2006) explored corporate governance in the Philippine financial 
services while Dumlao (2006) look at its economic assessment. On a micro level, 
Santiago (2000) used a case study approach to find about the succession planning 
experiences in Philippine family businesses. Across the Celebes Sea, Sato examined the 
corporate governance of six business groups in Indonesia (2004) and also applied a case 
study approach. The Indonesian business environment shares some similarities with the 
Philippines – high concentration of family ownership and an over-representation of 
ethnic Chinese businesses. The Santiago (2000) and Sato (2004) studies demonstrate 
how a qualitative approach towards corporate governance can yield a broader 
understanding of the corporate governance environment of a country. 
Specific publications on Philippine corporate governance include The Philippines 
chapter by Cesar Saldaña in Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia (ADB 2001), 
Celso Vivas’ practice-oriented handbook on corporate governance in the Philippines 
(2003), two chapters on Philippine corporate governance by Alfonso et al (on engaging 
the private sector into incorporating corporate governance reforms) and Lamberte & 
Manlañit (quantitative study on Philippine financial institutions) appear in Ho’s 2005 
edited book on South East Asian corporate governance. Finally, there is also Gregorio 
Navarro’s (2007) edited book on specific company case studies in Philippine corporate 
governance.  
3.2 Contribution of this Research 
 
Where my research provides a unique perspective is the approach I have taken. I have 
applied the ethnographic method. Compared to previous research that have in large part 
been quantitative and qualitative case studies surveys into Philippines corporate 
governance, my research uses the ethnographic method to discover the profound impact 
of corporate governance reforms on organisations and firms. My research also fills the 
void in providing greater understanding of the complicated dynamics involved in 
business-government relationship in the context of the introduction of corporate 
governance reforms. This approach provides an overall picture from the macro-, meso- 
and micro perspective that allows the reader to see corporate governance reforms in the 




part of a process that has multiple players, stakeholders (and their various interests) and 
histories.  
Formulating the research topic to come up with something doable, achievable and 
something new was the reasoning behind pursuing this qualitative method of research. 
The results in this research bear witness to the field of contests and tensions when these 
reforms were introduced. How did these reforms come about? How were they 
introduced? What was the reaction? What wasn’t considered? What is the long-term 
outcome of these reforms? 
Thus, I had no hesitation in ensuring that the design of my research was qualitative in 
order to gain a richer, profound and wider understanding that mere statistics could not 
unveil. Indeed, Claessens et al (2000) quantitative study provides an indication but not 
an explanation of why concentration of corporate ownership in the Philippines and other 
parts of East Asia are high. My results chapters (especially 6A) complement their 
quantitative survey by providing evidence on why such a state of ownership exists in the 
country, and in turn provides support for Carney’s (2008) treatise on development of 
business groups. 
The findings of my research provide a contextual account of corporate governance in the 
country. 
3.3 Research Question 
 
My research is motivated by the following overarching research question: 
What is the impact of post-1997 corporate governance reforms in Philippine 
institutions and Philippine firms? 
The structure of this question is as follows: 
• Post-1997 signifies the period of study. The pivotal year is 1997 which is the year 
of the East Asian crisis. The research proposes to study corporate governance reforms 
that were implemented after the crisis. 
• Corporate governance reforms primarily refer to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance; secondly they refer to other relevant codes and principles of 




bodies such as the international financial institutions (IFIs). The theoretical bases are 
institutional isomorphism, and convergence theory. 
• Philippine institutions include government and private sector regulatory bodies. 
The theoretical bases are institutional isomorphism, politicisation. 
• Philippine firms refer to private sector firms and they include firms that are 
family-controlled, ethnic-based, government-owned and foreign subsidiaries. The nature 
of Philippine corporate ownership and control is such that publicly listed firms are, in 
most cases, privately owned usually by family holding companies. The theoretical bases 
are agency theory, resource-based view, business groups and stakeholder theory.  
3.4 Research Design 
 
The design of this research uses an ethnographic approach combining both deductive 
and inductive form of inquiries. The ethnographic method is used to understand the 
‘insider’s point of view’ (Gibson & Brown 2009: 49). According to Angrosino, 
“Ethnography is the art and science of describing a human group – its institutions, 
interpersonal behaviours, material productions, and beliefs.” (2007: 14) and its 
researchers are "primarily concerned with the routine, everyday lives of the people they 
study.” (2007: 15). Furthermore, ethnographic methods are used when “the social issues 
or behaviours are not yet clearly understood.” (Angrosino 2007: 22). 
The approach I have taken fits in the ethnographic style as I wanted to find out the 
meaning of corporate governance to people and understand the context of corporate 
governance reform in the country. Having a qualitative research approach allowed me to 
study the phenomenon of corporate governance in the Philippines in situ.  
Had I focused on studying existing financial data in the Philippines, as others have done 
before such as Claessens et al (2000) ground breaking work on control and ownership in 
the region, it would not have explained the context such as the political and business 
environmental factors that shape corporate governance in the country. In this sense, 
generating data than using existing one allows a deeper layer of meaning and 
understanding why concentration of ownership is justified in an unstable political 
environment.  




details of actions and events that provide meaning and understanding – in this research, 
of how corporate governance was shaped informed and introduced in the country. The 
analogy of the ethnographer as traveller, translator and discoverer was pointed out by 
Geertz: 
“Doing ethnography is like trying to read a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of 
ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries, 
but written not in conventionalised graphs of sound but in transient examples of 
shaped behaviour.” (Geertz 1973: 9-10) 
This was the situation I faced in the Philippines – trying to understand Philippine 
corporate governance amidst the mix of complex socio-political and economic forces. As 
pointed out by Gibson & Brown (2009), the research process is rarely linear although 
there is, like any novel, a beginning, a middle and an end.  
I applied some elements of a structure-functionalist ethnographic approach (Angrosino 
2007:4) during my field study by interacting with people whom I had previously had 
little prior contact with. As an outsider, this allowed me to study how the private sector 
and regulatory organisations were organised. The strong family culture in the Philippines 
was reflected in the dominance of family-owned business groups and to an extent a 
substantial part of my results support traditional ethnographic studies of kinship where 
“family ties are...the ‘glue’ that hold societies together” (Angrosino 2007).  
However, mine was not the traditional ethnographic method as I did not observe my 
interviewees everyday though I saw a select group of interviewees on different occasions, 
several times, out of the formal interview setting to discuss and explain a broader picture 
of how the country was run. It was there in the informality of a social setting that they 
could be more frank and provide the context of how they saw the country, how they 
lived in the country and conducted their business in the country. Attending other 
functions by participating in the corporate governance workshops of chambers of 
commerce meetings allowed me to observe how the business environment worked. 
Thus, parts of my research support the field-based, inductive and holistic approach of 
ethnography. 
Throughout my results chapters, I have written up case study boxes that contain 




provide contextual elements of how corporate governance operated in the country. 
These case study boxes explain extraneous insights of the business environment. These 
stories are told in realistic, confessional and impressionistic modes (Angrosino 2007: 16) 
to capture the different elements and events that occurred during my data collection. 
These boxes are intended to provide an extra layer of understanding. During my time in 
the field, I also kept a diary as I was also a participant observer. Being in the Philippines, 
I conducted my research both as a subjective participant and objective observer.  
My experience of the research process has been that of trying to ride out the undulating 
waves of inspiration and thought. During my initial literature review, certain topics 
appealed and different avenues opened to pursue this archaeological discovery. I began 
with institutional theories and corporate governance theories of the firm but during my 
data collection, it became clear that I required more knowledge of the corruption 
literature which was not a common study in corporate governance research. Re-
acquaintance with the literature occurred after my fieldwork as I digested research on 
business groups, business families, family-owned corporations and, of course, 
corruption. I also realised that my type of research fell into the economic sociology 
domain – something that I had hitherto little exposure to, but in the wake of completing 
my data collection, found affinity with. 
Given the preponderance of literature and theoretical perspectives on corporate 
governance, the top-down theory approach24
                                                     
24 Gibson and Brown describe top-down theory as “any theory that has been formulated prior to 
empirical work, either by other theorists or by the researcher themselves. Theory in this sense 
may provide a way of posing empirical questions.” (2009:20) 
 worked best in the preliminary design of 
the study and I initially envisioned my research as a primarily deductive study. However, 
this deterministic approach changed during my fieldwork as it became clear from the 
initial data collected (in my early interviews) that the local environment was producing 
factors that were missing from the corporate governance theories such as the importance 
government played in determining and influencing corporate governance practice. 
Coupled with my increasing awareness of the impact corruption had in the country early 
on in my data collection, a top-down approach on corporate governance research could 
only be applied to some extent and that if I continued to pursue this approach, my 




Thus, combining both the deductive and inductive perspective; allowed me as a 
researcher an appreciation of existing corporate governance perspectives whilst realising 
its limitations which were going to be supplemented by what I was yet to discover and 
which I eventually discovered in the inductive phase. Appreciating this combination 
helped in organising my thought processes of the external factors that affected corporate 
governance which in my initial reading of the corporate governance literature had not 
emphasised enough.  
In one of the methods I applied – the interview questionnaire - I had open-ended 
questions that combined the deductive method (which acknowledged prior theoretical 
contributions) and the inductive method (which allowed my interviewees to articulate 
how their personal experience of corporate governance) resulting in a better 
appreciation and more well-rounded explanation of the actual functioning of corporate 
governance practice in the country. 
I also used aspects familiar with the ethnographic research approach in my method and 
which I applied during my data collection. While I had a questionnaire that set out 
corporate governance questions, I also made room for other aspects of research 
collection such as keeping a journal, and collecting newspaper articles that were 
pertinent to the business environment and corporate governance. In my data analysis, 
the combination of both inquiries saw the development of several categories that were 
not in my initial research such as several nodes relating to corruption (see later section 
on Data Analysis). 
Hence my research inquiry can be split into two phases: the deductive which was 
primarily derived from the theoretical literature review, which generated hypotheses and 
were tested during the data collection; and the inductive inquiry which allow the data to 
speak for itself by allowing the exploration of other elements that had an impact on 
corporate governance reform in the country. The inductive inquiry was present from the 
data collection phase onwards, and developed further in post-data collection phase when 
I reacquainted with the literature. Both phases combined to answer the principal 
research question and the outcome is this thesis. The following flowchart summarises 






Figure 11: Flowchart Combining Deductive and Inductive Methods of Inquiry 
  
 
3.5 Hypotheses Development and Testing  
 
Hypotheses development and testing are uncommon in the form of qualitative research I 
have undertaken. Hypothesis development is a form of theory testing as opposed to 
theorising – the former is more present in quantitative inquiries, the latter (with the lack 
of hypothesis development) lends itself to general qualitative inquiries. The use of 
hypotheses in quantitative analyses generally “[stipulate] a relationship between two or 
more variables” (Gibson and Brown 2009:139). Sutton and Straw (1995) explain 
hypotheses are concise statements about what is expected to occur, not why is it 
expected to occur. Lundberg (1976) elaborates on hypothesis development that requires 
the researcher to having knowledge of, or acquaintance with the phenomenon/a being a 
studied, a thorough knowledge of the subject, and an ingrained paradigm. 
I had accumulated knowledge and familiarity with corporate governance theories as an 
employee of a corporate governance research centre so I was acquainted with the 
theoretical foundations of corporate governance. Indeed, I had developed, generated and 
formulated my hypotheses prior to data collection in order to guide me and to provide 
focus on my line of research. I did not construct them during the course of data 
collection. 
Admittedly, in this research I was working from a functionalist/positivist paradigm. 
Both phases combined to answer research question :  What is the impact 
of post-1997 corporate governance reforms in Philippine institutions 
and Philippine firms?
Phase 2: Inductive method of inquiry during data collection and further 
developed in post-data collection consultation and reacquiantance with 
literature
Phase 1: Deductive method of inquiry with hypotheses after reading of 




While aspects of my results chapters point to class and elite studies where the Marxist 
research paradigm might provide further explanation of the existing political balance, 
such an approach would go beyond the scope of my research and other studies have 
focused on that (see for example the works by arguably the most well-known and 
internationally regarded Philippine academic, Walden Bello).  
Extending and limiting research has always proven to be contentious and the lesson I 
have learnt through this research journey is that I can but study a sliver of the 
phenomenon in order to contribute and further the development of knowledge. In 
essence, my research was not focused on class struggle but stood in the periphery of it 
though to live in the country, one was always made conscious of the disparity between 
the rich and the poor, and I appreciated the context in which my study was occurring. 
However my research is primarily concerned with how institutions and organisations 
reacted to external reforms. In this sense, my paradigm was situated with the 
functionalists though my approach has been but a cookie-cutter version of it. I believe 
the combined methods of appreciating both deductive and inductive aspects of research 
allowed me to study an overall picture of corporate governance in the country. The 
uneasiness for qualitative researchers to undertake forms of hypotheses development 
and testing stem from the perspective that qualitative research seeks to further explore 
the rich, contextual data with the “aim not to think in polarised ways about the 
relationship between variables, but to interrogate the character and complex inter-
relational nature between intricately specified and defined phenomena.” (Gibson & 
Brown 2009: 139) 
In this sense my research follows Glaser & Strauss’ conception of a hypothesis where they 
regard it as “a way of postulating the relation between different aspects of an analytic 
framework.” (Gibson & Brown 2009: 139). As I did not seek to build theory but further 
contribute to existing theory, my hypotheses define “the relationship between two or 
more features of an analytic framework that can be empirically tested.” (Gibson & Brown: 
131). 
The hypotheses in this research are as follows: 
H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar 




This hypothesis compares corporate governance policies in the Philippines with Western 
principles of corporate governance such as the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. This hypothesis is based on finding evidence of institutional isomorphism 
and aspects of convergence theory interspersed with capitalist varieties of development. 
Chapter 4 on the Business and Corporate Governance Environment supports this 
hypothesis with an account of the introduction of corporate governance by co-opting a 
select group of people in the Philippines, while Chapter 5 on Regulators also provides 
support for this hypothesis. Results from the hypothesis testing contribute to further 
theoretical development by giving reasons and accounting for the limitations and 
usefulness of institutional isomorphism. 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and 
firms will not diverge from indigenous customs. 
This hypothesis recognises that form and substance are two very different things. This 
hypothesis acknowledges that while the OECD principles are a strong influence, they 
remain a template and will be shaped by the local environment. Chapters 4 to 7 provide 
support for this hypothesis, supplemented by evidence from the results of the inductive 
inquiry in Chapters 8 and 9. 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance 
practices are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships. 
This hypothesis looks at Philippine firms and corporate governance theories of the firm. 
This hypothesis tries to establish whether separation of ownership and control in the 
firm has occurred such as the presence of outside directors on the management board 
and the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles. Given the dominance of agency 
theory in corporate governance research, this hypothesis is the main test for this theory 
in this research.  
Chapters 6 and 7 clearly shows that this hypothesis was not supported due in large part 
to the ownership arrangements of a firm. While this hypothesis disproves traditional 
agency theory, results indicate support for other corporate governance theories of the 
firm including resource-based view, business groups, stakeholder and the principal-
principal branch of agency theory (or agency theory II; see Chapter 2 Agency Theory). In 




a text box) offered firm evidence disproving hypothesis 3. This provides support for 
Kvale’s statement that hypothesis testing can take place within a single interview where 
“an interviewer’s questions test out a subject’s concept of an issue” (2007:38). Chapter 8 
also provides hints of agency conflict where the principal is the government but due to 
the politicisation in the country, the agent (being the government bureaucracy or 
organisation) does not operate independently of the principal (the government or 
executive/president). 
The theoretical framework for the deductive part of my research is as follows in the 
figure with hypothesis 1 at the centre: 
Figure 12: Testing three hypotheses 
 
Corporate governance reforms are at the centre of the research and therefore in the 
middle column of this figure. Hypothesis 1 (H1) is being tested to find out the similarities 
in the reforms in the Philippines. The relevant theory for this hypothesis is institutional 
isomorphism. The impact of corporate governance reforms on the two main units of 
analyses - institutions and firms - lie on the left and right respectively and H2 and H3 
tests the impact of these reforms. H2 and H3 are tested in firms, while only H2 is tested 
with institutions. H3’s relevant theories are corporate governance theories of the firm 
and business group development. These hypotheses primarily test the form and 
Institutions [Regulators] 







Firms [Private Sector] 
(Agency Theory, 
Stakeholder, Resource-
Based View, Business 
Groups)
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substance of corporate governance reforms in the country, a basis from which the 
inductive part of my research builds upon. 
The results chapters prove and disprove these hypotheses and the outcomes are 
summarised in the following table: 
Table 13: The Results Chapters, Relevant Theories, Deductive Hypotheses and 
Results 
Chapter Title Theory/ies Hypothesis Hypotheses 
supported? 












YES to both 
Chapter 5 Regulators Institutional 
Theory 
H1, H2 and 
inductive method 
inquiry 
YES to both 


















Chapter 8 Government 
Financial 
Institutions 
Politicisation H1; H2; H3 (with 




Chapter 9 Corruption Varieties of 
Capitalism 
No hypothesis testing in this 
chapter (inductive method results) 
 
Information on the theoretical oversight of each chapter can be found in Chapter 2: 
Literature Review.  
Chapters 4-8 tested, proved and disproved my hypotheses. Consistently throughout 
these chapters Hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported while Hypothesis 3 was not. 
Hypothesis 3, which dealt with traditional agency theory, unequivocally is not supported 
in the country. In Chapter 9 there was no hypothesis testing as it was purely the outcome 
of the inductive part of my research.  
Iteratively, my hypotheses form the deductive part of my research and provided a base 
from which I could explore and conduct the inductive part of my research. The deductive 




helped me overcome the problem commonly associated with deductive inquiries:  that 
the deductive method is constricting and may “get in the way of discovery.” (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990: 49) 
I did not remain constrained by the straitjacket of choosing one inquiry over the other 
but allowed both to emerge naturally and serendipitously as the research progressed. I 
sincerely believe there should be more encouragement to appreciate the use of 
hypothesis testing for this type of qualitative inquiry where one does not necessarily wish 
to purely undertake the grounded theoretical approach to research, nor the restrictive 
quantitative analysis approach more commonly associated in deductive inquiries.  
I believe combining both deductive and inductive methods of inquiry has allowed me to 
produce an extensive account of the impact of corporate governance reforms in the 
Philippines. While only part of my results has directly been the outcome from my 
hypothetical testing, they provide, explain and contribute to the theories I have used and 
cited in this research. Complementing this basis is the glory that is qualitative data in 
that the text has allowed multifaceted explanations of the phenomenon as a result of the 
inductive part of my research. 
I see the deductive part/hypothesis testing of my research to be at the core and the 
inductive part of my research explaining the rest of the phenomenon which I had 
initially overlooked and could not be gained from mere reading of the literature. 
3.6 Data Collection 
 
This section looks at the data collection methods that were applied in my research. The 
following research techniques were used: interviews, document analysis of media articles 
and other text, and participant observation.  
3.6.1 Interviews 
 
Kvale has a fitting metaphor for the interviewer – as a miner who digs and unearths 
knowledge; and as a traveller – someone who journeys to a faraway land and returns to 
tell his/her adventures. (2007: 19-20). I’d like to say I was a both a miner and traveller.  
Interviews were the primary source of my data collection during my field research in 




as interviewing is “inextricably and unavoidably, historically, politically and contextually 
bound.” (Fontana & Frey 2005: 695). As Angrosino beautifully describes it, the 
ethnographic interview is “a kind of partnership in which the informed insider helps the 
researcher develop the inquiry as it goes along.” (2007: 42) 
I conducted a semi-structured open-ended interview as this allowed me to combine both 
deductive and inductive inquiries – to test my hypotheses whilst exploring, allowing and 
not restricting the flow of data. Indeed, the interview as a form of “continual hypothesis 
testing, where interviewer tests hypothesis with the interplay of direct questions, 
counter-questions, leading questions and probing questions”(Kvale 2007: 86) was a 
situation I became familiar with over the course of my data collection. 
My interview data provides the validity to the phenomenon I observed during my 
research – it is a collection of people’s experiences and views of corporate governance 
and personal interaction with my interviewees. My data collection phase does support 
the structure-functionalist approach that “the data are objectively real; the 
circumstances in which those data are collected cannot easily be replicated.” (Angrosino 
2007:4) Indeed, given the short four months I collected my data, the data does reflect the 
validity of views on corporate governance in 2007 so the time aspect of the data 
collection is high. According to Angrosino, undertaking a structure-functionalist 
ethnographic approach does tend to serve an “inductive rather than a deductive agenda 
for scientific inquiry.” (2007: 5). Further supporting this approach, throughout my data 
collection I took the view of trying to be objective by keeping to the interview schedule 
and interpreting “people’s beliefs and behaviours...as real social facts” (Angrosino 2007: 
4). Appendix 1 provides a copy of the questionnaire I used to interview my respondents. 
3.6.1.1 Pre-Departure 
Despite being born in the Philippines, I have had little connection to my country of 
birth. Until my research I had no professional or corporate connections in the country. 
Some thought I could be possibly related to a clan in Cebu given I shared a surname with 
that business family only to disappoint them. I grew up in Australia and apart from a 
couple of short trips to visit family and relatives; I had little to do with the Philippines in 
the last 20 years. As one of the many millions of the Philippine diaspora, focusing my 
PhD on corporate governance in a country I knew of, but had little intimate knowledge 




In gauging the level of research interest for this project, I cold-contacted many 
organisations in the Philippines usually via email, some via phone or letter, requesting if 
they were interested in being interviewed for my corporate governance research. Out of 
all of the organisations I interviewed, I made contact with two organisations whilst in 
Sydney. One was the regulator, the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE); and another was 
from the private sector, the business group Ayala Corporation.  
Without the response from these two organisations, I would have had to seriously 
reconsider the practicalities in undertaking this thesis. I am forever grateful for the 
response from these two organisations gave to a budding researcher, a stranger from 
another land, who trusted the electronic means of communications to someone they 
hadn’t seen before nor had knowledge of. The openness and frankness in the email 
exchange with these organisations established a pre-departure interviewer-interviewee 
rapport which was reinforced when I arrived in the country and met my interviewees 
face to face. 
For all the trepidation I had that one of the biggest challenges I had would be accessing 
people and organisations because the country and the culture valued relationships, ‘who 
you know’ mattered more, than ‘what you know’ – connections versus meritocracy – 
these two organisations showed a level of openness, transparency and disclosure to 
questions which encouraged this study and my research trip.  
By luck, fate or chance, the doubts I had in collecting data in the Philippines vanished. I 
had at least two organisations I could interview if I went to the Philippines, and they 
were two organisations that were pivotal in my research and played important roles in 
the corporate governance environment of the country.  
To the Ayala Group and the PSE – your responses encouraged my initial foray and 
allowed me to expand this into a proper doctoral research. Thank you. 
3.6.1.2 Ethical Clearance and Funding of the Field Work 
Having established contact with these two organisations, this bolstered my confidence 
and I duly submitted for ethical clearance from my university (attaching a refined and 
more formal questionnaire) and applied external funding for my research. The former 
was an important administrative requirement that strengthened the integrity and 




approving my research, I showed this to interviewees and I believe this allayed some of 
their caution or reticence of talking to a stranger.  
As for the latter, under the aegis of the then Department of Education, Science and 
Technology (DEST), I was awarded an Endeavour Research Fellowship25 from the 
Australian Government which funded all aspects of my fieldwork including collection of 
my data for my study in the Philippines for 4 months from May to September in 2007. 
The funding covered all my living expenses whilst in the Philippines and I highly 
recommend this program to prospective research students. During my stay in the 
country, I was affiliated as a visiting researcher at the Institute of Philippine Culture at 
the Ateneo de Manila University.26
3.6.1.3 Collecting the Sample In-Situ 
 
It is often said that the most exciting stage of a qualitative research is collecting the data. 
It was with a combination of adrenaline rush, enthusiasm and motivation that marked 
my stay in the Philippines. My aim was to interview representatives from Philippine 
companies and regulatory institutions. Hence, I brought with me to Manila several level 
arch folders. I decided that listed companies would be the best start to contact. I printed 
off the 200 or so entries from the Philippine Stock Exchange website. I also had to ensure 
that some of the listed companies who were owned by the same business group were not 
contacted, but instead contacted their holding company. As the mother company, an 
interview with the holding company would best give the overall picture of the situation 
of the business group, rather than each listed operational company. I also printed non-
listed, non-company organisational websites to interview. 
I divided the folders thus: companies and organisations I’ve contacted, companies who 
agreed to be interviewed, companies and organisations who have not responded, and 
companies and organisations who did not wish to be interviewed. The correspondence 
with the select few who agreed to be interviewed was kept in a separate folder.  
Contact was usually done via email or by phone. Some were quite blunt and said no, 
some did not respond, some email addresses did not work, and a few said yes. Over the 
                                                     
25 With the change of Federal Government in 2007, DEST was transformed into the Department 
of Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) which oversees the fellowship 
http://www.endeavour.deewr.gov.au/Australian_applicants/research_fellowships.htm accessed 25 
May 2010 




phone, some companies did not know who to transfer my query to, and some companies 
did not want to talk at all and gave a response that was long-winding but a particular 
cultural aspect of the Filipino version of making a polite refusal without actually saying 
no (which have been mostly ascribed to Japanese culture but is probably indicative of the 
East Asian region in general). 
3.1.6.4 Interviewees 
For those companies/organisations and their representatives (all senior management 
executives and/or board members) who did agree to be interviewed, the interviewees 
were done face-to-face that lasted at a minimum, an hour long to three hours while a few 
wanted the interview to be conducted by email due to reasons of geography and time. 
Overall, 40 interviews were conducted with 60 representatives. Most face-to-face 
interviewees were conducted with one or two present. In one particular case, I had a 
lunchtime interview conducted with 9 representatives from one organisation and this 
was my one sample of a focus group type of interview. I gave my business card as an 
introduction though unlike other countries in Asia, exchanges of business cards are not a 
formal ceremony in the Philippines. 
Conscious that I was a stranger to them and that I had only a short time to establish 
rapport, trust and confidence, I intentionally did not use a recording device and instead 
relied on pens and notebooks. Indeed, one interviewee was so surprised by this that he 
did not believe me at first and looked me up and down for the recording device before 
finally asking if my pen was the device. Having obtained access and permission to 
interview them, I did not want to risk jeopardising an interview by obtaining an extra 
permission to record them in audio/video form and have them not be as frank or as 
open. Even if I lost parts of the data for not having a full audio record, I believe, accessing 
my sample of interviewees as I have done is sufficient achievement for me.  
My decision to have an ordinary pen and paper and not an audio recorder of the 
interview (unless it was conducted by email) was supported every time an interviewee 
mentioned that he would like to go off the record and I had to put my pen down and just 
listen to him (no female interviewee ever wanted to go off the record). Several 
interviewees also cautioned me that what they were saying were sensitive information 
and I was made very conscious of their reason for doing so. Bound by my ethical 




interviewees in the results chapters – unless they gave me specific information for their 
person/organisation to be known – have been de-identified and are anonymous. 
To thank them for their time and generosity, I gave each interviewee a token pen. Given 
the ethical issues that I discussed (such as bribery, undue influence etc), the token pen 
gesture became a source of post-interview discussion with some of my interviewees on 
its propriety and whether one should declare the pen as a gift to their organisation. In 
the interests of disclosure, each pen cost the nominal amount of AU$5.  
After the interview, I typed up my interview notes the same day to ensure the data was 
still fresh in my mind. Overall, an interview transcript was an average 12 pages long (1.5 
space, A4 size) with the shortest being 8 pages and the longest being 22 pages. 
If there were further queries that emanated from the interview, further contact was 
achieved through email, phone or mobile phone texting. The last method was a 
particularistic Philippine cultural trait as mobile texting was heavily used in the country 
given the country’s lack of landline access and reliability of internet connection. 
The organisations that are listed in Appendix 2 are supportive of, and at the vanguard of, 
promoting corporate governance practices in the country. This research would not have 
been possible without them and I am forever grateful for their generosity and 
magnanimity in allowing this researcher access to them and their knowledge. 
3.1.6.5 The Art of Networking  
Networking was important for me in interviewing people and trying to immerse myself 
in the culture. Given the limited amount of time I had in the country, I threw myself into 
attending events, functions, workshops and other gatherings where I could meet and 
interview people. This developed my skills in the art of the small talk and meeting with 
different people from various backgrounds - a skill underemphasised in books that 
advise how to do qualitative interviews. By luck, chance, and sheer forwardness on my 
part, my philosophy in approaching people to interview was: “the worst they could say 
was turn me down and say no. I have nothing to lose.” For four months in Manila, it was 
carpe diem. In attending corporate functions such as dinners and chambers of 
commerce, I approached strangers directly without waiting to be introduced – which in 
most countries, as in the Philippines, is not the norm and a noticeable social faux pas. 




the few who assented were one of the best interviews I conducted. A list of events and 
gathering I attended during the course of my stay in the Philippines is in Appendix 3. 
3.1.6.6 The Informal Setting 
As previously mentioned, for a select group of interviewees, I also managed to meet 
them outside the interview setting which allowed them to discuss with me issues that 
they did not wish to have on record during the interviews. The less formal meeting and 
off-the-record conversations provided the context and justification of their comments in 
the formal interview. In particular, these meetings allowed them to be more expansive 
on how they saw business being conducted in the country and explain other sensitive 
issues which they did not wish to have on record but which gave me an insight. The 
results chapters bear this out. In a way, my most controversial chapter in this thesis, 
Chapter 9 on Corruption, was the outcome of conversations I’ve had in informal settings. 
In formal settings, corruption was alluded to with veiled suggestions on where 
government may improve its record in this regard; in informal settings, countless stories 
and experience of corruption were told. In some circumstances, I did feel the latter 
became a therapeutic session for some interviewees. Telling an outsider the way of doing 
business in the country was a way for them to unburden about their own internal 
conflicts and difficulties, and feelings of frustration and sadness. The people I 
interviewed were in positions of power and influence, yet they felt this overwhelming 
sense of impotence and limitation in altering the dynamics of the country, and making a 
difference to reduce the poverty in the country.  
My experience of the informal setting provides support for what other researchers have 
found: that what is said off-the-record is as important - if not more - than on-the-record 
interviews.  
3.1.6.7 Foreign Companies 
Despite attending numerous foreign chambers of commerce events in essence to 
network with their representatives, I couldn’t increase the interview sample of foreign 
companies. By email I entered into long correspondences with companies based in Asia-
Pacific regional HQs in Hong Kong, only in the end for them to say “No, at this stage we 
will not allow you to interview us.” With one email interview I conducted with a foreign 
subsidiary, there were numerous people cc’ed in the email message including several 
lawyers. Needless to say, the responses were not as rich as a face-to-face interview, 




my question on recommendations to government, the answer was a simple no. Out of all 
my interviews, this was probably the question that elicited the most frank response, yet 
behind the corporate communications, this foreign subsidiary, perhaps out of self-
preservation and not to invoke host government scrutiny was quite bland. Feelings of 
disappointment were a natural effect. I can only say for foreign businesses that do 
business in the Philippines, they take a high risk and veer into that grey part of business 
conduct that may not be well looked upon in their home countries.  
3.1.6.8 Why am I doing this research on the Philippines? 
Only one interviewee probed me further for reasons why I was researching corporate 
governance in the Philippines. Responses that my natural curiosity and the fact that I 
worked for a corporate governance research centre was not a satisfactory answer. From 
my perspective, my agenda was to complete my thesis and doing it on the Philippines 
was a natural fit. This was the self-serving element of doing research on the country of 
my birth. Having watched others go through the arduous task of undertaking their own 
PhD research journeys, one of the main personal challenges in completing a thesis is 
motivation and how to sustain the motivation through this solitary journey. As most 
PhD students would empathise, one starts off a PhD hoping to change the world. Upon 
completion, it is not the world that has changed, but rather the PhD has changed the 
student. I knew that out of obligation to my heritage, I would complete this thesis. That 
was and remained the strong motivation in completing this thesis. 
Below are my observations notes from that interview conducted with two people: 
“[The] company [is widely recognised as having] the best corporate governance 
practice in the Philippines. [Interviewee A] was curious about my research – why 
I was doing it. I made an introduction on why I was involved in corporate 
governance. Post-interview he asked again and I responded the personal 
(diaspora) and professional (researcher) reasons. I guess he found it unusual why 
I, who had little connection with the Philippines, was doing the research but I 
saw this was an impartial research on my part.  
“[Interviewee A] left [the company] to join [a government authority] then 
rejoined [the company]. He had planned to reform the [authority] and abolish it 
and replace with another but was unsuccessful. [He knows] this academic whom 




“[Interviewee B] used to work for the World Bank and we exchanged stories 
about a [mutual contact]. [Interviewee A] had posters of corporate governance 
initiatives that his company has done on his office walls. His business card even 
has a box called “Corporate Governance: It begins with me”. [Interviewee A] 
seemed very serious and distant throughout most of the interview. [Interviewee 
B] was friendly on the other hand.” – May 2007 interview observation notes 
I guess I would have made an unusual sight going around Manila doing my interviews, 
cold-calling companies asking to talk about the processes of their company to a stranger. 
In hindsight, I suppose the reluctance to open up to me was probably a big element of 
companies that refused to be interviewed by me: the face value element. Conflicts of 
interests, hidden agendas, opacity – doing business in the Philippines is difficult. For this 
particular researcher, the particular challenges of the country provided a fertile ground 
for collecting data. 
Another interviewee even had me followed because he didn’t trust the business card I 
gave him as he told me I could have made up my identity. Piracy is common and pirated 
business cards are not unusual. Understanding this environment allowed this researcher 
to adjust to, and empathise even with the paranoid tendencies of this particular 
interviewee. Indeed, Intel CEO Andy Grove wrote a book entitled Only the Paranoid 
Survive.27
In the Philippines, trust is an important element. Who to trust and whom not to trust is 
important in this environment; I can only say this was some of the hazards or the more 
unusual aspects of collecting data in a developing country. 
 
3.1.6.9 Access  
In general, obtaining access is a key problem when conducting “elite studies” (Neuman 
1997: 336-339) or interviews “with persons who are leaders or experts in a community, 
people who are usually in powerful positions.” (Kvale 2007: 38) I am pleased to say that 
this problem was dispelled quite early in the field work. My interview observations notes 
bear out my way of accessing interviewees and effectively swept away notions of “lack of 
access” especially my pre-departure notions that I may be unable to access Filipino-
Chinese business families. 
                                                     
27Grove, Andrew S. (1996) Only the Paranoid Survive, 




So for the much-maligned apprehension of the potential reluctance of Chinese Filipinos 
to talk about their corporate governance experience, I am pleased to say, apart from the 
exceptions mentioned in the next section, this was not an obstacle in my research 
journey. I do not believe that non-participants would have contributed anything more 
significant had they agreed to an interview than those who did. A reluctant interviewee 
is not a rich source of data and I appreciate the openness of most of my interviewees for 
it is in these pages their stories are related.  
Below are two of my interview observation notes that provide an insight into accessing 
my interviews (by luck or opportunity), how the business elite live, how the referral 
system worked, the geopolitical environment of the country, how the country’s situation 
has affected families and the candidness of the response of some of my more open 
interviews: 
“[Interviewee #1] is a well-connected man (especially I believe in the Filipino 
Chinese community). He was referred to me from [a previous interview]. An 
Opus Dei member, [he] was part of [a government authority] created for 
privatisation. He was also a board member of [a conglomerate] during the 
[former owner’s] days. He said he was an independent director on the board and 
was considered the black sheep of the board. 
“He also referred me to [a regulator]. He is also good friends with some of the 
PSE players. He introduced me [to this] CEO/Chairman of [a listed company] 
whom I later interviewed. He is in most cases on a first name basis with the 
business community in the Philippines. Again, a well connected man although 
the diaspora has affected him as well. His parents live in the USA and so do his 
kids. One of his close friends is [a bank] CEO. [He] said his wife was from the old 
Spanish Filipino families. 
“After I told him a story about [a contact’s] connection to the Gandhis about a 
coup attempt on an island archipelago, and ringing Rajiv Gandhi to send in 
paratroopers, he said to me “you will hear a lot of stories about the Philippines” – 
July 2007 interview #1 observation notes 
After my interview with Interviewee #1, he accompanied me to the first half of my 




“[Interviewee #1] accompanied me to [Interviewee #2], a good friend of his. It 
became more of a reunion between two friends and I was just an extra. Both 
being of Filipino-Chinese backgrounds, [Interviewee #2] looked at me and said “I 
don’t know you but [Interviewee #1] I have known for 30 years but that’s how 
Chinese relationships work so ask away”. [Interviewee #2] also at length showed 
off a present – a coffee table book created by his daughter who lives in the USA. 
He said: “Even Manny Pangilinan” (CEO of PLDT) doesn’t have one! 
“An affable man, the interview went jolly well. He offered me some espasol. He 
had recently joined [this company] and knew [a business family I interviewed], 
he said the family wants to keep control as I suggested – cheekily on my part - a 
synergy between the two companies. He is an American citizen having lived in 
the USA for awhile however he wanted to return to the Philippines for patriotic 
reasons. 
“During the interview – haphazardly done due to the reunion between 
[Interviewees #1 and #2] – was President Arroyo’s State of Nation Address 
(SONA) TV coverage. [Interviewee #2] would at various points show me [which 
politicians] he knows. He also said that he had stopped banging his head against 
the wall and that if he entered politics he would be assassinated. He said at his 
age he would rather just do what he will be able to do what and when he can. 
One of his executives was watching the SONA waiting for GMA to mention their 
project in Mindanao. But this was never mentioned. At one stage [Interviewee 
#2] showed me and [Interviewee #1] a map of Mindanao and said why Basilan is 
such a big problem is because the peninsula facing Basilan is shaped like a penis 
so Basilan is being pissed on.” – July 2007 interviewee #2 observation notes 
Business research in Asia has emphasised much on the ethnicity of the family with many 
studies on Chinese business networks in the region (Weidenbaum 1996, Hamilton 1996). 
However, what unites all business families is the common goal of commerce. Facilitating 
commerce is part and parcel of trade and globalisation. What matters more in commerce 
is the regulatory frameworks, the rule of law, relations with government and less on the 
ethnic origin. A good idea and product in the marketplace counts more than the ethnic 




issue in terms of access. My sample was enriched by participation from big and small 
businesses owned by Filipino-Filipino, Filipino-Spanish and Filipino-Chinese. 
3.1.6.10 Snowball Effect – The Referral System 
It was clear that being in the country had a more positive effect on collecting data than 
outside it. The glorious referral system of who you knew in Manila counted. Again as 
Neuman pointed out: 
“Elites will use who you know, who talked to you, and who introduced whom as 
sign of approval or endorsement.” (1997: 338) 
This occurred more towards the latter stages of my data collection. I experienced the 
snowball effect – or the referral system. One would refer me to his or her network – the 
‘who you know’ came into play.  
I expected barriers in data and contact, but instead I saw how connections and 
networking worked. Who you know counted more. People who lived and worked 
overseas had a particular advantage working in the Philippines. Similar to other cities 
around the world, those who have had international exposure have a macro and 
cosmopolitan view of the world. The interviewees who were referred to me were 
articulate, intelligent and exceptionally knowledgeable.  
Far from parochial, the interviewees I made contact with were global, broadminded and 
mindful of the many business opportunities that await the country if only, and in 
parallel, the government could loosen its grip and reduce the existing inefficiencies and 
create a level playing field by removing barriers to entry, reducing protectionism in the 
country and allowing competition, reducing bureaucracy and vanquish the poison that is 
corruption. 
3.1.6.11 Notable Non-Interviewees 
It is worth mentioning that despite my general success, I also failed to access several 
notable business groups. There are two notable business groups missing from my 
interviewee sample. Both are headed by Chinese-Filipino taipans who have cultivated 
their business through the unpredictable nature of Philippine politics. Their success 
seems to wax and wane depending on whether the presidential administration is a 




3.1.6.11.1 Lucio Tan 
Lucio Tan came to prominence as one of Marcos’ cronies (Hutchcroft 1998: 133, 237) and 
the survival of his business interests after the dictator’s fall is testament to his endurance 
and remarkable luck – this view dependent on which side of the fence you sit on. 
Perhaps it was wise (on both sides) that an interview did not proceed. Indeed, whilst 
collecting my data in Manila, the son of the former dictator, Ferdinand ‘Bong-Bong’ 
Marcos Jr. reminded Tan of his recent past with attempts to reclaim expropriated assets 
(supposedly owned by the Marcos Family) from Tan. (Magno 2007, Sy & Mendez 2007, 
Business World 2007b) 
A newspaper editorial pointed out this irony:  
“The President Commission on Good Government (PCGG) is seeking the 
forfeiture of some 60% of Tan’s shareholdings in 10 giant companies – among 
them Fortune Tobacco, Asia Brewery and Allied Banking – claiming that the 
Chinese Filipino businessman merely served as a dummy for the late dictator, 
Ferdinand Marcos, who was their real owner. Tan, who is now estimated to be 
worth US$2.3B, was reputed to be one of Mr. Marcos’ closets cronies. In a 
surprising turn of events, the Marcoses announced they were going to testify 
against Tan.”- Philippine Daily Inquirer (2007) 
I did not manage to speak to anyone from Mr Tan’s companies despite several attempts 
by phone. However, the owner was present in some of my interviewees’ thoughts as the 
following sample show. These thoughts ranged broadly from the critical: 
“He was once heard to say: ‘If you bring me a big foreign company to do business 
here in the Philippines, I will be able to shred that company to bits. No global 
foreign company can compete against me here in the Philippines. No 
competition at all. But if I go to the USA, and do business there the way I do 
business here, I would not last a day.’” –private sector 1 
“A lot of companies here don’t practice accountability and transparency. The SEC 
and PSE need to have the resources to enforce stricter rules. [Tan] does not have 
a reputation for practising good corporate governance” –private sector 2 
“The policy I was espousing he disagreed with, so I had to go because the 




To the more philosophical: 
“There are big names in politics forming alliances with the private sector. Under 
Marcos there were alliances with his cronies who became the new elites: Tan, 
Siotan, Cojuangco.” – private sector interviewee 3 
Tan’s influence and interests span and bridge the business and political fabric of the 
country and he is a figure whom one cannot have an ambivalent position on. However, 
like his peers, he currently faces the same succession challenges as he prepares to hand 
over his portfolio of interests to the next generation.  
3.1.6.11.2 Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. 
The other tycoon worthy of a mention is Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. 
comes from a prominent family and cousin to the late president and adversary, Corazon 
Aquino. He was part of Marcos’ coterie also known as the “Rolex Gang” as the dictator 
was reputed to give his closest supporters a Rolex watch. During the turbulent period of 
the Estrada presidential administration, of which he was a close ally, an apocryphal tale 
had him march into the boardroom of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding the 
CEO and chairmanship. San Miguel Corporation produces San Miguel Beer - perhaps the 
most prominent and recognised Philippine brand in the world. The corporate history is 
nothing short of a Shakespearean drama. (Conde 2005) 
Boardroom battles and Cojuangco Jr. seem to be linked and in 2009, SMC took control of 
Petron (Sanchez-Lacson 2009) and a tussle for the control of Meralco pitted him against 
the Lopez Family reminiscent of the dark days of Marcos.28
Cojuangco Jr. has a strong Australian presence with former interests in the Australian 
dairy and horseracing industries. Given his Australian connections (Askew 2005), I 
thought I would receive at least a response. A letter sent to their Melbourne 
headquarters when they still owned the Australian dairy entity National Foods
 
29
                                                     
28 The battle for representation on the Meralco board occurred with GSIS and SMC on one side, 
and PLDT and the Lopez family on the other. PLDT under Pangilinan is said to be the Lopez’s 
white knight as there were moves by SMC to take over Meralco. See Lucas (2009) and Rimando & 
Balea (2009)  
 (before 
29 In April 2009 in an informal conversation, a National Foods executive imparted the offer price 
by Japanese company Kirin as the main motivation in divesting this asset and not because of 
greater corporate governance scrutiny. He also said National Foods under San Miguel was 
operating heavily under the direction of two significant shareholders and the then owners didn’t 




selling it to Japan’s Kirin Brewery) went unanswered; emails and phone calls to San 
Miguel Corporation in-situ were also unsuccessful. Although to give due credit, I decided 
not to pursue the avenue to interview a pension fund owned and controlled by his group 
as I was nearing the end of my research trip. 
3.1.11.6.3 Other Elusive Interviewees 
Other interviewees missing from my sample include those who have had incidences in 
their past that have stained them in the capital markets. These incidences include parent 
company-subsidiary relationships and less than timely disclosure. The capital markets 
can be quite unforgiving when it comes to such ‘stains’ and punish severely those that do 
not practice timely disclosure.  
3.1.11.6.4 The Final Interviewees 
Towards the latter stages of my time in the field, I was hearing similar information. I had 
interviewed a wide variety of people, various stakeholders and the data was overlapping. 
I had reached what is commonly known as theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin 
1998: 292-293). The data collection of my research had reached its natural conclusion. I 
was not uncovering new information or significant variation of perspectives anymore 
and given the limited amount of time I had in the country, my researcher’s instinct 
suggested that the interview data I had gathered was sufficient. I knew I had to stop and 
so chose someone in a prominent position for my final interviewee. It was a good way to 
book-end collecting the interview data sample.  
3.6.2 Media Articles and Other Text 
 
Supplementing my interview data were my secondary sources of data: media articles and 
other text. Like interviews, documentary research is heavily used in qualitative research 
(Silverman 2006) as they are “a ubiquitous feature of social life.” (Gibson & Brown 2009: 
65). 
While in Manila, I collected newspaper clippings or media articles I deemed relevant and 
related to my research. Over the four months, I became rather methodical and formed a 
habit of reading the daily broadsheets then cutting out and pasting in the most useful in 
                                                                                                                                                           
Filipino-owned to Japanese-owned drastically saw different corporate governance practices from 
one where there was without to one where there is now a form of Japanese corporate governance 
in place. I also explained my unsuccessful attempts in accessing an interview, and the executive 
responded I’d have probably needed to get a referral from Austrade and pay for the privilege of 




my scrapbooks. For my newspaper articles, a total of 892 articles were collected and they 
were coded in NVivo (see Data Analysis). The bulk of these articles were collected 
between June 1, 2007 and 31 August 2007. The articles were hard copy versions from the 
main Manila newspapers eventually reaching two volumes which I carried back with me 
to Sydney. After my in-country field trip, some articles were collected afterwards in light 
of geopolitical issues in the Philippines and these articles were saved electronically. 
A list of media articles I collected and analysed is in Appendix 4. Supplementing the 
media articles were other texts given to me such as company annual reports, copies of 
emails and related organisational documents. 
3.6.3 Participant Observation 
 
Finally, the last technique I used was me as a participant-observer. This technique is not 
a research method but rather “a strategy that facilitates data collection in the field.” 
(Bernard 1988: 150). Concurring with Angrosino’s (2007) sentiment on the participant 
observation technique, I conducted my research both as a subjective participant and 
objective observer.  
I kept a diary during my stay and wrote structured pre and post-interview observation 
notes as previous sections in this chapter attest to. With each face-to-face interview I 
had a preamble which described the circumstance of the interview (e.g. how was s/he 
accessed), my observations of the venue (which does reflect the resources an 
organisation had, see in particular Chapter 5 on Regulators where I compared and 
contrasted the building of one regulator to another), the time and length an interview 
took (brief, comprehensive), the behaviour of my interviewees during the interview 
(open, closed, comfortable, uncomfortable defensive, encouraging etc) and my own 
feelings as a researcher after an interview (elation, disappointment, able to establish a 
rapport with the interviewee or not). 
Throughout my results chapters, there are case study boxes that contain personalised 
narratives of particular issues and topics that provide contextual elements of how 
corporate governance operated in the country. These case study boxes are extensive 
stories that try to explain extraneous insights of the business environment. These stories 
are told in realistic, confessional and impressionistic modes (Angrosino 2007: 16) to 




are principally the outcomes of the participant observation process. The following figure 
is a visual representation of how I saw these three sources of data working together to 
support my chosen methodology: 
Figure 13: Three Sources of Data - The Qualitative Triangulated Method in Gear 
Motion 
 
3.7 Data Analysis  
 
In managing, organising and analysing my interview, media and other text data, I used a 
computer program called NVivo. I attended two workshops on NVivo funded by the 
Research office of the UTS Faculty of Business to learn how to use the program. As I was 
working from an ethnographic approach, I principally used the program in a code and 
retrieve manner though the program has features that extend to include building 
sophisticated models and conceptual networks. Gibbs (2002) and Bazeley (2007) provide 
a comprehensive account of working with the program. 
I customised the folders in NVivo under Sources (on the left hand side) by creating 
















under this folder were coded line by line. Under Memo, I added folders on Future 
Research, Interview Observations, Journal, Thematic Notes and Thesis Chapter 
Summaries. They form supplementary information and I did not code them but referred 
to them and created notes to jot down ideas as I was coding the main Sources 
documents. The following screenshot shows the main page of NVivo: 
Exhibit 1: Screenshot of NVivo program 
 
My approach in the data analysis of my interview and text data was I had a more bottom-
up approach in exploring the data. What I found useful in the NVivo was the ability to 
create nodes. “Nodes are containers to hold ideas, and represent concepts or categories” 
(Madden 2008: 16) and they were invaluable in my research. My node-heavy coding 
allowed me to structure my results chapters in a way that I never thought possible prior 
to my data analysis stage. My use of nodes heavily influenced how each results chapter 
was structured and my subheadings in each chapter are a reflection of my node use. 
I did not create ‘a priori’ nodes though I was guided by overarching themes in my data. I 
initially thought I’d take the top-bottom up approach and create several nodes in which 
to code but realised early on that this way of coding did not suit my work style. The 
inductive inquiry extended into the data analysis. As I analysed each line and passage of 
text, I allowed several definitions and perspectives for the data which again, finds more 




However, I did not lose sight of my initial research themes nor my hypotheses (with the 
exception of the chapter on Corruption which was definitely the serendipitous aspect of 
the research) and the use of NVivo allows the combination of both deductive and 
inductive approach to qualitative data analysis. 
3.7.1 Node Saturation in NVivo 
 
As I had combined inductive and deductive methods of inquiry, the latter had given me a 
useful list of concepts that was already present to test my hypotheses and therefore code 
my data as appropriate. I was “bringing a strong theoretical basis” to my research and as 
Bazeley suggests, in this form of “a priori or theoretically derived codes”, a researcher 
using NVivo generally ought to: 
”analyse your research question and identify from within it every category or 
concept that is used, knowing that you will need a node for each concept in order 
to gather (and then relate) data about them.” - (2007:76) 
Indeed, most of the text fell in clearly defined ideas that were generated from my 
hypotheses.  However, I did not allow myself to be restricted in my reading of the text. I 
did not have the problem that Bazeley chides deductivists of having as I did not restrict 
myself or “confine” my reading of the text. Instead, I allowed further interpretations of 
the data  thus generating further development of ideas that went beyond the boundaries 
of my initial research inquiry but which substantiated it. My results chapters are 
testimony to this form of combined analysis. It is important that hypotheses be tested, 
and see their further contribution to theory. However, beyond hypotheses testing, my 
research took advantage of the strength of inductive qualitative inquiry by contributing a 
more expansive perspective and giving into context my deductive results. 
Where grounded theory emphasises “theory work should continue until data saturation 
has been achieved” (Gibson & Brown 2009: 27), my approach to the NVivo qualitative 
data analysis was to saturate each passage of text to the point where I reached “node 
saturation”. I coded every line from my interviews whereby after I had coded all my 
primary text, I had categorised to 1077 items. The following historical screenshot shows 





Exhibit 2: Screenshot of Nodes Prior to Amalgamation 
 
After amalgamation and merging of some nodes that had a singular reference and 
deletion of some duplication, I had managed to bring it down to 972 working nodes. 
In my data analysis, node saturation for me was where every possible theme or category 
attributed to a statement or sentence was coded. Thus for one line, it was possible to 
several nodes attached to it. For example, one line of an interview where there were 
political overtones made by a private included nodes related to the political 
environment, the situation of the firm, the structure of the firm, relationship with the 
government and several others. This is a form of “fracturing or slicing data” where the 
multiplicity “capture what is happening in a single passage of text” (Bazeley 2007: 71) 
An example of what I mean by node saturation is the coding I have undertaken in this 
poignant passage of raw interview data below which I have captured and enlarged as a 




The screenshot is divided into three columns – the left hand side shows the Folders of 
Sources and Memos containing other documents; the middle shows the raw interview 
data; the right hand side shows the coding stripes that contained the nodes in the 
interview. The interviewee wishes for anonymity hence this document is entitled Anon. 
This passage contains a moment in the interview when off-the-record data was made. 
Prior to that, the interviewer was explaining the business’ relationship with the 
government which veered into a macroeconomic narrative of the political environment 
in the country. Text in bold was done by me to emphasise and indicate the importance of 
that particular data. 
In this particular passage, the text was coded to the several nodes (indicated by the 
coloured stripes) principally to the top level nodes of Presidential appointments and 
Corruption. Just in the right hand column where the nodes appear, is a strip of line 
called “Coding Density”. It shows how heavily the passage was coded to nodes – the 
thicker the line, the more nodes it had been coded to. For this particular sentence: 
“The government is corrupt from top-to-to bottom. Change the 
constitution, change culture. You can’t get anything done here; it’s all 
done by facilitation.” 
hovering my mouse over the coding density, a textbox appears which shows this text was 
coded to 18 nodes principally to Asian corporate governance, Business strategy, 
Competition, Corruption (and secondary or sub-category level headings), Culture, 
Government, Legislation and Political Environment. Apart from trying to objectively 
analyse this passage, the other side is this passage - like so many other texts in my 
interview data - did have a profound effect on me as a researcher. During my research 
stay in the Philippines I frequently emailed my supervisor about the distress I felt and 
unburdening the frustration my interviewees felt about how the country operated. 
Undoubtedly the use of NVivo tries to depersonalise the elements that may intrude or 
‘emotionalise’ the integrity of the data but I did want to briefly mention that I wanted to 
be objective as possible but the compounding effect of such interview text did have an 









3.7.2 Most Common Nodes 
 
The25 most common nodes I had referenced to after taking into account all sources are 
set out in the following table: 
Table 14: Most Common Nodes Used in NVivo Data Analysis 
Rank Node References Sources 
1 Business groups – family 175 44 
2 Company-family relationships conflict 158 42 
3 Corporate governance – awareness 145 48 
4 Culture – business – family 142 45 
5 Private sector reform and development 129 53 
6 Theory – Business Groups – Family Businesses 122 32 
7 Investors – foreign 188 48 
8 Political environment – uncertainty 113 46 
9 Board – Director – Independent – opinion, perception 
of 
112 37 
10 Corporate governance – applicability of 109 43 
11 Family business 108 36 
12 Corporate governance reforms 102 36 
13 Corporate governance – perception 100 38 
14 Board – Director – Independent – concept of  100 34 
15 Corporate governance – regulators 100 38 
16 Board – members 98 37 
17 Corporate governance as practice / pragmatism 98 40 
18 Corporate governance as compliance 95 37 
19 Culture – business – closed or insider 94 34 
20 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 93 35 
21 Industry – banking 90 31 
22 Ownership and control – listing – family 88 19 
23 Culture – business – boards 88 32 
24 East Asian Region including Free Trade Areas (APEC, 
ASEAN) 
87 37 
25 Corporate governance – transparency 87 38 
 
In this table, references refer to how many times a body of text was coded to a node 
while the source refers to the aggregate number of interviews, articles and other related 
papers that were part of my data analysis. For example, with the most common node of 
“Business groups – family”, I had referenced it 175 times throughout 44 sources or 
documents. 




found it made the search function much more time consuming personally. To find a 
solution for this, I created free nodes with hierarchies by having a dash or '-' attached to 
a main node to denote a sub-category or a sub-sub-category. 
Thus with the node “Business groups – family”, “Business groups” is the main tree/node 
or category with branches or subcategories forming from it such as “family”, “non-
family”. Thus I created a primary level, then a sub-category level, and a sub-sub-category 
level. 
Below is a tree diagram of the “Business groups” node as an umbrella term encompassing 
all its sub-sets. 
Figure 14: Main Node of Business Groups and its sub-sets 
 
 
Thus, under the “Business Groups” node, the sub-category of “Family” had a third level 
which included that encompassed “Banks”, “Companies”,” Challenges / Weaknesses of” ,” 
Founder”, “Related Party Transactions”, “Relationship with Government”, and 
“Transition from closed to open.” 
Having this form of noding also allowed me to structure each of my results chapters as 
befitted a main node. Thus for Chapter 6, elements of how I categorised a main node is 
Business Groups
Family
Banks, Companies, Challenges / 
Weaknesses of , Founder,  
Related Party Transactions, 
Relationship with Government, 
Transition from closed to open







present in how the chapter was written as that chapter is largely structured around the 
owners of Philippine companies which were mostly business groups. 
Naturally, there were some overlaps as language and meaning can be interpreted 
differently as I found out in trying to node business family related issues. Hence, in the 
table showing the top 25 nodes, there are 6 nodes that have the word ‘family’ attached to 
them, yet I had defined them differently when I created each one. Below is the table 
containing these six nodes with definitions (and how they were refined over time, for 
example I sometimes provided a justification of how one node was merged with 
another), how many times they were references (or coded) and the number of sources 
where they appeared:  
Table 15: Family-related Nodes 




Specific reference to the family owners 
of business conglomerates or as 
Granovetter notes are business groups; 
conglomerate node merged with this 
one as conglomerates are acquisitions 
with little or personal ties but business 
groups have them; see if this needs to 
merge with company-family 
relationships node - if there's an excuse 
for separation of these two or if it can be 
merged; if not Business Groups can be 
the parent node. Termed as family 







Aspects of how family members relate to 
the company the family owns e.g. 
succession planning, control, expansion. 
158 42 
4 Culture – 
business – 
family 
The importance of the family and how it 
plays a central role in the business 
culture 
142 45 










Reference to the phrase "family 
business". i.e. business = family so 








– listing – 
family 
Issues of listing on what it means – such 




Having this multiplicity of nodes allowed me to write better as I had structured the 
nodes, worked and refined them, and thus subsequently identified as to whether it was a 
main node. Thus for 972 nodes, I had several main nodes. For the main topic of my 
research, corporate governance was noded 81 times with sub-categories. The most 
frequently coded corporate governance nodes were: awareness, applicability of, reforms, 
perception of, regulators, and practice. A table containing the list of corporate 
governance nodes analysed in NVivo can be found in Appendix 8. 
3.7.3 Coding and Analysing Media Articles 
 
Similarly, I used the same analytical approach in my interview data and applied it to my 
media text. In NVivo, an Internal folder called “Media” was created with six internal 
documents (or items) representing the six newspapers these articles came from: Business 
Mirror, Business World, Manila Bulletin, Manila Standard, Philippine Daily Inquirer and 
Philippine Star.  
The screenshot below shows the list of newspapers, the number of nodes and the 
number of references. Most of the articles collected came from three broadsheets: 





Exhibit 4: Screenshot of Media Folder, Number of Nodes and References 
 
As the newspaper articles were hard copy versions, it took over a period of 12 months for 
a summary of each article to be typed, categorised, analysed in NVivo as this was 
concurrently going on with my data analysis of interviews. A summary of the article was 
typed up instead of transcribing it in its entirety in view of the relevance of the data in 
the newspaper article. Inputting the data was time and labour intensive however these 
newspaper articles were at the core of the triangulated methodology I had applied and 
they substantiated and complemented my interview data. 
The next screenshot below shows a Business Mirror article called Fraport’s Achilles heel 
which was related to the expropriation of a German-built airport terminal in Manila (see 
Chapter 9: Corruption; NAIA Terminal). In NVivo, the article was coded thus: Heading 2 
which is in italics and bold text for the date of the article, Heading 3 which is in bold text 






Exhibit 5: Screenshot of a coded media article 
 
The text of the article was coded under the major nodes of Capital Markets, Corruption, 
Foreign Ownership Controls and Investors. Similarly to my interview data, one line in 
the text was coded to 19 free nodes reproduced in the following table: 
Table 16: Nodes for One Line of Media Text in NVivo 
Node Sub-Category Sub-Sub-Category 
Capital markets Lack of trust PSE 
Corruption Cheating   
 Effects on country  
 Embezzlement  
 Endemic / Entrenched  
 Feeling towards  
 Influence peddling  
 Institutionalised / Organised / 
Centralised  
 
 Long-term  
 Major  
Culture Business Trust 
Foreign ownership 
controls 
Criticisms of  
 Facilitating corruption  
 See also Protectionism  
Investor Confidence   




Investors Foreign Germanic – 
German 
NAIA Airport Terminal   
Trust   
 
As may be noted, there were some overlap with some categories. For example, a node of 
Trust was created mostly to relate Philippine society’s viewpoint on trust. However, I had 
also created a trust sub-category attached to the Culture-Business node mainly to code 
statements of my interviewees where they mentioned trust or which related to the 
importance of trust in their business interaction. Thus, “Trust” as a concept was 
important in both business and society. In this particular line in the media article, 
undermining trust in business (due to expropriation) and undermining trust in society 
(due to perceptions of corruption) were both applicable. Thus, the line was coded to 
both nodes.  
Another instance where such overlaps occurred is present in the major node of Foreign 
Ownership Controls (FOC). Under FOC I created a sub-category of “Facilitating 
corruption”. I did not create a sub-category of FOC under the major node of Corruption 
as FOC was a major node in its own right. In this instance it was about foreign ownership 
controls facilitating corruption as a foreign investor could not have majority ownership 
(and therefore control) over its investment. The foreign investor was dependent on the 
largesse and goodwill of its local partner not to take advantage of its majority ownership 
in the joint venture. In this case, the foreign investor was sorely disappointed and the 
case went to arbitration as the terminal was expropriated. Thus, FOC are an important 
factor in the investment decision of a foreign investor and this was substantiated in my 
interview data. 






Exhibit 6: Screenshot of coding stripes in NVivo 
 
This was the time and labour intensive aspect of line-by-line coding of newspapers in 
NVivo but as previously stated, this method allowed the validation of my interview and 
observation data – that what my interviewees were speaking about had basis in the data I 
had collected from the fourth estate. 
3.7.4 Funnelling: From Analysing the Data to Structuring a Chapter 
 
The multiplicity of nodes I had created does bring to mind to the extent I was using a 
grounded theory methodological approach. Gibson and Brown provides a good summary 
of the debate between Glaser and Strauss' groundbreaking work on grounded theory 
(1999 [1967]) and the controversy that followed in Strauss and Corbin (1990) in that 
Glaser had accused the latter of advocating “the imposition of a priori analytic themes.” 
(2009:26) 
Why did I undertake such node saturation? Perhaps in a way to ensure that I had 
covered all possible interpretation of such a statement and to ensure I did not overlook 
the relevance and meaning of the statement. The subtleties of language are such that 
what is perhaps most important is what is left unsaid. 




call “funnelling” which brought together all the nodes pertinent to a particular theme. 
The output produced was a structure of a chapter. Below is a graphical presentation of a 
funnel that shows how all the nodes I created in NVivo helped structure the writing of a 
chapter: 
Figure 15: The Process of Funnelling and Synthesising the Nodes 
 
For Chapter 6, there were some 300 nodes that were referred to in this Chapter. This 
chapter focused on the convergence of corporate governance and business families with 
the additional issue of financing. This graphical representation of a funnel shows how I 
worked from the macro-level of multiple nodes to finally produce the results and 
structure the sections in this particular chapter.  
While I do not recommend this type of node saturation for other researchers with time 
constraints, for my ethnographic approach to this research, this was the way that worked 
best for me. Using NVivo helped clarify the data I had collected by providing a more 
objective way of seeing, analysing and writing. 





















Node saturation was a time-consuming aspect of my research that took some nearly 18 
months to complete altogether but I had saturated the data to all the possible nodes that 
I cannot be helped but be satisfied that I had covered every interpretation and meaning 
of each line of an interview. 
3.8 Writing up the Research Findings 
 
Writing up the research findings for each chapter produced its own internal writing 
struggle or challenge. I also worked backwards with each results chapter. Hence my 
Chapter 9 on Corruption was written up first as this was the most inductive aspect of my 
research. While corporate governance is the main topic of this research, underlying any 
private sector reform in the country is the spectre and effects of corruption. I could not 
ignore it - nor did I wish to - so writing this first was the most therapeutic way to get it 
out of the system. 
With Chapter 8 on Government Financial Institutions I struggled on its appropriateness 
as a stand-alone chapter as initially I wanted to create an Institutional Investors chapter. 
However, the output of rich data from the interviews I conducted with the three 
government financial institutions gave the added impetus to give them their own 
chapter.  
Chapters 6 and 7 produced a different internal struggle of a structural sort. These two 
chapters are at the core of this thesis. Corporate governance in essence is about 
ownership and control. How could I write up the data when ownership and control were 
frequently one and the same? To overcome this, I finally divided an initial one chapter 
into two – Chapter 6 which deals with ownership specific issues and Chapter 7 which 
covered managerial issues. Necessarily, there are overlaps between the two as both 
chapters complement each other. 
Chapter 5 on Regulators was pretty straightforward in that each corporate governance 
regulator’s strengths and weaknesses were described. Perspectives from the regulator 
and the regulated are featured in this chapter. One poignant aspect of this Chapter was 
the ousting of the Insurance Commissioner which linked this Chapter to the issue of 




Finally, the last result chapter that I wrote is the first that appears- Chapter 4 on the 
Corporate Governance and Business Environment. This chapter focuses on the culture 
and existing business environment when corporate governance was introduced, and how 
it was introduced. Contributions to institutional theory and an expansion on the 
understanding of culture is the main motif of this chapter. 
Overall, writing up my research findings took some 18 months to complete.  
Unless otherwise stated in the text, most of the interview data have been de-identified. 
This was to respect and preserve the anonymity most interviewees wished for but in 
some cases, I thought it prudent to anonymise them and the data despite their 
agreement to be formally identified. Interview data in a particular section are also 
denoted by numbers such as “private sector 1” or “private sector 2” indicating comments 
from different individuals in each section. That is, “private sector 1” does not mean the 
comments come from a specific interviewee throughout the results chapters but rather a 
comment made by one person in a particular section. 
In undertaking an ethnographic approach to my research, the research journey has been 
far from linear with real life tending to intrude frequently. However, my findings that are 
accounted for in the results chapters from 4 to 9 reflect the methodological approach I 





CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
This chapter looks at the business and corporate governance environment of the 
country. The first half of this chapter examines the culture of the Philippines and its 
political environment, while the second half looks at the introduction of corporate 
governance reforms. 
The following elements of Philippine culture are discussed: insularity and elitism, family, 
ethnicity, conflict avoidance, collectivism and masculine. On the matter of the 
Philippine political environment, the following issues are explored: politicised 
regulation, politically-connected firms and public sector governance. Included in this 
section are areas where government can make a substantial difference, political dynasties 
and the choice the country faces between choosing a path of democracy or dictatorship. 
Philippine culture and politics provide the context in which the corporate governance 
environment operates.  
Providing a background to corporate governance reforms, the following events and 
policies and regulations are mentioned: the impact of the East Asian Crisis (1997), OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), impact of the Enron collapse (2001), US 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the main securities regulator’s view of the crisis and Enron, 
and a theoretical reflection the cycles of crisis and reform. 
The relevance of institutional theory is explained in the isomorphic process (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983) of introducing corporate governance reforms into the country. Coercive 
isomorphism is discussed along with the influence of international financial institutions 
(IFIs) to impose corporate governance reforms on countries under their purview which 
includes the Philippines. Mimetic isomorphism is then discussed to explain the 
operationalisation of corporate governance on the policy and regulatory levels.  
A corporate governance tool developed by the World Bank called the Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) and its effect on Philippines regulators are 
explained. The natural limitations of institutional theory due to the unintended 
consequences of isomorphism are explained.  




conditions is aided by having a figurehead to legitimise corporate governance reforms in 
the country. The Philippine figurehead in this case is Dr. Jesus Estanislao and he founded 
the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) which is the organisation most actively 
associated with corporate governance in the country. The role of the ICD in promoting 
corporate governance reforms is discussed.  
4.1 Culture 
 
Culture is an inherent part of any business environment. This section on culture provides 
the social context of what it is like to operate a business in the country. Culture is 
embedded in a country’s fabric and permeates all organisations. Understanding some 
basic elements of Filipino culture provides insight into why corporate governance 
reforms in the country take the form they do and explains the way there were tensions in 
the way they were implemented. 
This section also contributes to supporting Hypothesis 2 of my research: 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
Whereby the cultural elements of the Philippines, in particular the role the family plays 
in shaping and indigenising corporate governance in the country. 
My interview guide had a specific question on culture. I asked all my interviewees the 
following: 
What are the specific aspects of the business culture in the Philippines that influence 
the formulation and implementation of corporate governance? 
This open-ended question provided a fairly open-ended response and many interviewees 
were able to provide and reflect on the extent Filipino business culture impacted the 
operationalisation of corporate governance in the country. 
4.1.1 Analysing Culture Nodes in NVivo 
 
I created 72 cultural nodes from the data generated by my culture question. The culture 
nodes provided support for the integrated perspectives of Hofstede and Teehankee (see 
Chapter 2: Literature Review on Culture). I categorised the nodes initially into two 




nodes, while the latter had 30 nodes. The table below showed my initial culture 
categories: 
Table 17: Business Culture vs. National Culture Nodes 
Business Culture National Culture 
Insularity and Elitism (Closed/Insider) Family 
Family Conflict Avoidance 
Conflict Avoidance Collectivism 
Ethnicity Masculine 
 
As there were crossovers between the two main culture categories and indeed also 
within some of the cultural nodes, I decided to integrate them. While there may be 
arguments to the contrary to explore the divisions further, it is not within the scope of 
this thesis to investigate the fine line where business culture remains distinct from 
national culture and vice versa. Hence for simplicity’s sake, I decided to address all these 
elements motivated by the recurrence of two main elements in business culture – that of 
family and conflict avoidance – that also appeared in national culture. Overall, six 
cultural nodes form the basis of culture in the country. 
Teehankee’s notion of conflict avoidance ranked high. While I had insularity or 
closed/insider as a business culture node, in national culture the notion of collectivism is 
closely linked to this perception. Indeed Hofstede’s power distance is part of the 
closed/insider culture and similarly with the notion of collectivism there are two 
subgroups emanating from this – that of being part of the collective and outside the 
collective. There is an attitude of elitism if a person is outside the ‘collective’ or one’s 
circle. Thus, while closed/insider can be argued as being a sub-group of collectivism, the 
propensity in the interview data to state there was a closed/insider business culture in 
the Philippines warrants this classification as distinct to the collectivism node. 
Closely related to the collectivism and insularity classifications was the central role of the 
family where exclusivity due to blood ties also ranked highly. Elitism was defined as 
having gone to the same schools, universities and/or being members of the same clubs.  
Ethnicity is also worth mentioning in the culture nodes. The interview data mentioned 
several business families coming from different ethnic groups in the Philippines. Finally 
in terms of Hofstede’s masculine index, I only found support for this in a minor element 




The following figure contains the main elements of cultural nodes from my interview 
data that have an impact on the business environment: 
Figure 16: Six Culture Elements in the Philippines 
 
The six main culture elements emanating from my coding of business culture are: (i) 
insularity and elitism (closed/insider), (ii) conflict avoidance, (iii) family, (iv) ethnicity, 
(v) collectivism and (vi) masculine. The following sections discuss them in detail. 
4.1.2 Insularity and Elitism 
 
Initial categorisation of this node was closed/insider. I later decided to use insularity as 
the overall term. I also had the boardroom culture distinctive from elitism however given 
that the boardrooms of the country represented the country’s business elite, it seemed 
natural to make elitism a subset of insularity. The table below contains terms mentioned 


















Table 18: Insularity and Elitism 
 
Amongst interviewees, there was a sentiment felt about the insularity of the business 
culture. Interviewees spoke of the elitism present in the boardrooms of the country. 
Appointments to the board are normally shortlisted through familiarity with someone or 
some group’s network. Personal relationships are also strongly emphasised. 
The insider nature and relationships in business was encapsulated by two incidents that 
occurred during my data collection. During one interview, I was privy to a conversation 
between an investment banker and potential investor with the former saying to the 
latter: “Well, 90% of any deal is chemistry and I know you will get along with him.”  
The other was a private sector interviewee who noted all the friends he had amongst the 
regulators and fellow industry peers. In one phone call he made, I could overhear the 
regulator pick up the call and say to him: “Hello my friend, what can I do for you.” 
How this manifests itself on the board culture is straightforward. The nodes for boards 
dealt with effective leadership (as most boards were majority populated by 
management), change leadership (in how to reform the board in light of corporate 
governance reforms) and the phrase of ‘inner circle’ which related to the small pool of 
well-connected or name/trophy directors companies wanted.  
As the Philippines is typical of a country where there is a high power distance, my data 
provides support and concur with some of the sentiments Hofstede outlined. Given 
boards of directors host the country’s business elite, the elements of elitism are ever 
present: 
“We have introduced a chairman circle which involves 5-10 top level company 
chairmen who would talk about issues regarding the economy with significant 
shareholders. What we find is that chairmen only listen to their peers and 
colleagues.” – ICD 
• Connections or Network, Inner-Circle, Relationships 
• Boardrooms: leadership, ability to make changes
• Rich-Poor Divide, Poverty




“People who affect the life of the country in the political intellectual circle are 
very limited. It is elitist.” – private sector 1 
Networks and connections also mattered, in some cases, above one’s talent: 
“[You cannot get by on] sheer merit, sheer talent [alone] but knowing the right 
people gives you the edge.” – academic 
As Calero (2007) pointed out, the stratospheric society of Manila means “the first thing 
people want to know when they meet you is who you are related to. Family ties are very 
important, especially for the family elite.” One foreigner observed that blue chip 
boardrooms are normally populated by the elite so the elitism in the Filipino boardroom 
does not differ from other countries: 
“All these connections - they just have a different way of running the business.” –
foreigner 
Another pointed out networks counted too in other parts of the world: 
“If it comes down to a choice between your schoolmate and somebody you don’t 
know – all things being equal - you’d choose your schoolmate. But choosing on 
the basis of school ties is not just in the Philippines. It’s universal and the old 
school ties are not necessarily just Filipino.”-private sector 3 
With one interviewee who was rather defensive in his response throughout the 
interview, he spoke of the norm of speaking to people whom only one knows. As a 
stranger to him, it did explain his posture throughout the interview. This insularity is a 
common cultural element in the region according to him although whether this 
insularity and parochialism is sustainable for the country’s development is another 
matter. He spoke at length on corporate governance in the country through the prism of 
cultural considerations: 
“The emphasis on relationship is not only in the Philippines but the whole of 
South East Asia based upon on relationships. We don’t do business with 
strangers, which is also the Chinese way of doing business. Hong Kong and 
Singapore are not so relationship based [I interjected that these two countries 
who were more “open” were doing well]. I’m not sure about corporate 




the cultural way but not on the corruption side – in establishing relationship-
based corporate governance, there is a need temper it with disclosure and 
transparency. So that it may be said that though we may be related (i.e. not 
relatives, but friends etc) our relationship is transparent. When I say relationship 
it is not relatives. But you cannot just get somebody from the outside world and 
just get them in.” –private sector 4 
Insularity also manifested itself in the rich/poor divide and complemented the high 
power distance of the country. The gulf between the few wealthy elites and the mass 
poor was acknowledged by several: 
“You have the middle class rich who are not really rich or super-wealthy such as 
the middle class in Australia. This middle rich is embarrassed by wealth. My 
parents earned their wealth. It’s the other way around here. The [very rich] flaunt 
their inherited wealth – they flaunt it, as they have it. It’s very hard to hush 
inherited wealth.” -regulator 
In well-defined superior-subordinate relationships, fealty borders on the feudal not only 
in business life but also the greater political life: 
“We’ve allowed our leaders to perpetuate the system. It’s feudal: The handouts 
from the amo, masaya ka na. (If you receive money/goods from the boss, you are 
happy/content). The Philippine economic structure is part of corruption. We 
don’t even have basic industry as we’re importing [everything]. I hope we can 
have as little government as possible. Political dynasties are more of a sign of how 
the political economic structure is set up. We are a protected economy until we 
open up. We are so used to a feudal system. What gets replaced is still there with 
the landlord and that creditor power. 80%-90% of Filipinos are poor – it’s 
democracy in lip service, not democracy in the real sense of the word” –private 
sector 5 
“The perception amongst the masses is only the rich can get justice in the system, 
and that perception hasn’t changed.” –private sector 6 
“The oligarchies here are above the law in a weak state. They own the 




The last two comments point out the ultimate expression of insularity and elitism: that 
of the oligarchical nature of Philippine society where a few families control the country 
with their actions affecting the lives of so many. 
4.1.3 Family  
 
The family is the key factor in determining and modifying corporate governance in the 
country. This research explores how family ownership in corporate governance processes 
and external standards are modified by this basic underlying feature. This characteristic 
of the private sector of the Philippines is explored further in Chapter 6.  
The family in Philippine business culture is central with one interviewee pointing out 
this was the norm for the rest of the world, aside from the Anglo-American sphere: 
“Family corporations here are culture. It is not formal. But it is not different from 
the rest of Asia. The Anglo-American corporate governance structure in terms of 
concentration of ownership is an exception rather than the rule. Even 
Scandinavia has family-owned concentration of corporations as well.” -academic 
Thus the conundrum of introducing Anglo-American corporate governance - which is 
largely non-family based - to the rest of the world where the family is at the core of 
private sector activity. My interviewee pointed out one big factor for the proliferation of 
such Anglo-American precepts was due to the established dominance of corporate 
governance research coming from this cultural sphere: 
“The researchers are coming from the US and UK hence the bias of corporate 
governance towards the Anglo-American model. Their data looks at the 
concentration of ownership in the USA, UK and even in Australia. But in Asia, 
family corporations form a big part of the economy in terms of family structure. 
Family-owned corporations are so dominant in the country as in many countries 
in Europe.”-academic 
The fundamental difference in the ownership issue of Asian and indeed Philippine 
corporate governance from its English-speaking counterparts determines the nature of 
corporate governance research in the region. Internally, business families confront issues 
that are family-specific. For business families, they face the challenge of ensuring there is 




include generational transfers or succession, the sentimental value of the business, 
relationships with siblings and inheritance. Again, Chapter 6 deals with how business 
families deal with these issues extensively. 
For this section, the impact of the family on business culture is set out in the following 
table: 
Table 19: Culture nodes relating to the family 
 
Extending the centrality of the family in Filipino life, there exists the notion that when 
an employee joins a business, s/he also becomes a member of that family: 
“In Far Eastern University (FEU), we are used to consider ourselves as one big 
family. Some employees would say they graduated from here, studied here, I met 
my husband here, I can never repay what FEU has given me.” - FEU 
The notion of kinship means loyalty. This is to ensure there is loyalty to the family and 
not betraying that trust fostered when joining a ‘family’. Loyalty to the family is core: 
“The Philippines is family-centric. Somebody once described the Philippines as a 
country of families and tribes.” – private sector 1 
“There’s also the ‘tayo-tayo’ (we-us) mentality. In a larger cultural context, there 
is that tribalism in this country.” – private sector 2 
In contrast to the prevailing attitude in some Western countries, a reverential respect for 
elders was poignantly pointed out by one interviewee: 
“[On culture] we have the concept of pakikisama30
                                                     
30 Pakikisama generally refers to the ability of getting along with each other. See section on 
Conflict Avoidance. 
 and brotherhood. Sometimes 
it happens to get in the way but it is not bad per se. Pakikisama also emphasises 
the elderly, we respect them. In the West you put the elderly in nursing homes, 
it’s not good. It’s good there but bad here.” –business family member 
•Generational, succession, sentimental value of business, siblings, and 
inheritance
•Kinship, kapwa (togetherness), loyalty, respect for elders





Seniority was also placed above meritocracy: 
“Seniority plays a big role instead of meritocracy especially in family 
corporations.” – business family member 
Indeed, the notion of meritocracy has some way to go in family-owned corporations. 
This is linked to the inherent regard that family members will be more loyal than 
professional managers. Or as the old adage goes: “blood is thicker than water.” 
Therefore, loyalty outweighs meritocracy: 
“The cons [in family businesses] are you don’t always get the best men on top for 
example those [non-family members] who have better qualifications. There could 
be some source of conflict there.” –business family member 
“A loyal employee is better regarded than a more competent employee because 
with the former, you can depend on their loyalty.” – private sector 3 
Several interviewees also mentioned the downside of emphasising the family. Not only 
does the sense of family creates a sense of entitlement amongst members and allows the 
proliferation of nepotism, it does prevent a greater sense of empathy or caring beyond 
the world of the family. This is linked to the “inside the collective” perspective, where 
outsiders and outside interests have less of an impact. One interviewee asked if the 
family could be blamed to some extent on inhibiting the development of the country: 
“Before you get to country, there is loyalty to family, friends and schools. In the 
USA, the civil war tore apart families. These are cultural things – are they (family) 
inhibiting development or do they allow things to work?” – private sector 4 
While another pointed out the dominance of the family was due to the weak and 
authoritarian state of the country where formal civil institutions cannot be relied upon - 
the family is people’s social security net: 
“There is a weak sense of public. We have a perspective that looks at the 
community very narrowly in terms of immediate family. Certainly you have to 
look at the family as basis for understanding the problems of the Philippines but 
you can’t dismiss it. The family is the basis for security for people. Any reform 
will come from that system as well. The weak sense of community that we have 




short-term view but it is linked to the lack of trust in institutions that are larger 
and the sense that if you wait for your turn, you won’t get anything. The family is 
their social security net. Unless you [the state] can provide, people will continue 
to rely on families.” – academic  
Unless the state can provide the services most Western governments do provide to its 
citizens, people will continue to rely on families. Therefore, in order to live with the 
uncertain environment, people have come to rely on the institution that can be trusted 
the most - the basic unit of the family.  
4.1.4 Ethnicity 
 
Closely linked to the family is the ethnicity of the dominant business families in the 
country. Similar to the feelings and attitudes displayed in Sales’ (1979) seminal study of 
Quebecois business elites, my interviewees frequently pointed out the ethnic group of 
the business family as possessing different cultural values and traits. The main ethnic 
groups mentioned by interviewees are outlined in the table below: Filipino-Chinese, 
Filipino-Spanish, Filipino-Malay and a culture defined by an amalgam of Oriental and 
Occidental values: 
Table 20: Main Business Family Ethnicities 
 
4.1.4.1 Filipino-Chinese 
While trade between China and the Philippines has had a long history since pre-
Hispanic times, waves of Chinese immigration in the aftermath of general political 
instability in the early 20th century, due to the Cultural Revolution and political 
prosecution under Communism, that catalysed the establishment of an entrepreneurial 
class defined by their Filipino-Chinese ethnicity in the country.  
Given the dominance of ethnic Chinese business family groups in the development of 
East Asian economies, the perception that this group dominates the country’s economy 
•Filipino-Chinese, Confucian, Taipans
•Filipino-Spanish
•Filipino-Filipino (Malay), East Asian





has some merit – to an extent. Proportionally wise as percentage of population, they are 
over-represented in the list of big business groups and are widely considered as forming 
the entrepreneurial backbone of the country.  But it is fair to say that the other ethnic 
group, the Basque-Filipino business families, are also overtly represented. Combined, 
these two ethnic groups dominate the economic landscape of the country. There is a 
perceived rivalry between these two groups although it could be based upon business 
interests rather than ethnicity. 
The Filipino-Chinese, colloquially known as Tsinoys, dominate the country’s rich list (see 
Table 27 on Forbes’ Top 25 in the country in Chapter 6): 
“It’s the Filipino Chinese which grows the economy of this country than the 
Filipino-Filipino or Filipino-Spanish.” – Filipino-Chinese 
For the top Filipino-Chinese tycoons, the word tai-pan, which was first used to describe 
heads of major business houses forged in colonial Asia (especially in Hong Kong) in the 
19th and 20th centuries, the term has proliferated to encompass them: 
“The taipans are the following families: The Sys, Tans, Gokongweis, Yuchengcos, 
Gotianuns.” –manager 
“The taipans of the Philippine business environment include the Yuchengcos and 
the Cojuangcos.” -regulator 
Several interviewees pointed out the dominance of a group of Filipino-Chinese business 
families in a particular sector such as the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE): 
“The exchange is dominated by the Filipino-Chinese.” – private sector 1 
“[My interviewee] also spoke about the power of the Chinese-Filipino 
stockbrokers over the PSE...and that while they are small they protest a lot and 
are disruptive even though most of the trading – by volume and price – is done 
by foreign brokers.” – interview observation notes 
Filipino-Chinese values shaped by Confucianism with its respect for elders/seniority, 
social harmony and keeping things such as succession within the family were mentioned 
as particular traits: 




practising business in a more diversified manner. The Chinese traditionally see 
the company as their family business. The family is involved in the business as 
very few members do something else besides the family business.”-private sector 
2 
While another interviewee pointed out that the relationship-based nature of Chinese 
culture meant disclosure and opening up to strangers or outsiders take time: 
“It is important that there is a great deal of trust first especially amongst Filipino-
Chinese families. Introducing reforms take time as you have to talk to different 
members of the family. It takes time...Guanxi, relationships still dominate in 
China...With Chinese companies, it is hard to get permission. They require time 
to open up to you. They are not excited about people writing about them. It’s an 
indirect indictment [of their wealth and influence].” – private sector 3 
Interviewees made the distinction between those who were born in China and those who 
were Filipino-born. The latter is expected to have a level of acculturation with his/her 
country of birth and a well-cultivated emotional distance from China than with the 
former’s émigré status. The following commentary is testament to this eventhough the 
‘Chinese’ in question has lived most of his life in the Philippines: 
“[After the family] the next highest shareholder is owned by a Chinese.” –private 
sector 4 
For one Filipino manager working for a Filipino-Chinese business family, he observed 
that the second generation was caught between these two worlds: of having an ethnic 
background but growing up in a different dominant culture. The founder had integrated 
somewhat by marrying outside the ethnic-Chinese community: 
“The family consider themselves Filipino citizens of Chinese. We call them intsik 
(Filipino word for Chinese) which is not a nice thing to say...Aside from the 
patriarch, all the children were born here. The mother is from here. They are 
more Filipino than anything...I was organising a joint venture with [a mainland 
Chinese company], and I asked the son to translate the Chinese characters for 
me, and he said I don’t speak Chinese. It’s like learning Chinese, he learnt some 




Overseas networks of ethnic groups provide a solid foundation in terms of providing a 
commonality linked by language, culture and descent. However, not all ethnic Chinese 
families in the Philippines have grown to own and manage a business enterprise. 
In general the organisations I spoke to are believers in corporate governance and 
ethnicity is sometimes given too much credit in the discourse. The “Asian values” that is 
sometimes espoused was less of a factor amongst interviewees. The fact of the matter is, 
the private sector interviewees I spoke to had more pressing problems on their mind 
(such as their relationships with government) than their family origins. After all, they 
were all playing and competing in the economic field of the Philippines. 
From a regulator’s point of view, succession planning is gaining currency since a group of 
these largely Filipino-Chinese founder-entrepreneur businesses are ready to pass the 
baton to the next generation: 
“I was once invited to a Chinese Filipino family-owned company that was not 
regulated by the SEC. I asked them, your corporation is not publicly listed, why 
are you inviting me to speak on corporate governance? I don’t consider myself to 
be a proper guide to lecture on corporate governance to your fathers and sisters. 
He responded, impress upon them that it’s a coming trend. If we practice 
corporate governance now, it will save the company from the boredom of the 
next generation.” – SEC regulator 
For Filipino-Chinese conglomerates, there is some sensitivity over their loyalties to the 
nation and this was touched upon by a couple of interviewees. Not in a defensive way 
but in almost the incandescent vulnerability over irrational xenophobia. It must be 
remembered that loyalties to one ethnic group can vary from one individual to another 
especially if the person is born and bred in the country yet questions over one’s loyalty 
may remain due to artificial elements. There may also be confusion over one’s identity as 
this contradictory statement indicates: 
“If you’re Chinese, you’re always Chinese. That’s the beauty of being Chinese. 
Relationships are emphasised in the China market. [pause]. But we are a pure 
Filipino company.” – private sector interviewee 
In one interview, the elephant in the room (one’s ethnicity) was not mentioned at all 




with Roman characters, and the other the Chinese characters. Responses became hedgy 
when I asked about the company’s expansion into China. Truly, they were a Filipino 
company, and the Chinese market was another place for expansion. 
4.1.4.2 Identity over Ethnicity 
Identifying one’s self to one ethnic group can itself be quite limiting. Having grown up in 
multicultural Western Sydney, diversity is part of the norm and Balkanisation of student 
groups is sporadic as students from different ethnic backgrounds mix freely with each 
other. 
This of course does not discount that ethnicity does not wholly affect the business 
networks and arrangements on some level. However, the core goals of my research were 
less concerned with ethnicity and there is no intention in this section and let alone be 
interpreted as such that I seek to make light and treat this issue in a superficial manner. 
Needless to say, there are better informed ethnologists and academics more able to 
probe into the complexities of ethnicity and its bidirectional relationship within the 
Filipino business environment (see Lee-Chua 1995, Limligan 1986, de Borja 2005). The 
scope of my research however is limited to treating this issue briefly in these pages and 
future studies can address this. 
I came across Chinese Filipinos in the academic, public and private sector spheres and 
ethnicity was little or no issue at all when talking to me. Identity rather than ethnicity 
counts. When I interviewed my exuberant, ebullient, and jovial Filipino Chinese 
businessman he spoke about having to learn four dialects in the Filipino province he 
grew up in because from one town to another, the language was spoken differently. It 
made commercial transactions difficult unless one was fluent. The only time he 
mentioned racism directly in the interview was in his overseas experience. The following 
monologue is his story and an insight into how the country needs to operate out of 
isolation: 
“I am an American citizen as I have lived in the USA for awhile. However, I 
wanted to return for nationalistic reasons and because the lifestyle is easier for 
me here although most of my family lives in the USA. In the USA I was a Vice 
President at [an MNC] but I faced some racism there. They made fun of my 




meeting. I will never be Western or 6 feet tall so having grown up here, I would 
prefer to do business here. 
“Here in the Philippines, everyone is connected. In the USA, in Silicon Valley, if I 
go to a government office, I get what I need. In the Philippines, we look for a 
friend in a government office. Even if they are not the right person to speak to, 
they would feel insulted if we didn’t go to them in the first place. It’s delicadeza, 
it’s the Filipino way. If you want expedience and to save time [you use your 
connections]. In the USA, it’s called networking. In the Philippines, you get to 
know these guys as part of networking You can’t remove the network system. 
There’s the old boys’ club in LA, New York. Here, a lot of business leaders studied 
abroad in the US so there are the Harvard, Wharton and Stanford Clubs.  
“To work abroad, we have to recognise [corporate governance]. The Philippines is 
not the centre of the universe. We have to be more pro-active, above board, and 
transparent.” 
Like the experience of other Filipino professionals who have worked overseas (and carry 
with them that cachet of experience) and returned to the Philippines, they carry with 
them a sense of purpose and a feeling of being able to witness the possibilities of change 
in the country. 
4.1.4.3 Other Ethnic Groups 
In contrast, interviewees’ views towards other ethnic groups mentioned were more 
ambiguous. For Filipino-Spanish business families or mestizos, their dominance reached 
its zenith under Spanish colonial rule. However, the onset of World War Two and the 
dictatorship of Marcos saw mass emigration of this group and businesses broken up 
never to revert to its pre-war eminence. Nevertheless, the handful of Filipino-Spanish 
business families still having an impact of the economic life of the country, namely the 
Ayalas and the Aboitizes, are testament to the endurance and successful execution of the 
family’s internal processes, and ensuring their business passed through succeeding 
generations. Unlike the Filipino-Chinese, where most of them are now handling issues of 
first intergenerational transfer from entrepreneur to son or daughter, the Filipino-
Spanish have experience on their side in generational wealth management. For ethnic 
Filipino-Filipino or Filipino-Malays, entrepreneur Manuel Pangilinan and the Lopez 




As the country has seen various Western powers impose and spread their cultural values 
and norms, a couple of interviewees pointed out that the country was a fusion of Asian 
and two schizophrenic Western colonial legacies of Latin (Spanish) and Anglo-Saxon 
(American) values. While Philippine business is dominated by a substantial ethnic-
Chinese presence, commerce and trade is also global. The country is not immune to 
ideas being generated from one side of the world to the other. The following passage 
articulates how cultural values can only impact to an extent the way of doing business in 
a globalised world: 
“We’re not Confucian although we have Chinese companies. There are Confucian 
values. If we’re not Confucian, we’re Western in our business leaders so we are 
between Confucian and Western. We’re not as confrontational but it also 
depends on the individual. Business in general has become more homogenised. 
Everyone reads the same books by the same [business] gurus around the world. 
So it’s very hard to say on how much culture impacts. In business, you aren’t 
necessary hiya (sense of shame). There’s a tendency to do that in business and it 
is not only limited in your circle. We tend to be personalistic. The top 
businessmen are mostly Filipino-Chinese with Confucian values. It does make us 
unique as it is more Confucian. But are we hiya in business? Businessmen are 
hard-asses. It does influence but only to a certain extent. We would go along with 
it until up to a point bordering on the legality. We do not rock the boat but it 
really depends on the individual and where their limits are.” – private sector 
lobby group  
This was echoed by another stating commercial practice overrode cultural traits: 
“In a large cultural context, there is that tribalism in this country. (Discussion 
about business competing on a global level) We are a Filipino company so we 
have the peculiarities of our environment. We have to show ourselves to be a very 
flexible organisation. The best practices where we could add value to our 
business ensures the long term viability and growth of our company so we don’t 
let culture restrict us. Since we have started buying raw materials for our markets 
in the EU, Japan, US, Taiwan and Korea; we have had to deal with MNCs. Their 
expectations and business suppositions are doing things the Western way. We 




Thus, while ethnic elements may provide an explanation of particular business practice, 
commercial reality dictates a realistic view of doing business with or without culture’s 
‘restrictions’. Caution must be made with regards to claiming the ethnic identity as 
having a strong impact than it really does. Commerce, trade and entrepreneurialism tend 
to be less discriminatory although in an environment which fosters a business-political 
axis, ethnicity can be a powerful tool for a discontented population.  
All business groups – and indeed all companies – I spoke to face a common set of 
challenges in the Philippines (see Chapter 9: Corruption]. Corruption does not 
discriminate on the basis of one’s ethnicity according to my interviews. However, 
corruption was and is retarding the country’s economic growth and preventing the 
country from joining and participating in the greater pan-Asian economic development 
that has thus eluded the country. Indeed the overwhelming sentiment was hope for the 
cycle of economic growth, jobs, increased unemployment and reduced poverty. The 
business environment may favour the politically connected, but ethnicity is not a pre-
condition. 
4.1.5 Conflict Avoidance 
 
While Hofstede deemed the country to live with ease with uncertainty, his initial study 
did not pick up on the degree cultures avoid conflict. The Philippine culture is sensitive 
to conflict and many things are done to avoid confrontation. Mitigating the generation of 
bad blood or enmity between feuding parties is an important trait. The following table 
lists frequently mentioned words by interviewees that highlight elements of conflict 
avoidance: 
Table 21: Elements of Conflict Avoidance 
 
•Pakikisama (ability to get along with another), smooth interpersonal 
relationships (SIR) malasakit (empathy), hiya (sense of shame), sensitivity, 
delicadeza
•Emphasis on body language than what is said





 The notion of pakikisama, or the ability to get along with one another, was particularly 
emphasised. High conflict avoidance in the Philippines is encapsulated in the concept of 
smooth interpersonal relationships (or SIR) which is a variant of social harmony and is 
part of social acceptance in the Filipino context (see Lynch 1981): 
“There is a sense of propriety of never confronting. The US cliché is that the 
Filipino is wily: that’s a failure to understand the Filipino will not say no as that 
will cause a loss of face. We view it differently. For a Filipino, read and emphasise 
the bodily language over the spoken language.” – economist 
Social harmony in relationships are highly emphasised which complements the cultural 
element of insularity: 
“We are very relationship driven. There is that Malay culture element of having 
smooth interpersonal relationships and not being confrontational.” – private 
sector 1 
“You have to understand it and give importance to relationships. That’s how 
things work here. It’s personalised here. Almost everything is around 
relationships on how to get things done.” – private sector 2 
Facilitation, negotiation, compromise were techniques cited to manage and avoid 
conflict: 
“Here, it’s really on dealing with people you know – your friends, people you grew 
up with. There’s also a feeling here of ‘pakikisama’ (going along with others, 
compromise). You deal with friends, people you already know. The business 
partners are on a professional level but they would have been working together 
for quite some time. Directors that have been here don’t view only each other as 
colleagues but as friends. Filipinos don’t like confrontation. We always want 
compromise and try to accommodate everyone.” – holding company 
Or if conflict must take place, it must be done behind closed doors or done in a manner 
where the ‘face’ or one’s hiya is saved and mutual respect is recognised. Interviewees 
spoke of delicadeza which is related to the word delicate or being sensitive with one’s 
actions to ensure no harm is done to another’s ‘face’. Closely following delicadeza is deep 




necessary in order to understand how people interact in the country. Though as one put 
it, high conflict avoidance is a deterrent to proper corporate governance processes being 
implemented: 
“Criticisms here are taken too personally. On the board, there is very little 
discussion, a lot of feeding through. There is hesitancy to confront. It is a 
deterrent to real corporate governance. Corporate governance operates in an 
open environment, honest thoughts, and the ability to criticise without being 
personal.” – private sector 3 
This observation was echoed by another and he explained how conflicts in the 
boardroom are mediated: 
“Things here are taken personally…Confrontation doesn’t happen in the 
boardroom. If the difference is of a fundamental nature, it does not get sorted out 
in the boardroom but backroom through a mutual intermediator.” –economist 
However, several interviewees pointed out this aspect of conflict avoidance does not 
wholly recuse responsibility or the ability to make the hard commercial decisions when 
required: 
“Pakikisama is on the ground to a certain extent. But this is not an excuse to 
mask shortcomings. It does not mean closing off the possibilities of bringing new 
ideas and practices because this would trigger in-breeding which will be bad in 
the long term.” –listed company  
“On the merits of team work of pakikisama or of getting along, if you use it for 
covert intentions, then you use it for elements of deception.” – lobby group 1 
Another pointed out the sometime roundabout way of addressing issues where 
disagreements may arise can be subject to misinterpretation: 
“The problem for us is everything is personal. It’s all related .It’s tough separating 
the personal from the professional. It’s difficult to do that here. Look at the 
family, there is a lot of emotional baggage. Culturally in fact we’re more sensitive 
in our communication styles (than Western families). In the West, people can 




Filipinos need to read between the lines: there is scope for being interpersonal, to 
interpret [but also] misinterpret. The values are different.”  – academic 1 
Nevertheless, long-term relationships are far more important than a disagreement over a 
potentially divisive issue. The value placed on long-term relationships outweighs 
quibbles with erring on the side of good relations rather than the other taking 
precedence: 
“When [an issue] has to be tackled, there is no way of avoiding the issue so we 
run a meeting. We’ll hear both sides but we’ll face issues head on. So they are 
elements of hiya and pakikisama. We’ll go on but shy away from controversial 
issues. For business people if that’s the business in hand, we’ll have to address it. 
If we don’t have, prudence dictates it is better to have good relations than not.” – 
lobby group 2 
Some situations do demand the ability to talk directly with the possibility of alienation 
and this becomes a bit contradictory as one pointed out: 
“At the same time, we are faced with images of Hollywood and USA where we 
walk and talk American but in our relationships we have ambivalence so it 
becomes a bit schizophrenic. When you’re talking about principles of corporate 
governance, you have to be unpleasant. Related party transactions are not 
pleasant.” – private sector 4 
For one foreign interviewee, he pointed out the disadvantages of the highly 
individualistic culture of the West and sees the positive effects of pakikisama not only in 
the Philippines but in the region especially in its ability to move forward in a consensus 
manner: 
“How do you apply pakikisama to a capitalist model? Loyalty is thin in this model 
and is it possible to have smooth relationships? It’s important not to look at 
pakikisama as a negative. In the capitalist model, it’s a dog-eat-dog world and 
highly individualistic. Here in the Philippines, I have never ever seen a case of 
road rage. There are elements in every culture that is as bad as it is good. Is the 
Philippine culture here corrupt because of its former colonialists (Spain/USA)? If 
you go to Hanoi, they criticise their government and when you mention the war 




Being able to make decisions with the general agreement of others without major 
conflict is a hallmark of Philippine business culture. 
4.1.6 Collectivism 
 
The collectivist culture of the Philippines supports the high power distance and high 
conflict avoidance in the country. The most frequently used word in my interview data is 
the word “we” which denotes collective responsibility and collective decision making 
especially when responding to questions in my interview guide. Below shows the most 
frequently appearing 20 words from my interview data, with the topic of this research, 
corporate governance, ranking 4th and 3rd respectively: 
Table 22: Top 20 Most Frequently Used Words in Interview Data Generated from 
NVivo 
Rank Word Word Count Rank Word Word Count 
1 We 2048 11 Company 918 
2 Have 1941 12 More 909 
3 Governance 1489 13 He 906 
4 Corporate 1425 14 Family 902 
5 From 1356 15 Board 869 
6 Has 1210 16 Government 819 
7 An 1125 17 Which 788 
8 I 1085 18 One 782 
9 Business 986 19 So 777 
10 You 922 20 Philippines 714 
 
In defining collectivism in the country, it is interesting that the perception of 
collectivism can also be quite selfish. Collectivism is also linked to the business culture of 
insularity. In the matter of collectivism, those outside one’s network can find it a 
different culture to penetrate. With collectivism there is a dichotomy: there is a sense of 
generosity to insiders; equally, there is no obligation to be generous or reciprocal to 
outsiders. Thus collectivism has two faces –collectivism as a group, and self-centredness 
and a distrustful attitude towards those outside one’s group. 
In this sense, I delineate the collectivism element by defining perception of being “part 
of inside the collective” and attitudes towards those on the “outside of the collective.” 
The latter perhaps defines why there is a strong element of elitism, exclusivity or 
arguably social divide – you are part of a group or not. Below is the dichotomous 




Figure 17: Dichotomy of Collectivism 
 
If a person is inside the collective, the feeling of “being one” with other members of the 
collective is present. This empathic feeling provides support for this group version of 
self-actualisation as depicted by Lapeña (2002) in Chapter 2. Being inside the collective 
means there is social acceptance, reciprocity and mutual trust that bypasses any 
organisational constraints. Too much of this in the case of the latter may facilitate 
corruption (see also Chapter 9 where patronage and group membership overrides 
organisational boundaries). Several interviewees provided insights into what high 
insider-collectivism means when enacted: 
“It is not so much corruption or bribery but undue influence in a sense. Here, 
there is so much on the family connection, of doing favours.” –private sector 1 
“There is also the aspect of gift-giving. We like to give. It is taken in different 
context in corporate governance. If you refuse a gift, it offends people. It’s part of 
the culture” – private sector 2 
“In the Philippines, we look for a friend in the government office. Even if they are 
not the right person to speak to, they would feel insulted if we didn’t go to them 
in the first place. It’s delicadeza, it’s the Filipino way” – private sector 3 
The referral system is a feature of Philippine business relationships. A big part of the 
Collectivism
Inside the Collective
Social acceptance, reciprocity (utang na loob), 
favouritism,  gratitude, insular, parochialism,  
neighbourliness, pakikisama, pride, trust







snowball effect (as in Chapter 3: Methodology) in my data gathering was the subsequent 
referral of people for me to interview. While it is arguable that the elites in every 
business culture – whatever country – have a referral system in place whether through 
formal networks such as conferences and chambers of commerce events, the referral 
system in the county is far more personal, relationship-based and informal. 
At the other end of the spectrum, if one is outside the collective (whether it be by ethnic 
group, school and college ties or family membership), the group becomes self-interested, 
self-preserving and self-important. Exclusionary elements come into play dealing with 
those outside the collective. While not so black and white, the element of “if you’re not 
with us, you’re against us” attitude is present: 
“The value system here is driven by families: Where are you from? Who’s your 
partner for the business commitment? Something comes up with a family that 
overrides everything. The priority has completely changed. There’s a selfishness 
aspect here. I observe it when people walk, drive, the person will stop, do 
whatever they want, walk from one side to the other side of the road. What 
comes first is what they want to do. It’s indicative of a lot of what’s happening 
here. What it is, it is related to bribes. It’s selfishness that’s predominant. The 
Filipinos are also proud.” – private sector 4 
“There is a matter of how you control and control in a responsible manner. There 
is a selfish streak here which is to amass as much wealth as possible.” – private 
sector 5 
Attending a corporate governance workshop, the theme in bold letters spelled out: 
“Country Above Self.” For a highly collectivistic culture, it is almost contradictory that 
people in this country whose identity is forged and defined by which group they belong 
to can at the same time have problems in uniting and working for the common good and 
common welfare of the nation. Thus, in this aspect, this research uncovers the 
contradictory nature of collectivism: membership of a group also has exclusionary 
aspects. That is, while this particular East Asian culture is highly collectivist and family-
oriented - it can also be quite insular. Understanding the dual face of collectivism and 
the importance of group membership is supportive of a culture that is highly insider with 






The last of Hofstede’s cultural index masculine-feminine, is marginally supported to 
some extent by my interview data. However, it doesn’t feature prominently as much as 
the others. The Philippines tends to rate highly on the side of masculine in the index 
which is defined by assertiveness and the traditional role of the male as the breadwinner 
in the society. The table below shows the masculine elements in my interview data: 
Table 23: Elements of Masculine 
 
The latter is displayed in the machismo attitude some interviewees pointed out as being 
present in the business culture of the country. However, proportionally, women are 
better represented in senior management roles in the Philippines. As one interviewee 
pointed out, the strong Filipina is not an uncommon feature: 
“Culturally, Filipino women were brought up to take decisions and there are 
powerful women up the corporate ladder. They are very accomplished so there’s 
not much discrimination in place. The women were brought here to take 
responsibility in the family environment. The boys are pampered.” –private sector 
6 
This reflects Hofstede’s observation that in a masculine culture, women tend to display 
more assertiveness. 
4.1.8 Concluding Remarks on Culture 
 
In viewing culture in the Philippines, the above mentioned elements must be integrated 
to appreciate a better understanding of the business environment in the country. The 
interrelatedness of one element to the other does bring to mind the egg-chicken 
problem. Is it because of the centrality of the family that produces an insular, elitist, 
and/or collective culture? Is conflict avoidance and insularity the manifestation of a 
collective culture? Does ethnicity really matter in the operation of a business given all 






state? These unexplored questions show the limitations of this research but also shows 
the fundamental, enduring importance culture holds in this research. The next section in 
this chapter provides support for culture’s impact.  
4.2 Political Environment 
 
From the cultural arrangements of the country to the more prosaic political composition, 
the business environment of the Philippines is inextricably linked to the politics of the 
country. This section looks at the relationship the private sector has with the state. The 
external, pragmatic relationship between business and state has strongly manifested 
itself in the unsavoury aspect and pervasiveness of corruption in the country (See 
Chapter 9: Corruption). This section looks at the impact of the dysfunctional state on the 
corporate governance environment and the private sector. This section contributes best 
to the ongoing debate on the varieties of capitalism around the world as indeed the 
varieties of corporate governance that have taken form in order to operate across varied 
socio-political environments.  
Similarly to the previous section on culture, this section contributes to supporting 
Hypothesis 2 of my research: 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
Whereby the political instability of the Philippines, in particular the lingering effect of 
the Marcos dictatorship has made a profound impact on business practices. 
As the Philippines is neither a fully-functioning capitalist free market country (like the 
USA, Australia) nor one that is heavily directed by a strong state (such as South Korea, 
China), the government’s influence and impact on the private sector has been viewed as 
a major hindrance (rather than facilitator) to the economic development of the country.  
When interviewees were asked about what can be done to improve corporate governance 
in the country and whether there were effective government institutions, almost all 
interviewees emphasised the importance of government in any reform process. A 
substantial proportion of the comments were highly critical of government’s actions and 
positions. Being part of ASEAN, the Philippines’ lack of economic progress relative to its 




with government. At the same time, most were unified in their response that the 
solution also lies in government and that the public sector must also lead by example. 
This section summarises the attitude and opinions of the private sector on the political 
environment of the country, and its relationship with government. 
4.2.1 A Challenging Environment 
 
The political environment of the Philippines is a difficult one and the dysfunctional 
politics affects the country innately. As Hutchcroft pointed out: 
“successful economic development has been constrained to a large extent by 
weaknesses of political development” (1998:4). 
The frustration felt by those who see the country ‘being left behind’ as other countries in 
the region develop rapidly is palpable. It is not the lack of intellect, willingness to work, 
or entrepreneurialism (after all millions of Filipinos have migrated elsewhere and 
become citizens of and contributed to their adopted lands). Rather, it is the political 
system and its effects on the government institutions it controls that have largely 
constrained the natural talent of the country’s citizens to improve and contribute to the 
country’s development. As The Economist pointed out, government policy is at the core: 
“Business groups cite several reasons for giving the Philippines a low competitive 
ranking: widespread perceptions of government corruption; poor infrastructure; 
bureaucratic red tape; and unpredictable policies. The problems outweigh 
advantages such as the availability of a trainable workforce and the population’s 
general openness to foreigners. Declining English proficiency among workers is 
an increasing concern. Many investors find business regulations complicated and 
burdensome, particularly procedures in business registration, customs and 
immigration. Investors often view the courts’ propensity for issuing temporary 
restraining orders on issues affecting business as detrimental to foreign 
investment, as is weak enforcement of regulations.” – Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU 2008) 
From the viewpoint of the private sector, its relationship with government is oft-
described as a challenging experience. A big obstacle to the country’s economic growth is 




and the frustration by these eminent people was obvious in the room during my 
interview: 
“The board are all concerned businessmen. They work on the policy level and 
there is a feeling of frustration with the current business environment. One left 
after my question on government and whether it has been effective and what can 
be done. He said my questions provoked him to be frustrated and he felt his 
anger rise about the current situation that’s why he had to leave.” – interview 
observation notes 
This frustration stemmed from the successive failures of decision making on economic 
policy: 
“The country moves out of sheer inertia. You don’t feel the presence of the 
government or their initiatives moving the economy.” – private sector 1 
The country still hosts a high level of protectionism and barriers to trade with 
government playing a pivotal role. An interviewee saw the two sides to this 
protectionism – protection of the country’s industries inhibited growth but also ensured 
social sensibilities were being catered for: 
“Companies that operate here are vulnerable to very politically-risky judgements. 
When investment is opened to outsiders, you favour removing barriers to entry 
as soon as possible in politically sensitive sectors. I am not an absolute believer in 
justice meted out by the invisible hand but there’s the social sector [and social 
impact] to consider when you open previously closed sectors to external 
ownership and investment.” – private sector 2 
In its failure to act as facilitator for economic development, government is seen as a 
hindrance, with the hands of the private sector largely tied by its public sector 
counterparts. Some private players have filled in the institutional void left by 
government providing support for Chung’s (2005) thesis on business groups:  
“Government is failing internally for example in education, mining. Eventhough 
it’s not the job [of the private sector], we provide schooling in the communities 
that we are in.” – private sector 3 




in the Philippines. Government constraints are related in the next section and how 
regulation in the country is largely politicised. 
4.2.2 Politicised Regulation 
 
The pervasiveness of political decisions has a profound, integral and immediate impact 
on the private sector and its regulators. The lack of autonomy in decision-making by 
regulators means informal relationships, hierarchical decisions and political patronage 
are issues that policymakers and businesses must contend with in order for the latter to 
exercise their authority and for the private sector to operate successfully in the country. 
Various newspaper editorials during the course of my fieldwork suggested improvements 
in government’s oversight of the private sector to instil confidence and diminish 
unpredictability. The following excerpt from a Business Mirror editorial encapsulated 
where governance fitted in: 
"Even more important is upholding good governance so that the private sector 
sees engagement with the government in the noble enterprise of economic 
development and nation-building as worthwhile and necessary. Corruption 
begins to rear its ugly head whenever development projects are announced by the 
government, but as they say, it takes two to tango." Business Mirror (2007c)  
Several interviewees (including one regulator) spoke about politicised regulation in the 
government bureaucracy as hindrance to economic development: 
“...we have to be realistic. We have to operate here with this government...As a 
businessman, the bureaucracy, the corruption, the politicking involved [is 
frustrating] – I refuse to have any dealings with them.” – private sector 1 
“Economic development [in the Philippines] is tied up with politics.” –private 
sector 2 
“The political infrastructure of government is stifling and it’s a hindrance to 
economic progress” –regulator 
Echoing past experience with a predatory government, elements of crony capitalism still 




initiatives largely depended on the extent protectionism and favoured players are in the 
sector: 
“No, the [government] has not been effective. They have paid lip-service. They 
have attempted to do certain things and it depends on the sector. Regulation in 
banking and finance has been the most successful for a variety of reasons as the 
financial community is globally integrated with Basel requirements and that’s the 
name of the game for that sector.” – private sector 3 
“[There are] heavily regulated industries in this country in areas of infrastructure: 
water distribution, airlines, ports management. The incentive of [operations in] 
these industries is in regulatory capture. These are regulated industries. The 
culture of rent seeking is to capture politicians, to capture the decision-making 
so you’re not accountable.” -  private sector 4 
Politicised regulation damages the bureaucracy and contributes to eroding public 
confidence in government. Politicised regulation also contributes to inefficient allocation 
of private sector investment. On the public sector investment side, Chapter 8 looks 
extensively at how government pension funds – the country’s main institutional 
investors – are guided not by their mandate but by the whims of their political overseers.  
4.2.3 Politically-Connected Firms 
 
Within the private sector, the reality of dealing with the politicised environment means 
players are faced with the spectrum of choice from reluctance to whole embrace of the 
sometime unsavoury aspects. Incentives for a business to be well-connected politically in 
order to operate show the challenge of doing business in the country without involving 
government officials. The nature of one’s connections comes down to a matter of 
organisational values for the firm involved. The reality of operating in the country means 
a certain compromise must be reached to ensure the continued existence of a business: 
“Every businessman would like to see ethical conduct similar to the initiatives 
from the private sector. In the private sector, we practice good ethical conduct. 
It’s a difficult scenario [as you have] to compromise your values.” – private sector 
1 




seeking in government, while the other tier realises their core businesses cannot operate 
without influencing politicians: 
“There are some big legitimate businesses versus some big guys who are playing 
another set of rules. Our hope is the latter become ethical players and become 
ethical. While in the former the big players exercise CSR and not take advantage 
of their premier position and market power. The problem is for these legitimate 
companies they are forced to behave unethically [to compete].” – private sector 2 
“My [interviewee] was president of [a public sector] board and promoted [a 
liberalisation policy] which went against the interests of a politically connected 
person. The President of the Philippines needed this person’ support so [my 
interviewee] had to leave his position. According to my interviewee this person 
has bought so many congressmen and the President flipped-flopped her support 
for my interviewee. This person published a full page newspaper ad calling my 
interviewee a traitor on the liberalisation policy. My interviewee is currently in 
his position as there were people who supported his stance.” – interview 
observation notes 
For one regulator, interacting with a politically connected private sector owner is a 
source of frustration: 
“To [name of politically-connected person], just stop complaining and just do 
business. Just do your work. If you run into a problem and you don’t want to 
cough up anything, that’s what you get. You’re buying decisions, buying people. 
Some people just complain.” –regulator 
Some interviewees criticised the sometimes ‘unethical’ players for contributing, and in 
some cases, compounding the weakness of the government. When private sector 
participants interfere in the politics of the country, unintended consequences occur: 
“It’s all about the right connections for example if you look at the cigarettes 
sector. It’s not a level playing field. There is not free and fair competition. They 
want government they can dictate even if the cause of that is instability in the 
country. They looked the other way when the President cheated because the 
contender was not part of the elite. They are now reaping the consequences of 




“A lot of companies don’t practice accountability and transparency. The SEC and 
PSE need to have the resources to enforce stricter rules in accountability and 
transparency. [Name of a person] is one of those people who don’t practice 
corporate governance.” – private sector 4 
The annual State of the Nation Address (SONA) made by the President is a signal to 
private sector participants whether their projects (if mentioned) will go ahead (or not). If 
it did not get mentioned, then it will never get off the ground: 
“Certain projects in the State of the Nation Address (SONA) require strong 
political support. These projects would not have passed if it didn’t get political 
support.” – private sector 5 
Attempts to insert some independence in a public sector office are sullied inevitably by 
the connections of the recipient as in the following case of an ombudsman. The 
connections of this person mean any perception of his independence is marred by how 
he came about to be appointed: 
“There is an ombudsman and it’s supposed to be an independent position but it’s 
a political appointee by the President. The present one was a classmate of the 
First Gentleman at law school. [So people think] it’s the influence by the First 
Gentleman on how the ombudsman got appointed.” – private sector 6 
The legacy of the Marcos years has also meant unravelling the culture of rewarding 
politically well-connected firms. Under the rule of Marcos, the dictator’s favourites 
received the spoils of patronage with supporters receiving board memberships: 
“For example, government corporations were sequestered during the Marcos era 
with their own boards of directors.” – private sector 7 
“Under Marcos, big names in the political arena formed alliances with his cronies 
and they became the new elites.” – private sector 8 
In doing so, Marcos’ actions divided the private sector by pitting one business group 
against another and this has created a long-standing distrust of government with the 




4.2.4 Calls for Public Sector Governance 
 
For governance reforms to gain wider legitimacy and acceptance, several interviewees 
called for improved governance in the public sector to complement private sector 
reforms. The lack of reform in the former leads to a credibility gap. The introduction of 
corporate governance has prompted calls for similar reforms in the government sector. 
In a public governance conference held in 2007, the PSE CEO Francis Lim encapsulated 
this public/private sector diptych on Philippine corporate governance: 
"Governance is not just the responsibility of the public sector. It is not just the 
responsibility of the private sector. In other words, it's a shared responsibility." –
Lim in Estopace (2007) 
Most interviewees were articulate in what they saw were problems in the public sector 
that affected the way they did business: 
“Government must lead by example. It affects us in the private sector. Whichever 
standards we use, we can’t do it just by ourselves. I’d like to see public sector 
corporate governance. It is a key driver for corporate governance integration in 
the way we do business. Family firms have now the tendency of going public and 
that will help strengthen the private sector.” – business group 1 
“Corporate governance when it comes to private sector entities is equally 
challenged by the lack of corporate governance in our counterparties in 
government. Entities we’re dealing with such as the BSP, SEC, are already at that 
levels. I don’t believe in the peddling [of influence] in this system of government. 
[Government] should be the first one to implement [governance] as in the private 
sector. It’s a system of nepotism here.” – private sector 1 
“The real problem is the national and political governance. Thankfully, the 
[corporate] regulators have been good. But we operate locally so we need the 
government for a whole host of things. There are all very basic reforms that are 
needed.” – private sector 2 
Private sector corporate governance requires complementary reforms in the public 
sector. The future of private sector development relies in that sphere. The following two 




“...corporate governance cannot be isolated from other forms of governance such 
as public governance. The public governance in the Philippines is not the best in 
the world. There are broader public governance issues as well. If we get 
corporations to behave and they don’t see the consistency on the public level, it 
is a disincentive. We cannot look at corporate governance in the Philippines 
independently of public governance issues as well. We recognise dealing with 
governance reform on the national level is not impossible but it is a big 
challenge. On governance we can take as much as we could and there are 
grounds gained. The glass ceiling [needs to break] on public governance and the 
governance of state-owned corporations as there is some political baggage and 
inefficiencies in that sector.” – private sector 3 
“The future of corporate governance in the private sector depends on the public 
sector. You can’t simply disregard the effects of public governance. A major 
stakeholder here is government. You look at government, the regulator – the 
performance of any of the private sector companies is affected by support from 
the public sector. This is the environment where you operate. The public sector 
also needs to develop its own governance standards to attend and contribute to 
the growth of corporate governance in the private sector. Governance of the 
public sector in countries is successful because they have mature government 
institutions and the government develops their public sector.” – PLDT 
The main stumbling block – that of politics – can be unsurmountable in the current 
environment for effective public sector governance to take place. A culture of active 
regulatory enforcement throughout the rest of the government bureaucracy and not just 
the main financial regulators was strongly wished for: 
“We need to have complementary reforms in the BIR and the other regulators. It 
cannot be [just the private sector].” – private sector 4 
“Greater transparency in the regulatory environment of both government and 
self-regulatory bodies like the PSE will contribute greatly to improve corporate 
governance in the Philippines. Of course, more transparency should also help 





While for the most part the corporate governance regulators (see Chapter 5) are held in 
better esteem than most, some interviewees had problems with their industry-specific 
regulators: 
“In a heavily regulated industry such as the telecoms, so much depends on the 
National Telephone and Communication Commission [I asked if I should contact 
them on governance but they said they won’t be useful on this point]. Telecom 
industries here are regulated - it important to address the certain limitations and 
weaknesses of the regulator.” – private sector 5 
“We are also monitored by CHED - the Commission on Higher Education. CHED 
is another government body monitoring us. If I were in CHED, I’d do more…they 
took back their word when we limited our tuition fee increases. When they 
issued [an edict] on tuition fees, we followed it to the letter (but they later 
reversed it). We’re glad there’s no problem on our part to do this.” – private 
sector 6 
To give credit where it is due, the public sector side is heavily influenced by the 
concentration of power in the executive. Both public and private sectors recognise that 
there lacks strong, autonomous government institutions in the country primarily 
because of the high degree of political influence exercised by the executive at all levels of 
bureaucracy (see Chapter 8). The Westminster model of a strong bureaucracy working 
independently of the politicians as personified in the UK TV series “Yes Minister” does 
not exist in the country. The bureaucracy suffers major upheavals every time a new 
president takes power in the country. Such is the concentration of power and decision-
making in the executive – which is embedded in the country’s constitution – the 
temptation is there not to relinquish the position voluntarily. Indeed, in a one off-the-
cuff moment when the then UK PM Tony Blair resigned from his office in favour of his 
treasurer Gordon Brown, one of my interviewees observed: 
“That [peaceful] transfer of power would have never occurred in this country.”–
private sector 4 
How this concentrated power affects the government bureaucracy is palpable with the 
ability of the executive to appoint and dismiss heads of departments autonomously. One 




difficult for lasting governance reforms (such as independent director appointments) in 
the public sector to occur: 
“How can we have independent directors if everybody gets appointed by the 
country’s president? The president has enormous power relative to appointments 
and the president does recognise that there must be good corporate governance. 
The president believes good corporate governance must prevail be they public 
(government-owned) corporation or else. It is difficult to change the culture but 
we have to start." –public sector 
The public sector is bigger than the private sector of the country. There are more 
government owned corporations than there are listed companies on the Philippine Stock 
Exchange with 736 government owned corporations compared to 241 listed companies.31
Public sector reform is far more relevant and of greater import. A common sentiment 
amongst my interviewees is that a strong private sector in the Philippines requires an 
equally strong, non-politicised public sector. The private sector is small and the widely 
influential OECD principles of corporate governance have been imposed on it yet there 
is no similar reform in the public sector. In 2005, the OECD issued Guidelines for 
Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises. This is an acknowledgment of how 
corporate governance reforms in the private sector are shaped by the large public sector 
in developing countries such as the Philippines.   
 
The appointments system in the country is vested in the President and changes to this 
system require legislative reform to make independent board appointments on 
government-owned corporations.  
Reciprocal reforms in public sector governance to complement private sector reforms 
will enhance both sectors’ capabilities and gain wider legitimacy amongst the general 
populace. 
4.2.5 Role of Government 
 
Areas of public finance, opening up protected industries and having a level playing field 
were mentioned by interviewees as necessary for government to address in order to 
improve private sector development. There is a wish for government to be the referee of 
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a level playing field and to enforce the rules consistently. This would create an 
environment of certainty and predictability which business favours: 
“I’d like the government to open the economy up. Competition isn’t at all 
possible by itself. You need regulations and regulatory authorities. For example 
with the stock market, it is a free market but it has to be bounded by a lot of rules 
so there’s a level playing field so there is no insider information trading and full 
disclosure is made. [It’s hard to be deceitful] with free markets and competition 
with good regulations.” –private sector 1 
“Opening up the economy helps with the liberalisation of reforms. Under Ramos, 
PLDT, water, telecoms and banks were opened up. Opening up protective 
industries resulted in robust reform.” – private sector 2 
The problems of the public sector are a reflection of the quandary of the government of 
the Philippines. As the operational arm of government, the bureaucracy is affected by the 
caprices of the executive. The pervasiveness of government and its tendency to control 
has impeded the development of the natural entrepreneurship of people. Referring to the 
economic policies of the past, one interviewee pointed out the devastating effect they 
have had on the country’s private sector development: 
“The whole of GOCC requires reform in its legal personality. All GOCCs should 
have a prospective charter. Look at the corporate governance of the GOCC and 
change the whole system. Pure capitalism or what it should be is people don’t act 
in their own self-interest. The pure capitalism model here is what the role of 
government should be if it happens. If there is less government, you achieve 
things more simply. For example if government is only occupied with social 
welfare measures and you deregulate the rest and open up the economy - why 
couldn’t it happen here? Is it completely different? Government can get out of 
many things. They have major interference.  
“True economy subsidisation doesn’t work. They are trying to have the capacity 
to control, and the unintended impact spreads through. This is where politics, oil 
and food make it very difficult to reform the sector. You need to get government 
of there. Subsidies on food and oil benefit the rich and they’re not targets at all of 




compete. These are frustrating times. Here, you can’t get politics out of the way; 
politics doesn’t allow that to happen…There is too much worry about the politics. 
Government involves itself where it should not be involved. It becomes 
personalised and political…if oil prices increase, the people starve. The 
government can introduce social welfare measures but [try as it might] the 
government can’t control the economy, it can’t control impact. There is no 
confidence in the entire country.” -private sector 3 
Indeed, the thriving informal sector in the country shows it is not ingenuity, business 
nous or entrepreneurship of Filipinos that is inhibiting its development32
“The culture impacts on how government is involved and it is involved in far too 
much. It’s inhibiting the natural competitive behaviour. [The country has people] 
who have had capitalist success and done extremely well. They are widely 
respected.”- private sector 4 
: 
While in practice government is far too ubiquitous, the policy formulation has now 
taken a more enlightened approach with a mindset towards less involvement of 
government. The following passage from the then Finance Secretary, Gary Teves, sets out 
the limitations of government in future national economic activity: 
“The principle is, we believe that in most cases, all other things being equal, the 
private sector can operate most of the corporations or establishments where the 
government has some stake - they're better left in private hands. And we believe 
the government should concentrate on its core business. And that's to 
concentrate on providing social services and infrastructure. It will be very helpful 
if the government were just to concentrate on this core business and let the 
private sector do the rest. But as we do this, what's also very important is that we 
have a good sense of our approach on regulation. It has to be a regulatory body 
that will combine enforcement with a sense of the market.” - Business Mirror 
(2007d)  
The above passage also reflects the limitations to future reform in the country. It is not 
up to the Finance Secretary to set in motion these overall macroeconomic reforms but 
                                                     
32 Entrepreneurship in the informal market has been a source of study such as Morris and Pitt’s 
1995 study of entrepreneurialism in South African townships and Morris et al (1997) linkage of 




the politicians that can and do make these happen. Political will is the crux. The 
instability and unpredictability of leadership in the politicised bureaucracy affect the 
ability of private sector participants to make long-term decisions (see Chapter 8): 
“It’s very developmental. A lot of areas need improvement such as public finance. 
It really is a question of political will if reforms can be implemented. Year in year 
out we have the same complaints.” – private sector 5 
“It’s investment-given that [implementing reforms] are to do with culture. It also 
has to do with political will. The political ingredient is essential. When you make 
the rules, you naturally affect the whole scenario.” – regulator 
Or as one hopefully suggested, looking to outsiders to force change on the country, 
liberalise and let it join the rest of the world: 
“Throw out the politicians – they can freely politicise other institutions. The 
countervailing force is the international market as they demand certain levels of 
good governance. The financial markets want that but that’s short-term. In the 
long term, change the constitution, allow foreign competition [and remove] 
foreign ownership restrictions, [so there’s] competition in media, telecoms and 
service industries.” – private sector 6 
The frustrations felt by my interviewees lie principally due to the problems that have 
readily available – but politically sensitive – solutions. The problems are widespread, but 
the solutions are also well-known. Conflicting interests of politically-connected 
individuals, families and companies make reforms difficult to implement. The next 
section briefly looks at political dynasties and their role in the political infrastructure – 
and fabric – of the country. 
4.2.6 The Philippine Oligarchy: Political Dynasties 
 
The oligarchy is a feature of Philippine socio-economic life. One explanation of the 
political sluggishness to motivate reform has a lot to do with the interests of political 
dynasties that dominate the country: 
“There are vested interests of the families that control the economy and politics. 




the senior level of the President. Selected families are involved in the politics. 
Look at the candidates, they’re all interrelated. The politicians within the Senate 
and Congress – they are handed from father to son.  The unions here – major 
unions are controlled by [this person]. He’s the president and he just handed it to 
his son. That’s the way things work in this country.” – private sector 1 
While it was beyond the scope of this research to explore further the role of political 
dynasties, several interviewees mentioned their importance in understanding the 
operations of the country. A regulator suggested I read a book called The Rulemakers 
which looks at political dynasties. The book was written by members of the Philippine 
Centre for Investigative Journalism (Coronel et al 2007) and documents how 70% of 
members of the Philippine legislature are related to each other. In a country of 80 
million people with a purported democracy, at face value it is difficult to understand why 
wider representation is not available and why political seats are handed from one family 
member to another: 
“Due to the political oligarchies in the country, bills are passed to protect one 
politician. There are political families that are generational: wife, widow of sitting 
member; they are sitting until the next generation comes along. It is not a matter 
of merit on who becomes a politician but on who they know. If they know a 
person who is well, they tell another person, until it spreads that they are a  good 
person and that is how they are voted.” - regulator 
The dominance of family-owned business groups in the private sector is mirrored by the 
clannish nature of Philippine politics. A few families dominate the private sector and 
equally a handful of families dominate the Philippine political sphere. According to one 
interviewee this meagre representation breeds a high degree of inequality: 
“Certainly there is an uneven playing field. This remains a serious problem. 
Family-based form of economic power translates into familial politics.”- academic 
A quick solution to the political dynastic problem is far from immediate. One offered the 
perspective that the reality of dealing with political dynasties means some pragmatism 
must be observed. This includes appreciating that a member of the political family would 
have the best exposure and in-house knowledge of how to navigate best through the 




“If I were to choose a governor in my town tomorrow, one from academe or one 
from a political family; I would choose the one from the political family. That 
person would have had political training and governance started in childhood. 
That person would be living politics and government every day and exposed to a 
lot of practical training. An academe doesn’t have that. [A political family 
member would be] used that to that…[The Philippines] is an exciting place, not a 
dull place.” – private sector 2 
Another defended political families and their tendency to interact and marry each other, 
thus propagating the elitism: 
“[On dynasties] and oligarchies in politics, in business, sure they exist. Wealthy 
families marry each other. In politics, the oligarchy is a sure thing. People who 
interact [in the same circles] become attracted to each other. I’m not sure if 
dynasties are more of an issue of governance and whether they are a deterrence 
to governance. It’s not their fault if the families [have reached where they are] it’s 
public governance awareness that’s hurting the country more than families.” – 
business family member 
Another interviewee called for overall reform such as disestablishing their hold on 
Congress. However, the current state of the concentration of political power means 
members of political dynasties are wary of losing the power that they have accumulated 
over several generations. The sense of entitlement to a Congress seat means political 
families will be reluctant to lose power without receiving something in return for any 
loss of influence and prestige: 
“We need political reform but we have to break up the dynasties. Congress does 
not have the commitment to pass laws to break up dynasties. Maybe we need a 
revolution. Can it be done peacefully? We almost had the opportunity in 1986 
and it was a revolution. The old order changed, but the new order inherited the 
old order’s corruption and kept it.” – private sector 3 
The intergenerational representation in government of political family members has 
institutionalised the process. If changes are to be made, these political dynasties need to 
be co-opted. Clearly the way democracy is governed in the country is dysfunctional but 




another issue altogether. Indeed, how is it possible to implement political reform within 
the pre-existing oligarchical structure? Political families are both the problem and 
solution according to the following passage: 
“You have to take the family seriously. You can’t put decisions to argue that the 
political families are a hindrance to modern institutions may lead to the failure to 
examine how to move away from that form [of dynastic politics]. You have to 
understand families: their recruitment, financing reforms. There is a huge 
concentration of wealth. Start where you are. Start with the political families. 
New generations are socialised and groomed to take power with a different 
socialisation. There are a lot who are tired of the same families. There is a 
situation where the Western institution in the political and economic arena is 
imposing on a highly concentrated, unequally economic and political structure. If 
you move to a parliamentary system, you’ll have local oligarchs. It goes hand in 
hand with institutional changes, address the inequality first. You can’t move from 
A to B (congressional to parliamentary) without understanding the familial 
control. Reform, the possibilities of reform have to start with that. There’s a 
certain level at which some of the [corporate governance] principles allow us to 
challenge the corruption and control of families.” –academic 
As the earlier section on culture in this chapter pointed out, the centrality of the family 
in Philippine culture is reflected in the dominance of this institution in political and 
business spheres. However, that other trademark of Philippine culture of insularity 
outside the collective provokes exclusivity. By their nature, families have a natural 
limitation due to extant blood ties. We cannot all be closely related to each other. 
Therefore favouring a family member simply because of their connection has had 
unintended and unfortunate consequences as outlined by my interviewees above.  
By any measure, a country nearing 100 million people is ruled by an oligarchy where 2/3 
of the politicians are related to each other is hardly representative of the population. 
4.2.7 Democracy or Dictatorship? 
 
The ineffectiveness of the political process to affect economic change in the country was 
a major concern for interviewees. At stake were issues of pride, nationalism and a sense 




effective enough to contribute to overall national development instead of continuing the 
entrenched power of political families. The sense of failure in all levels of government 
was a reality most were dissatisfied with manifesting itself with little confidence and 
trust in the efficacy of government: 
“We claim to be a democracy, how practical is that? In this election? Influenced 
by other factors?” –private sector 1 
Some observed there was a high turnover of politicians who have not sustained more 
stable patronage; therefore this places more ‘worthy’ candidates in a bind: 
“Government can do a lot, but will government? They have not done much. At 
the local government level there are term limits but even good local officials 
experience a lot of turnover.” – academic 
“The official figures of GDP growth aren’t true. They are borrowing more than 
they are stating. There is a looming crisis. There are 4 ministerial positions 
unfilled. It’s like a revolving door. [Cabinet] secretaries come and go, for example 
if the Minister of Trade has a falling out with the President. In the Philippines, it 
is very uncertain. There is no continuity or consistency in the ability for the 
organisation such as ours to establish a long-term ongoing relationship with the 
secretaries. We need to first establish stable relations [with government].” – 
private sector 2 
Several discussions I had with interviewees felt that to overcome the inefficiencies in 
government, a strong dictatorship would be sufficient to get back the country on its feet. 
Some spoke of the early days of the Marcos dictatorship when there was ‘order’ with 
people queuing and not the chaos that dominates government policy and decision 
making of today: 
“They need a revolution or a dictator by the scruff of the neck. Just change it, 
change the constitution to a parliamentary system. But they’ll go through pain 
before we get to that.” – private sector 3 
“The Philippines has always been influenced by geopolitical events. No possibility 




prices but we could have a dictator like [Venezuelan President] Chavez.” –private 
sector 4 
“When Marcos declared martial law in 1971, that was an ‘opportunity lost’. People 
were following the [orders] given. [However] power corrupts.” – private sector 5 
And in that last statement I exchanged with the interviewee the maxim that absolute 
power indeed had the tendency to corrupt absolutely. 
Another interviewee pointed out that many were seeking solace in religion as way to 
counter the disappointment and despair in the country. In the Philippines, there are 
mass religious Christian movements, unattached to the dominant mainstream 
Catholicism in the country. This religious movement was a metaphor for a greater search 
for spirituality amidst the futility felt by people in a corrupt system and government. 
These religious movements have also become political forces in their own right: 
"Currently, the Philippines has gone to greater spirituality with the spiritual 
movements. It is a reaction to the lack of trust [in government] since they can’t 
do anything in the system, they invoke supernatural forces. That’s why these are 
political forces now e.g. El Shaddai and Villanueva harping on the lack of values 
in government." – private sector 6 
One regulator called the country as being the ‘pariah in international markets’. And 
indeed, the rest of East Asia had moved on in their developmental stage while the 
Philippines is seemingly stuck in a quagmire: 
“Look at other Asian countries. 20-25 years ago we were ahead of Taiwan. When I 
hooked up with Arthur Andersen I was very happy with a Philippine salary. [The 
peso was] much higher than Taiwan. Right now, it’s different, you work in peso in 
Taiwan you are dead.” – private sector 7 
Advocates for a stronger state frequently mentioned the example of Lee Kuan Yew’s 
Singapore: 
“…there is too much democracy in the country. Marcos tried to change it but he 
was ruled by his wife. Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan did not have so much 




are made. Here in the Philippines, there is too much democracy.” – private sector 
8 
“Why is the Philippines left behind? There is too much democracy. In Singapore 
you have Lee Kuan Yew. Five years ago he came here and said “You Filipinos are 
crazy. You’re going the American way, emphasising human rights, democracy. 
What do you have compared to the USA? You are far apart [economically]. If you 
look at Lee Kuan Yew, they throw you out of Singapore [for doing petty things].” 
– private sector 9 
The path to return to a Marcos dictatorship redux is not without its supporters. If the 
country were to return to those days, at what price will the country have to pay for 
another dictatorship? Asking an academic if the country could afford another bout of 
dictatorship, his response criticised the short-term memories of people: 
“Advocates of authoritarianism forget that the Philippines went through 14 years 
of martial law with negative results. The problem is that in an oligarchic 
patrimonial state-society structure, authoritarianism leads to further 
concentration of power. Note that Davao, Marikina and Singapore are all cities. 
You can’t rule a whole diverse country the same way.” – academic 
The Philippines tried dictatorship and it did not work. However, the current democratic 
regime it is under does not seem to bring the long-awaited benefits of development. 
Where during the period of dictatorship, the responsibilities of progress (and failure) lay 
principally in one decision-maker; the period of ‘democracy’ the country is in means that 
many are to blame for the failure of the country though none seemingly wishing to admit 
to this (collective) responsibility. 
Disappointed by several presidents, the Philippines’ failure to take-off has disappointed 
many. Neighbouring Indonesia, which recently toppled its long time dictator Soeharto, is 
progressing and advancing economically and even its democracy is regarded as more 
functional than the Philippines. Vietnam, after the shackles of war, has embraced market 
liberalisation and undergoing a path of development not so dissimilar to China. Will 
greater economic and political integration through ASEAN save the Philippines the way 
EU membership for Spain paved the way for that country to cast off the remnants of 




just that, nascent. Democracy is not widely embraced in the region. As one interviewee 
pointed out the Philippines expects an outsider to save the country yet only the country 
can save itself. Internally generated reform will have the most legitimate form of change 
rather than an externally generated one. 
The political environment in the country continues to be fundamental to the way 
business operates. The political environment shapes, influences and motivates how the 
private sector behaves, while the general public react to unpopular political leaders with 
discontent through public displays of protest. The political environment of the 
Philippines will continue to be a challenge to all actors. The heavy hand of the state 
dominated by a few well-connected players has thus far meant severe social and 
economic inequality. Ruling families, not bureaucratic elites, dominate the country. For 
now they shape the country’s present and near-future.  
4.3 Background to Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
Whereas the previous sections mentioned the prevailing conditions in the country, the 
latter half of this chapter looks at the formal introduction of corporate governance in the 
country. In order to answer the main research question motivating this research, “what is 
the impact of corporate governance reforms in the country” it is important to narrate the 
background to the introduction of these reforms and subsequently the impact of such 
reforms (which are explored in later Chapters). 
The main events that shaped the introduction of corporate governance in the country 
were the East Asian Crisis of 1997 and the collapse of Enron in 2001. The corporate 
governance responses to these events were the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance of 1999 which was substantially motivated by the defects that were 
systematically exposed in the East Asian Crisis, and the US Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 
which was a regulatory response to the blue-chip collapse of Enron.  
This section also provides supportive evidence of my first hypothesis: 
H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar ideas 
contained in Western principles of corporate governance 
Whereby, Western principles of corporate governance, and the ideas contained therein, 




This section primarily addresses the following question:  
Why were corporate governance reforms introduced into the country?  
In order to answer this question, the background of the reforms by narrating the 
different corporate crises, the motivations and the influences of different institutions are 
explored. 
4.3.1 Impact of East Asian Crisis (1997) 
 
The East Asian Crisis of 1997 had a less severe effect on the country than its neighbours. 
Why this was so was largely due in part to the fact that the Philippines was overlooked 
by foreign portfolio investors relative to other East Asian countries. The Philippines had 
also suffered a debt crisis during the 1980s which affected other Latin American 
countries at the time but did not affect other East Asian countries. In short, the 
Philippines was not as an attractive foreign investment destination as other countries in 
the region.  
Capital market speculators were less inclined to find the country as attractive for their 
investment. And when these same fickle foreign investors were spooked by the wave of 
debt hampered by currency devaluations during the crisis, these investors quickly 
removed their money. As the Philippines received less money from these foreign 
investors, the impact was less severe and arguably, did not provide the big impetus for 
structural changes that affected Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia: 
“We came to the party too late, we didn’t catch the fire. We didn’t do what 
needed to be done because there was no urgency in the post-crisis reforms. We 
didn’t fall as bad, but neither did we pick anything up to get back on track.” –
lobby group 1 
On the Philippine Stock Exchange, several listed companies - who were structurally 
vulnerable and were funded weakly - collapsed: 
“BW Resources turned to the PSE to raise money but it was essentially a conduit. 
The Ramcar Group was a conglomerate of food, auto accessories. These 
companies come to mind as being immediately impacted by the East Asian crisis. 




compared to the regulars such as the First Pacific Group. You don’t hear too 
much about these small companies.” – private sector 1 
Yet, the crisis did still have an impact on the country: 
“On the East Asian Crisis, of course the crisis had an impact. It didn’t impact as 
bad in the Philippines as Indonesia and Korea but there was the large scale 
intervention on behalf the IMF. It affected the Philippines. You had a situation of 
a number of large corporations with mismatch borrowings, USD liabilities, 
funding amounts matched with revenues stream.” – private sector 3 
For the main part the East Asian crisis provoked a great deal of awareness on corporate 
governance: 
“In terms of the family structure, the crisis did not affect [business groups]. It just 
raised the awareness. [The system here] is family concentrated as far as practice 
is concerned.” -academic 
“The East Asian Crisis triggered an awareness in part of corporations in the 
Philippines and the regulators. There was a need to institute corporate 
governance.” – Ayala 
“The crisis affected a number of companies and they were awoken to raise 
corporate governance standards. The crisis was pretty obvious in that it created a 
lot of awareness and value of corporate governance. The Philippine market is 
dependent on foreign capital. The source of capital outside is foreign banks and 
foreign financing. They are aware of corporate governance. It is important for 
Philippine corporations to be able to access foreign capital. [The standards of 
corporate governance] affect the borrowings of Philippine corporations. It’s 
[these standards that act like a] barometer of making a decision [on whether] to 
extend credit to Filipino corporations. During the crisis, the Philippines was one 
of the 4 countries blacklisted by foreign investors. Corporate governance is 
imperative to raise standards.” – PLDT 
Thus for other companies who survived the crisis, they took the opportunity to 
restructure in the post-crisis environment: 




which highlighted good corporate governance of corporations was necessary and 
that corporations couldn’t remain closed shops.” – ICD 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the first release of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance provided the impetus to introduce and improve corporate governance in the 
region and elsewhere. 
4.3.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) 
 
The 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were promulgated a mere two years 
after the East Asian Crisis. They were a direct response to the East Asian crisis. The 
principles provided the opportunity to solidify and establish proper corporate conduct 
and they recognised the importance of well-governed companies to societies. Similar to 
other countries in the region, the importance of the OECD principles is carried out 
through the formulation, implementation and application of corporate governance in the 
country. Chapter 2 looked at the influence of the principles and responses to their 
widespread adoption. 
4.3.3 Enron’s Collapse (2001) 
 
While the East Asian crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of growing economies in a 
financially globalised world with poor institutional foundations, the impetus that 
provided the mindset and substantial motivation to introduce corporate governance in 
the country was the collapse of the US energy giant Enron. Soon after, the collapse of 
WorldCom happened. As auditor of both Enron and WorldCom, Andersen survived the 
failure of Enron, but did not survive the latter – its reputation could not handle under 
scandal and by then had lost legitimacy. Within a short space of time, three giants of 
American industry had failed and disappeared. The impact of these collapses were 
profound - if a then highly-esteemed corporation like Enron could implode so 
spectacularly in a short period of time, corporations in other countries such as the 
Philippines can face the same fate and as easily be affected.  
Enron is now used as a case study in the Philippines on the warning signs of a company 
that supposedly ticked-all-the-boxes in corporate governance, yet the substance 
underlying the company form was sorely lacking. The story of Enron helps corporations 




corporate governance workshop for mid-size companies, the use of Enron as a warning 
for business was explained as thus: 
“Government and regulators want this corporate governance workshop to be 
undertaken by all directors. Imagine [Lucio] Tan, Ayala Group’s  JAZA going 
through these workshops. 
“Why must we have corporate governance? Because it is expected by the 
international community. A country that is perceived to practice poor corporate 
governance won’t receive much FDI. We’ve been in that category for many years. 
We have our own Enrons in this country and we need to restore the reputation of 
business for everyone. 
“Why do we use Enron? Because it contains the recipe for bad governance and is 
the ultimate collapse. For the last 5 years we’ve presented Enron. The material is 
still appropriate. Enron was the mother of all scams. It is the most catastrophic 
collapse in world history and its existence had many ingredients of bad corporate 
governance. There are some similarities to some Filipino corporations in being 
‘photogenic.’” –CG workshop 
Enron’s once-highly regarded risk management system in place proved to be grossly 
ineffective: 
“When we were trained in risk management, we were taught the version of 
Enron’s risk management. Even with the risk management structure they had in 
place, the company still collapsed. Enron in the Philippines was audited by 
SGV/AA. Enron was just engaged in ‘intelligent gambling’.- CG workshop 
Similarly, Enron’s complex corporate structure came for some scrutiny:  
“We use Enron as an example because it was the preferred placement for Harvard 
MBAs. Brian Gruber was hired in the year’s collapse and he wrote a lot about 
Enron. It had a complex corporate structure with 3,000 separate entities 
including 600 in the Cayman Islands. How can we consolidate a company with 
3,000 separate entities in different parts of the world with different deadlines?” –
CG workshop 




financial institutions during the GFC and their engagement with credit-default swaps. 
Indeed the crisis of 2008-2009 showed little had been learnt from Enron’s foray into 
derivatives: 
“By 1997, Enron had lost its core competence being involved in weather 
derivatives. They were trading ‘credit risk’ ever heard of this risk before? The 
Enron units were working independently of each other. The organisation was 
flattened.” –CG workshop 
The behaviour of Enron’s board was also scrutinised. Firstly on the short-term 
remuneration orientation of its members and the unethical behaviour engaged in order 
to achieve the former: 
“The board also had bonuses, options based on market value. Keep on as they 
would improve by showing good returns. The objective to Enron is properly 
made up and projections from the market. There were four core values of Enron: 
Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence (RICE). They had a code of 
conduct which expressly prohibited from obtaining personal gains. But this 
prohibition was waived by the CEO (also the Chairman) who said that as long as 
the funding arrangement was not adverse to the company then the Chairman can 
negate the code of ethics and do away with it.” – CG workshop 
The culture set from the top filtered down to the bottom. While the board was not 
explicit in its approval for a short-term value orientation, it was perceived to be implicit: 
“Business plans were prepared by management and they were responsible for 
achievement of the plan. The plans required the approval of its responsibilities 
were with the board. The business units were competing against each other. Its 
profitability was based on multi-Level marketing. It is always good investment to 
have long term investment financed by long term borrowings as the income is 
regulated. For Enron, its investment rating went down if [short-term] 
profitability is not sustained. Enron sold off many long term investments. Enron 
was an asset light company and the assets were concentrated in a few.  –CG 
workshop 





“The Enrons of this world with trophy directors, heavyweight directors - even in 
developed countries, the corporate governance principles were not being 
followed. Solid reputations proved to be unfounded. Corporate collapses are not 
the monopoly of the US as it has also happened in the UK, Australia.” –private 
sector 1 
Finally, workshop participants were posed the following rhetorical question: 
“Do I sit on the board whose company operates like Enron?” –CG workshop 
4.3.3.1 Impact of Collapse 
The psychological impact of the Enron collapse on Philippine corporations provided the 
bigger impetus for corporate governance reforms in the country. The following 
comments show the impression Enron’s disintegration made amongst interviewees: 
“There is a gap between the East Asian Crisis (1997) and Enron (2001). It was after 
Enron that there was great concern about corporate governance. If it could 
happen in the USA – that bastion of capitalism – it could happen anywhere. After 
Enron, there was a rush into introducing guidelines. Rather than waiting for 
other collapses to happen locally, there was intent to do something about. If it 
could happen in the USA, it could happen to big Philippine corporations. Enron 
is suppose to be the model of risk management. It was the envy of the business 
community with risk management as it could do things so efficiently, even 
managing weather risk. Its collapse was monumental.” – industry association 
“Things were slow [in corporate governance] as the Philippines wasn’t as affected 
by the crisis but then in 2001, Enron happened. Corporations looked at the ICD 
again with new eyes and asked about corporate governance: “We better do 
something about these governance things” before we become the next Enron.”-
ICD 
“It wasn’t until after the Enron fiasco that the Philippine Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) accelerated efforts to put good corporate governance 
standards in place, and Benpres complied with the good corporate governance 
requirements.”-BPH 




crisis) But really [corporate governance happened] from 2002/2003 – starting 
from Enron.” –public sector 
Other interviewees mentioned Andersen’s collapse motivated corporate governance 
reforms into the country: 
“In governance [in the country], the reform is principally the SEC Code of 2002 
and that was the result from external pressures. There was a crisis in the US, the 
Enron Scandal. Earlier than that was Andersen. 
[discussion of why American scandals should affect the Philippines] 
“Well we kind of had an Enron situation here with the local affiliate with SGV – 
the largest auditing firm. It was found they were cooking the books, allowing the 
clients to lead them instead of auditing. There were a few companies that had lax 
accounting. It was not as dramatic as Enron but there were some pretty big 
companies that were involved.” –private sector 2 
“My impression is that corporate governance would be more an offshoot of SOX 
in the USA due to the Andersen thing…less so the East Asian crisis.” – private 
sector 3 
A couple of my interviewees also used to work for Andersen or had an Andersen 
connection. Ironically, the once-vaunted Andersen had a major role in introducing 
corporate governance into the country: 
“I looked at the role of consultants that reformed the PSE, SEC. These included 
the ADB, Arthur Andersen – the latter was the Chief Consultant of the SEC and 
the PSE. Andersen talked about the need for good governance.” -academic 
The corporate governance reforms in response to Enron were perceived by some 
interviewees as a study in prevention of corporate collapses:  
“We welcome [corporate governance]. We can say that because of this [corporate 
governance] nothing similar to Enron will happen. Investors are better 
protected.” –private sector 3 
“I’d assume corporate governance in the past few years have been strengthened 




are more familiar with the responsibilities of the company. Before, you didn’t get 
dividends and that was ok. But now, the norm is to give back to shareholders. 
Lots of companies now distribute dividends. For a listed company, it’s becoming 
the norm to issue dividends. There’s also transparency - companies that are not 
being run well, you see lots of items in the newspaper on them. We want to 
institute governance mechanisms so you don’t get these kinds of disputes. [All of] 
this has been brought about by the Enron thing. The corporate governance has 
been strengthened but government have to learn how to implement it strictly on 
companies.” – private sector 4 
In the post-Enron world of Philippine corporate governance, reforms are at the 
beginning and there is still a long journey ahead. The Philippines has yet to suffer a 
major blue chip corporate collapse ala Enron since the reforms: 
“More or less the regulatory institutions have been effective. So far there is no 
Enron thing.” –bank 
Similarly, uniformity in accounting standards remains a challenge. For Philippine 
companies who used to follow US GAAP, switching to IFRS - in light of the efficacy of 
American standards of reporting after Enron - continues to be a learning curve and a 
work in progress: 
“In 2004 we shifted to the IAS from US GAAP” – public sector 
“There is now a lot more you hear of complaints now on accounting standards 
brought about by SOX. Here, we used to adopt US GAAP, now it’s based on IAS. 
This has been a big change.” –listed company (1) 
“The accounting standards are not yet robust and we are waiting what will 
happen with the international accounting standards. The new standards are strict 
on disclosure. There are new accounting principles that are new to accountants 
which require a lot of disclosure. Previously, the financial statements are only 7 
to 30 pages. Now they are 100 pages for financial statements which show more 
transparency. The new standards are based on the IFRS which the Philippines 





For one company that has embraced corporate governance, an attitudinal change is 
occurring moving from a compliance-based approach to the more holistic understanding 
of why corporate governance must be implemented and recognised: 
“Here, there is now a mindset of receptiveness. There is an appreciation that the 
changes are good. Everybody realises there’s a Basel II framework that must be 
complied with because it’s an international guideline and instituted after Enron. 
The corporate governance manual didn’t have the same negative reaction. The 
culture has changed. Especially the values have changed. There is now an 
emphasis on integrity, patience, hardworking, honesty.”-bank  
However, a lot of convincing still remains on the positive effects of corporate 
governance: 
“Our culture is poverty. We’re doing all this because of it. The perception is why 
do we need corporate governance? If corporate governance comes in, they argue, 
it is an additional expense. The benefits of corporate governance hasn’t been 
show or felt at all. They don’t feel it so why change it. I’m afraid that if they 
follow this it could be. Does an Enron have to happen first before changing the 
attitudes? –lobby group  
Where the East Asian Crisis was largely systemic, the collapse of Enron was not. The 
destruction of Enron in a matter of months was monumental only now superseded by 
the collapses of companies and the general systemic failure of the investment banking 
industry in the 2008-2009.  
Enron’s collapse was singular affected no other company in its industry. The problems 
were internal and the directors and managers of the company were largely to be blamed 
for its collapse in their failure to discharge their responsibilities properly. In the post-
East Asian Crisis decade, the collapse of Enron was a tale of weak corporate governance, 
poor risk management in substance, and a board captured by its managers. The lessons 
of Enron are well-appreciated by the country’s private sector. 
4.3.4 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
 
Enron’s collapse precipitated the passing of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This was 




required more stringent oversight of companies and formalised the corporate 
governance responsibilities for managers of a corporation: 
“Enron drove SOX and this filtered down to all stock exchanges. The issue of 
corporate governance issue was always there but Enron brought it more to the 
surface.” – private sector 
“In the Enron aftermath they introduced SOX. The effect was reactive. Enron had 
the bad ingredients of corporate governance. The company was a photogenic 
case of corporate governance. They had all the elements.” – lobby group 
A Philippine version of the US SOX was pending in 2007 and shared many elements of 
the American legislation. I had some discussion with several of my interviewees whether 
it was an appropriate form of legislation for a developing country given SOX was 
intended for American corporations and their prevailing business landscape. One 
interviewee mentioned how the country had always copied legislation from other 
countries, especially America as it is seen a country with best practice – or what is 
currently fashionable: 
“What we have done is always copied [legislation] from foreign sources. We 
might have obscure original ones but we usually copy mostly from the USA or 
other countries. Sometimes it’s copied word for word. Whatever is the in-thing, 
we copy. If you copy it, we change it a little bit to conform to local practices. But 
the moment you pass it, it becomes a Filipino law, and is binding. Everybody 
follows it, and if you don’t there will be consequences.” –private sector 1 
However, there was less enthusiasm for the full implementation of SOX in the 
Philippines given its highly prescriptive nature and the ensuing costs in complying with 
the law: 
“It’s horses for courses. There is some presumption in the extreme and in the 
Western code of corporate governance, SOX is at the one end of the spectrum.”-
private sector 2 
“You don’t want to follow the path of SOX. SOX made it very expensive for 
companies. It made money for external auditors but the cost of compliance is 




pass. We hope to resubmit it and we can come up with a better corporate 
governance reform law. Legislation is one of our reform areas.” –lobby group 
For PLDT which lists on both the PSE and NYSE, compliance with SOX had some 
positive effects. The company’s corporate governance procedures improved though the 
compliance cost was increasing especially with regards to the internal disclosure 
requirement of section 404 of the legislation: 
“The advantages are you comply with higher corporate governance standards. 
The disadvantages are the costs of compliance. In light of SOX, compliance 
requirements are very costly, principally due to the intensive, external auditors 
and time it consumes in regulatory compliance. Costs are very prohibitive. It 
entails lots of work to validate compliance requirements. Preparation for SOX 
compliance is because of s.404 with respect to the internal control processes. In 
s.404 all departments within the organisation have to revisit the processes with 
under the Financial Reporting Requirements.”-PLDT 
For PLDT and other Philippine companies that are listed on the NYSE, SOX has had an 
effect on their procedures and internal risk processes. For an American legislation which 
sought to address American problems, it is a sign of the wide-reaching influence of 
American corporations that regulations seeking to cover them should reach extra-
judicially. 
4.3.5 The SEC and the Introduction of Corporate Governance 
 
For the SEC, it had watched the corporate governance developments around the world 
before Enron’s collapse. As the corporate regulator, having the awareness to regulate is 
one thing; having the will, legitimacy and justification to regulate is another. Enron was 
the catalyst for major corporate governance reforms but there was momentum building 
up to make changes in corporate behaviour from the East Asian Crisis onwards. Society’s 
well-being is at stake when a large business collapses. Ensuring and having well-
functioning businesses was at the core of this realisation: 
“The awareness of corporate governance now is not yet at the level of which we 
could be. Given a scale of 1 to 5, if we could reach up to 4 in which we would in 




now [on making changes]. There is urgency, the emotion of urgency and that 
desire to be able to move it along. 
“There was a time of awareness from 1997-1999. There was awareness in the 
capital market that confused a lot which created even more confusion and there 
was uncertainty on what they were being made aware of. The crisis showed there 
were governance issues in listed companies. There were severe governance issues 
in the real estate business on pre-selling and retailing items without too much 
disclosure.”-SEC 
This awareness was echoed by another interviewee: 
“Even prior to Enron, we were talking about shareholder value as the framework 
of good corporate governance and we were talking about that in that language 
and about the power of the institutional investor.” -academic 
As other interviewees mentioned, while the East Asian Crisis was a monumental event in 
the institutional arrangements of other countries, the crisis made a blip on the radar but 
did not catalyse major reforms in the Philippines. From the SEC’s point of view, the crisis 
did not provoke a big enough concern to merit widespread reforms. The crisis was the 
lull before the storm: 
“In the post-crisis environment, we were made aware of it. The finger was put on 
to it in effect. Like the undertow in the river, the water’s really calm but if you 
put your hand into the water, you can feel it, the pool at your feet eventhough 
one didn’t know what it was.”-SEC 
The storm was the collapses that happened in Europe and America, and even in Australia 
with the collapse of HIH. Supposedly blue-chip, well-managed corporations were in fact 
poorly-governed. Corporate governance to the regulator means greater transparency and 
disclosure: 
“Shortly after that, we heard [corporate governance] from the outside. There was 
a tsunami [of corporate collapses] that hit Europe (Parmalat etc). As a practicing 
lawyer mostly with British, Australians and Canadians, there was dialogue with 
others. We went through a difficult time trying to convince companies to make 




“We were hearing it from the West, through the words corporate governance, 
transparency, disclosure – having a regime of disclosure. We would gauge the 
company’s disclosure. In the Philippines [the disclosure] might look solid but it is 
mostly run by the family or the director’s family. Under the regime of disclosure, 
we are able to find weaknesses in this company. 
“This is what [corporate governance] means. In quick succession Enron and other 
collapses came and the whole scenario played out. All of a sudden there was a 
comparison of what was happening and trying to structure what was happening 
in place. When Enron came about, some went to the US SEC so we got an 
orientation about this difficult case study. There was also Parmalat but we looked 
at Enron closer due to similarity of things.”-SEC  
Arguably, the lessons of Parmalat are probably more poignant given the business 
environment of Italy and the Philippines share similar elements in terms of having family 
owners of corporations. Parmalat’s owners, the Tanzi family also engaged in several 
related party transactions to ensure family control – an action not so dissimilar to those 
exercised by owning Filipino families to ensure control of corporations. Nevertheless, the 
collapse of Enron was seen to be as the exemplar given the ties of history, culture and 
language the Philippines had with the USA.  
Enron and its legislative response, SOX, provided the major impetus for introducing 
corporate governance in the Philippines. This event, rather than the 1997 crisis gave the 
regulator the credibility, legitimacy and reason to introduce corporate governance in the 
country. A level of understanding was reached between the regulator and the 
corporations on the necessity of introducing corporate governance: 
“All of that was blowing in the wind. Enron’s collapse had made it more focused 
and [we could concentrate on introducing corporate governance]. We would find 
modules, look at SOX and see if this is the way to do it. We are finding out other 
laws to make it simpler. We understand English - all our business schools’ classes 
are in English. All our corporate governance institutes speak English. It was not 
difficult for us to understand the importance of corporate governance. The 
business sector had reached a certain level, given time and effort to do this 




governance in place but didn’t put it in place. This is how [corporate governance] 
jumpstarted and there is now regular transmission from gear to gear.”-SEC 
Perhaps not so dissimilar from other corporate regulators, understanding why one must 
sit back and wait for a big enough collapse before regulating shows the nature of 
regulation. Awareness is one thing, regulation is another. The latter needs public support 
and legitimacy from wider society in order to be accepted. Regulators need cause to 
regulate: an action-reaction approach. Perceived unnecessary preventative behaviour by 
imposing regulation would bring calls of further administrative burdens. While the SEC 
showed they were aware of what was happening in corporate governance, how best to 
react to it needed a catalyst before corporate governance could be introduced.  
4.3.6 Cycle of Crisis and Reform  
 
A crisis provokes a regulatory response. The East Asian Crisis saw the OECD Principles 
as a response. The collapses of American companies in 2001 saw the main corporate 
governance reforms introduced into the country with the Philippine SEC Code of 
Corporate Governance in 2002. Later that year, SOX was passed in the US and the 
revised edition of the OECD Principles was published two years later in 2004. The GFC of 
2008-2009 are yet to have a formal regulatory reform response in the Philippines at the 
time of writing. However as previous experience has shown, international developments 
have a profound impact on the corporate governance reform of the country. Following 
Clarke’s thesis of the cyclical nature of crisis and reform (see Chapter 2), for this research 





Figure 18: Cycle of Corporate Governance Crises and Reforms 
 
This section provides overwhelming evidence to support my first hypothesis on how 
foreign principles formed the basis of local corporate governance principles. The next 
section displays the institutional isomorphic activities to force them on the local 
environment. 
4.4 Introducing Corporate Governance Reforms and Institutional Theory 
 
The previous section provided the background and context of the rationale behind 
corporate governance reforms. This section deals with how corporate governance 
reforms were implemented in the country through national (regulatory) institutions and 
private sector organisations. The main theoretical contributions of this chapter relate to 
the macroeconomic aspects of introducing corporate governance reform through the 
lens of institutional theory and specifically institutional isomorphism.  
Concurring with the theoretical basis of institutional theory, the introduction of 
corporate governance reforms in the country was done through a mixture of coercive 
(especially from external institutions) and mimetic isomorphism. This section will look 
at both coercive and mimetic isomorphism to explain the ‘guiding hand’ that introduced 
corporate governance into the country. Coercive isomorphism provides support for the 
Crisis
•East Asian Crisis (1997)
Reform
•OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999)
Crisis
•Collapse of Enron (2001)
•Followed by WorldCom, and Andersen (2001)
Reform
•Philippine SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2002)
•US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)
•OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, revised) 
Crisis






reforms motivated by external institutions, while mimetic isomorphism is present in 
policy formulation. Together they provide an explanation on how externally formulated 
corporate governance reforms were introduced into the country.  
Similar to the previous section, this section heavily provides support for my first 
hypothesis in that it provides greater details on the introduction and operationalisation 
of these policies in the country with the explanation of institutional theory: 
H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar 
ideas contained in Western principles of corporate governance 
The following figure graphically explains the combination of these institutional 
isomorphic elements to provide an explanation for the introduction of the reforms: 
Figure 19: Institutional Isomorphism and Introduction of Corporate Governance 
Reforms 
 
Coercive isomorphism deals with the encouragement by external institutions to 
introduce corporate governance while mimetic isomorphism deals with policy 
formulation to operationalise corporate governance reforms: 
4.4.1 International Financial Institutions and Introducing Corporate Governance 
 
Support for the introduction of corporate governance reforms was done at a very high 
level heavily influenced by International Financial Institutions (or IFIs). In the context of 
the Philippines, the institutional influences came from the OECD, World Bank and the 



















with the region. The World Bank’s assessment on the introduction of OECD corporate 
governance throughout the world through their “Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes” (ROSC) is the major influence in the standardisation of corporate 
governance in developing countries as the following passages indicate: 
“The assessment of corporate governance practices in a country measures the 
legal and regulatory framework, as well as practices and compliance of listed 
firms against the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Since the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance were agreed in 1999, they have formed the 
basis for corporate governance initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries alike.” (World Bank 2004a) 
“The objectives of this program are to: 
• Benchmark the country’s corporate governance framework and company 
practices against the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance. 
• Assist the country in developing and implementing a country action plan for 
improving institutional capacity with a view to strengthening the country’s 
corporate governance framework. 
• Raise awareness of good corporate governance practices among the country’s 
public and private sector stakeholders.” (World Bank 2004b) 
Indeed, the push by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm 
of the World Bank, to implement the OECD form of corporate governance has rendered 
a template and tick-a-box approach in assessing participating developing countries as 
they are matched against the OECD standards of corporate governance. A country 
received points if they recognised an OECD corporate governance standard. The points 
ranged from 1 which represents Not Observed, 2 is Materially Not Observed, 3 is Partially 
Observed, 4 is Largely Observed and finally to 5 which represents Observed. (McGee 
2009) 
The following extract contains the World Bank’s 2006 Summary of Observance by the 
Philippines of OECD Corporate Governance Principles. The tick-a-box assessment places 









The ROSC assessment is supportive of the argument for convergence of corporate 
governance codes and the top-down manner of this imposition is set out in the following 
passages. There is no disguising the templated approach undertaken by the World Bank: 
“The assessments: 





• provide benchmark indices by which countries can evaluate themselves and 
gauge progress in corporate governance reforms; 
• strengthen the ownership of reform in the assessed countries by promoting 
productive interaction among issuers, investors, regulators and public 
decision makers; 
• provide the basis for a policy dialogue which will result in policy 
recommendations.” (World Bank, 2004a) 
“The World Bank uses a diagnostic tool – a Template - that it has developed to 
gather pertinent information for preparing the Corporate Governance ROSC.” 
(World Bank 2004b) 
Other ways to spread corporate governance are through discussion roundtables hosted 
by IFIs attended by high level representatives from the public sector. The 10th Asian 
Corporate Governance Roundtable hosted by the OECD was held in Manila in 
September 2009.(OECD 2009). The following comment from a public sector interviewee 
shows how these ideas are filtered through to the regulatory level: 
“Last April I attend a roundtable discussion on the Asian experiences of corporate 
governance for GOCCs (hosted by the OECD). So the principles of the OECD on 
the public sector came up.” – public sector 
These high level roundtables allow the transfer of information of the concept and idea of 
corporate governance amongst high-level officials.  
4.4.2 The Report on Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC) and Coercive 
Isomorphism 
 
The coercive isomorphic element of ROSC and its importance in filtering corporate 
governance through the regulatory bodies was highlighted in one interview. My 
interviewee showed me an email from an international financial institution (IFI) 
representative when he was chair of a regulatory body. 
The IFI representative specifically wanted to discuss particular issues regarding the 
progress of corporate governance reforms in the country. The email discusses the 
possibility of a second country assessment as the first corporate governance assessment 




methodology was looking for similar situations (especially institutional) that existed in a 
developed country and applying it to a developing country position. The following box 
contains excerpts from the email and the consultative tone suggests the second 
assessment would not be as coercive as the first (the results of this second assessment 
can be seen in Figure 26 in the previous section: 




“We had discussed the possibility of updating the ROSC corporate governance 
assessment…because it is important to measure progress over time, especially in 
important markets like the Philippines. 
 
“An update in the Philippines would not be a mechanical repeater of the first assessment. 
While it would measure progress over time, the policy would be broader – especially if 
well all work together. 
 
“First, the OECD Principles themselves were revised [NB – the OECD Principles were 
updated in 2004 after initial publication in 1999]. The World Bank-OECD Regional 
Roundtables and the Corporate Governance ROSC Assessments reflecting the experience 
in developing countries and transition economies provided significant input to these 
revisions. One of the results is that the revised Principles now include a separate section 
on the supporting legal and regulatory framework which reflects the importance 
assigned to the institutional backdrop for an effective corporate governance framework.  
 
“In parallel, we have updated and modified the methodology to reflect the changes of the 
[OECD] Principles as well as the lessons learned from conducting the assessments. The 
new report format allows us to highlight key issues and focus on recommendations on how 
to implement and enforce corporate governance reforms [own emphasis]. The country 
team has now expressed interest and I’m looking forward to meeting with them when in 
the Philippines.  
 
“I would be grateful if you could point out to the council that the [previous] review was a 
“quick review” which would be an important input into a formal update but does not 
replace the need for one…if it is not asking too much, I would also be grateful if you 
could arrange for a meeting with the council when I’m in Manila.” 
 
Such high-level approaches in introducing global reforms are common or are seen as the 
most effective way in reaching out to key local policymakers. For example, the following 
World Bank document on tackling corruption in the country cited the assistance of other 
country-donors and concerted action with regulators and local associations to improve 




“Helping to Improve Corporate Governance: The East Asian Crisis exposed 
shortcomings in regulation, supervision, corporate governance and ownership. 
The WB, along with several donors (ADB, USAID, AusAID), is supporting the 
government’s corporate governance action program which involves an integrated 
set of reforms to be implemented by the BSP, SEC, PSE, PICPA, and ICD.” (World 
Bank Office in Manila 2001: 2) 
While the OECD notes the corporate governance principles are they themselves “non 
binding and do not aim at detailed prescriptions for national legislation” (2008:105), their 
influence due to their wide adoption by IFIs shows the coercive or ‘push’ element to 
introduce corporate governance in member countries.  
4.4.3 Ramifications of the ROSC Assessment 
 
The outcomes of the ROSC assessment have not been pleasant and they show the 
unintended consequences of institutional isomorphism. For developing countries such as 
the Philippines, the OECD standards have been operationalised by the World Bank 
through their ROSC assessment. Controversy over the results of the assessments has 
struck fear, humiliation and/or profound soul-searching by local institutions that were 
largely affected by the assessment. The country participated in the second assessment 
and the results profoundly affected the regulators (World Bank 2006). 
Effective corporate governance reforms require taking into account the local 
environment’s situation and the ROSC remain controversial. For example, following the 
OECD Principles the ROSC assessment heavily emphasises the rights of shareholders. In 
developed countries where there is widely dispersed ownership and greater shareholder 
participation in the population through their own shareholdings or through pension 
funds, shareholder rights are emphasised heavily especially when the managers of the 
corporations are not themselves major owners. However, in countries such as the 
Philippines where a single person or family owns over 50% of a publicly listed 
corporation and stock market participation is still the preserve of a few, emphasis of 
shareholder rights over issues such as those relating to government (e.g. expropriation, 
institutional capacity) remain a testy point. As pointed out by one interviewee: 
“A major influence would be the fact that a lot of Philippine companies are 




of appreciation of the relevance of corporate governance principles and practices 
to how they do business, i.e. as families. Regulators should consider this reality in 
formulating their implementation strategies.” – Manulife 
What the ROSC assessment overlooks is the different roles government plays in 
developing countries in determining corporate governance development. Government 
can be regulator, shareholder, stakeholder, facilitator, underwriter or even, antagonist. 
Thus, there are questions on the appropriateness of such a standardised approach taken 
by a highly influential body that also funds the country’s development programs. The 
political argument underlying this is the results from such assessments will form the 
basis for future World Bank aid programs for the country. The investment argument for 
these is that foreign investors will use the ROSC results to take a pick-and-choose 
approach in diversifying and determining their emerging market investment portfolio.  
The political and organisational ramifications of a simple tick-a-box questionnaire from 
an IFI are enormous. Below is an extract from an SEC-wide email by the SEC Chair on 
how it viewed the ROSC assessment and trying to reassure its employees the limited 
impact of this external judgment: 
“We may agree or disagree with the World Bank’s assessments – entirely, or in 
part. The degree of assent or dissent also varies from one to another. These only 
underscore the fact that an assessment, an evaluation, or an appraisal is 
inherently subjective. In other words, it is a judgment, based on certain 
standards, principles, criteria. In the case of a not-so-favourable assessment one 
can have a negative reaction. We do not agree with the judgment, so to speak, so 
we come up with rationalisations, explanations, finger pointing – why we did not 
fare so well. 
“There is also a positive reaction to an assessment that is not so rosy. But I am 
not sure if this is more dominant than the negative one in the Philippines. I said 
positive because those who get an assessment like Partially Observed treat it as a 
wake-up call, a challenge to do better next time, to strive more. Not because they 
wanted a rating of Observed or Largely Observed. It is more of working harder 
because it accelerates the transition from principles to actual practice of good 




The ROSC externally assessed the regulators and pointed out the defects in their 
regulatory capacity. The less-than-positive results have alienated them. For the 
regulators themselves, the ROSC assessment compounds the perception of corporate 
governance as external tools developed without the input of local conditions. Decoupling 
the ROSC results from how regulators implement more suitable and credible corporate 
governance reforms locally will take some time to do. 
4.4.4 Mimetic Isomorphism and Global Corporate Governance Convergence? 
 
At the formulation and implementation level, regulators sought guidance from existing 
corporate governance policies. With the backing of the IFIs, the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance became the default template for the Philippine regulation of 
corporate governance, as with other developing countries in the region. The policy 
formulation of corporate governance in the country is mimetic isomorphism in action as 
the following regulator explains: 
“We took the contents of our code of corporate governance from the OECD 1999 
Principles of corporate governance template. We downloaded the materials and 
the template from the website. The SEC took the initiative and downloaded the 
principles. Why? In 2000, the SEC got reorganised. The SEC was busy (that’s why 
things didn’t happen immediately after the crisis), we were waiting for Senate 
approval for the new SEC code, regarding the governance principles, disclosures 
and accounting.” – SEC I 
The other regulators followed suit and so with the introduction of corporate governance 
in the country, institutional isomorphism was present: 
“The Insurance Commission circular was based on the SEC corporate governance 
of 2002. The BSP has no code of corporate governance but the BSP requires bank 
directors to attend corporate governance meetings and under the General 
Banking Act33
                                                     
33 General Banking Act of 2000 or Republic Act No.8791 
 of June 30th 2000, the directors must adhere to the ‘fit and proper 
rule’. Initially, it was difficult to implement this. They questioned the legal basis, 
even if it was not in the Corporation Code. There is a basic corporate code in the 
1980s. Chairman Bautista, SEC took the position to include the ‘fit and proper 




rule’ in the Manual and Code as the main criteria of independent directors.” – 
SEC I 
As several interviewees pointed out, external imposition of Western standards is not 
unheard of in the country therefore isomorphic tendencies are not unusual. In this sense 
some of these comments provide support towards the thesis of a global trend towards 
corporate governance convergence and harmonisation albeit with several disclaimers: 
“Filipinos are culturally attuned to developments in Western business concepts. 
The Philippine regulators (SEC, PSE, Bangko Sentral), readily adopt business 
standards set by Anglo-American companies and impose those so that local 
companies can more easily access foreign capital.” – BPH 
“The [corporate governance] effort is global. It’s a small community Pressures 
have risen. There are pressures to harmonise governance practice. So [in the 
private sector] there was agreement with the ICD founder, and Ausaid was 
heavily involved. There is a formulation for business conduct, greater 
transparency, and business behaviour. There was strong encouragement from the 
BSP, SEC. A very strong encouragement from regulatory authorities to establish 
codes of conduct for directors, independent directors, and regulated entities.” – 
private sector 1 
The notion of financial liberalisation as driving corporate governance, one interviewee 
pointed out the flows of investment from the investing country and their standards were 
having an impact: 
“The crisis opened the eyes of the regulators in particular to own up to their 
ability of introducing a system for corporate governance. We are currently 
learning from each other. From the US we are learning from the lessons of Enron 
and WorldCom. For the moment the US drives us and they are big investors in 
the Philippines. The best practice [of corporate governance is] defined by the big 
funds in the US and certain rules are adopted or they are pressing us to adopt. 
The Fed’s been hard to do the same on transparency, accountability. It’s a race 
for everyone. 
“In China it’s the same. The US investment flows in to Asia are an important 




dotcom crisis or Enron. Which one’s influencing whom? The fund manager in the 
Philippines had to deal with an earlier debt crisis – not with Asia but with Latin 
America in the 1980s. The debt crisis happened in the Philippines and Latin 
America at the same time. This crisis only affected the Philippines and no other 
Asian economies were affected. As a result of that [crisis] there were a lot of 
regulations introduced to strengthen the system. [Today,] bank supervision goes 
hand-in-hand with corporate governance.”-private sector 2 
This comments provide some – but not overwhelming - support for the globalisation of 
corporate governance and possible convergence of standards as being largely influenced 
by short-term investment flows and catalysed by crises in the financial sector. However, 
using a developed country standard and applying it to an emerging market where it was 
not initially meant for remains a challenge. Corporate governance in the Philippines 
shows the struggle between the imposition of external Western standards to the 
prevailing environment. In this sense, corporate governance is somewhat idiosyncratic 
and alien as it did not evolve from the bottom but rather imposed from the top. The 
following comment comes from a regulator who pointed out the practical realities 
developing countries face in introducing reforms largely formulated by developed 
countries: 
“I attended an OECD Roundtable [for East Asian regulators] in Tokyo…there was 
talk on the IASB and governance. The Thai representative said, “we don’t like 
corporate governance it’s destroying our own companies.” We hope it doesn’t 
end up unlike the IASB. It really is a pain. The US is changing SOX, moving 
around…[we can get] blindsided by these reforms.” – regulator  
4.4.5 Other International Standards 
 
Other edicts aside from the OECD Principles readily find an audience in the Philippines. 
In particular, the country has moved towards complying with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
in terms of financial statement reporting (SEC 2009). Similar to the goals of Basel II for 
the banking industry, global convergence of accounting statements is a goal of the IASB: 
“The goal of the IASC Foundation and the IASB is to develop, in the public 




Previously, companies in the Philippines were using the US GAAP [Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles] model of reporting but now most reporting has moved towards 
complying with IFRS: 
“The Philippines has more IAS [International Accounting Standards] now, 
although it had an affinity with US GAAP.” – private sector 1 
The BSP’s 2005 circular issued compliance by companies with Philippine Accounting 
Standards that have been modelled after the IFRS rather than US GAAP (BSP 2009). This 
transition from one form of reporting to another has had its challenges: 
“People know they are the regulators, they’ll get the flack for not policing the 
market. This is true for the SEC. They must have their financial orders in on time, 
and they are now [moving towards] IAS.” – private sector 2 
One sector affected by the change in reporting, the college assurance plans (CAP) 
industry, saw a detrimental effect on the pricing of their products (see Chapter 5 on the 
SEC): 
“[The issues in the college assurance plans] were due to the change in the 
financial statements [we were] moving towards the IAS – a direct product of that 
[turned] a profit into a loss” – academic 
Thus, whether it is entirely appropriate or fully implementable for the country to 
incorporate these global standards is an ongoing matter as a regulator points out: 
“The Philippine Accounting Standards is a relative copy of the International 
Accounting Standards. [However] we can’t fully abide [to the IAS]. We are as 
global as can be. There are penalties. [The private sector] is asking for leeway and 
for some difference. We move the standards in order to fit but there are 
idiosyncrasies to fully implement them here. So there is a disclosure in the 
footnote, it’s there. There is monitoring if there are any issues. However, [in 
terms of corporate governance, some firms] are suspended and penalised if they 
don’t have independent directors.” – SEC  
The imposition of external ‘global’ standards overlooks some of the particularistic local 
issues present in the business environment of the country. The harmonisation of global 




dictated externally will need to be modified appropriately to gain legitimacy and to suit 
local conditions.  
4.4.6 Summary of Corporate Governance’s Introduction 
 
The following figure summarises how corporate governance diffused from the 
germination of an external idea and mainly formulated with developed countries in mind 
to being introduced in the local Philippine environment: 
Figure 21: How corporate governance reforms were introduced into the 
Philippines 
 
Step 1 shows the importance of the external influence of IFIs. 
Step 2 shows the necessary high level interaction between the IFI and local influentials to 
ensure the transfer of knowledge, and later on, acceptance of this reform: 
“Quote me on the Capital Market Development Council (CMDC) on how 
corporate governance started. As Chairman of the CMDC I appointed Jess 
Estanislao as Chair of the Corporate Governance Taskforce in 2000. That’s how 
[corporate governance in the country] began.” – Josue Camba, Chair of Basic 
Energy 
Step 1
• External IFI corporate governance representatives (mainly OECD, WB and 
ADB)
Step 2
• Introduce and spread idea of corporate governance reforms to key internal 
policymakers or local influentials
Step 3
• Establishment of local, formal group of decision makers with political 
(presidential) backing and support
Step 4
• Introduce the concept of corporate governance reform to regulators through 
regional roundtables, discussions and formal directives
Step 5
• Introduce corporate governance reforms to the regulated (private sector) 
formally through laws, circulars and policies
Step 6





Step 3 is the formal mechanism of setting up an organisation that will look at how it 
would operationalise the reforms into the local environment. The backing of the political 
branch of the country, the President’s approval executive order no less, is necessary for 
this organisation and its operations to receive widespread legitimacy and esteem. 
Members of this organisation would reflect various interest groups but more importantly 
they are the leaders who will carry out the reform.  
The next section looks in detail the above Steps 2 and 3 with the establishment of the 
Institute of Corporate Directors under the aegis of Jesus Estanislao to ensure the reforms 
were localised to gain wider legitimacy in the country. 
Step 4 reflects how those who would be enacting the reforms need to learn and know 
what type of reforms they are enacting. If there is internal opposition to such reforms, 
formal directives such as the comment below shows how regulators overcome their 
objectives: 
“There’s a new executive order on corporate governance which allows the 
Department of Finance to supervise so government corporations can set up their 
[corporate governance].”- public sector  
Step 5 is the coalface interaction of reform being implemented by the regulator to the 
regulated. As one industry group explained: 
“The BSP has had a series of circulars which strengthened corporate governance 
practices in the banking industry; also an insurance circular for the insurance 
industry.”-IIA 
Chapter 5 on Regulators looks more closely at this. For existing professional associations, 
having their input was an important step in spreading the idea of the reform to their 
members: 
“The Institute for Internal Auditors (IIA) became instrumental in drafting the 
SEC Corporate Governance Code. Some aspects of the draft were already done 
and they were asked for comments or input on it. The IIA is one of the key 
players in drafting the code. The IIA was called in by the SEC Chairman to look at 
the circular draft. Some principles of the draft came from the OECD. The SEC 




environments and was not tailored after the USA SOX as SOX came after the 
circular II.” - IIA 
Finally Step 6 is the application and operationalisation of the reforms by the private 
sector within their organisations themselves. Chapter 6 looks extensively at the impact of 
corporate governance reforms from the perspective of the private sector, while Chapter 8 
looks at the introduction of corporate governance in government owned corporations. 
The OECD (corporate governance) reforms or G-20 (banking) reforms may have the very 
best of good intentions but in a developing country context where transparency is scarce 
and the political environment can be quite unstable, the bureaucracy and regulatory 
arms have tended to sit uneasily in the middle. Thus, the instability of a nation-state is 
not taken into account when principles or standards are formulated and unilaterally 
imposed especially in Steps 5 and 6. 
Where the reforms may contradict the political conditions and sensibilities, then they 
will not be implemented for they will not receive support. The imprimatur and political 
backing is important for these reforms to have an effect: legitimacy from the top is 
required, while wider acceptance from those affected by the reforms is fundamental. 
The pre-existing arrangements- especially the institutional and cultural -do provide 
obstacles for the effective implementation of these principles. While they work in theory, 
in practice they need to be modified to take into account the heavily politicised nature of 
policy making in the country. 
The next section looks at how corporate governance reforms were and are being 
conceptually adapted to better suit local conditions and address the problems 
mentioned in this section. 
4.4.7 Locally Adapting Corporate Governance Reforms  
 
While the previous section dealt with the tensions and the institutional isomorphic 
tendencies of corporate governance reforms – fine in theory, but what about in practice -  
motivators for the introduction of corporate governance or the operationalisation of 
corporate governance was and remains a challenge. Adapting principles largely suited for 
Western countries to developing countries is a work-in-progress. Thus, this section 




the form of corporate governance undertaken, and the second tests the substance of 
corporate governance reforms: 
H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar ideas 
contained in Western principles of corporate governance 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
Where in Anglo-American countries, one consideration of corporate governance looks at 
ensuring destruction of shareholder value is mitigated, in the Philippines, corporate 
governance is seen as improving the business environment by reaching out to the owners 
of the company and improving standards of behaviour. Conceptually adapting what 
corporate governance means for the country is an important part of operationalising and 
supporting the reforms. As a largely Western concept, corporate governance must be 
made suitable and adapted for the local conditions to gain legitimacy, support and 
substance: 
“Corporate governance must be operationalised at the corporation level and with 
the intention to do so. It is growing now. Companies with significant 
shareholders used to making decisions on their own also have issues of control. 
Governance brings but also demands.” – ICD 
According to one company, corporate governance principles will be adapted as it suits 
the Philippines. In this regard, an emphasis on the principle-based rather than the rule-
based perspective of corporate governance will find more support amongst locals.  
“At the end of the day, corporate governance will grow in the region but in terms 
of the approach, Philippine corporations will take a different approach to the 
ones compared in the USA, UK. For those companies, it will be acceptable for 
them to have rules than principles based. Here, the emphasis will be on the 
latter.” – PLDT 
One interviewee pointed out there were three main constraints to the full suitability of 
OECD corporate governance principles in the country with the highly concentrated 
ownership structure in a single shareholder or family the major difference between 
Philippine-style and Western-style forms of corporate governance: 




ownership is a major factor, economic distribution is another and the level of debt in 
your financial portfolio can also affect corporate governance as your creditors can 
influence your decision making. To address the constraints, we begin on values. 
There are families that subscribe to higher principles of corporate governance and 
ethics. You can begin by making the corporate governance model suitable to these 
higher goals. For outside principles to succeed, there must be a basic model that can 
be adopted to suit the local conditions here so other families can follow suit.” – 
business advocacy group  
The importance of the family’s attitude and values towards corporate governance is 
reflected in the corporation. As the interviewee above pointed out, some families support 
corporate governance, some don’t. The following comment is one case of the ambivalent 
attitude towards adoption of full Western-style corporate governance: 
“To me corporate governance is tied up with macroeconomic development and 
with government. It’s required practice. If you take the standards in developed 
countries, put it here it’s going to be problematic. We should evaluate Philippine 
corporate governance under Philippine culture. For example, you can’t have the 
same standards such as human rights here as in the West. What they think is 
human rights here, they then get problems. Adoption of Western principles here 
has to be tempered.” –private sector 1 
For corporate governance reforms to have an enduring legacy, they will be substantively 
affected by how they address particular problems in the Philippines. The next section 
discusses some of these challenges. 
4.4.8 Corporate Governance Challenges 
 
The country’s past experience of crony capitalism showed a politically well-connected 
few were rewarded as a consequence of their connections and had a major advantage 
against others who did not. Corporate governance complements the concept of private 
sector development and calls for a level playing field in the country: 
“There is an unfair competitive advantage for big players. 45 groups control 60% 
of the market capitalisation. That’s 45 family groups. In Indonesia it’s 16 family 




“[To improve the economy here], there are ideas that particular projects could be 
accelerated, a level playing field is present and government policies are 
transparent. This would allow a certain preparedness to compete.  If there is too 
much regulation along the way, that will makes costs of doing business high.”-
private sector 2 
“When you have heavily protected industries in areas of infrastructure, there are 
incentives in these industries to engage in regulatory capture. When you have 
well-regulated -  but less protected - industries that creates a more level playing 
field. The financial markets are wanting that. That’s short-term. In the long term, 
to improve the economy here, you need to change the constitution and allow 
foreign competition.” – private sector 3 
Ensuring private sector participants behave in an ethical manner in a country riddled 
with corruption is no easy task. Straddling the line between behaviour that is corrupting 
and one that could ultimately corrupt is an unpleasant way to do business. To some 
interviewees corporate governance is part of the way in improving the private sector of 
the country and having a business environment conducive to investment. In this sense, 
corporate governance is a long-term process for businesses that is not completed 
overnight: 
“It’s a start. I don’t think we as a whole are nowhere near where we want to be. 
It’s a good start. My concern is that the Western style will not work in Asia. For 
companies like us, it’s no problem for us for sure. But I’m not sure if it will work 
for family-owned corporations. The Asian Institute of Management (AIM) 
recognised that managing a family corporation is a discipline itself. We can’t use 
the Western model of management. The concentration of ownership here is 
reflected in family-owned corporations.” – private sector 4 
In a country where the culture is family oriented, too much familiarity creates a sense of 
self-centredness or reflective of one where the state is captured by a few, and a feeling of 
hopelessness of those who cannot influence the state. Thus, in promoting governance at 
the public and private sector levels, a sense of nationalism and patriotism is invoked to 
love the country beyond one’s self: “Mahal ko ang Pilipinas” [I love the Philippines] as the 




For private sector participants who have to implement the operational aspects of 
corporate governance, they share the same sentiments as other private sector 
participants in the developed world – seeing corporate governance as compliance. Some 
interviewees spoke of their weariness on the compliance-based approach, while others 
were supportive of why they were doing it and to ensure corporate behaviour is done in 
an ethical manner: 
“There are elements of corporate governance of telling people what “it” is. People 
don’t know what it is yet. Corporate governance is not simply attending about 
some [training], it’s not just compliance with SEC rules; it’s a function of the 
director to the public.” – private sector 5 
While the compliance-based approach towards corporate governance helps in 
heightening the awareness for companies to its duties and obligations to a wider 
audience, it is the higher-level understanding of what the reasons are behind their 
introduction that will have the profound impact. As the rest of the world has introduced 
codes or principles of corporate governance, other interviewees feel that by practising 
corporate governance, the country has joined the international community: 
“We’re hoping to be in on this as part of the international standards for corporate 
governance.” - regulator 
Lastly, one interviewee was more circumspect about the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in the country and from his observations how companies try to straddle the 
internal and external pressures. He sees a divergence between groups of companies that 
implement and observe corporate governance in substance, and the other groups that 
don’t: 
“[The future of corporate governance] will still be dichotomies. There will be 
segregated corporate governance with one form of corporate governance for the 
very big listed professional corporations and another form of corporate 
governance for the majority who are still family-based and non-professionalised. 
The former will also be more involved with an expanded notion of stakeholders, 
paying more attention to the community and employees with some of the 





Grudging acceptance of adopting externally imposed reforms have been the outcome of 
the introduction of these largely Western based corporate governance reforms. While 
not wholly embraced, increasing transparency, accountability and disclosure are 
worthwhile ideas that have resonated in the aftermath of financial crises.  
The next section looks at the importance of having a figurehead in the country to 
spearhead the reforms in order for the reforms to take a more local flavour and gain 
wider legitimacy. 
4.5 Dr. Jesus Estanislao and the Institute of Corporate Directors 
 
Throughout my data collection journey, the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD) came 
up often as the principal answer when asked how corporate governance was introduced 
into the country. Amongst interviewees, the organisation is widely known as having 
spearheaded corporate governance reforms in the country. The ICD continues to be 
associated with Dr. Jesus Estanislao as the main corporate governance champion and 
major advocate in the country, ably helped by the very active JJ Moreno.  
The establishment of the ICD with Dr. Estanislao as figurehead has made the 
organisation synonymous with Philippine corporate governance. His role and 
organisation fills in Steps 2 & 3 in Figure 21 on How Corporate Governance Reforms were 
Introduced into the Country. 
 ICD’s establishment was assisted by Australia through its development assistance arm of 
AusAid. Several of the ICD fellows were funded by AusAid to undertake director training 
at the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD). Other countries in the region 
(such as Thailand) benefited from this support from Australia in formalising a company 
directors’ program locally. In the ICD offices, I was shown how the technical equipment 
all had AusAid stickers plastered “a gift from Australia” –an indication of Australia’ soft 
diplomacy approach in the country and wider engagement with the region. 
The ICD is making progressive inroads into the wider adoption of the professionalisation 
of directors and management of the enterprise: 
“Corporate governance has improved since 1997 in certain companies at least. 
The large companies here are aware of corporate governance. Management, 




practice is still being sorted out on what is the best way. They see it more and 
more.”- ICD 
Many interviewees regarded Dr. Jesus Estanislao as the main instigator of corporate 
governance in the country. He was pivotal in gaining legitimacy and wider embrace of 
corporate governance. Estanislao is a highly-regarded Filipino both nationally and 
internationally. The office of the ICD pays tribute to the dynamism and influence of 
Estanislao. Photos of Estanislao with world leaders and influentials dot the walls of the 
office. He is an institutional reformer and builder. An account of the founding of the ICD 
and its founder follows: 
“There was a tremendous amount of goodwill towards the ICD Chairman Dr. 
Estanislao. He set up two institutes: 
1. Institute of Solidarity in Asia (ISA) – for public governance issues 
2. ICD – for corporate governance issues 
The ICD and ISA were established largely because of him. Dr. Estanislao is well-
known around the region in community-building and is a consultant to the 
previous and current Pope. Dr. Estanislao founded the University of East Asia 
and the Pacific, was the former Secretary of the DPPI, and was a founding 
member of the ADB Institute. 
“When ICD was organised, it was implicitly done to serve a principal (Estanislao). 
Before I came to the ICD, the organisation was about supporting the principal 
and his activities and not much about governance. In effect, it was a personal 
office to support the advocacy of the chairman. The plan to implement corporate 
governance projects and to develop professional directors came in 2002. Then a 
business plan was developed to promote corporate governance.” – JJ Moreno  
Estanislao’s past history and achievements still lingers on in other organisations he 
reformed (one of these organisations, the Development Bank of the Philippines pays 
tribute to him; see Chapter 8 Government Financial Institutions). In the Philippines, his 
past record  and achievements in both government and the private sectors have given 
him the legitimacy to pursue corporate governance reforms and apply them in the 




leadership is held in high esteem. Interviewees spoke of his role as pivotal in 
championing corporate governance in the country: 
“Estanislao – he was the former Secretary of Finance. Malakas siya. [He’s strong]. 
Corporate governance would be adapted [with him at the helm].” –private sector 
1 
“Corporate governance was started by Jess Estanislao after he was approached by 
the Australian Government. He was funded by the ADB. Subsequently, AusAid 
funded people to go to the AICD directors’ course. More [of the] ADB [funds] 
should [go into funding for these courses]. The champion here is Estanislao.” –
private sector 2 
“Estanislao is active in the region promoting corporate governance.” – BSP 
Estanislao as corporate governance champion in the country and the region was 
recognised by the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) whose 
membership is largely comprised of institutional investors from the developed world. 
Estanislao was awarded with Robert ‘Bob’ AG Monks, a corporate governance expert, in 
2002 recognising his achievement in introducing and raising standards of corporate 
governance in the country. While the East Asian Crisis was a motivator for introducing 
corporate governance, having Estanislao as the local figurehead for this reform was 
pivotal. Estanislao’s leadership and vision allowed corporate governance to gain currency 
in the country. The idea that corporations which are well-run and well-governed 
contribute best to society’s wellbeing could not hope for a better champion than 
Estanislao. As one mentioned: 
“The East Asian Crisis did not have any impact on corporate governance. 
Corporate governance came into the picture not because of the crisis but because 
of a pioneering man called Dr. Jesus Estanislao who established the ICD. He was 
a director of MetroBank. He initiated corporate governance and he conducted a 
seminar on corporate governance for all directors of the MetroBank group, 
affiliated companies, insurance companies, savings and investment banks. All 
MetroBank directors attended this corporate governance seminar in 2002.” –
MetroBank 




and the ICD had political and regulatory support for its establishment and existence 
even though the ICD is not a public sector or government body:  
“The BSP and the SEC are effective corporate governance institutions. They have 
been a good system for the reform movement. The ICD won’t be where it is today 
without the mandate from the BSP and SEC. We have 105 fellows, 1200 directors 
at the ICD attending through our one or two-day seminar. The ICD wouldn’t 
have gotten these numbers if not through the support from the regulators.” – 
business advocate  
Similarly, the ICD has also received support from other private sector bodies such as the 
Institute for Internal Auditors (IIA): 
“The IIA has actively participated in the ICD with an advocacy role with them. 
There is a mutual active participation between both organisations. For example, 
the ICD awards outstanding internal auditors for the last 3 years. Estanislao or JJ 
are very much active in judging. There are 1,000 members of the IIA.”-IIA 
The trust and legitimacy ICD has gained in such a short time has made it the foremost 
pioneer and advocate of corporate governance in the country: 
“We capture the issues in Philippine boards and provide contextual value. We 
deal with real issues such as and help corporations on topics such as: 
* independent directors 
* presence of significant shareholder board (what they’d do, e.g. expropriate and 
other certain issue); and 
* certain issues boards face when dealing with government” - ICD 
The ICD provides a valuable service sorely felt in a country where family-owned 
businesses and a family-oriented culture dominate. The idea of professionalising the 
management to manage the ‘family business’ is still yet to be the norm. The following 
comment from a business family member on how attending an ICD training in the 
Philippines is a family event shows how director training has to be adapted to suit the 
culture in the country: 
“I took the family to a one-day orientation - that is, the 10 family members 




several generally good speakers with practical experience.”-business family 
member 
This is the environment the ICD operates in and the ICD has adapted its courses to suit 
the sensibilities of the director community who circulate in a small social circle. The 
familial element in the private sector of the country means the ICD refreshingly provides 
impartiality and a third-party’s objectivity. 
The primary stakeholders of the ICD place a great deal on the advice of the institute as 
providing a beacon for greater private sector development in the country. Not only is it 
an advocate for professional director training, it is also taking on other roles for private 
sector issues; namely to fill in for elements of institutional/organisational capacity still 
missing in the country: 
“For the ICD, our major shareholders are the corporations and trying to get them 
to do the right thing. The other stakeholders are the community, the regulators, 
the media. We are actively involving the Institute of Internal Auditors – we call 
them the reputational agents, the lawyers. They are part of the government 
system with the corporate secretaries. We helped them set up an Institute of 
Corporate Secretaries. Others have asked us to set up a Shareholders’ 
Association.” – ICD 
Other services provided by the ICD include board specific assessment on their 
performance and evaluation:  
“We also provide Board Advisory Services, board retreats and board evaluation. 
Although we’d have open seminars, there are now specific intervention programs 
for specific corporations.” -ICD 
For a country that still requires the establishment of major corporate governance 
institutions common in developed countries, the ICD is seen as providing the capacity to 
lead and expectations are high. 
4.5.1 ICD Scorecards 
 
As a way to measure the practice of corporate governance in the private sector, the ICD 




benchmarking exercise that charts how corporate governance is proliferating in the 
corporations: 
“[For us] 2002-2004 was marked by informing companies about corporate 
governance through training. After 2004 we wanted to know and find out where 
we are now, with and what type of governance that now exists in East Asia. We 
looked at the Thai corporate governance scorecards and we decided to bring 
them here to find what governance now exists here in form. To inform the 
companies about the scorecards we issued technical papers to state why we were 
doing it. 
“After two years of running the scorecards we are trying to develop the second 
generation of corporate governance scorecards building on what colleagues have 
developed. We looked at findings from the World Bank and other IFIs. We’d like 
to be the incubator of our corporate governance scorecards. With the corporate 
governance scorecards we present our scores and our ratings on each 
corporation’s corporate governance. 
“The first few years of the scorecard exercise was to increase the awareness and in 
measuring the impact of corporate governance. Now, the theme of the 
conference dinner on May 30th is that we have to promote corporate governance 
in one company and one corporation at a time.”-ICD 
As the scorecards are also a ranking exercise, it brings out the natural competitive streak 
to strive to be recognised as a company that practices corporate governance best: 
“There are five Ayala companies in the top 10 list of the corporate governance 
scorecard: Ayala Land, Ayala Corporation, Manila Water, BPI, Globe Telecom. 
China Bank did well on the scorecard so did Aboitiz-owned Union Bank: well 
known for their corporate governance practice.” – ICD  
However, this also means that for those whose governance practices are far from 
desirable, the bottom rankings are not a pleasant place to be recognised. This is not an 
easy thing for the ICD to publish given Philippine society values saving face. Public 
humiliation is best avoided: 




exercise to do to inform them, according to our rating, we have ranked you 
number 128 out of 128 companies. We give them feedback. The top 10 are publicly 
available but the rest are not publicly available except for the company 
concerned.” - ICD 
Nevertheless, the ICD scorecards are a useful bottom-up exercise in monitoring the 
expansion of corporate governance in the country’s corporations: 
“We have received recent score feedback and it’s about time to enhance the 
corporate governance scorecard system. In the third year of the scorecard, we 
hope to develop and share this with the rest of the region. Corporate governance 
improvements have happened in the corporations for the past two years.” -ICD 
Unlike other jurisdictions such as Australia and other Anglo-American countries where 
reporting on a board’s evaluation and performance is an annual reportorial requirement, 
this is an optional element in the Philippines. Yet, the ICD does aim for best practice and 
as can be seen throughout this thesis there is a high level awareness of corporate 
governance developments around the world.  
4.5.2 ICD and the Public Sector 
 
However, corporate governance cannot be isolated from the other element that 
complements private sector development – that of public governance. Not surprisingly 
the public sector’s institutional weaknesses were also a concern in the ICD: 
“The public governance in the Philippines is not the best in the world” - ICD 
The ICD has also branched out into providing some of the services it provides the private 
sector to the public sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the country: 
“The Insurance Commission now requires directors of insurance company boards 
to go on training with the ICD. This is similar with the Energy Commission. The 
Office of the Philippine President also requires directors of SOEs to go through 
the corporate governance training program.”-ICD 
Furthermore, the problem of enforcement by government is a story that resonates 




is interested in seeing more active enforcement by regulators though is cautious about 
the capacity of regulators to enforce corporate governance rules and mandates: 
“Corporate governance has improved since 1997 in certain companies at least. 
The large companies here are aware of corporate governance. Management, 
directors believe there is a lot of value in the governance thing. The general, not 
many are sorting out. Not value. The culture or practice is still being sorted out 
on what is the best. They see more and more. They see slowly now from a 
business standpoint but each company proceeds at base. Regulators issued 
regulations and mandate what they have done. We have enough to go on. The 
challenge is enforcement. Whenever these policies are imposed, it is fairly hard 
for enforcement. It is not a question of whether they want to force. It’s the 
capacity to enforce. Issues need to be strengthened.” - ICD 
The ICD is widely credited for formalising corporate governance in the provision of 
training and professionalisation of directors. The organisation is at the coalface of 
monitoring corporate governance progress in both public and private sector spheres.  
4.5.3 ICD and the Future of Philippine Corporate Governance 
 
The ICD under the aegis of its founder, Dr Jesus Estanislao, was and continues to be 
instrumental in introducing, formalising and cementing the operational aspects of 
corporate governance into the country.  
The ICD currently sees a core influential group of corporations embracing corporate 
governance and applying it in their organisations though an expansion of this group 
would be welcomed. The organisation is also interested in seeing more effort in 
developing data for corporate governance. One of its fellows suggested he would like to 
see more stringent requirements in directorships as multiple directorships in the two-
digits are common. 
The future looks bright for the ICD and in the long term, the organisation hopes that 
major corporate governance developments would have taken place. Under the 





4.6 Closing Remarks 
 
The business and corporate governance environment in the Philippines is being shaped, 
and will be shaped, by various politico-economic conditions. Corporate governance is a 
work in progress with initial reforms having met some resistance and requiring 
adjustment for them to be adapted and made suitable for local conditions.  
This chapter supports on one level the coercive form of reforms, especially by means of 
high level approaches but the substance of these reforms are questionable. Attempts to 
insinuate such reforms take a long period of time to ensure it receives support from all 
stakeholders. The culture of consensus and conflict avoidance in the Philippines 
permeates through society from the top to the bottom.  
Are corporate governance reforms the means or the ends? For one regulator at least, the 
failure to implement reforms saw her dismissal from her office. In trying to strengthen 
the industry, her position was weakened (see Chapter 5 Insurance Commission). This is 
another unintended consequence of coercive isomorphism. Failure to receive wide 
support or consensus makes a reform lose legitimacy and the role of the implementer – 
in this case a regulator - untenable.  
These are the tensions and limits of externally imposed reforms. In response to the 
perceived rigidity of inorganic reforms, the unintended consequence is subsequent 
resistance. While the basis of the idea is there, the implementation is the challenge. 
Nevertheless, the reforms have now been implemented in the country and the impact of 
the reforms is being felt: 
“Corporate governance is a fairly recent development in the Philippines and is 
still evolving.  It is worthy of note, though, that there is a much more heightened 
awareness on corporate governance now than before, and this awareness still 
continues to grow. It may also be noted that improved corporate governance 
regulations and practices have helped companies do business better.” – Manulife 
The spirit of what corporate governance is suppose to achieve has now embedded itself 
in the country with greater awareness that well-governed companies do make a 




It is in the details of what constitutes transparency in an opaque environment, 
accountability in a private sector dominated by families, and disclosure in a volatile 
political environment that will contribute to a more functional economy and society. If 
the ultimate aim of corporate governance reforms is to contribute to a better business 






CHAPTER 5: THE REGULATORS 
 
This chapter looks at the corporate governance regulators of the country and the impact 
of corporate governance reforms on these institutions. Regulators are important 
stakeholders in the corporate governance environment of a country. Why strong 
regulators matter in a country like the Philippines and issues faced by the corporate 
governance regulators – and the regulated - are discussed.  
This chapter begins by discussing the importance of strong regulatory institutions. 
Common themes faced by all regulators in areas of regulatory enforcement, 
harmonisation, coordination, resources and dialogue with the regulated and 
complementary governance reforms in the public sector are discussed. This background 
provides the context of the corporate governance regulatory environment of the 
Philippines.  
The bulk of this chapter devotes a section each on the regulators and their experience in 
implementing corporate governance reforms in their industry or sector. There are four 
main corporate governance regulators in the country. They are: 
1. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) or Central Bank of the Philippines. The BSP is 
the banking industry regulator 
2. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC is the corporations and 
main private sector regulator 
3. Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE). The PSE is the capital market regulator; and 
4. Insurance Commission (IC). The IC is the insurance industry regulator. 
The three government regulators are the BSP, SEC and IC. The PSE, similar to other 
countries around the world, have demutualised and is the non-government regulator. 
This chapter looks at specific corporate governance issues and problems facing each 
regulator and the industry it regulates. 
5.1 The Importance of Strong Regulatory Institutions and Enforcement 
 




H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar ideas 
contained in Western principles of corporate governance. 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
where the formulation of reform is influenced externally, but application of corporate 
governance regulation is shaped by the circumstances and events of the regulatory 
environment. Sections in this chapter provide evidence to support both hypotheses and 
show the limitation of the underlying theoretical underpinnings of institutional theory. 
Specifically, this section looks at the importance of institutional capability and 
enforcement of reforms by regulators and addresses Steps 4 and 5 from Figure 27 in the 
Chapter 4 on how corporate governance reforms were introduced into the country: 
Figure 22: Introducing Corporate Governance Reforms into the Philippines - 
Steps 4 and 5 
 
A reform formalised in a law or circular is ineffective if it is not enforced. As the previous 
chapter related, the Philippines has used standards developed for OECD countries for its 
corporate governance reforms. However, there is a widely held perception that the 
country has weak regulators and existing laws are not enforced: 
“We have good regulations but the rule of law is not happening here. [The people 
who break laws] are not held accountable.” – private sector 1 
“They have to be more pro-active in monitoring corporate governance 
compliance.” –private sector 2 
A factor pointed out by another interviewee was ensuring regulators have sufficient 
knowledge on what they are suppose to be regulating as this would help them in their 
enforcement capacity: 
“[You need to put] more people in government who are more aware and 
Step 4
• Introduce the concept of corporate governance reform to regulators 
through regional roundtables, discussions and formal directives
Step 5
• Introduce corporate governance reforms to the regulated (private 




appreciate corporate governance. The competitiveness ratings of a global survey 
initiative looked at the corporate governance criteria whether the companies 
were competitive or not. If the regulatory authorities don’t know the value of 
corporate governance how can they regulate corporations to a competitive level?” 
– private sector 3 
The problems of enforcement are a conundrum faced by many developing countries; the 
regulations may be modelled after the world’s best but the issue of enforcement is far 
more pressing. If laws are not enforced, then the laws themselves become ineffective: 
“I do feel many regulations are not being enforced. Insider trading is illegal here 
but much of it doing. [The regulation is in the] books but not enforced. [The] big 
guys get away while the little guys get caught even with the right regulation.” – 
academic 
The following interviewee gives a specific example on the problem with lack of 
monitoring and enforcement: 
“We have just done the first step on corporate governance. We shall see. The 
enforcement of the [corporate governance] circular is not much felt. Monitoring 
compliance is not done very much. The SEC does not have much people 
monitoring compliance. Monitoring is on a self-assessment basis, and there is no 
follow-up. We have done the first step, so we’re waiting for the next. There is no 
evidence yet of the circular being reinforced. If the monitoring is in place – only 
God knows! There were plans for SEC to partner with ICD on monitoring. With 
the BSP – there is not much in monitoring. There are better structural procedures 
in place than the SEC as the BSP has examiners and they can at least enforce 
compliance with the code unlike the SEC. With the SEC Self-Assessment, the 
companies were complying in paper but we’re not so sure if they were complying 
in practice. There is a question mark, we are not so sure and no one can attest to 
that.” – IIA 
This is perhaps a consequence of externally imposed standards as they have not been 
formulated locally. Regulations may be more useful if they are simplified and localised; 
taking into account the practical reality of the capacity of the regulator and the resources 




poorly on the effectiveness of the regulator though it depends on the sector being 
regulated according to one interviewee: 
“No [the regulators] have not been effective. They have paid lip service [on 
corporate governance enforcement]. [They have] attempted to do certain things. 
It depends on the sector. Regulation in banking and finance has been the most 
successful for a variety of reasons as the financial community is globally 
integrated for example with the Basel standards. And that’s the name of the 
game!” – private sector 4 
For other interviewees though, the regulators have been more effective than in the past: 
“To some extent they have been effective. The PSE and the SEC have been 
successful in having publicly listed companies comply with various corporate 
governance requirements. However, they have to be more pro-active in 
monitoring corporate governance compliance.” – private sector 5 
“I think compared to the past years, yes [they have been effective]. Although it 
still requires improvement, we’re on the right direction now. They are very much 
monitoring corporations over corporate governance. Unlike before they just give 
you the regulations, now they’re very strict with deadlines, disclosure and 
transparency. This is a move in the right direction, we need some improvements 
and it’s there. They have never been strict as they have until now.” – private 
sector 6 
“Yes, we now have effective corporate governance institutions because it was 
mandated by the BSP and SEC. That has been a good system for the reform 
movement.” – business advocate  
Corporate governance reforms would have greater import and currency if it had strong 
regulatory oversight with private sector participation and consultation. 
“There are certain limitations and weaknesses in our regulatory institutions 
[interviewees exchange look of despair dealing with government]. Corporate 
governance in general has major stakeholders. The regulators - PSE, SEC - play 




Philippine corporations is to follow what is dictated by the regulator. They won’t 
follow it if it is not dictated by the regulators.” – PLDT 
“The big corporations are influential in their corporate governance standards but 
they won’t drive the change. It will be the regulators and government. The 
change will be done by industry standards and government regulation.” –private 
sector 7 
There are expectations that regulators should and must be seen as enforcers of existing 
rules; and that enforcement is done without prejudice. This echoes again calls for a level 
playing field with regulators as impartial referees. 
5.1.1 Harmonisation in Enforcement 
 
Harmonisation of corporate governance reform and enforcement was a subject some 
interviewees brought up. When corporate governance reforms are enforced, one 
regulator may have a different view on a particular issue. A case in point is on the issue 
of directorships and how this is recognised as a professional qualification: 
“The BSP has no Code of Corporate Governance but the BSP requires bank 
directors to attend corporate governance meetings and under the General 
Banking Act of June 30th 2000, the directors must adhere to the ‘fit and proper 
rule’” – SEC  
If a banking director is about to be nominated to an insurance company directorship, 
there is some divergent requirements in terms of compliance between the two regulators 
– that of the BSP and Insurance Commission in this case – and this may lead to problems 
or confusion: 
“They need to harmonise the corporate governance requirements of regulatory 
agencies. There needs to be a common reservoir for all of this. The requirements 
for independent directors should be consistent amongst regulators – we are 
talking about the same individuals (independent directors) and the same 
companies. Why must there be discrepancies in the requirements? So for the 
requirements for director training, why should it vary across agencies for example 




A pertinent issue that requires harmonisation is the technological. In particular, the SEC 
is occupied by the proliferation of database and company information (see Co-ordinating 
the IT Infrastructure under the SEC section later in this chapter). 
However, regulators are gradually dealing with their divergent requirements. To 
coordinate the introduction of corporate governance reforms amongst the regulators, a 
Financial Sector Forum (FSF) was initiated by the BSP in 2005. 34 The Financial Sector 
Forum meets bimonthly and brings together the BSP, SEC and the Insurance 
Commission.35
“There is a Financial Sector Forum that meets once every two months and it 
brings together the main regulators: BSP, SEC and IC. In this forum, things like 
how each agency promotes good governance is discussed. It is an alignment of 
standards and regulations. It was established in 2005.” – BSP 
 This Forum facilitates discussion amongst the government regulators on 
how corporate governance is being implemented in the sectors under their purview and 
that there is proper uniformity in coordination as the main regulators in developing the 
capital market in the country (Espenilla 2006: 145): 
Co-ordinating corporate governance reforms are a work in progress for regulators. 
5.1.2 Resource Constraints 
 
However, what affects the ability of regulators to enforce is the lack of resources - both 
staff and technical. While later sections in this chapter look at the specific resource 
issues of each regulator, the following comments are characteristic and common to all 
regulatory bodies.  
There is a widely held belief that government needs to give more resources to the 
regulators so they can do what they were established to do: 
“Look at it from their competencies and resources of decisions. They can’t 
                                                     
34 Similarly, in Australia, there exists the Council of Financial Regulators which meets quarterly 
and coordinates the main financial government regulatory agencies. The Council comprises of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Treasury. 
http://www.rba.gov.au/financialsystemstability/australianregulatoryframework/cfr.html accessed 
3 December 2009 
35 According to Espenilla (2006), the Philippine Deposit Insurance Commission (PDIC) is also part 
of the FSF: however I never sought an interview with the PDIC as they mostly dealt with deposits 




effectively enforce the rules of the game without the right people, training and 
resources. The key is competencies and resources with [the regulatory] agencies. 
You need to enhance and require competencies…the reforms in regulatory 
agencies such as the PSE and SEC will be more meaningful in those agencies to 
shepherd corporate governance in the country and that these reforms also 
happens. Philippine corporations look at the PSE and SEC as the primary 
advocates of corporate governance here. For [wider acceptance and legitimacy of 
corporate governance reforms] to happen, they need to enhance their 
competencies and for government to give them resources. Give them the 
intellectual and financial resources.” – PLDT 
From another interviewee, the lack of resources in the regulatory authorities is a 
reflection of other areas in the country that have more pressing needs in the government 
budget. Hence, other ways need to be found: 
“You need to have piecemeal reforms and look at the bigger picture. How do you 
give the ombudsmen more teeth and weed out the corruption in government 
institutions? If you give ombudsmen power in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
give it autonomy, give it teeth. You can’t do a Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and 
give high salaries to your civil servants. The country can’t afford high salaries. It 
has to be piecemeal, long-term reforms. Technology will help, and others.” – 
private sector 1 
In dealing with the resource issue, some interviewees pointed out regulatory agencies 
only seek to regulate those who do comply with the laws while ‘failing’ to regulate those 
who did not. A catch-22 situation becomes extant. Therefore, those who comply will 
continually be the targets of the regulators and not those who do not pay tax (see also 
BIR in Chapter 9 Corruption): 
“There is only a small percentage of companies that pay taxes. The government 
isn’t efficient in collecting and they only look at the visible companies such as the 
listed ones.” – private sector 2 
It will take some time for the impression - that those who disobey the laws will not be 
punished precisely because there are not enough resources to pursue the lawbreakers – 




5.1.3 Public-Private Sector Dialogue  
 
Reflecting another unintended consequence of the hierarchical nature of coercive 
isomorphism is the lack of dialogue between the regulators and regulated over the 
introduction of corporate governance reforms. This lack of communication was touched 
on by some interviewees: 
“Regulators may want to take a "guiding role" and thus conduct more often 
dialogue with listed firms on how they see a regulation to be enforced or 
complied with. In this way, the rules are made clear and the listed firms can zero 
in on the more significant improvements that should be undertaken…Generally, 
listed firms would at the least comply with the minimum required. I believe 
regulators should take an active role in significantly improving corporate 
governance but not with a mindset of imposing fines or penalties. Thus it is best 
that regulators take the mediative role of clarifying its requirements as well as 
helping listed firms comply through the issuance of reminders way ahead of time 
of the submission reports that are required.”- private sector 1 
“Basically, I’d hope there will be a dialogue between the government agencies and 
the listed companies. [The dialogue] hasn’t been enough. I have discussed this 
with other lawyers the PSE rules on disclosure. They have asked us too much and 
the requirements are unreasonable.”- private sector 2 
Consistent application of rules in the interaction between the regulators and the 
regulated would also help the relationship: 
“Some consistency is required such as making requirements known to listed 
companies and don’t do anything. There are complaints with the change of rules 
without informing. There needs to be some consistency. As regulators, they need 
to be developmental with the market instead of being the hindrances. The 
keywords are that the regulator should not navigate but instead facilitate. This is 
something new to them.” – PLDT 
Harmonisation, enforcement and consistent application of laws will be greatly enhanced 
by dialogue between the private and public sector for corporate governance reforms to 




5.1.3 Corporate Governance Regulation in the Philippines  
 
This section provided the context of the local regulatory environment of the Philippines. 
The rest of this chapter looks at the main experiences of the four main corporate 
governance regulators in the country and provide a particular insight into how the 
OECD corporate governance reforms were introduced by the regulators in the 
Philippines. 
The following figure summarises the role of the regulator, the sector or industry the 
corporate governance regulator is responsible for, and the local corporate governance 
reforms they have oversight of. Echanis has a similar chart on external influences on 
Philippine corporate governance with the additional role of the judiciary. (2006: 4) Since 
I did not extend my sample to members of the judiciary, I have not included it though 










External corporate governance 
reform
OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (1999, 2004)
General Banking Act 
(2000) RA 8791 [IAS  
and Basel II]
Bangkko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (Central 
Bank of the 
Philippines or BSP)
All banking and 
quasi-banking 
companies
SEC Code of Corporate 
Governance 2002 (Circular #2)
Securities Regulation Code 
(2000) RA 8799
[US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002]
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)
All listed companies 
including PSE, 




















The main external corporate governance reforms that have made an impact into the 
formulation and implementation of corporate governance in the country is the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, 2004) Supplementary external reforms that 
have also had an effect include the IAS, Basel II, and the US Sarbanes Oxley Act. They are 
italicised in the second row boxes of the BSP and SEC reforms respectively.  
In summary, the BSP is the banking regulator and has oversight of all banks under the 
General Banking Act. The SEC is the principal private sector and corporate governance 
regulator under the SEC Code of Corporate Governance 2002. This SEC Code is the main 
corporate governance regulation in the country. The PSE has oversight of listed 
companies and issued its own guidelines on corporate governance. Finally, the Insurance 
Commission has oversight of insurance companies and has issued its own code of 
corporate governance. The next sections discuss each regulator’s experience of corporate 
governance regulation in the country. 
5.2 Central Bank of the Philippines 
 
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is the Central Bank of the Philippines. The BSP is 
the country’s central monetary authority and is divided into three functional divisions: 
monetary stability, supervision and examination, and resource management support.  
The BSP has six main responsibilities: liquidity management, currency issues, lender of 
last resort, exchange rate policy, foreign currency reserves and financial supervision. This 
last responsibility is the one closely linked with its role in promoting corporate 
governance reforms in the country and building public confidence in the financial 
system: 
“Amongst the mandate of the BSP is to foster an environment that is conducive 
to the financial stability system of the country. Within the banking industry, 
corporate governance is necessary. We promote banking in trust.  If the public 
has no trust in the public sector, then they would not use the industry. As the 
banking supervisory regulator, we have issued regulations to promote corporate 
governance.” - BSP 
The BSP’s financial supervision allows the institution oversight over the “operations of 




banking functions.” (BSP 2009b) 
5.2.1 Independence and Autonomy of the BSP 
 
At the heart of a capital-market based economy is an independent central bank. A 
central bank that is depoliticised and acts independently promotes economic stability. 
An independent central bank decoupled from political events promotes or improves real 
economic performance: 
“…an independent central bank may serve to insulate the economy from political 
business cycles either by preventing pre-election manipulation of monetary 
policy…or by reducing partisan shocks to policy following elections.”(Alesina and 
Summers 1993: 152) 
The BSP has “fiscal and administrative autonomy from the National Government” (BSP 
2009c) which has allowed this regulator a degree of autonomy and independence not 
found in other government institutions. The BSP is in an enviable position relative to 
other corporate governance regulators. The BSP is subject to less political interference 
and this distinction is important. Autonomy represents a great amount of flexibility in 
fulfilling a regulatory institution’s mandate. Autonomy also represents stability. This 
makes an enormous difference in the sometime highly politicised environment of the 
country: 
“The BSP is one of the more professional organisations [in government]. The 
levels of compensation [there relative to others is high]. It is fiscally independent. 
That is a big advantage. It is easier to make pioneering reforms. For example, [a 
particular reform] was easier to do through the BSP than the Ministry of 
Finance.” – former public servant 
Another interviewee pointed out the BSP governor’s position is less influenced by the 
political appointment system that is prevalent in the country’s public service. This allows 
the regulator to do what it is supposed to do without fear of retribution: 
“It is the exception rather than the rule: the BSP Governor’s tenure is fixed-term 
by law. If there is a change of presidential administration, he can’t be replaced 




make fixed terms but this would restrict [the Philippine President’s] ability to 
change at the top.” – private sector 1 
However, this has not always been the case. Why a strong, well-resourced and 
independent central bank is important in a developing economy environment is related 
in the next section which looks at the bank’s experience under Marcos. 
5.2.2 The BSP under the Marcos dictatorship and Hutchcroft’s Booty Capitalism 
 
The Philippines has experienced immense periods of political instability in the last 50 
years. For the public service, riding out the turbulence is a matter of survival. To ensure 
the public service keeps functioning despite or in spite of the political environment is a 
hallmark of a strong civil service. Unfortunately, for the most part, the Philippine public 
service has yet to achieve this wall of separation between the politics and the 
bureaucracy. It is worthwhile to recall the experience of the BSP during the dictatorship 
of Marcos. Almost all government institutions were negatively impacted by the 
dictatorship. The BSP was no exception.  
Paul Hutchcroft’s 1998 excellent book Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the 
Philippines provides the context and history of banking regulation in the country. 
Hutchcroft’s monograph an account of what happens to banks when there is a weak and 
authoritarian state with some predatory elites. Unlike Thailand where there is a strong, 
well-compensated bureaucracy that is relatively independent, public sector employees in 
the Philippines are subject to undue influence. Hutchcroft documented the particular 
challenges faced by the BSP over its supervision of the industry and his account is 
centred on the interaction between the regulators, the regulated, and the political 
masters of both. In particular, he notes politically well-connected bank owners regularly 
undermined the independence of the bank’s regulatory and supervisory capacity, while 
courts generally sided with the bank owners: 
“Bank owners express outrage if they are investigated by the Central Bank, and 
expect bad and fraudulent loans to be overlooked. The Central Bank threatens, 
but fails, to prosecute bank owners for violation of its regulations. Courts declare 
the Central Bank to be arbitrary in its treatment of a given bank, and castigate it 
for not offering sufficient assistance to ensure a bank’s survival (even errant 




confidence in the banking system that the Central Bank is duty-bound to 
preserve. In later years, those who nonetheless lose their banks commonly point 
to appreciation of their assets (especially real estate holdings) to argue that their 
banks are no longer insolvent and should be reopened.” (1998: 101) 
The Central Bank’s role under the Marcos dictatorship became that of a facilitator for 
Marcos’ cronies and friends. Hutchcroft detailed 12 instances of state-sanctioned 
expropriation of banks that benefited Marcos and his friends.36
Previous BSP governors were also subject to legal actions brought against them 
personally by owners of companies they were seeking to regulate. Such lawsuits 
undermined the capacity and willingness of regulators to regulate. Coupled with the 
widely held perception that the judicial system of the country is corrupt, lawsuits against 
regulators are seen as highly politically motivated. Regulatory chiefs in other government 
institutions are also subject to legal actions even if their decision making was discharged 
in a professional capacity. The following interviewee relates the example of such a suit: 
 
                                                     
36 “Some twelve banks – almost all of which were in a weak position – ended up in the hands of 
Marcos and his cronies: 
1. Continental Bank was reopened as International Corporate Bank (italics included) under 
the control of [Marcos] crony Herminio Disini. 
2. Pilipinas Bank of crony Ricardo Silverio was kept alive with generous equity assistance 
from state banks. 
3. Jose Cojuangco’s First United Bank was purchased by his nephew, Eduardo ‘Danding’ 
Cojuangco , on behalf of the Philippine Coconut Authority and with funds provided by the 
coconut levy, renamed United Coconut Planters Bank and controlled by a small group centred on 
Cojuangco (see also Askew 2005) 
4. Genbank became Allied Bank, under a group of investors led by Lucio Tan 
5. Emerito Ramos eventually sold Overseas Bank of Manila to a group close to Herminio 
Disini, which renamed the bank Commercial Bank of Manila. 
6. The Philippine Bank of Communications was steadily acquired by a group of investors led 
by Ralph Nubla, the main liaison between Marcos and the Chinese-Filipino business community. 
7. Controlling interest in the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank of the powerful 
pre-martial law clan of Eugenio Lopez was assumed by regime interested led by Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ 
Romualdez (brother of Imelda Marcos) 
8. Philippine Trust Company ended up in the hands of Emilio Yap, a friend of Imelda’s 
family. 
9. Philippine Veterans Bank, nominally owned by World War Two veterans and almost 
entirely beholden to the government for support, had most of its shares ‘held in trust by the 
veteran with all the bogus medals, Ferdinand Marcos 
10. Republic Bank was transferred to Roberto S. Benedicto, a fraternity brother of Marcos 
who was head of the Philippine Sugar Commission, and renamed Republic Planters Bank. 
11. Trades Commercial Bank also went to Benedicto, was renamed Traders Royal Bank, and 
used to handle financial transactions for the regime. 
12. Security Bank, reportedly came to be controlled by Marcos himself, and took major 




“If I were to make a recommendation it would be to limit legal suits brought 
against public officials in introducing reforms while in public office; there needs 
to be a limit on the legal liability against public officials. BSP governor Fernandez 
had to adopt draconian measures for all banks. This was challenged by a legal 
technicality in the courts. Under Philippine law, public officials are responsible - 
personally liable for official acts. That is, your personal assets are on the line such 
as your property if there was a suit. The former Governor’s own estate was 
attached to the court action. He had to pay legal fees. The BSP, the DPIC 
(Deposit Insurance Commission) - they are the institutions vulnerable to these 
challenges. The system’s corrupt. The stakes are high.”– private sector 2 
Recovery from this period of turmoil and havoc continues to this day however the BSP’s 
rehabilitation has been quicker than most other government institutions. 
5.2.3 A Better-Resourced Regulator 
 
For the institution and people within the institution, the growing independence of the 
BSP after the turbulence of Marcos is a welcome change. My interview observation notes 
bear the difference of this change in terms of the resources between that of the BSP and 
SEC have at their disposal. The former is well-resourced, the latter is not: 
“I arrived at the SEC early for an 8am interview. The SEC was established in 1936. 
The offices aren’t as well resourced, not as neat and tidy as some of the private 
sector buildings. The lifts took awhile, there was no air-conditioning within the 
offices and people used fans. But the office I went to was already busy with 
people despite the early morning. My interviewee was busy typing on her laptop 
when I arrived and our interview was interrupted by various calls, including one 
discussing the recent election. During our meeting, we kept being interrupted – 
or a timely reminder of our location – by the passing of the trains. The SEC is 
located next to the main road leading in and out of Makati (EDSA) and the 
railway line.” – SEC observation notes 
“Compared to my interview at the SEC, the BSP is like a palace in a salubrious 
complex. Marbled floors, tight security, it is indeed a well-resourced government 
agency in comparison to its poorer cousin. Also one could see the ever present 




led to one BSP building to another, there was a floor-to-ceiling crucifixion in one 
corner with burning candles at the foot of the cross. The offices of the Assistant 
Governor were filled with valuable Filipino art paintings, one by Fernando 
Amorsolo. There was also some ethnographic artwork from Mindanao including 
some ceremonial music instruments which I took for Thai ethnography. There 
were around 4 office assistants…We sat around a padded leather table. Though 
the leather was chafed and worn, the furniture displayed wealth. The Reserve 
Bank of the Philippines is a well-resourced agency.” – BSP observation notes 
5.2.4 Crisis and Reform  
 
The aftermath of crises became catalysts for banking reform. The fall of the Marcos 
dictatorship saw extensive political reforms while the East Asian Crisis prompted 
structural reforms. Extensive rehabilitation followed after Marcos’ departure especially 
for state-owned banks (see DBP section in Chapter 8 Government Financial Institutions): 
“Before, there was a bias in the law in favour of owners. A long time ago banks 
were a monopoly. Banks knew little about corporations they were lending to. 
Banks didn’t know bad accounting and so forth. Banks were only agents, as 
channels of capital. But that is not the reality now.” – private sector 1 
While the East Asian Crisis showed Philippine banks could no longer operate in isolation 
nor could it be buffered in an era of financial globalisation. The following account relates 
what happened in the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis: 
“The banks accumulated a lot of non-performing loans (NPLs). Post-crisis, there 
was significant deterioration of the [currency] piso. Currently the piso is still low 
and has not rebounded back to its pre-crisis level. It was once 53P to USD1 and 
now it is P45. The recovery is significant but it still has not recovered. There was 
also a lot of default from customers. Before the East Asian Crisis the banks 
became very aggressive with foreign currency loans. Afterwards, they couldn’t 
pay their obligations so there were a lot of foreclosures. The banks accumulated 
lots of non-performing assets. Compared to the rest of the region, the (NPLs) 
were not that bad. In the Philippines before the crisis it started with single digit 
NPLs, but it reached 16 points during the crisis but it is back now to high 6/low 7 




The East Asian Crisis exposed participants in the banking industry separating the well-
run banks from the not so well run banks. 
“Banks are reliant on the capital markets now. Previously you could suppress the 
real value of a bank. The banks were in denial. The capital market was not 
holding what was its actual worth. The financial regulators were moving towards 
a way to price assets against a mark to market system. The BSP knew what crazy 
things banks were entering into with their risk capital. Now, it depends on who 
the banks are lending to. Previously, it was lending to somebody affiliated with a 
bank. Most of the big banks are now listed and there is greater independence 
between the capital market and corporations and banks. Now the banks need to 
work more closely with the regulators.” – private sector 2 
Anecdotally, one major bank rode out the East Asian crisis as it was highly capitalised 
although its practices were suspect. This crisis became a catalyst for the bank to improve 
its corporate governance practices. For another, out of the crisis came opportunity. At 
least one large commercial bank acquired a couple of its smaller rivals during the East 
Asian crisis: 
“During the crisis, we took advantage of several opportunities. We acquired 
banks and we were aggressive in doing this during the crisis and we took 
advantage of these opportunities. Smaller companies had a hard time, and they 
merged with other companies. There were two banks that merged with [the 
bank] during the crisis.” – business group 
One outcome of the crisis was greater emphasis on the veracity of externally audited 
financial statements. The BSP sees public reporting of the financial health of banks as a 
key component in determining the quality of corporate governance in banks: 
“Financial statements audited by external auditors for [companies regulated by 
the BSP, IC and SEC] must contain documents that vouch for what is contained 
in the financial statements. The BSP requirements are quarterly statements from 
the commercial listed banks and they must be published in the newspaper. For 
the smaller rural banks postings of information within the premises and other 




Within the BSP itself, several board committees were established after the East Asian 
crisis. An audit committee was established in the latter term of former BSP Governor 
Buenaventura and there is a risk management committee at the monetary board. A 
corporate state planning committee was also established under Buenaventura. This 
committee looks at medium to long-term planning for the BSP.  
The corporate planning committee is guided by a 5-year plan with the last round being 
the period 2004-2011. Issues of corporate governance and how it is looked in the medium 
term is part of this committee’s purview. The committee presents to the monetary board 
what has been accomplished over this period such as meeting milestones, formulating 
strategies and noting the bank’s key stakeholders. Apart from supervision, other issues 
include price stability, inflation targets and financial literacy. Financial literacy amongst 
depositors is a pressing issue in the country: 
“On financial literacy, the consumers are just used to traditional deposits and 
other banking products are not well known. We promote a certain amount of 
financial literacy in coordination with the SEC, IC, an NGO called EPRA (based at 
Ateneo) on Economic and Literacy. It is an issue with the Financial Sector Forum 
and literacy starts with school children.” - BSP 
In contrast to the East Asian Crisis, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis had a more 
limited impact on the country. Some major banks had limited exposure in American 
investment bank Lehman Brothers which collapsed in 2008, however, unlike the East 
Asian Crisis, previous banking reforms in the industry (see Basel II reforms later in this 
chapter) had buffered the major companies and were in a stronger fiscal position to ride 
out this crisis (Rimando 2008). Nevertheless, the country still has some way to go with 
its banking reforms such as setting up a credit reporting facility. The lack of this facility 
is a reflection of the reluctance by companies to disclose information, a point underlined 
by one interviewee: 
“It’s an issue with pride and greed. Having a credit bureau is a practical manner. 
[The obstacles to it is] attitudinal. [There is plenty of] inquiries by foreigners but 
companies do not want to give information. There is a lack of [company] 
information.”- private sector 3 




Bank, Justin Lin, wrote a wide-ranging article for the Economist. Included was advice to 
establish a credit registry or bureau to encourage start-up businesses in developing 
countries (Lin 2009).  
5.2.5 The Rural Banks 
 
Due to their scale, scope and size, big banks can generally survive a crisis through a 
merger or acquisition. However, the effects of a crisis are magnified with smaller banks 
that are not as well-established, as large or as professional. 
The East Asian Crisis badly affected the rural banking sector which remains the bedrock 
of financing in the rural provinces of the country. As a largely agrarian society, the 
closure of rural banks has had a ripple effect in their communities. For the BSP, the 
corporate governance structure of some rural banks made them prone to unprofessional 
practices. Echoing Hutchcroft’s observation of the then unprofessional larger banks, the 
small banks are largely mired by the inherent conflict of interest of owner-borrower. 
Rural bank owners still have the propensity of treating their banks as personal piggy 
banks: 
“There are around 80 thrift banks and there are 700 rural banks. There are 11,000 
branches across the country. In terms of [banking] failure it was not caused by 
the [East Asian] crisis. The number of failures of the rural banks was due to 
governance and mismanagement. Most of the rural banks are owned by families 
and they were the operators and sometimes the borrowers. At the end of the day 
they couldn’t collect.” – BSP  
The BSP is preoccupied with proper regulation and supervision of rural banks and should 
a bank become non-operational, the exit strategy comes into play: 
“With rural banks, we follow the core principles and improve the information 
system so there’s an early warning system. If there are red flags we can take 
prompt corrective action. We try to bring the bank back to its healthy status. [If 
not], we try to make the ‘exit as orderly’ as possible. 
“So with some rural banks that are currently problematic, they are identified, 
[made to take] prompt corrective status, and [sign a] memo of understanding 




contains a list of positive measures which makes the problem bank commit to 
undertake in a timeline to improve its governance, its capital position, business 
improvement, decrease its non performing loan ratio, and reduce costs.” – BSP 
interviewee 
The BSP’s preoccupation with rural banks and how to reform is not uncommon amongst 
developing economies. Reforms requiring simple solutions to simple problems rather 
than complex solutions for the developing country context ought to be emphasised. (Lin 
2009) One private sector interviewee suggested the audit of banks can be more 
streamlined by outsourcing it to the private sector: 
“The [job of] BSP auditors can be done by the private sector so audit of banks can 
be done better. There are several thousands of rural banks and only the BSP [is 
auditing them]. [If the private sector does the audit] it would reduce some of 
them bureaucracy.” – private sector 1 
Furthermore, the GFC also exposed the continuing issue of the governance of rural 
banks: 
“The major banks are pretty sound here, although a few rural (small) banks have 
gone bust on bad loans, practices and fraud – [they are] now being exposed.” – 
private sector 2 
The reform process in the Philippine banking industry continues and has gone some way 
to address the issues that arose from the Wild West environment of Hutchcroft’s 
account. However, there is still a lot to be improved in the industry. 
5.2.6 Introducing Corporate Governance to the Banking Industry 
 
When corporate governance reforms were introduced, it was the Philippine banks that 
were first exposed to the main corporate governance reform of independent directors. 
The Philippines has a largely bank-based model of financing as the capital market is still 
underdeveloped. (see Chapter 6 on Financing).The key to introducing corporate 
governance in the country was and continues to be in the banks. Any ongoing reform in 





The regulator of the industry takes a pivotal role in ensuring corporate governance 
reforms are implemented by players. The mandate given to the BSP to oversee the 
reforms in the industry is through the General Banking Act of 2000 (or Republic Act 
8791). Emphasising corporate governance is principally due to the need to engender 
public confidence and promote disclosure: 
“We have tried to promote governance beyond banking. There is a circular which 
requested banks to give their clients, to submit documents such as audited 
financial statements.” - BSP 
Banks are required to have a corporate governance manual that operationalises and 
applies key corporate governance principles. The following bank set up a corporate 
governance committee to deal with compliance requirements: 
“[The] BSP used to audit financials but now zero-in on corporate governance 
(CG) and risk management (RM). CG and RM are now integral parts of their 
regulation. The BSP makes each of the directors attend two-day seminars to 
improve corporate governance amongst officers – corporate governance for the 
board and directors but also for officers… 
“[We have a] corporate governance committee which implements separate 
scorecards in rating how well each director observes governance principles. By 
mandate, the corporate governance committee meets and reports regularly. In 
the scorecard we rate the board of directors, rank individual directors and rate 
ourselves and the corporate governance committee. [These scorecards] evaluate 
the performance of the board, individual directors, board committee and top 
management. [It also covers] appointment of officers, and whether the bank 
adheres to ‘fit and proper’ rule mandated by BSP. As a result of the regulatory 
requirements of the BSP, we now have adopted the Corporate Governance 
Manual (2002) and a Corporate Governance Charter (2005)” - bank 1 
The corporate governance manual was subject to some revisions by the regulated banks 
to adapt it to their set of circumstance. As a result, some were challenged in trying to 
fulfil the BSP’s requirements: 
“Our first manual on corporate governance was introduced in 2003 and is 20 




manual in 2002/2003. We patterned the 2003 manual after that. However the 
model manual was mostly applicable to commercial books. In 2006, the manual 
was revised and is now 22 pages with 5-6 pages of appendices. The revisions took 
into consideration the bank’s position as a state-owned enterprise and the 
constraints involved and the set up of how we are organised and to make sure 
that the principles of corporate governance is covered by this manual. In the 
2006 Manual, there are two attachments. The first annex is the Self Assessment. 
The second annex is the rating system.” – bank 2 
“[With the manual] if the scoresheet was unacceptable to the BSP or they say it’s 
not good enough, we would ask them to give us a sample but they never did 
provide a sample. They would just say it’s too superficial.” – bank 1 
Verifying requirements, such as the self-assessment of directors, is an organisation-
specific matter allowing the bank’s board to reflect on whether corporate governance is 
being implemented effectively. Overall, there is a positive opinion of the BSP amongst 
interviewees. The banking industry is core to the private sector financing of the country 
and the regulator must be adept at noticing any defects in the system at first instance: 
“At the BSP there is a basic fact of high level of corporate governance standards.” 
– private sector 1 
However, one interviewee wanted more consultation from the regulator instead of an 
“obey or be punished” approach when introducing reforms: 
“The BSP is purely regulatory, and it is not doing their job as an administrator. 
[They say] this is the rule, follow it. We the regulated would wish they could help 
us ‘do the right thing’. The feeling in the private sector is – do the rule, follow it, 
violate it and there is a sanction. Show us the way on the rule. On corporate 
governance, we are taught the duty of obedience, follow the rules. Here is a 
street, there is no pedestrian crossing, the policeman will tell you, go to this side, 
cross here. The BSP on the other hand says do not cross here, it’s up to you to 
find the way. They know the rules. Teach us how to do it.” – bank 1 
Externally generated corporate governance reforms in the banking industry will continue 




5.2.7 The ICD and Professional Director Training 
 
The corporate governance requirement of having capable, qualified independent 
directors was implemented in the Philippines in large part due to the ICD with backing 
and support from the BSP. Indeed, the ICD is credited for having the material from 
which the BSP policymakers based its circular: 
“…there are cut and paste circulars that are issued from the BSP but which are the 
exact issuances from the ICD given to the BSP. For example, we issued a 2006 
Policy Paper in February and the BSP circular in September was an exact copy of 
our 2006 policy paper.” - ICD 
In introducing the idea of having professional qualified directors on company boards, the 
ICD understood the importance of banks in the overall private sector environment and 
financing structure of the economy. The ICD initially targeted the banks to introduce 
director training: 
“So how did we introduce corporate governance reforms? The Central Bank of 
the Philippines with a tremendous amount of goodwill for my founder 
(Estanislao was the former Chairman of the Monetary Board) it was not very 
difficult for us to mean well. They opened up to us through policy 
recommendations where we introduced certain concepts which the BSP have 
welcomed. There were circulars and we got the message across to them the 
importance of good governance.  
“Thus, the ICD had a good opportunity to train the commercial banks and 
develop the banking system. Before and after the East Asian crisis, the Filipino 
banks were not affected. They were still there before and after although there was 
some consolidation. They were not as affected because they were detached from 
the brunt of the crisis unlike Indonesia. The banks were too detached regionally 
thus they were not affected. However, that did not tell them that they had good 
governance. 
“The BSP introduced a two-day compulsory corporate governance training for 
bank directors. This strategy was aimed at bank directors because it was 




placed such a central role in the commercial industrial groups (CIGs). Once the 
banks knew, then it would filter through the rest of the CIGs. This two-day 
training in 2002 was not met happily by directors who wondered who were these 
upstarts who influenced the BSP to introduce the training. The bank directors 
had a choice of eight training providers but all chose the ICD.” – ICD 
The key support and cooperation from the BSP provided the impetus to introduce 
corporate governance reform that became a requirement in the country: 
“The Central Bank is the most advanced regulatory agency on governance and 
related issues. There is a committee group on board, the resources [in the BSP] 
are there, control is important in the sector and the law allows them want to do. 
The BSP gets things done.” -ICD 
“We require banks to undergo a two-day orientation in corporate governance. 
The first day is on concepts and principles of corporate governance. The second 
day is on risk management. The BSP developed certain accreditation guidelines 
to train the directors.” – BSP  
The standards for a bank directorship have now improved due to the professional 
training required for this position. A bank directorship also carries with a ‘fit and proper’ 
rule for the candidates, which is not required in other industries: 
“There is a ‘fit and proper rule’ which has a list of qualifications and 
disqualifications for a banking director that was articulated in the General 
Banking Act of 2000. Prior to that when bank directors were elected, senior vice 
presidents and over have to be confirmed by the [BSP] Monetary Board 
processes. One had to show that age limits were being met: 21 years of age for an 
officer, 25 years of age for bank president. One has to possess none of the 
disqualification and not be temporarily suspended. Furthermore delinquencies 
should not be found….Director and officers must meet the fit and proper rule or 
they get disqualified. Banks must have compliance officers to ensure that banks 
are meeting their director requirements. The two-day corporate governance 
seminar is but to whet their appetites. Then it’s left to [the banks] to identify the 
gaps – all the way down the organisation ladder. That’s enough to assess the 




“In corporate governance, to be a director of bank, the BSP will check you first 
according to the fit and proper rule. They will do a criminal check on you. The 
SEC won’t do a check on [a director of] an ordinary corporation but the BSP does 
due to the special nature of fiduciary [responsibilities] of a financial institution.” 
– private sector 2 
The training of bank directors has also seen the banks being the first to host 
independent directors or have independent directors sit on company bank boards in 
excess of the legislated requirement: 
“The ICD promoted corporate governance in banks with the BSP requiring 
directors to go through a corporate governance seminar. More independent 
directors have joined the banks - mostly in the banks.” – private sector 3 
However, one bank director was dissatisfied with the current training requirements and 
other corporate governance mandates, recommending these reforms be far more explicit 
and wide-reaching: 
“One has to evaluate the performance of the board, individual directors, board 
committees, top management, the appointment of officers, and that the bank 
adheres to ‘fit and proper’ rule mandated by BSP. There was the BSP requirement 
which meant completing a two-day seminar to be a director. The BSP required all 
bank directors to attend the day seminar and it was accredited by them. For 
corporate governance, initial steps have been taken, something more should be 
down so corporate governance filters to other family businesses. Family-owned 
organisations observe BSP rules but not corporate governance. When I lecture 
before them, it’s [corporate governance] all Greek to them. They do not know the 
liabilities of directors. The BSP makes each of the directors attend two-day 
seminar to improve corporate governance amongst officers – corporate 
governance for the board and directors but also for officers. We require more 
materials such as publications, reading materials. The SEC has a Code of 
Corporate Governance but is addressed only to listed corporations. But all 
corporations, whether they are listed or unlisted, open or closed, should have the 
Code applied to them. Somebody should be in charge e.g. the ICD. How about 





Professional director training in companies is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
country and there remains some resistance to this requirement. However the benefits of 
having a professional director are now being recognised. 
5.2.8 Basel II Standards 
 
Aside from the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance that have become – through a 
combination of coercive and mimetic isomorphism –operationalised in the country, the 
BSP follows closely the comprehensive 2006 Basel II Framework on capital standards37
The standards are overseen by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) located in 
Basel, Switzerland. For the BSP and other central banks in the world, compliance and 
implementation of Basel II are a main preoccupation. There are three pillars underlying 
Basel II: minimal capital requirements and calculation of risks for the financial 
institution in concern; the supervisory review process undertaken by the Central Bank 
and the third pillar of market discipline. How to implement mutually agreed upon global 
standards locally are done step-by-step with the standards providing guidance to the BSP 
in terms of which aspects of the banking system require monitoring: 
 
which are specific to the banking industry. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis, the framework lays out the “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards” (BIS 2009a) which seeks “to align regulatory capital 
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face.” (BIS 2009B) 
“There has been a marked improvement of risk management in the banks. The 
emphasis in supervision is we’ve changed our conduct of bank supervision. We 
follow the principles issued by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. We 
are following a risk-based approach and looking at the strength of risk 
management. We look at processes, the effectiveness of internal audit, and the 
compliance function rather than focusing on transaction. We look at compliance 
but this is secondary to processes and accreditation is part of the training 
process.” - BSP 
The early implementation of these reforms has generally improved the capital positions 
of Philippines bank. The Basel II reforms are also indicative of how the banking 
                                                     
37A list of the BSP’s implementation of the Basel II reforms can be found in the following page: 




regulation in the country will be shaped in the future: 
“With corporate governance we have kicked-off with the OECD requirements 
[and then] for risk-based capital adequacy of Basel II.” – SEC II 
A key element of the Basel II is the application of these reforms to the different types of 
corporate structures. In the case of the Philippines, the country’s private sector is largely 
dominated by diversified business groups with a bank at the core of the group’s 
operations (see Chapter 6). The applicability and scope of the Basel II framework to 
complex structures is illustrated by the following illustrated excerpt: 





With reference to corporate governance within Basel II, risk management is largely seen 
as part of senior management’s responsibilities. (BIS 2009a: 97-98) 
5.2.9 BSP and Currency Circulation 
 
Apart from banking supervision, there is another pressing issue for the regulator. For the 
BSP, there exist practical problems with the circulation and lifespan of the currency 
which are related to current social and geopolitical issues.  
Philippine bills are frequently substituted for paper with notes being heavily marked 
during the course of its life. The BSP is keen to promote a ‘clean note policy’: 
“The problem with Filipino bills is people like to mark and draw on the bills. We 
want to promote this policy so that they don’t write and draw on it, and take care 
of it. It’s difficult because in public markets, especially the wet markets, the 
lifespan of a bill and note is shortened. It doesn’t happen in groceries. In Manila, 
the note tends to have a longer life. But in the provinces, when used in the public 
market, for fish or meat, when the currency gets wet, the bills don’t last long.” -
BSP 
The other issue is the metal coins in circulation. The coins are melted and used in the 
ongoing separatist warfare being conducted in parts of the Mindanao region, and 
curiously enough, as substitutes in Japanese casinos: 
“Should we promote metal coins [in lieu of clean notes]? The metal coins are 
expensive to produce. With the coins, people tend to hoard it hence we are 
promoting their return to public circulation. The 10 peso coin has different 
metals in the inner and outer ring. Hence, we have a coin drive to retrieve the 
coins. In Mindanao, the 10 peso coins are used for bullet casings. In Japan, they 
are being used as casino chips.”-BSP 
Similar to other corporate governance regulators, for the BSP responsibilities of market 
supervision are tempered by the reality of dealing with the particularities of the daily 
issues of the country. 
5.3 Securities and Exchange Commission 
 




private sector of the country. Based on the US equivalent and founded in 1936 during the 
American colonial era, the regulator was reorganised in 2000 and has around 500 
employees. The SEC’s powers and responsibilities of oversight are set out in the 
Securities Regulation Code (SRC) or Republic Act 8799 (SEC 2009b). The SEC’s mission 
is “to strengthen the corporate and capital market infrastructure of the Philippines, and 
to maintain a regulatory system based on international best standards and practices that 
promote the interests of investors in a free, fair and competitive business 
environment.”38
5.3.1 SEC Corporate Governance Code of 2002 
 (SEC 2009) 
 
Introducing corporate governance reforms is part of the SEC’s mission to incorporate 
international best standards and practices. The main thrust of these reforms is codified 
in the SEC Code of Corporate Governance of 2002. (SEC 2009c) This Code was 
established with advice from stakeholders and modelled after the OECD 1999 Principles: 
“The new Code for the SEC SRC came into 2001 with implementing rules and 
regulations. We were preoccupied with the new rules in place. [At the same time] 
corporate governance became a beginning trend. The former SEC 
ChairwomanBautista, picked up the idea from attending conferences and when 
she came back we started working on it. Bautista is now an independent director 
of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and RFM which is owned by the Concepcion 
Family.” – SEC I 
“The SEC was taking best practices from all over the place Malaysia, Singapore 
and other environments and was not tailored after the USA SOX as SOX came 
after Circular II. The SEC circular was in April 2002, SOX came in July 2002. The 
IIA was involved into drafting the circular. It was asked to participate by giving 
input in the financialisation aspects of the draft such as internal control, internal 
auditors.”- IIA 
Corporate governance reforms were part of a wave that swept the world in the early 
2000s in the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis and the collapses of Enron and Parmalat. 
For the SEC, awareness of what was happening in the region made it realise that sooner, 
rather than later, the regulator needed to start incorporating these reforms as well. The 
                                                     




realisation on how corporate governance was going to affect the regulator and the 
regulated and the momentum this generated: 
“The awareness of corporate governance at this point is at a level at which it is 
not yet at the level of which we could be. Given a range between 1 (low) to 5 (high 
awareness) the level would be up to 4 in which we would in effect have greater 
acceptance. We have information now and there is the emotion of urgency and 
that desire to be able to move [corporate governance] along. The time of 
awareness was from 1997-1999. There was awareness in the capital market which 
confused a lot. [Corporate governance] created confusion because [the market] 
was not sure what they were being made aware of…[eventually] we were made 
aware of it.” –SEC II 
Introducing the reforms by the SEC was made with some trepidation and not without 
controversy. For the SEC, last minute injunctions against the Code’s introduction were 
being anticipated. However, the regulator believed in the effectiveness of the reforms as 
a matter of ethics and competition: 
“When we first started making forays into corporate governance, we were 
waiting for a group of lawyers to take the SEC to the Supreme Court to stop us 
from instituting corporate governance but they haven’t done so. We knew 
though that if the suit went ahead, how can the Supreme Court decide against 
us? How can they rule against ethics? We cannot leave Philippine corporations 
uncompetitive. If the Supreme Court ruled against it, we can always require the 
PSE to do so because the PSE has listed companies and the listed ones comply.”- 
SEC I 
The application of a largely Western concept has also been localised with a value-based 
approach paralleling the religious observations of the country: 
“[Governance] is not a novel contrivance to make our lives more complex. What 
is transparency and accurate disclosure but the commandment Thou shalt not 
lie? What is shareholder value but the commandment 'Thou shalt not steal?'” 
SEC Commissioner Cueto in Estopace (2007) 
The Code covers the responsibilities of the company board and management, 




rights. The Code covers the majority of large private sector participants: 
“We regulate listed corporations. The Corporate Governance Code covers public 
corporations (registered issuers; companies with more than P50M in assets; those 
with more than 200 shareholders each one holding 100 shares each) those 
unlisted but come under securities regulations. For the bulk of corporate 
registrants, we only supervise them in that they have to submit general 
information sheets and audited financial statements. With listed companies we 
cover those on the PSE (around 240), 35 public corporations and 41 mutual funds 
(registered issuers). Secondary licensees are covered by the Code. The Code of 
Corporate Governance governs them.” – SEC I 
“[The SEC Code] has oversight depending on the size of companies. Not all 
companies have audit committees. Big listed corporations, public companies with 
big shareholders base, 200 members with 100 shares totalling P50M are required 
to have audit committees and are subject to the same circular…but partnerships 
are not covered.” – IIA 
Similar to the seminars for banking directors (see previous section on BSP in this 
Chapter), the SEC also requires company directors to undertake some formal corporate 
governance training: 
“There is a corporate governance seminar everyone has to undertake when every 
director is appointed. It came in as it’s a requisite of the SEC. For the SEC it’s all 
directors. The seminar is a bit light compared to [other courses I have taken in 
other countries].”-private sector 1 
For one interviewee, he would like to see the Code applied to other private sector 
entities: 
“The SEC has a Code of Corporate Governance but it is addressed only to listed 
corporations. But all corporations, whether they are listed or unlisted, open or 
closed, should have the Code applied to them. Somebody should be in charge [of 
implementing the Code] such as the ICD. How about [applying the Code to] 
small companies? The SEC could observe them.” – private sector 2 




the Code is a form of a black letter law: 
“We [hope we can] get to amend the Corporation Code a lot faster…we are 
waiting for Congress to resolve it. We will try our best with amendments which 
includes a recommendation relating to corporate governance. In the Securities 
Code [one amendment would have] more independent directors and the ‘fit and 
proper rule’ for directors to be institutionalised in basic law.” – SEC I 
Having a rules-based approach on independent directors reflects this as the most 
controversial corporate governance reform and a source of tension in the country (see 
Chapter 7, section on Independent Directors). For Philippine corporations, opening the 
board to outsiders and introducing independent directors needed a sledge-hammer 
approach from the regulator. 
5.3.2 Corporate Governance Manual 
 
Companies covered by the Code are required to adopt a corporate governance manual. 
For companies that fail to produce a manual, financial penalties apply. The penalties are 
there to encourage companies to take up and formalise corporate governance processes 
within their organisations: 
“The SEC issued the Code of Corporate Governance more for diagnostic 
purposes. Then we came out with the Model Manual of Corporate Governance 
which was based on the Code. But the SEC’s intention to make the available 
model, look at them, look at the principles and practices and apply to them 
(companies) to make adjustment as not all corporations have the same situation. 
Instead of going over the manual, we simply compare it with the text of the 
manual. If we find there are inadequacies, we ask them to make the necessary 
adjustments and file the new manual with us. On the certification of the 
compliance officer, the Philippines is like other countries, changes can be made 
in the manual of corporate governance. The corporate governance manual should 
not be static due to the changing business environment. If there are deviations 
from the manual, the companies must explain to us why. If in practice the 





Companies I interviewed generally spoke about operationalising the requirements and 
compliance with the manual (specific issues over the manual’s requirements are set out 
in Chapter 7 on Independent Directors): 
“Yes. The company has created a code of conduct for all employees. It has also set 
up various board committees composed of board members, such as an audit, 
compensation, nominations, and investor relations committees. The company 
also has two independent directors in its board. Under the manual of corporate 
governance of the company, an independent director must be a member of the 
audit, compensation and nomination committees.” – private sector 1 
Adoption of the manual emphasised the board committee structure (see also Chapter 7 
on Board Committees) with some companies creating committees not then in place: 
“In 2002, Benpres adopted a Manual of Corporate Governance which was made 
mandatory by the SEC. Pursuant to the Manual of Corporate Governance, the 
following were undertaken: 
• two (2) independent directors were elected; 
• an Audit Committee was created; 
• a Nomination Committee was created; 
• a Compensation and Remunerations Committee was created; and  
• a Code of Corporate Conduct was adopted.” – Benpres 
For one company in particular, behaviour of employees rather than operational issues is 
reflected in their manual: 
“The manual of corporate governance is on how to behave, to do things such as 
not to cheat customers.” – private sector 2 




Besides periodic financial statements, assessing the disclosure of material information 




“It is not enough to have disclosures in periodic reports for selected companies. 
When the SEC feels they require to submit more certification [for directorships], 
directors do so under oath so they are [reluctant to falsify their qualifications] 
before they exclude certain allowances… 
Disclosure is part of the corporate governance tenet of transparency: 
“So how do we enforce corporate governance? Through disclosures. Transparency 
is a sign of good corporate governance. Here we have our own disclosure 
requirements. The PSE has their own within minutes. Here with the SEC it’s 
within 5 days. However, most companies, when they submit information to the 
PSE, they also cc the SEC. But it is not sufficient. You have to personally file. It 
needs to be disclosed as part of disclosure practices…we encourage companies to 
disclose timely information [if they don’t] there is a scale of penalties.” – SEC I 
For one company at least, a disclosure-ready culture to comply with regulations has 
become operationalised: 
“[We disclose] on a regular basis with media releases. This is also in accordance 
with the SEC. We need to submit our accounts to the SEC, the annual report 
lodged with the SEC, copies to the media and all to the shareholders. There is not 
a lot of contact with PSE much. We make regular disclosures.” – private sector 1 
However, compliance with the new culture that emphasises disclosure means reams of 
paperwork are generated. This is not an easy task for the SEC nor for the companies it 
regulates: 
“We analyse annual reports, quarterly reports, information statements, beneficial 
ownership reports. The most difficult would be annual reports. They are reviewed 
preferentially to information sheets. We require distribution of these sheets 15 
days before the annual general meeting.” – SEC I 
“We wanted the SEC to revisit the evaluation form in public companies. The 
ICD’s helping develop a more practical evaluation system. The SEC has 99 items 
for the peer evaluation form with a coverage of 13 pages. It is too much, too 
many, too petty.” – private sector 2 




rubric of compliance and its associated costs. To my interviewee, corporate governance 
is burdensome to small businesses like him: 
“Why did I say corporate governance is a pain in the ass on the phone? In the 
Philippines we’re being made to do this, to write manuals on corporate 
governance, try to fulfil what we’re talking about. We also have to report that the 
manual corporate governance is up to date. They make a lot of fuss about it. So 
it’s a pain in the neck doing all these things. A large organisation would have 
times for all of this. There’s no problem for them, they can tell one department to 
do this for them, tell them what to do. Here, our company is small. It only has 20 
employees. All of my employees are doing things, doing their jobs during the day. 
Attending to corporate governance is a pain in the neck.” – small company 
Creating a more transparent business environment has brought its challenges: the 
regulated must adjust to the new requirements and equally the SEC has to be ready for 
the information generated. Corporate governance as compliance has emphasised 
disclosure of information at its heart. Creating a culture where there is “a regime of 
disclosure” in a largely insider business environment is an ongoing process. 
While ensuring companies have incorporated corporate governance reforms is now a 
responsibility for the regulator, the main activity of SEC remains its monitoring and 
supervisory role. The SEC is expected intervene in the market when waves of Ponzi-like 
schemes come and go, and keeping a watchful eye on the PSE, the capital market 
regulator. The next sections look at these responsibilities in detail.  
5.3.4 Monitoring Companies: The Pre-Need Industry 
 
During my fieldwork, some interviewees questioned the effectiveness of the regulator 
and the problems of the pre-need industry. The pre-need industry is under the 
regulatory oversight of the SEC although its products are arguably close to insurance: 
“a pre-need company is a SEC registered corporation which sells preneed plans 
that are essentially contracts or agreements that provide for the performance of 
future services, payment of monetary considerations at the time of actual need or 
agreed maturity.”(Espenilla 2006: 138-139)  




“Thank God the bomb over pre-need didn’t go off.” – SEC II 
Popular pre-need products relate to educational or college plans. As befitting a culture 
that prizes education and the rewards that come with being educated, such plans were 
popular with overseas Filipino workers (OFWs): 
“What has become big which are neither listed nor registered issuers cover 
mostly schools, universities and hospitals. Hospitals would issue their shares to 
medical practitioners. Private schools would issue shares to employees, teachers 
and students. Pre-need companies issue educational plans, memorial plans and 
they have become problematic. These pre need companies sell educational plans. 
After a person or family has bought these plans they expect to have the money 
from these plans when the time comes to fund high school or college education. 
You know how Filipinos are. They would sell their carabao or the farm to fund 
education. Some have become OFWs so they can send their kids to school. They 
[OFWs] purchase pre-need plans, then come college or school time the money’s 
not there.” – SEC I 
Some operators saw the money flowing into the industry as an opportunity to exploit 
these aspirations and the pre-need industry nearly collapsed (Rimando 2008). The role of 
the SEC came under scrutiny and there were questions whether the plans were insurance 
products and therefore under the oversight of the Insurance Commission: 
“[The modus operandi of] the pre-need companies were “give me X amount for 
young child’s education so when it comes to college, I’ll pay for the college 
tuition.” The Department of Education removed the [ceiling] controls on tuition 
fees. [The companies] continued to sell plans [and it became a] pyramid scheme. 
They were not [seen as] insurance products and were only regulated by the SEC. 
[So you have a] financial institution selling a promise but t was not regulated by 
the Insurance Commission. [These companies were] selling securities to poor 
Filipino families. There’s something defective with the law to begin with when 
[pre-need companies] are not under the Insurance Commission.” – private sector 
1 
Another academic interviewee pinpointed the problems of the industry to the new 




changed the profit valuation of the companies. For many of his colleagues who 
participated in the plans, the industry’s near-collapse was personal: 
“The BSP specifically has introduced structural, better guidelines in terms of 
disclosures. This is why the College Assurance Plan (CAP) suddenly became 
unprofitable and its P3B net worth becoming negative by at least P1B due to the 
BSP requirements of international accounting standards. The valuation became 
different. It was due to the constant thing to the change on the way we returned 
and the change on financial statements. [We are] moving towards the IAS – 
which turned the direct product from a profit into a loss. It’s all about proving 
[the companies] are able to pay for college [but not being] able to anticipate the 
increase of tuition fees. [They say it is] not responsible to forecast [that increase] 
as it’s a very good plan.” – academic 
Global convergence of financial reporting has its drawbacks. Issues over valuation soon 
saw the industry and regulator on opposing sides of the debate with the regulator trying 
to regulate the industry so it could meet international standards, while the private sector 
found itself in the red almost overnight: 
“They blame each other; CAP blames the SEC for being unreasonable to adjust 
the way of reporting. The SEC says it’s just doing their job, this is the right thing. 
By changing the way reporting is done you turn the P1B profit into a loss. With all 
monies made, it’s a set of really to trying to be on par with the rest of the world. 
Why are they (SEC) doing this? Whether CAP failed because of corporate 
governance but is government about this? Raising awareness? Has the 
government done something differently? They’ve changed the rules so the rules 
are friendlier to corporate governance.”- academic 
For the SEC, recognising the relative merits of the product and distinguishing it from 
other insurance products remain at the core issue over the near-collapse of the industry. 
The pre-need educational plans have a predictable maturity, akin to a term deposit: 
“In the pre-need industry they were using an insurance calculation with the 
exception of the life plan - that’s why you buy an insurance industry product. In 
education there is no catastrophic event. You know exactly when you’ll be 




load mark-to-market plan. [The problems arise if] 15 years down the line [the 
consumer] couldn’t claim. That was all in the use of regulation.” – SEC II 
Thus for the SEC, enforcing international accounting standards has had unintended 
consequences for one industry and the millions of lives affected by this one sector in the 
country. 
5.3.5 Oversight of PSE 
 
The SEC has the core supervisory role over the capital market regulator, the PSE, and 
other entities that have demutualised: 
“We also cover Manulife and Sunlife which listed on the PSE because they 
demutualised so Filipino shareholders do not have to dispose their shares and 
trade in an overseas market like Canada. They can instead sell their shares on the 
PSE. The trend is for Asian countries to promote cross-border trading.” – SEC I 
Unlike the two Canadian insurance companies above, the PSE demutualised to 
decentralise the power of the stockbrokers over the exchange. The PSE has undergone its 
own set of corporate governance reforms (as the section on the PSE in this chapter 
shows). Like other stock exchanges around the world which have demutualised, an 
inherent or perceived conflict of interest exists when the capital market regulator is 
listed on its own exchange39
“…[the PSE is] a self-regulatory organisation [and the onus is on them to act] 
especially over what you think is right. Don’t cross [that line or perception] or 
you [will get hit] with the kitchen sink.” – SEC II 
: 
The Latin saying quis custodiet ipsos custodes (or who guards the guardians) 
characterises the relationship between the SEC and PSE. Corporate governance reforms 
within the PSE are a work in progress and the SEC has oversight that these reforms are 
taking place. As the entity in question is the capital market regulator, the approach has a 
more sensitive turn. For the SEC, their oversight includes ensuring the once broker-
dominated exchange has progressively reduced its ownership stake in the PSE. This can 
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be seen through the enforcement of minimum requirements for outside director 
representation on the board of the PSE.  
The make-up of the PSE board is an important signal to the market that the exchange is 
becoming more independent from its broker origins. At the ICD Annual Dinner, the 
Chair of the PSE stated: 
“Eight out of 15 members of the PSE board of directors are non brokers. Three of 
the eight are independent directors. The Chair and President are non-brokers. 
47% of ownership still with brokers but moves to get it down to 20%.” – Vitug, 
PSE Chair. 
These reforms continue to be a struggle and opposed by some brokers who are protective 
of the status quo. The issue of board seats is reflective of the PSE’s ownership 
composition. In 2007, the SEC penalised the PSE for non-compliance with the reforms 
that required the broker ownership composition be reduced to 20%. The SEC penalties 
are evidence of the PSE’s internal battles. Noncompliance by owners, rather than the lack 
of enforcement by managers is the issue. (Rubio 2007b) 
For the SEC, ensuring a well-governed PSE is a matter of investor confidence, market 
integrity and public credibility. For the PSE, the professional managers of the exchange 
are hampered by the wishes of the owners who are reluctant to have any further reform 
that dilutes their power. Who owns, controls. 
5.3.6 Resource Issues affecting Monitoring 
 
The ability of the SEC to regulate and to monitor the companies it oversees was an issue 
with some of my interviewees. Like most other government bodies, the resource 
deficiencies are well-known. Constrained internally and pressured externally, all 
regulatory institutions such as the SEC need to work within these limitations. As my ICD 
interviewee explained, the availability of technical and human resources impact the 
ability of the regulator to regulate: 
“We deal with heads of institutions. They fully subscribe to corporate governance 
principles. But there are issues: 




• there are staffing and resource issues which are challenging for them 
• the SEC is committed to governance reform but they need help from us  
“The intentions are genuine and they are there. There are certain interferences from 
above (government/politics) that muddle the issues. The pressures are exerted. 
These pressures with the lack of resources and lack of capacity – the good intentions 
are not enough. Where would the good intentions bring me? Against this is the SEC 
deals with a heterogeneous group of corporations with complexities on governance 
issues. For example, what to do with holdings and manufactures? The commitment is 
the same as the BSP but the BSP gets things done.”- ICD 
The reorganisation of the SEC in the early years of the 2000s saw a reduction in the 
personnel. The resource issue within the SEC comes down to the matter of personnel – 
both in terms of quantity and quality.  
“We are struggling with monitoring the information sheets and audited financial 
statements. A department of 30 people is in charge of monitoring listed 
companies, registered issuers, and financing companies of which there are 
around 800. We do have resource issues. There always not enough staff.” –SEC I  
There is an overwhelming amount of information that is required to be processed and 
analysed by a small team: 
“We have a core of 13 people – 5 CPAs and 8 people who regulate closely the 
financial reports. There are 13 people covering 500 corporate entities. To solve the 
resource issue we have asked HR to increase the number of people. In 2000, 
when the SEC got reorganised, there were plans for not too many people as there 
will be automation soon in the SEC. [7 years later, we are still waiting]. We hoped 
that ordinary corporations could file their reports via online. It should have been 
in place by April 15 but the SEC wasn’t ready. Hopefully, this will be done next 
year. Our capability is not sufficient so [companies] are still filing with us hard 
copies.” – SEC I 
As one interviewee wryly pointed out: 
“The SEC does not have much people monitoring compliance.” – private sector 1 




undermines its effectiveness and ability to enforce existing regulations. 
5.3.6.1 Coordinating the IT infrastructure  
When I first entered the SEC, I saw queues of people waiting to file their papers. The 
delays in more electronic ways of filing company information and automating are a 
whole of government issue. This is the IT infrastructure issue that confronts the SEC and 
the rest of government machinery. Different arms of the government bureaucracy have 
their own databases and linking them up to have a more streamlined and centralised 
form of connectivity is a challenge: 
“There are some 500,000 companies. We need to have the databases linked such 
as having a single TIN (tax information number). It is not taking the reach off 
point yet. A central hub database is not just an information exercise. The hub 
needs to be able to talk to each other.” – SEC II 
To aid enforcement, some suggested there be technological harmonisation of company 
databases and information so this would provide a central point for all regulators to 
ensure the same information was being filed with them. This would cut duplication and 
administration barriers in the process: 
“With the SEC, you could have a database of companies, financial statements. But 
we’re talking to deaf ears. For PSE listed companies you could do that with the 
SEC and reduce some of the bureaucracy. The people in agencies BSP, SEC, IC 
can think about [harmonisation].” – private sector 1 
Technology, while an attractive option is no silver bullet. Problems of security over 
personal records and abuse of confidentiality are major stumbling blocks. The possibility 
of crime syndicates accessing and manipulating the information was brought up by one 
interviewee: 
“For example, [you could] introduce technology across industries. In Australia, 
you have the tax file number – here there is no utilisation of tax file number, no 
utilisation of a social security number. They’ll not consent as these different 
institutions can give the above numbers to the banking industry. It could be done 
but it is hard to sell. The real reason may be to hide. If you had a common 
system, how do you keep it secure? There are syndicates that go in there. Bring in 




The computer languages of the databases of the different government bureaucracies are 
also different. This leads to frustration but is symptomatic of the unwillingness of 
agencies to coordinate and cooperate: 
“[At the] bidding stage the computer languages are different. Sun/Solaris – who 
else is using Solaris these days? Our [computer] language is not the language of 
BIR, Customs. If we put up a hub it may become the Tower of Babel. Maybe when 
you can cross- check and link it with the Department of Trade and Industry and 
tell us the company with the business name, registration of names  [I asked him 
about trademark and copyright violations]…There is the CICT. It is the Cabinet 
Office in Charge of Technology. There is a strong reformer at GSIS [discussion on 
how Winston Garcia managed to computerise the systems at GSIS]. But it’s just 
information and retrieval. It’s interactive here. We need one that stores and 
retrieves…[however] we have bit off more than we can chew. We have a 
computer system that is a Ferrari on a barangay (rural) road.” – SEC II 
My interviewee’s last comment of having a top of the range computer system but not 
having the basic infrastructure (e.g. such as reliable power supply) to run it reflects the 
simultaneous aspirations and disappointments of the task in improving the country. 
5.3.6.2 Attracting the Best and Brightest 
Aside from databases that need to be networked, are adequate and practical, another 
interviewee pointed out the Philippine public service needs to attract the best and 
brightest. Excluding the BSP’s fiscal independence, the remuneration in government is a 
strong deterrent in attracting la crème de la crème. The SEC’s situation is no exception: 
“[The SEC is] constrained by resources. Specifically in the government sector [a 
main constraint is] the ability to retain and attract people. The regulator has to 
understand everything that is happening in industry. The compensation is a 
small fraction compared to the private sector. The problem recurs throughout 
the bureaucracy.” – academic  
Enthusiasm for selfless public service can only be sustained for a limited amount of time 
before reasons of pragmatism and materialism rule out such idealism: 
“At the SEC, joining the government is a sacrifice to some professionals. To 




SEC but you don’t find the bright lawyers joining government. There is a strong 
pull of getting material things. The pay scale in government is below and only a 
few would join out of passion and commitment. The challenge for the SEC is to 
[attract staff from other] organisations. During Chairman Bautista’s time, she 
initiated to increase the pay scales but in general, in order to get good 
professionals the [SEC] should provide better pay scales.” – private sector  
In a land of poverty, a more satisfying career in a functional private sector than a 
dysfunctional private sector is no choice at all. I further discussed with this interviewee 
the differences in resources and appearance between the BSP and SEC. At one point he 
mentioned the dreams of a centralised government city along the lines of Washington 
DC or Canberra in a post-independent Philippines that has long since vanished: 
“During Filipino independence, there were vast tracts of land in Quezon City that 
was destined for all government institutions. [Progressively, the lands] have been 
sold out, there are some few agencies but the original vision has totally 
disappeared” – private sector  
Nevertheless, the slow move towards professionalisation in the regulator is an 
encouraging sign: 
“One of the things that happened was the SEC was moving in the direction of 
professionalisation and the PSE is moving in that direction. [Having] more 
[professionals] strengthens the state. They strengthen the autonomy of the state 
and they fill the professional base of the SEC and PSE. You need to do that.” – 
academic  
To attract quality public sector candidates requires remuneration consummerate with 
their responsibilities; incentives (including intangibles such as the prestigious nature of 
the post) which would deter any temptation to use positions for personal gain; and the 
recognition that serving the country is not necessarily a sacrifice but a worthwhile 
service. 
5.3.7 Private Sector Opinion 
 
Despite the financial shenanigans the SEC has to deal with and the rocky 




interviewees were positive in their assessment of the agency. Given the resource 
constraints it has, some interviewees held the SEC in utmost esteem: 
“The SEC is a very effective corporation. I like the SEC. It is one government 
corporation that is doing its job very seriously. It is run very well, it is very good.” 
– private sector 1 
“The SEC is one of the best run government agencies, they are very professional” 
– private sector 2 
“[Are] the SEC and the PSE effective? I guess so. Certainly the SEC is one of the 
better GOCCs [government-owned and controlled corporations] but it’s still 
operating as a government agency.” – private sector 3 
While others, who were not as glowingly positive about the SEC, nevertheless 
acknowledged that there was some improvement: 
“The SEC has improved a lot.” – lobby group 
“The SEC is much more efficient now than before..If only regulators can be 
promoters so implementation can be done so we can have a private sector. But 
are they willing to let go? [But the attitude is] what’s in it for me?” –private sector 
4 
One interviewee pointed out the SEC’s improvement was a reflection of the external 
pressures it has faced – that a strong private sector does require a strong regulator: 
“[The SEC’s] improved for example with having to change to being stricter with 
the [accounting] rules. [They’re] changing per se, [and the SEC’s action over] CAP 
[which was] hit by it. [We] have higher expectations and begging ourselves not to 
be last if the goal is not to be last in terms of corruption not just in government 
but in corporate corruption as well. The Scandinavians are more ethical.” – 
academic 
For interviewees who were vehement in their criticism of the SEC, the agency’s 
monitoring oversight was again pinpointed as its weakness. One company had an issue 
with trademark violations and this was linked to the duplication of responsibilities in 




“Here in the Philippines, we are a well-established corporation. The big issue for 
us is our Blue Cross Logo that we have. It is registered under the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) and the SEC. That’s two agencies with the SEC for the 
trademark. We guard our Blue Cross trademark jealously. You can now check 
online and see how many people use Blue Cross. There are 25 organisations that 
have Blue Cross as their trademark on the SEC database. You’re allowed to do 
that as long as it’s not in a related industry. 
“…There are quite a few trademarks of Blue Crosses in the industry that has been 
registered. The registration of our trademark was all prior to them. So when is 
the monitoring of the trademark done? How does the SEC and the DTI put into 
place the monitoring of this? Is it system driven? You do a DTI search and you 
get all the names of companies that use our trademark. Why do you allow 
registration in a related industry but tell us that you shouldn’t?” – Blue Cross 
In 2007, a case of conflict between the majority and minority owners of a listed company 
played out in the public press.  
“PRCI is a family corporation masquerading as a publicly listed company. We 
have a Manual of Corporate Governance which the SEC requires of all publicly 
listed companies after the Enron scandal in the States, but it is honoured more in 
the breach than its observance. There is no real corporate governance. It's all lip 
service. That's why we believe the SEC should come up with measures to strictly 
monitor and enforce the compliance of publicly listed companies with the Code 
of Corporate Governance. Otherwise, it's not even worth the paper it's written on 
and we might as well do away with it.”- Arnaldo (2007) 
This case exposed – again - the weak enforcement of corporate governance regulations, 
but this time in the area of protecting the rights of minority shareholders. I did contact 
the company in question, PRCI, if they wished to discuss their corporate governance 
practices but my request went unanswered. 
5.3.8 Future of Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
For the SEC, as the main regulator of corporations, it has a challenging task ahead in 




“For the future of the SEC, it would be the same but fully implementing the 
practice of good corporate governance. It may be difficult but we are committed 
to make sure listed companies get funding from the public and they follow the 
principles and practice of good corporate governance.” – SEC I 
Additionally, the reputation of the country’s legal system means another way to settle 
commercial disputes could be in the offing: 
“[I would like to see the SEC have] quasi-judicial powers to deal with intra-
corporate disputes instead of giving it to the normal courts. It’s an argument of 
expertise. The courts can’t have that aspect of trust. In corporate courts the 
judges come as fine, fiscally-aware former clerks. The orientation [of knowledge 
on commercial matters] is still at a minimum and there is not much awareness 
that’s why there are a lot of revoked corporations. If you don’t file in the next 5 
years, the [companies] get revoked. The orientation is not there.” – SEC II 
Overall, the SEC sees the future of corporate governance as being more formalised or 
codified in law. In an optimistic best-case scenario, corporate governance practice will be 
part and parcel of doing business in the Philippines: 
“We still have a long way to go but we are trying our best to comply. In 10, 15 
years (and that would be an optimistic time line) we will able to make corporate 
governance a way of life for all corporations.” – SEC I 
The resource constraints, the multivaried responsibilities of the SEC and the country’s 
developing economy environment can only ameliorate the agency’s supervisory duties: 
“It will take a long time to do what needs to be done properly. How do you 
implement corporate governance in a country where the majority of people work 
in an informal environment is substantially cash based? How do you introduce 
corporate governance? How do you get small family-owned corporations to even 
consider these issues? It is also a substantially rural-based economy. In the 
provinces it’s all cash. How do you get the SEC to issues operational reports? It’s 
almost impossible to regulate and monitor corporations. Browsing through the 
SEC, two-thirds of corporations don’t renew themselves. It would take sheer 




In this sense, corporate governance reforms in the country must be considered in 
context. For the SEC, corporate governance remains a work in progress. As the real 
economy grows, there will be increased pressures placed on the SEC to substantially 
improve its regulatory capacity. 
5.4 Philippine Stock Exchange 
 
The Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) is the capital market regulator in the country and is 
supervised by the SEC. (PSE 2009b) Out of all four regulators in this chapter, only the 
PSE is a non-governmental organisation and is designated a self-regulatory organisation 
(SRO). The PSE has oversight of nearly 250 listed companies (WFE 2009a: 29). The PSE is 
a member of the World Federation of Exchanges which is an association comprising of 53 
regulated exchanges globally (WFE 2009b).  
5.4.1 History 
 
The PSE is the result of the amalgamation between two rival bourses: the Manila Stock 
Exchange and the Makati Stock Exchange. The Manila exchange is located in Ortigas, 
while the Makati exchange is located in the Makati CBD.  
During my visit to the Manila exchange, a memory plaque stated the Manila exchange 
was established during the American colonial rule on the 8 August 1927. The founding 
members were five Americans: WPG Elliott, Erick W. Little, Gordon W. Mackay, John J. 
Russell and Frank W. Wakefield. The Makati Stock Exchange was established in 1963. In 
1992, both bourses were forcibly unified and in 1998 it became a self-regulatory 
organisation (SRO). In 2001, the PSE was demutualised with help and advice from 
AusAid and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).  
Historically, the PSE is one of the oldest exchanges in Asia. However, perhaps as a 
reflection of the country’s stunted economic development, the PSE is also one of the 





Figure 24: Domestic Market Capitalisation of Asia-Pacific Stock Exchanges (WFE 
2009c: 84) 
 
In 2008, the PSE’s domestic market capitalisation was valued at US$52, 030M. In 
comparison, the booming stock exchanges of Shanghai ($1,425,354M) and Hong Kong 
($1,328,768M) reflect the booming economic growth of China. 
The various organisational upheavals in the history of the exchange have not been 
without its difficulties. At the time of writing, the legacy effects of the amalgamation of 
the bourse still lingers. The demutualisation of the exchange saw the brokers’ control 
and ownership over the exchange reluctantly diluted with non-owner managers 
professionally running the PSE. The following sections look at pertinent organisational 
issues such as its trading floors, trading hours and the old boys’ club. These issues 
represent the field of contestation between the PSE’s owners and its professional 
managers. 
5.4.2 Trading Floors 
 
A traditional stock exchange has a trading floor where brokers buy and sell shares of 
listed companies. Some exchanges such as the ASX are now fully electronic so the 
trading floor does not exist in reality anymore. During my fieldwork, it was quite an 
incredulous moment to be informed that in a resource-starved country, there was 














trading floors that only run three hours per day. The following observation notes I made 
comparing and contrasting the two floors bear this surprise: 
“This bit of the interview surprised me. I didn’t realise that the PSE only opened 
in the morning for trading i.e. three hours. I was surprised and told [my PSE 
interviewee] that it might be a competitive disadvantage compared to other 
exchanges in the region as a potential foreign investor may not invest because 
there is only a brief trading window. I suggested that the PSE ought to open from 
say 10-4 or 10-3 as the business day in Manila is all day long. [My interviewee said] 
they experimented with longer hours in 2003 but the trading volume remained 
the same.” – Manila Stock Exchange observation notes 
“[My interviewee] showed me the Makati Stock Exchange which is a full trading 
floor like the Manila-based one where the PSE was headquartered. This 
prompted me to text the PSE about two trading floors at opposite ends of the city 
being a waste of resources since they only trade for 3 hours. Makati is as big or as 
glamorous as the Ortigas one.” – Makati Stock Exchange observation notes 
While technically the bourses have united, physically they have not. This is an important 
distinction. Indeed two of my interviewees pointed out previous cases of “inter-bourse 
arbitrage” where an entrepreneurial arbitrageur could sell a company’s share at a higher 
price at one exchange and buy it low at another: 
“Before there was arbitrage [between the two exchanges]. Hopefully when we go 
to Fort Bonifacio [that will unite the exchanges]” – SEC 
“[There were] sensitivities [in amalgamation]. [They] wanted to reform the 
Makati Stock Exchange to make it as the only one and put up the PSE there. For 
the PSE now it’s all linked, previously there was inter-bourse arbitrage 
(chupitero). [It’s the] aspect of exchanges. Now there is also computerisation. 
There were the old guards who were against computerisation as it’s a small 
bourse and they provide a personalised service.” – private sector 1 
The main reason behind the reluctance to unify is largely cultural. The two exchanges 
represent two dominant ethnic groups that dominate the bourses: the Filipino Chinese 





“There is the pride of having a trading floor in Makati. In Manila it was the 
Chinese group with the formation of the Chinese trading floor in Ortigas and the 
Spanish mestizos in Makati on the other side.” – SEC 
At the time of writing, the unified exchange has yet to materialise physically in its new 
location in Fort Bonifacio: 
“The Fort Bonifacio unified exchange [has been] delayed to 2011.” - PSE 
Locational issues aside, the PSE makes the point of ensuring the technical aspects have 
been covered and that these two trading floors do not lend themselves to such arbitrage 
activities anymore (PSE 2009b). 
5.4.3 Trading Hours 
 
“The PSE is open from 9.00-12.15. From 9.00-9.30 – the PSE opens. From 9.30-
12.00 – the market is open. From 12.00-12.15 – this is the market run.” – interview 
notes 
Similarly, the idea of having three hours for a trading day was a rude shock. Both trading 
floors are open for three hours in the morning only. Being informed of this, I did make 
the point of asking my subsequent interviewees about the tiny window of trading on the 
PSE. Coming from Australia where the trading day reflected the working hours of the 
general populace, the idea of three hours for a trading day seemed unusual to me. The 
ASX’s trading day was 6 hours long and the trading floor had long been computerised 
although a computerised board for the public exists in Sydney’s Martin Place. (ASX 
2009) 
Still, in my naivety, I did not expect that the PSE would support and have two trading 
floors yet would trade for only three hours a day. From a resource-efficiency point of 
view it didn’t stack up. Everywhere in Manila I was constantly reminded by the lack or 
limited amount of resources an organisation had to deal with. Yet two trading floors for 
three hours per day seemed sheer extravagance to me. Countering this argument, as 
some subsequently pointed out, the PSE is a small exchange and the market activity 
during the three hours is intense. A previous experiment to extend the trading hours was 




Interviewees who were supportive of an increase in the trading hours pointed out 
reasons of increased volume, increased market activity and alignment with the rest of 
the region: 
“We have had 10 new listings this year. We are undergoing a listing on the IPO 
this year. When we have enough business, then we’ll have the afternoon trading. 
There is still a lot of upside in [extending trading hours]. Currently the market 
trades USD100M per day. That’s decent volume already. Back in 2000, a couple of 
trading days there had only a trading volume of USD6M. If we open all hours 
then the trading volume could go up to USD200M a day. In an open market the 
year to date is USD90-100M a day. This year’s been quite good. When you have 
more IPOs you’d [have another incentive] to open up for trading. The last 12 
months has been the busiest for IPOs with follow-on offerings, new shares and 
old ones together. It has not been this active since the [East Asian] crisis.” – 
broker 1 
“If there is an increased trading hours there would be more depth and width. The 
Philippine market is small so they can only hold so much trading interest.” – 
private sector 1 
“The entrepreneurs and capital markets ought to play a role. If the PSE opened 
the trading hours that would allow development so there would be a lot more 
companies to do IPOs and improve the reporting,” – private sector 2 
“When they increased the trading hours – we tried it for a month in 1999 – the 
market was trying to recover then [after the crisis]. The other stock exchanges – 
it’s the only stock exchange I know in the region that is only trading for half a 
day. The Jakarta Stock Exchange is open all day.”- broker 2 
This last comment prompted me to do a quick comparison of other trading hours of the 
exchanges in the region. Below is the table I came up with and which I subsequently 





Table 24: Asia-Pacific Stock Exchanges’ General Share Trading Hours (Source: 
WFE 2009d) 
Exchange AM (Trading Hours)  PM (Trading 
Hours) 
Australia 1000-1600 all day  
China (Shanghai & 
Shenzhen) 
0930-1130 Break 1300-1500 
Hong Kong 1000-1230 Break 1430-1600 
Bombay 0955-1530 all day  
Indonesia 0930-1200 Break 1330-1600 
Korea 0900-1500 all day  
New Zealand 1000-1645 all day 
Malaysia 0900-1230 Break 1430-1700 
Philippines 0900-1210 Morning trading only 
Singapore 0830-1706 all day  
Thailand 1000-1230 Break 1430-1630 
 
Out of 11 countries in the region, the PSE remains the only exchange that trades in the 
morning only. Interviewees who were ambivalent about extending the trading hours 
cited the lack of demand and the exchange’s relatively low volume and small size.  
“If there’s a demand, they’ll extend trading hours.” – investment banker 
“The PSE in the Philippines is quite insignificant. For a long period of time the 
PSE has not been on the radar for foreign investors. If the trend continues 
economically there’d be pressure to extend trading hours as a function of the 
volume, with the two stock exchanges. [Extending the trading hours] would not 
be an economic decision [for the brokers but more a political decision].” – private 
sector 3 
“The PSE is a small exchange. It does not need many hours or market 
capitalisation volume activity. It is as small as Colombo, Sri Lanka. We are one of 
the oldest stock exchanges [in the region] and we have been left behind by our 
neighbours. It is a loss of our comparative and competitive advantage. There is a 
cost consideration for the exchange. It would carry costs [if they extend the 
hours]. Members would not feel justified by the incremental value within those 
hours. They would see more activity but could be very slow. They would lose 
more interest or create queries. Essentially, they would be spending money 




appreciate more the longer hours of the trading day. This is on the pros and cons 
of extending trading hours. ” – private sector 4 
One could pose the chicken-egg problem: do the limited trading hours place a ceiling on 
the volume or growth of the PSE or is it due to the lack of depth in the PSE that 
discourages any extension to the trading hours? This conundrum was never fully 
investigated during my stay there but in perhaps another foray into the history of stock 
exchanges around the world, some pattern may be discernible on the causality of the 
relationship. 
5.4.3.1 Impact of Trading Hours on Companies 
While the benefits of longer hours are yet to be appreciated, the limited trading hours 
does impact on the timing of company announcements. Very good news or very bad 
news may be announced by the company close to the end of the trading day and it would 
take a cycle of 21 hours for this news to be digested and traded by the market when the 
bourse re-opens. Such a situation makes the PSE vulnerable for activities relating to 
market manipulation.  
“[We announce to the] PSE with respect to the cash dividend declaration within 
10 minutes after [the board’s] approval. It’s more of a rule in theory than in 
practice. We have to wait for the board of directors to adjourn. If it’s close to the 
close of trading we would disturb the trading at 1230pm. [The PSE did] try to 
[trade] for the whole day [but it is now] trading only in the morning.” – private 
sector 1 
The volatility of the three hours imposes limitations on companies and perhaps 
contributes to the widely-held perception of insider trading within the exchange: 
“The PSE is very volatile. We had a low share price a few months ago and it now 
jumped to high. It is a bit all over the place. There is a factor of various stock 
exchanges in Asia, the volume in trading generates interest e.g. Chinese model, 
people can’t bet so they go to the stock exchange. This is something that happens 
in this part of the world. The low volumes of trading here in the Philippines are a 





Limited trading hours on the PSE have an effect on companies making timely disclosure 
to the market. 
5.4.3.2 Importance of Golf 
Aside from market capitalisation size, one broker pointed out a list of self-serving 
reasons why – in all seriousness – that extending the trading hours would be highly 
inconvenient for the brokers of the PSE: 
“There are now talks about the possibility of doing business in the afternoon. 
Many wouldn’t like it. It would interfere with their golf, lunches. In the 
afternoon, it was 930-12, 12-1 then 1-3.30  [The extended trading hours] really 
interrupted their lunch, and changed their lives. Many of our members wouldn’t 
like it. On this particular question I could go either way. It is not important, 
money earnt in the afternoon session was so small it might not be worthwhile, 
they’re studying it now.  There is no real desire from brokers to have an 
afternoon session. Many brokers value more their time than money. If we were 
certain we’ll double the amount of money we’re making now, it would take a lot 
staff, a reconfiguration. We go home at 530-7pm. At 4pm closing, you would go 
home at 8-9pm at night. You would need new people because you can’t do it 
every night. There is a serious configuration required. A P10B trading volume 
every single day would require a method of cooperation. [We would need to hire] 
additional staff to cope with the whole thing. It can be done. Except I’m not 
joking when I say it’d inconvenience the brokers. It’s just not worthwhile even if 
we can make twice as much.” - broker 
This insight into the attitudes of some brokers gives the impression of an insider culture 
with a high sense of entitlement towards the functioning of the exchange. It struck at the 
core of what the purpose of a stock exchange is – is it to serve the brokers or to 
contribute to the country’s capital market development - or both?  
The identity crisis in the ownership of the PSE reflects the clash between the old ways 
and the pressures of the new economic reality. Intriguingly enough, a paper written by 
Hart and Moore compared the membership of a stock exchange to a golf club - the love 
of golf and being a stockbroker seems to be complementary. The golfing analogy in Hart 
& Moore’s paper extends to improving the infrastructure including bunkers, greens, 




“The parallel with an exchange should be reasonably clear. The assets of the golf 
club (the course and clubhouse) correspond to the assets of the exchange. The 
playing members correspond, say, to large financial institutions; the social 
members correspond, say, to smaller brokers. In money terms, the large financial 
institutions have much more at stake in the exchange than have the smaller 
brokers.” -Hart & Moore (1996: 58) 
The players and the social members of the club are reflective of the culture divide 
between the old and the new brokers. Reforms to break down the barriers to ‘golf club’ 
entry were received unenthusiastically by the old time members (see later in this section 
on The Old Boys Club’). 
5.4.4 Demutualisation, Professionalisation and Ownership Issues  
 
The demutualisation of the exchange saw the mandatory decrease in ownership by the 
brokers of exchange who wielded absolute control and the professionalisation of 
management in the organisation. Demutualisation required external influence to enforce 
this particular reform and change. In particular advice and help from the ASX and 
AusAID were sought to push the PSE along this particular road. This reflects again the 
external influence and coercive isomorphism of institutional development in the 
country: 
“Demutualization is part of the PSE’s integral efforts to strengthen 
professionalism in its business operations, maximize transparency, reinforce 
competitive position globally, and optimize financial performance. The 
conversion marked the pinnacle of the year-long efforts to comply with the 
deadline set by law and seemingly unending months of conferring with the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) consultants who extended technical assistance 
in the study and development of the appropriate demutualization framework for 
the PSE. The demutualization study conducted by the ASX consultants and 
financed by the Australian government through the Philippines-Australia 
Governance Facility (PAGF) – Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) covered business model options, corporate governance model, 




market regulation policies, financial issues, and organisational structure and 
manpower requirements.” (PSE 2009c) 
Furthermore, reducing the majority ownership of brokers is enshrined in law. According 
to the Securities Regulation Code, Republic Act 8799, section 33(c): 
“Chapter IX Exchanges and Other Securities: Trading Markets 
s 33 (c) where the exchange is organised as a stock corporation: 
“that no person may beneficially own or control, directly or indirectly, more than 
5% of the voting rights of the exchange and  no industry or business group may 
beneficially own or control, directly or indirectly more than 20% of the voting 
rights of the exchanges. Provided however, that the commission may adopt rules, 
regulations or issue an order, upon application, exempt an applicant from this 
prohibition where it finds that such ownership and control will not negative 
impact on the exchanges’ ability to effectively operate in the public interest.” 
As the ownership control of most Philippine corporations consists of major blocks in 
excess of 50%, the 20% limit for a block ownership of the exchange is yet to materialise, 
hence there were penalties imposed by the SEC on the exchange over its inability to meet 
this ownership criteria: 
“The PSE is regulated by the SEC. Most of the shareholders are still the brokers at 
less than 48%. Under the law, not one group, individual or business entity should 
own more than 5% of the PSE. And not one industry can own more than 20%. 
This legal requirement is, in effect, to ensure that the PSE is an open exchange. 
The brokers group, though, still remain big owners.” –PSE 
The reduction in ownership has seen some improvements: 
“[The 20% requirement] has introduced professionalisation in the stock market.”- 
SEC 
“As you can determine from the comment about golf games, the brokers have 
had a sense of entitlement for far too long and have been dictating how things go 
for such a long time, that they forget why the exchange demutualised in the first 





“The PSE corporate governance practices have improved with the election and 
rules of demutualisation by virtue of the requirement of having more than 50% 
coming from non-brokers. It gives more confidence [in the PSE]. More trust.” – 
business advocate group 
However, the reduction in ownership has yet to meet its legislative requirements. The 
battle for the control of the PSE is ongoing. In January 2010, the top professional 
manager of the PSE, Francis Lim, departed after five years as President and CEO. (Dela 
Peña 2010) Being a professional manager in the PSE is no mean feat as invariably an 
independent manager is caught in the web of competing interests between the SEC, the 
owners and the market participants. 
5.4.5 PSE Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 
In terms of corporate governance reform, the SEC Code of Corporate Governance 2002 
takes precedence and is applicable to listed companies. However, the PSE has issued 
Guidelines for Corporate Governance for listed companies in 2009. Similar to other 
corporate governance reforms in the country, these Guidelines were formed conscious of 
international developments. The guidelines were heavily influenced by external 
organisations such as the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), Australian 
Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council, California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS), Corporate Governance & Financial Reporting Centre (CGFRC), CFA 
Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF), International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD). 
PSE (2009d: 5) 
The 10 PSE Guidelines are reproduced below: 
Table 25: Ten Guidelines for a Well-Governed Company (PSE 2009d: 6) 
1. DEVELOPS AND EXECUTES A SOUND BUSINESS STRATEGY: Shareholder 
return is optimized through a sound and well-executed strategy. 
2. ESTABLISHES A WELL STRUCTURED AND FUNCTIONING BOARD: A well-
functioning board creates value for the enterprise. 
3. MAINTAINS A ROBUST INTERNAL AUDIT AND CONTROL SYSTEM: Internal 
audit and controls enhance operational effectiveness, deter fraud, safeguard 
company assets, and ensure compliance. 




PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT BELONG TO THE MINORITY OR NON-
CONTROLLING GROUP: The exercise of shareholders’ basic political, economic 
and governance rights should be facilitated in an equitable, timely and 
transparent manner. 
5. ENSURES THE INTEGRITY OF ITS FINANCIAL REPORTS AS WELL AS ITS 
EXTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTION: Financial reports must represent a fair and 
true condition of the company. 
6. RECOGNIZES AND MANAGES ITS RISKS: An Enterprise-wide Risk Management 
system should be in place and properly functioning. 
7. ADOPTS AND IMPLEMENTS AN INTERNATIONALLY-ACCEPTED 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY REGIME: Material information should be 
disclosed fully, fairly, timely, and accurately. 
8. RESPECTS AND PROTECTS THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF ITS 
EMPLOYEES, COMMUNITY, ENVIRONMENT, AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS: 
Corporations should manage the social, environmental and governance aspects 
of its operations. 
9. DOES NOT ENGAGE IN ABUSIVE RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND 
INSIDER TRADING: Abusive related party transactions and insider trading 
undermine the trust and confidence on the company as well as prejudices non-
controlling shareholders’ interests. 
10. DEVELOPS AND NURTURES A CULTURE OF ETHICS, COMPLIANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT: Corporate and employee actions should be conducted 
according to the highest ethical and professional standards at all times. 
 
In a speech to the Institute of Corporate Directors 2007 annual dinner, the Chair of the 
PSE, Jose Vitug spoke about the importance of corporate governance to the stock 
exchange and the enforcement by the organisation in ensuring timely disclosure is made: 
“On corporate governance, there are legal standards and extra-legal standards. 
Article 19 of Civil Code is to do things in 'good faith.' The Philippines is blazing in 
Asia a trail of good corporate governance. This involves an ability to sustain 
market growth and much could depend on level of transparency and 
accountability. I did the planning, investing and cooking - but someone else did 
the eating. For example, our miracle rice [which we did the research and 
investment in is now used by others because there was no proper intellectual 
property over it,] so for the PSE, we adopt what we preach.  
“The PSE requires companies’ websites to reflect real time disclosures. This is 
crucial to enhancing transparency and accountability. Those who refuse will get a 
subtle reminder. There is an increase in the list of non-complying companies 
(which is published annually). The PSE board supports the ICD scorecard which 




blackouts, selective disclosures, 10-minute blackouts, online disclosure systems. 
We have a form of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) that 
monitors dubious stock market transactions. One day good governance will be 
second nature however we need to develop it and that we have to practice and 
internalise it.” – Jose Vitug, ICD Dinner 
Companies that do not comply with PSE listing rules can be subject to delisting: 
“Delisting occurs when there is:  
• non-compliance with the listing rules,  
•  inadequate disclosure 
• failure to produce required reports 
Relisting does not happen automatically. From the investors’ point of view, their 
loss due to a delisted company will have to be taken into account. An exit 
mechanism must be at hand for investors.” – PSE 
The next section discusses the important stakeholder of the exchange: the role of the 
brokers in inhibiting and/or progressing future corporate governance reforms. 
5.4.6 The Old Boys’ Club – The Brokers 
 
As previous sections mentioned, the brokers of the PSE hold sway over the functions of 
the exchange. When describing the PSE’s role, interviewees inevitably mentioned the 
brokers who still dominate and exercise influence in the strategic direction of the 
exchange. This influence stretched to the listing of a company when brokers, and not 
professionals, ran the exchange.  
To give some idea of the clubby culture of the exchange, a couple of interviewees 
mentioned instances when companies that intended to list had to go to a special brokers’ 
listing committee whose members divided the spoils of the initial offering. This control 
over the listing procedure allowed rent-seeking behaviour to occur as an IPO required 
the support of committee members before it could go ahead: 
“The PSE has gone a long way when it was run by brokers. It was difficult then. 




noise….Before you could list, you had to go through a brokers’ committee.” – 
private sector 1 
“[The listing was] not judged on its merits but judged on [their face to face 
interaction] with the listing committee.” –SEC 
“[The] listing committee is not a board committee anymore. Before, all IPOs had 
to go through this committee.” – private sector 2 
The broker-dominated listing committee does not exist anymore but stories such as 
these gave the impression of the PSE as epitomising a highly inefficient market where 
insider information dominated. On another front, pressures towards professionalising 
the brokers are gaining some groundswell support although some remnants of this 
culture still exist.  
“[My interviewee] started off by saying Australia was heavily involved in 
promoting corporate governance in the Philippines. I said I was only aware of 
some aspects – demutualisation of the PSE. On the PSE [my interviewee] 
mentioned that it had a reputation as a boy’s club…The PSE is still an old boys 
club.” – private sector (1) interview observation notes 
“We also spoke at length about the problems in the Philippines. He mentioned 
there was plenty of politicking at the PSE. He said it could take a couple of 
generations or two before reforms in the Philippines could happen. [The reforms 
would happen but] not in this lifetime.” - private sector (2) interview observation 
notes 
“The old boy’s club is still kind of important. They have competitors now so there 
could be trading in the afternoon. Clearing is operating at T+3 or T +4 days. 
[There is] no [technical] problem trading in the afternoon. The PSE has the 
capability of trading in the afternoon. [However, the perception of stockbroking] 
is a part-time profession as it was a club.” -private sector 3 
One stockbroker who was willing to be interviewed was the late Irving S. Ackerman, who 
represented the old guard of the exchange but was not adverse to reform in the PSE. His 





Text Box 3: Irving Ackerman, Stockbroker 
Irving S. Ackerman is an 80-something year old German Jewish-American with a New 
York twang who – by fate and chance – found himself in the stockbroking business in 
post-war Manila. He was referred to me by my interviewee at the PSE as a character with 
stories to tell, one of the personages and part of the fabric of the exchange. Ackerman 
came to the Philippines as a G.I. during World War Two and never left. The wartime 
period had a profound effect on his life and a large part of our interview was spent 
talking about the war and the horrific stories of the period: 
“I was in the US Army during the war, a low-ranking lieutenant. We were 
stationed here just before the war ended. We were suppose to lead the invasion 
of Japan but luckily we arrived in August 1945 when Nagasaki was bombed. At 
the end of the year we would have invaded Japan but thankfully it did not 
happen. We would have fought [a land war] with them [but they surrendered]. 
Previously I was an accountant in New York City. When the war happened, I was 
about to graduate, in a city college of New York. [After the war] I married a 
Filipina and she was a pianist. We married in 1947 and spent 10 years in New 
York. She was at Juilliard. We returned to the Philippines in 1957. I was with her 
for 57 years and she died in July 2005. I have remarried since, and my [second 
wife] helps me in the business.” 
 
Ackerman was one of the ten founding members of the Makati Stock Exchange and the 
only American. He has a front row seat on the trading floor of the Makati floor. His 
success in the Philippines was helped by the patronage of several people: 
“[When we returned to the Philippines] I was the first and then only stockmarket 
analyst in the Philippines in 1958. My column was in the Manila Times. The paper 
was ahead of the [Manila] Bulletin then. Mr Chino Roces, the publisher, allowed 
me to do this. He helped me a great deal. The same with Max Soliman, he was 
the publisher of the Star. Chino Roces, Bebing Roces, Benito Pullieto, they were 
my benefactors, sponsors. The Manila Times called the shots. It was a very good 
break and [as a columnist] I tried to stay very honest and not shame the paper.” 
 
Ackerman owns a brokerage office and is usually at the PSE (Makati floor) during office 
hours. Ackerman has seen many changes in his lifetime as a PSE broker: 
“The old boys’ club was 20 years ago. The Manila Stock Exchange, it is dominated 
by Filipino-Chinese. I have a lot of Chinese friends, many Chinese here, Chinese 
clients. The Makati merged with Manila which became the PSE. 
 
“[In 2007] there is a lot of [hot money] coming in from all over the world. 
Surprisingly (eventhough the PSE is not known as market maker), the Philippines 
is looked at due to increase improvements in corporate governance. This country 
has been working very hard. In the last year or so, efforts have been made so all 
these years it has been paying off. Stock market news on the PSE is hardly ever on 
when we’re in the US. There is news on [the stock markets of] Indonesia, 
Vietnam but not the PSE. But there’s been improved market activity and 
production. The Philippines has been struggling for years and years to be noted 
and it is only now that others are getting to know of its existence.” 
 
Ackerman also wrote a book which he gave to me on trading on the PSE: “How to invest 




country’s stock market rested with local, not foreign investors: 
“Currently it’s 60:40 (hot money: local money). We have to educate our people. 
We have courses given in college now about the stock market. We need to 
educate more people to invest and make investments, some in real estate, 
manufacturing, stock market etc. [We have to ensure local investment] becomes 
dominant so it becomes 75:25 (local money: hot money). We don’t have to worry 
about [local] money running away. The money made here, stays here. Hot money 
is in and out and there is no more profit to be made.” 
 
This attitude carried with it a sense of patriotism in his business:  
“The firm by choice doesn’t deal with foreign investors. We deal 99% with local 
people.” 
 
And a need to develop and strengthen the institution of the stock market before 
exploring the more exotic financial instruments that have proven to the bane of more 
developed markets. In a 2000 book that explored the possibility of a derivatives market 
in the country, Ackerman spoke out in his opposition to its establishment due to the 
weakness of the institutional environment in the country: 
“Now, I think that instead of devoting a great deal of money and time to this 
wonderful idea of derivatives exchanges, which probably would be something 
very good for the Philippines maybe ten years from now or maybe fifteen years 
from now, I think that the government, if it wants to have a matter of national 
pride, should devote itself to building the stock market…I think that the 
government should know how to spend its money and it is by having a wonderful 
program in building the stock market. I am not saying anything about the 
derivatives but it is just too premature. We need people to understand what 
stocks are and if they don’t understand what a stock is, it would be a little 
difficult to understand derivatives.” (Ackerman in Buenaventura et al 2000: 143-
144) 
 
Overall, Ackerman was optimistic about the outlook for the Philippines and the 
sometime fatalistic environment of ensuring natural disasters do not coincide with 
human ones: 
“The whole economy is showing signs of better health. The GDP is 6% instead of 
the targeted 5%. It has helped the market, things are getting better so hopefully 
there’s no sudden bad development – hopefully no terrible flood or earthquake or 
something made by God and made by Man that would be a serious development 
[to hamper growth]. Things are going steady now. Relative to other countries, it’s 
peaceful. Mindanao – that problem ain’t going to be stopped in the near future. It 
continues, will continue. The Muslim people want Mindanao, but Manila is not 
about to give Mindanao. All sorts of things: MILF, MNLF – they are gathering 
strength, they really want Mindanao.” 
 
And philosophical about the Filipino way of doing business: 
“In the Philippines there is a lot beating around the bush. But things get done 
eventually.” 
 
In January 2009, Ackerman died aged 87 after 45 years in the stockbroking industry of 





5.4.7 External Pressures to Reform 
 
There are two main sources of external pressures to reform at the exchange: regulation 
from the SEC, and foreign investment and competition. One regulation from the SEC 
saw increased capital requirements and placed unprofitable stockbroking companies out 
of action: 
“There are 182 brokerage firms here in the Philippines. But of 182, 132 are 
operating. The 50 have temporarily suspended their activities with the 
permission of the PSE and SEC. They suspended themselves voluntarily. The 
reason why these 50 firms have not operated again is the SEC is saying now that 
in order to open they need a capital requirement of P100M (USD2M). For some of 
the brokers, it’s a big stumbling block. None have reopened. They need P100M in 
cash or assets.”– broker 
In short, the consolidation of the industry reduced the pool of mostly local Filipino 
brokers. Filling in this vacuum is the professional brokerage houses which are generally 
subsidiaries of large foreign investment banks. These subsidiaries have been established 
throughout the region to parallel the foreign investors present in the area. Foreign 
investors normally use the subsidiaries of internationally recognised names rather than 
the local brokers. Foreign investors have driven the trading in the exchange, and it is 
foreign brokers that drive most of the trading activity on the exchange. Increased trading 
activity may mean that the favourite broker pastime of golf may recede: 
“The number of companies going IPOs and if it continues presumably [will 
change things at the PSE]. When you get foreign investors in the exchange, a lot 
of golf goes.” –private sector 1 
“Most of the leading (international) brokers are here in the Philippines. There is 
net foreign buying/selling. The PSE is a small market by comparison to its 
neighbours. It’s easy to drive the market with foreign money. If there is an 
increase in trading hours there would be more depth and width. The Philippine 
market is small so they can only hold so much trading interest.” –private sector 2 
External competition has ensured the local monopoly over the PSE has been broken to 




the influence of these new entrants is still quite limited as pointed out by the following 
interviewee:  
“[My interviewee] stated  that while the [local brokers] are small they protest a 
lot and are disruptive even though most of the trading – by volume and price – is 
done by foreign brokers. He showed me a list of the large brokers in the country 
and nearly all were foreigners…Of the top 10 brokers there was hardly any locals 
(except for Ackerman). While they’re the biggest, their influence is 
disproportionate to the size. The smaller they are the influential they are it seems 
in running the PSE.” – private sector interview observation notes 
Breaking up a monopoly is a hard thing to do. For regulators, well-connected families 
exercise extraordinary influence especially if they are politically connected. For the 
brokers affected, the life which allowed afternoon leisure is now slowly disappearing. 
Unsurprisingly, there is some rearguard action against adjusting to this new way of 
practising the profession: 
“The elites have to be dragged to separate the brokers from the PSE. The brokers 
are accountable for this brokerage reform. Most [of these small] companies are 
owned by families with limited liquidity.”– private sector 3 
For the time being, the old brokers still have the upper hand as the following interviewee 
relates how an association of institutional investors failed to get their representative 
elected to the PSE board: 
“The Fund Managers’ Association of the Philippines (FMAP) represent the bulk of 
institutional investment companies here. They want to be part of the PSE board 
but they lost the director’s election recently. They’re more relevant to corporate 
governance, they manage the money. The Secretariat talks to people.” –broker 2 
The clash of cultures continues as these groups vie for influence on the future direction 
of exchange. 
5.4.7.1 Reaction to Reforms 
The brokers are still very much involved and integral in the reform and transition of the 
PSE. Given their once dominant ownership of the exchange, the loss of power has meant 




financial globalisation at the coalface. In this case, the PSE’s once insider culture is now 
exposed to the cyclical uncertainties of financial markets and requires adaption to this 
new era: 
“[The PSE] will just have to [continue its reforms]. It’s still partly run by the old 
boys’ club of the old brokers; there’ an outsider on the board who is an 
independent director which is good. The old boys’ club is difficult to penetrate. 
Whoever runs the PSE must have teeth on what he can and cannot do. You need 
a strong reformer to face down the opposition from stockbrokers and face the old 
practices. The PSE has now been more proactive. A lot of them are now attending 
international roadshows.” – broker 1 
But as one interviewee pointed out, all market exchanges started in a rather informal 
manner such as the insurance marketplace established by Lloyd’s of London which has 
its origins in the coffee houses of 17th century England (see Raphael 1995). Nevertheless, if 
the PSE is to attract more investors, especially local ones, it is important as a matter of 
confidence to ensure the organisation is able and capable of facilitating market 
transactions in a timely professional manner, rather than being seen as beholden or 
biased in favour of one particular interest group: 
“[The PSE shows the difference of how a capital market exchange is run] between 
a developing economy vs. developed economy. A developing economy is a net 
capital importer. You’re competing for deficit capital with other markets. There is 
an underlying growth of GDP, and you assume this to translate to ROEs. That’s 
your differential, the scales are differential.” – private sector 1 
In late 2007, a UK hedge fund, GLG Partners, bought a stake in the PSE allowing them a 
board seat (a more thorough discussion of GLG is in Chapter 6 in the section on Foreign 
Investors).The interest of the new foreign owner in the PSE gave some hope in the 
reform of the exchange: 
“As you can determine from comments about golf games, the brokers over here 
have had a sense of entitlement for far too long and have been dictating how 
things go for such a long time, that they forget why the Exchange demutualised 
in the first place, to curb their influence and to manage the Exchange more 




market from the particularly ‘Philippine’ way of doing business (word of mouth, 
old boys club, influence peddling, ‘me first’ mentality, etc) and hopefully get it on 
the track to think big and compete with the other bourses in the region… it really 
will take a LOT of time for Filipinos to outgrow bad habits that hamper our 
growth.” – PSE via text 
For exchanges in the region which are now centres of global finance such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Sydney, the transition to a more professional and impersonal organisation 
has already occurred. The mobility of global capital means countries must adhere to 
certain standards including a more professional exchange if they are to attract investor 
interest.  
5.4.8 A Small Market 
 
The PSE is one of the region’s smallest markets and one wonders whether the size is due 
to the organisational culture and limited hours of trading on the exchange, or the 
exchange reflects the country’s small private sector that is largely dependent on bank 
financing. Perhaps it is a bit of both. 
The PSE’s size means that a few listed, blue-chip companies dominate activity on the 
exchange. Out of some 250 listed companies, only half are active and the partial listing of 
companies limits a company’s share activity: 
“The biggest problem with the PSE - and it’s not their fault - is the volume is still 
quite small. The number of listed companies is quite small. The stocks traded are 
small. The 130 actively listed are quite small. Our business is small – it lends itself 
to a high degree of manipulation. [You need to] increase the level of liquidity. 
The degree that is publicly traded is quite small. Infinite publicly trading is very 
small.” – academic 
“On the PSE there are around 130 active companies. There are 250 issues. For 
USD5M you can rock the market. It’s like USD150M/USD200M per day. It’s a 
relatively small market, selective…It’s a market that is not developing – it’s a 
laboratory – as if what big markets are like if you put it in a petri dish and watch 





However, others pointed out activity on the PSE in no way truly reflects private sector 
activity: 
“The stock exchange is purely a matter of how many individuals can make money 
out of others. It is not helping the country.” – consultant 
“[The PSE] is sentiment driven market at this stage. [It’s] not accurate. [It doesn’t 
reflect what’s] on the street, whether the economy’s doing well or not. It’s likely 
to be cyclical.” – private sector 
Nevertheless, the PSE’s size supports Granovetter (2001) and Leff (1978)’s thesis of 
business groups dominating the business environment where there is stunted capital 
market development. 
5.4.9 Insider Trading 
 
Stock exchanges have always had to deal with problems of insider trading. For the PSE, 
the exchange’s small size makes it vulnerable to movements due to insider information 
and the old boys’ club give the impression of a market that is far from transparent: 
“There are many small markets that are vulnerable to influences that is not 
market driven but by insider information. With the exception of the institutions 
and the intelligentsia, very few people would do whiz bang analysis.”– private 
sector 1 
“The release of information affects stock prices. [There is a] ridiculous amount of 
insider trading. It is very significant. Our market is small with a few big players 
who have a lot of huge power and can move the market in one direction. The 
management is not consistent. You also need to improve the business condition 
so there’s less insider information and not just stock manipulation. You need to 
give more confidence so the public are able to purchase stock without these 
issues. The PSE needs to address these many different type of anomalies.” -
academic 
Currently, the bourse is divided by blue chip listed companies that can be traded and are 
seen to be practising timely disclosure and abiding by the rules, and other listed 




manipulation. The onus is on the PSE to ensure that it is seen to practice and have good 
corporate governance in place: 
“The difficulty with the PSE is that’s the place where you need good corporate 
governance. There is too much insider information in the market place. A lot 
make [money] on insider information. What foreign investors are looking for are 
at the fundamentals. When it comes to blue chips versus the rest, the rest are all 
inside information.” – private sector 2 
“The PSE [as a corporation and as a self-regulator organisation] is subject to 
corporate governance issues and it has had uneven success in its professional 
management. More people are being engaged in PSE especially to stem those 
who are key players who can move the stock prices.” – academic 
For one interviewee, it comes down to the ownership structure of the PSE for it to ever 
gain legitimacy in the long-term: 
“Other regulatory agencies such as PSE, SEC have been less successful [in 
implementing corporate governance]. For the PSE it’s a test drive and 
fundamental in its operations is the ownership of the stock exchange. There are 
some institutional elements and if not institutional, there is some short-term 
economic advantage of a few players to encourage speculation on the exchange. 
It needs tighter standards.” – private sector 2 
The propensity of insider trading affects the perception of the PSE as a capable 
organisation that can operate within the constraints of its internal pressures. Previous 
past experience of some dodgy listed companies have tainted the PSE to some extent. 
Market manipulation under the Estrada Administration brought the PSE to near collapse 
(see Chapter 8: Government Financial Institutions). The following comment explains the 
psychology of minority investors and their attitudes towards the unregulated and 
regulated market: 
“No, [minority investors] can’t be protected in this environment. It’s the choice of 
the lesser evil. The OFWs keep their money abroad. There was a pyramid scandal 




billions of pesos. How here in this country there are so many people who put so 
much money involved.40
“It has happened before. So there are two reasons: These people are stupid. It’s a 
pyramid so why put it there when you know it’s a pyramid scheme.  How 
effective are the sellers of these schemes? It implies that people are stupid, greedy 
and irrational. The alternative is before the pyramid [goes belly up] – people 
make money before it blows up. People made money [in these pyramid schemes] 
before they [would] invest in the PSE.  
 
“The rationality is there but not for the ruled. [They] make more money though 
it’s riskier. Still they put money there whatever risk premium is there to put 
money in the scams than do it legitimately. People think there is no reason they’ll 
be more protected in the PSE than they will be in the scams. It’s either outright 
poor corporate governance or lack of transparency. Nevertheless the corporate 
governance is not improved. 
“This indicates the lack of trust in legitimate investments in the first place. It’s 
either poor corporate governance or if it’s perceived, companies have not been 
transparent enough to [induce investment]” – academic  
This is a challenge to regulators who have an uphill battle to fight against this perception 
and to show that funds channelled in legitimate investments will be somehow regulated: 
“[The] market is very liquid and a lot is to do with foreign investors. But even 
without the foreign investors, we are becoming more educated along the lines of 
the capital market. A lot of local investors were victimised by scammers as there’s 
so much greed. If we can mobilise those funds in the capital market, at least 
they’d be regulated.” – regulator 
The perception that there is no difference between speculating money on the stock 
market and participating in a Ponzi scheme because the formal institutions cannot be 
trusted is unfortunately, widely-held. 
                                                     
40 During my field research, another pyramidal scheme was uncovered called the FrancSwiss 




5.4.10 Improvements in Enforcement 
 
Some interviewees mentioned the improvements they have seen in the PSE as an 
organisation, especially in monitoring companies and their adherence to the listing 
requirements: 
“We give credit to the PSE for being aggressive in their disclosure practices. They 
are aggressive in monitoring. What they see in the newspaper, they send notice. 
We clarify a lot of notices with the PSE even if the news is from unreliable 
sources.” – private sector 1 
“I think compared to the past years, yes [they have been effective]. Although it 
still requires improvement, we’re on the right direction now. They are very much 
monitoring corporations over corporate governance. Unlike before they just give 
you the regulations, now they’re very strict with deadlines, disclosure and 
transparency. This is a move in the right direction, we need some improvements, 
it’s there. They have never been strict as they have until now.” – private sector 2 
“The PSE is a well-run company, though it could be more relaxed [in 
enforcement]. If a Philippine company wants to expand internationally they have 
no choice but to list on the PSE. So they are corporate conscious. [The PSE] is 
pretty well run.” –private sector 3 
The strong leadership provided and guidance by senior managers in the PSE have set out 
the culture of the organisation, though it still requires pivotal support from key board 
members to set out a clear agenda on the direction of the exchange: 
“The PSE as a private company has made robust attempts [to regulate]. The PSE 
requires more independent directors and people are measuring and monitoring 
that. This is terribly important and the time is right. We have a good leader with 
Francis Lim. The PSE needs changes. It needs more support especially from the 
brokers.” – private sector 4 
The PSE and SEC, as the twin regulators of the companies, must have the capability of 




“The PSE makes sure companies are transparent in reporting, being fair to all 
shareholders and discuss Information at more time. People know they are the 
regulators so the PSE will get the flack for not policing the market. This is true 
with the SEC, to get the financials in order on time and now with the move to the 
IAS.”-stockbroker 
“Both the SEC and PSE are professional agencies and while other agencies are 
not…I have not heard of corruption there. We’re not unhappy with the way they 
have handled their regulatory responsibilities. We would like more of them in 
other agencies. The PSE is a listed company, and it’s very professional.” – private 
sector 5 
“Maybe on a scale of 1 to 10, I’d give a 3 or 5 out of 10 [for the effectiveness of 
government]. They are trying to do their best, to improve this thing [corporate 
governance]. Over the past two years there has been a tremendous effort on their 
part to improve corporate governance.” – private sector 6 
However, reforms within - and enforcement by - these two agencies will be limited if 
there is no support or similar undertaking from the rest of government: 
“Regulation is a function of the macroeconomic environment. It’s a function of 
government. The PSE and SEC can’t do much if the economy’s not there without 
the government directing policy. If you see government not being run efficiently, 
that’s not good corporate governance. That doesn’t encourage good corporate 
governance. It’s too much to expect [from the private sector] to exercise 
[corporate governance] when there is no implementation or capacity to enforce 
corporate governance in the public sector.” – private sector 7 
This sentiment was echoed by other interviewees and shows the importance the role 
government and the public sector play in determining and influencing behaviour in the 
private sector. 
5.4.11 Dialogue, Transparency and Resources 
 
Apart from the general feeling that wider macroeconomic institutional reform should 




interviewees suggested greater dialogue with its stakeholders, more disclosure and 
transparency of its operations: 
“Maybe before they issue out new rules, they would invite companies for 
comments so there’ll be draft resolutions if anybody wants to comment on it. I’ve 
not heard them have a dialogue. Maybe they should do this, consult with 
companies about the changes before they implement it. I’m sure they have 
consultants and experts drafting the rules but if there’s been public dialogue, I’ve 
not heard of it. We have not received much notice. They publish in the papers if 
it’s important. They post it on the website so you’ll have to access the website 
regularly to know the changes.” – private sector 1 
“Greater transparency in the regulatory environment of both government and 
self-regulatory bodies like the PSE will contribute greatly to improve corporate 
governance in the Philippines. Of course, more transparency should also help 
control the culture of corruption prevalent in developing countries.” – private 
sector 2 
Human and technological resources are areas that also require attention: 
“There are 1000 employees in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SETI). You need 
more staff, and structure for bigger listings such as in Thailand– private sector 3 
“I was given a tour of the PSE and they had a bookstore. However the latest PSE 
publication is from 2005 and they are just now catching up, two years later. The 
delay was due to the reorganisation. The website has the latest updates of the 
companies.” – observation notes  
“The PSE is looking to upgrade the trading system and is looking closely at 
Thailand’s. We had a look at the ASX’s CHESS trading system as well.” – PSE 
The PSE is well aware of other developments in other exchanges in the region; however, 
the regulator is constrained by limitations that originate locally.  
5.4.12 Decoupling and the Future 
 
For the present, participation in the PSE is still the domain of a few. Nevertheless, if or 




this development. Like any other regulatory body, much of the PSE’s function also 
depends on the political development of the country: 
“Politicians want to pass the silver bullet law that can solve everything and have a 
functioning capital market. Every congressman wants to be in on this law, one 
bill that will solve everything but it can’t be solved properly. There has to be 
dichotomy that’s why [it’s important for] capital markets to run under their own 
steam.” – SEC  
Nevertheless, there is a growing sense of awareness that there is a separation going on 
between the political side and the business side of the country. That is, the capital 
market is increasingly becoming decoupled and running independently of political 
events of the country. The following interviewee talks about this wall: 
“There’s something lasting to do with the legacy of the President Macapagal-
Arroyo. A wall has been erected on the effects of politics on the PSE – between 
economic activity and political activity. We don’t know how sturdy it is but it is a 
wall now. You can have a mini-rebellion by the military and the market is 
unaffected. The market continues to operate on its own. There are signs of that 
being in place. There’s many a time that has occurred in Japan as well – the 
government changes, the government falls but the stock exchange goes on. It’s 
the same when [former US President] Clinton was impeached. That’s the only 
way to go.  
“This wall has been set up Gary Teves, good advisers like Salcedo…hopefully [the 
PSE will be] forgotten [by politicians] until the 2010 [presidential elections] so the 
masonry continues on the wall. Once [the wall] gets established, it will be fluxed 
out of the political arena. You can also gauge political will. If you look at politics, 
there is an outstanding wish to separate [the politics] from the economy. It’s 
difficult for politicians [not to interfere and do] something and make it happen. 
The economic argues against its each other. Many programs are common. When 
the wall increases, then you will realise the separation – like separation of Church 
from State. Then you can have a synergistic distinction.”-private sector 1  
This distinction was supported in a comment by then Economic Planning Secretary Neri 





"Our businessmen are able to put a firewall between economics and politics at 
the moment. But in the long run, the effects of political risks on the economy 
could be worrisome. Our political institutions are still rather primitive and 
almost tribal with a lot of political killings. We need to have social trust to 
achieve a higher economic growth in the future. Social trust and economic 
growth has a correlation.”- Economic Planning Secretary, Romulo Neri in Remo 
(2007) 
Perhaps, one day the PSE as with the rest of the private sector and the bureaucracy, will 
be able to function despite or in spite of political upheavals. The future of the PSE as 
contributor to improved corporate governance in the country will continue to depend 
largely on the substance of its own governance practices, by the perception from the 
companies that it seeks to regulate, and its independence and ability to discharge its 
duties without fear or favour. 
5.5 The Insurance Commission 
 
The Insurance Commission (IC) has regulatory oversight over the insurance industry. Its 
mandate is “to regulate and supervise…to ensure that adequate insurance protection is 
available to the public at a fair and reasonable cost and to assure the financial stability of 
the insurance industry so that all legitimate claims of the insuring public are met 
promptly and equitably.”(IC 2009)  
Compared to other government agencies, one interviewee regarded the Commission as 
second only to the BSP in terms of the effectiveness of its enforcement: 
“In a list of most effective government agencies, I would say it’d be 1. BSP 2. 
Insurance Commission 3. SEC.” - ICD 
Amongst interviewees, there was a grudging respect for the industry regulation provided 
by the Insurance Commission: 
“The Insurance Commission is big and large and given the resources it has, it is 
run very well. The industry is managed pretty well from a regulatory sense. It is 




to go. It has progressed with a series of things that ensure companies are 
prudentially managed. At the end of the day, the fundamental concerns [the 
Commission have] are that you’re not ripping off your clients and that you have 
sufficient reserves to pay the claims.” – private sector 1 
For a sector to be effective, a strong regulator is also required. This section looks at the 
insurance industry in the country, the regulator, and the particular events surrounding 
the departure of an Insurance Commissioner. 
5.5.1 Insurance Industry 
 
The insurance industry is premised on the purchase of products that have a promise 
attached to them but with an indefinite discharge. According to one interviewee: 
“When you buy financial instruments (e.g. mutual fund): for the investor you buy 
it due to a promise on future ROI. With an insurance product you never know 
when it will be fulfilled. Investment products are a liquidated promise” – private 
sector 1 
In the Philippines, the insurance industry in the country is characterised by a 
concentrated few players in the life insurance segment, and a widely fragmented non-life 
or general insurance segment. In the 1990s, the industry was opened to competition 
allowing 100% foreign ownership although capitalisation and residential requirements 
differ between local and foreign operators: 
“There is an X amount of capital, certain portion that must be present in the 
home market to establish the corporation. The shareholders can represent equity 
but there are residency requirements for directors. E.g. 60, 70% of the directors 
must be residents though, they are not required to be citizens.” – insurance 
company 
According to Ghosh (2006), there is still scope for growth in scope and coverage in the 
Philippines. Total insurance penetration in the country was at 1.5% in 2004 (2006: 139) 
while total insurance penetration was at 1.5% in 2004. Total density for both segments 
decreased from 1997 to 2004 due in large part to a downturn in coverage in the non-life 




far more fragmented than the life segment, the exception being South Korea where there 
are more life insurance companies as the following table shows: 
Table 26: Indicators of Concentration in the Insurance Sector (Ghosh 2006: 140) 
Economy Year Herfindhal 
index41
Number of companies 
 
Life Non-life Life Non-life Composite Total 
China 2004 1803 3684 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Hong Kong 2005 926 229 46 110 19 175 
Indonesia 2004 811 478 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Malaysia 2003 1683 460 7 26 9 42 
Philippines 2004 1439 424 34 97 4 135 
Singapore 2004 1989 588 6 42 7 55 
South Korea 2004 1846 1622 22 17 - 39 
Thailand 2004 2527 439 24 71 - 95 
 
Ghosh suggests that the widely-fragmented non-life sector gives room for further 
rationalisation. He sees consolidation of the insurance industry given the current 
heterogeneous landscape of the sector and future prospects of companies to reinvest in 
the growing capital markets of the region (2004: 140). Furthermore, the different 
regulatory oversights over insurance products that deliver the same elements mean there 
is duplication. Therefore the sector in the region will undergo major institutional 
reforms at some point. 
The next three sections look at two segments of the insurance industry: life insurance 
and non-life insurance; and a segment that ought to be regulated by the insurance 
regulator: the health maintenance organisation (HMO). 
5.5.1.1 Life Insurance 
The life insurance segment in the country is dominated by large players both local and 
international. Since my data collection, the biggest event that shaped this segment was 
the problems of American insurance giant American International Group (AIG) which 
                                                     
41 The Herfindhal index is defined as the sum of squares of the market shares of each individual 
firm. It ranges from 0 (competitive or equally distributed) to 1 (monopolistic or dominated by one 
firm). Alternatively, it can range from 0 to 10,000, if percents are used as whole numbers (e.g. 75 
instead of 0.75). World Bank comparisons across markets suggest that a Herfindhal index value of 
around 1,200 to 1,500 would be the natural range for non-life insurance markets, and because of 






played a pivotal role in the global financial crisis of 2008 and had a major presence in the 
region. At the time of writing, its Asian assets (now known as AIA) have been subject to 
different acquisitive overtures by other companies (see AIG section later in this chapter). 
Notwithstanding this event, this segment is generally considered as well capitalised: 
“The life industry is much better managed as it is a smaller market which is the 
nature of the industry. There are foreign companies as well more in life which 
drives the changes and standards. In life there are 30 companies. 15 would be 
foreigners. It’s an 80:20 principle. 20 companies run 80% of the business. From 
the top group, only one would be local. Ayala/Insular Life is in the Top 10. The 
two biggest are AIG and Sunlife. It’s a toss-up between AXA and Insular. There is 
also Manulife/Prudential (UK). There are major innovators that have been 
foreigners.” – private sector 1 
Foreign-owned insurance companies and locally owned large insurance companies have 
driven the introduction of good corporate governance practices in this segment. 
5.5.1.2 Non-Life Insurance 
The non-life segment of the industry is characterised by small players and is heavily 
fragmented. It is dominated by family-owned and operated businesses.  
“There are many products that are being insured in the non-life segment. A lot of 
companies on the fringe are on motor vehicles, lines of business that lends itself 
to corruption. The [non-life segment is] diverse, difficult to manage. The 
regulators are grafting on this issue, there are minimum requirements. The other 
is to [have the capacity of] policing. The non-life insurance industry is more 
difficult. It’s difficult to generate a ROI as it is competitive and fragmented. The 
opportunity to generate profit is difficult. Of 100 companies in non-life there are 
10-15 that would be foreign. One would be a significant because of its history 
(AIG) but mostly it is run by SMEs...” – private sector 1 
“While the life insurance industry is deemed strong in terms of capital, "the non-
life is characterized by a large number of very small, family-owned firms that are 
inadequately capitalised and operationally weak.” (Milo in Balea 2007) 
The numerous players in this industry have also stretched the resources of the regulator 




“The problem with the industry is that on the non-life side you have too many 
companies. The small companies are not run really well. The practices that do go 
stretch the Commission’s resources.” – private sector 2 
Due to the variety of players and products in the non-life segment of the industry, this 
segment continues to be a regulatory challenge. 
5.5.1.3 Health Maintenance Organisations  
The other segment worth mentioning which is not regulated under the Insurance 
Commission is the Health Maintenance Organisation (HMOs): 
“There are two types of industries insurance and HMO providing similar 
products. One is well regulated, and the other one isn’t.” – private sector 1 
The HMO is overseen and regulated by a division of the Department of Health. HMOs 
are ‘easier’ to set up: 
“All that is required is to satisfy the application requirements - that is, to meet a 
half page of items, then an annual simple audit, and submit the audited financial 
statements, then [the Health Department] issues a licence to renew the business. 
The same thing happens in the insurance industry but it is more extensive.” – 
private sector 1 
There is a wide gulf in the manner of regulation between the Health Department and the 
Insurance Commission. HMOs currently face a series of challenges due to issues of scale, 
scope, competition, misuse of short-term/long-term financial instruments, and lack of 
professional managerial experience. The following interviewee articulates these 
problems: 
“The HMO industry is not managed. There are 16 participants in the HMO 
industry. Most of the health insurance is provided through the HMO industry, 
companies. There are some 20M people covered. But the benefits and the levels 
are not huge. It is not governed. There were 38-40 participants before but is now 
down to 16. 
“[The nature of the industry is] it is demand driven by employee benefits. The 
funding for the payment of medical services is very competitive. There are a lot of 




pricing of their products. They enter with a low price and the claims have a high 
price. The claims are higher than expected. The loss of money in the first year is a 
lot. Some HMOs have been set up by doctors. They use the money to buy 
property but it’s a cash-flow business. How do you fund your claim when it’s in 
property? 60% or more (of the funding) go into (paying the) claims. If you use 
the money you can’t pay your claims so it has a bad reputation of 
mismanagement, irresponsible decision making, no right treatment but no 
obligation.”-private sector 1 
The failure to implement or practise corporate governance in this sector is symptomatic 
of the operational vulnerabilities of the industry:  
“The financial characteristics of the environment to get into trouble are still 
there. There are no corporate governance guidelines. There is an industry 
association which is trying to set up rules. But there is no policing. So it’s badly 
run, it suffers in the end with the insured in the market place. 
“Our HMO lost about P70M over a period from late 90s to 2004. It wiped out the 
capital. It was insolvent when I came in. It had to be recapitalised by the 
purchase of it by the insurance business so it’s now a wholly owned subsidiary. It 
was a limited business but is now back on its feet. This is typical of what’s 
happened in the industry.” – private sector 1 
At the time of writing, the Insurance Commission is understood to be interested in 
regulating the HMOs: 
“The Insurance Commission is quite happy to do it that way to have the HMO 
under its purview. The Insurance Commission wants to strengthen the industry 
with regional counterparts so they have capital requirements. Meeting those 
requirements – risk based capital will lead to better financial, prudential 
management so that there is a certain margin of reserves, liabilities. At the end of 
the day, the minimum capitalisation required is quite low.” – private sector 1 
Given the core responsibilities of the Department of Health, the Insurance Commission 
would have the resources, the expertise and understanding of the financial instruments 




5.5.1.4 Fraudulent Claims 
The nature of the industry means separating the fraudulent from the legitimate claims is 
part and parcel of the operational challenges for insurance companies. Claims processed 
in USD are heavily scrutinised. The following insurance interviewee describes the 
company’s bureaucratic processing of claims in order to prevent fraud: 
“Our core service is medical, but a lot of it is grey. We are tight against fraud. In 
the Philippines there is a lot of non-compliance with requirements on the 
application form. We ask people to disclose e.g. health problems. Policy 
conditions have to allow for non-full disclosure. So the policy is quite tight. If 
there are pre-existing conditions whether there can be a debate between the 
doctor, client and company, it’s a grey area. We’re quite tight. We’re strong in 
doing the right thing and take on faith but tight on requirements on claims. We 
require original receipts. So we’re quite bureaucratic. So people complain.” –
private sector  
Claimants who wish to be treated in American hospitals are heavily scrutinised: 
“There are weird and wonderful schemes going on here in the Philippines. Our 
dollar products are to international standards. If you want treatment in USD, we 
are very careful regarding fraud. The other day, we were collecting information 
for a claim form that was doctored and submitted for processing. Instead of 
under $6,000, the claim was under $60,000. It was a clear case of fraud. So we 
have a few sorts of claims like these and they hurt. It’s also in the nature of the 
indemnity that lends itself to fraud. So we have to be quite tight for example on 
people who know they are ill. There is poor medical care here so they take the 
chance to do it, going from one insurance company to another. If it doesn’t work, 
it doesn’t work.” –private sector 
For one travel insurance claim, the fraud was easily discovered: 
“For travel insurance, someone submitted a claim in Turkey. It must have been 
for around $400, we processed it. There was an audit check. We got a translation 
for it. It was a bar tab – food, drinks. It’s a problem in the industry. There is the 
cost of getting a certified translator as well.” – private sector 




interviewee noted the Insurance Commission tends to support the claimant: 
‘In terms of the insurance regulation – when you have situations of conflict 
between the companies and the policy holder, the regulators tend to favour the 
policy holder. We would settle the claim amicably, even if it’s not valid. It is little 
more than influence. Some of it does go on. It’s not major corruption bit minor 
things. For the most part the insurance industry seems to be clean except for 
‘suggestions’ or ‘advice’ of easing policy restrictions on certain policy holders.” – 
private sector  
For a privileged few, there would be informal pressure to approve claims reflecting the 
strong-arm tactics of a well-connected client: 
“For example, it was suggested that we make a partial settlement on a claim 
though it was not valid but suggested it was a good thing to do. The reality was 
this was due to the personal connections of a claimant. It hasn’t been settled. In 
my 10 years, this is the first time it has happened. We would settle the claim 
amicably, even if it’s not valid. It is little more than influence. Some of it does go 
on. It’s not major corruption bit minor things.” – private sector 
Preventing fraudulent insurance claims is part of doing business of the industry. 
5.5.2 Corporate Governance Reforms in the Insurance Industry 
 
The main corporate governance reform that was introduced into the industry was the 
Insurance Code of Corporate Governance in 2002. It is part of the ongoing reforms in the 
regulation of the industry: 
“It’s getting together. The Insurance Code is being revised, reviewed – it’s being 
tightened. It’s at the early drafting stage between the regulator and the industry. 
It’s going to modernise the industry, it’s dealing with prudential requirements, 
sales, corporate governance. It will have much more teeth; it will build in higher 
fees and fines. Some regulations don’t give the regulator flexibility needed. Any 
change has to be legislated.” – private sector 
The Insurance Code was introduced before the SEC Code and further updated at the end 




requirement that insurance companies separate the role of Chair and CEO/President. 
The SEC Code only requires a justification for the combination of the role: 
“The corporate governance code indicates that the Chairman shall not be 
President which is not in the SEC code...the insurance industry is cognisant of 
corporate governance.” – private sector 
The Insurance Commission shares the same sentiments as the SEC in emphasising 
further company director education and training but take a more stringent approach in 
its enforcement: 
“Under the regulation of the Insurance Commission, the corporate governance 
standards in places are weak, and in some places are strong. There are rules and 
courses for corporate governance training. The Commission would also penalise 
the company if you didn’t go through the training. The ICD training and courses 
are basic on what directors should be doing. All executives, directors and officers 
have had to attend it. It is a way of introducing corporate governance. There’s a 
self-governing checklist and we have to submit. It covers typical things an 
organisation should be following. But it takes time for corporate governance to 
be seriously considered.” –private sector 
“The Philippine government institutions show their commitments on raising the 
corporate governance standard by implementing Code on Corporate Governance 
applying to local corporations, including insurance companies. Besides (and we 
speak only of the insurance industry), all directors or trustees of insurance 
companies, reinsurance companies and mutual benefit associations as well as 
officers with a rank of Vice President are required to attend a one-day training 
and orientation course on corporate governance conducted by duly accredited 
training providers of the regulator.” – Manulife 
The Code also provides for the rotation of auditors: 
“The Insurance Code provides changing external auditors every 3 years. Our 
current auditor is in its second year of auditing, the board selected the auditor 
from an accredited list. In order to make that list the auditor had to have 
Insurance Commission accreditation, meet licensing standards, experience of 




Similar to SEC regulated companies, audited statements are the main way for the 
regulator to ensure companies in the industry are complying with its requirements: 
“We provide copies of our audited statements. The audit reports meet 
international standards. For the insurance industry, it’s an accreditation 
requirement, an audit for the insurance company, and to certify certain standards 
of audit so the licence can be renewed. The SEC is required to receive a copy of 
our audited financial statements. The Insurance Commission does annual audits 
and is part of their regular review. Under accreditation standards, the auditor is 
an agent of the regulator and the auditor has to report any activity that is 
unscrupulous.” – private sector 
Unlike the PSE, there are no corporate governance guidelines for insurance companies. 
According to my interviewee, this is to the detrimental to the industry: 
“There are no corporate governance guidelines. There is an industry association 
which is trying to set up rules. But there is no policing. So it’s badly run, it suffers 
in the end with the insured in the market place. The major MNCs do corporate 
governance on a stringent level than the locals. It would take a big education 
campaign. Corporate governance is more about education than anything else.” – 
insurance company 
While corporate governance has taken a foothold in the industry, the main insurance 
reforms that have had the most impact are aspects of the Code that tightened and 
increased the capitalisation requirements. They overshadowed the nascent corporate 
governance reforms as the main thrust of these capitalisation requirements was to 
consolidate the non-life segment of the industry. 
During my data collection, a standoff occurred between the lobby group, the Philippine 
Insurers and Reinsurers Association or PIRA representing 93 non-life Insurance 
companies and the Insurance Commissioner. This episode was an insight into why any 
regulatory reforms in the Philippines can be protracted and how the political 
appointment system gives way to instability. 
5.5.3 The Ousting of the Insurance Commissioner 
 




corporate governance with. Unlike the other three regulatory institutions that directly 
dealt with corporate governance in the private sector, I was not successful in 
interviewing the then Insurance Commissioner, Evangelina Escobillo. I later found out 
that my data collection period coincided with the turbulent time for the organisation 
and the industry in general.  
Escobillo, amongst three interviewees, was held in high esteem as a reputable, highly 
competent public servant and reformer: 
“The government has been effective in the industry. The Insurance 
Commissioner Escobillo has actuarial training and is a highly accomplished 
technocrat. She used to be the Landbank (government-owned bank) head…The 
previous Insurance Commissioner was kicked out, asked to resign as he had 
alienated quite a few people. There is a lot of politics behind it. Escobillo is 
tough. She’s heading in the right direction. By and large [the Insurance 
Commissioners] are political appointments. The last two commissioners have 
been political, the other was a career man. What’s good about Escobillo is that 
she’s a technocrat. She knows what she’s done. Her background lends that 
experience to a regulatory institution.” – private sector 1 
“[I asked him about the brouhaha over the insurance commission’s consolidation 
and reforms] The consolidation of the insurance industry, it has already 
happened in the banks. She won’t be out of a job. Vangie knows what she’s 
doing.” – private sector 2 
“Insurance Commissioner Escobillo has been very active in improving governance 
in the sector.” –BSP 
However, one interviewee made an off-the-cuff moment that encapsulated the feelings of 
those who did not share the same sentiment as the above three: 
“I’ve spoken to some of the insurance industry owners and they can’t stomach 
that woman.” – private sector 3 
In June 2007, Escobillo tried to implement reforms under Department Order 27-2006 
(Insurance Memorandum Circular, 2006), which would increase the capital adequacy 




directly affect the operations and viability of the smaller insurance companies in the 
non-life industry. The Order was well received by the large life insurance players (Remo 
2007c) but strongly resisted by non-life firms headed by the industry lobby group, 
Philippine Insurers and Reinsurers’ Association (PIRA) (Remo 2007d).  
Lobbying against a reform that disagreed with one’s circumstance proceeded to full 
effect, including muck-raking to undermine the reputation of the Commissioner: 
“The Insurance Commissioner [Evangelina Escobillo] wants to make changes and 
has stepped on a few toes and alienated some powerful people. Even if the 
company is a small, the principal could still be powerful and well-connected…[in 
the Philippines] if you don’t like someone, you tend to do some rumour-
mongering. The major players have not been alienated but [she has alienated] 
some powerful players who run small insurance businesses.” – private sector 1 
A full-page newspaper ad paid for by the lobby group, PIRA, criticising the Commission’s 
reforms appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on the 8th of June 2007 as the scan on 
the next page shows. 
I sent PIRA a lengthy email asking if they wished to discuss their criticisms of the 
regulator in the ad and the reforms in the industry. In particular I was interested in the 
second last sentence of the ad as I found it unusual to see corporate governance applied 
in such a context. 
“We need an Insurance Commission that would guide us in transforming the 
industry cognisant of the need to protect and serve the public, and compliant 
with the principles of Good Corporate Governance.” – PIRA ad 
PIRA never responded.  
I asked a couple of my interviewees what they thought of the lobby group’s ad. One 
pointed out the political nature of the ad: 
“The PIRA Ad - the Commission jumped the gun on releasing the information. 
It’s based on poor information. There is also a political reason behind it. The 
Commissioner is trying to make changes to strengthen the industry but 
notwithstanding that, in response by the Commission and the Department of 




true. Much of the industry has changed that affects the tax application. There are 
lots of products and premiums. The industry doesn’t withhold their tax 
payments.” – private sector 1 
Exhibit 8: Scan of PIRA advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 June 







Another interviewee was in disbelief when I showed him the ad. In the context of using 
corporate governance to promote their argument, he responded: 
“Escobillo is looking at the actuarial risks of insurers and so she raised the capital 
requirements. PIRA is representative of small insurers. There are a lot of small 
companies. The small companies are not happy with the taxes and they are not 
happy with Escobillo raising the capital requirements. So they squealed… Good 
corporate governance starts with corporations and their fiduciary responsibilities. 
[The small companies] invoked good corporate governance in the PIRA ad as 
eventually everybody would invoke God.” – private sector 4 
Thus, in the case of this ad, the corporate governance discourse effectively requested the 
opposite. Corporate governance had become a loaded phrase with political overtones. 
This very public display of open conflict between the regulated and the regulator is 
unsavoury in Filipino culture. Why such a public display? According to my interviewee, 
it was a struggle for power of the regulated trying to impose its will on the regulator: 
“It’s nothing personal is the message [of the PIRA ad]. Never tell the regulator to 
her face that you’re being unfair. We don’t like confrontation here. There are 
ambiguities. Some things never get resolved. PIRA wants power of appointment. 
Their message is: regulators who can’t handle people they’re regulating should be 
kicked out. By invoking good corporate governance, they’re taking the high 




Given how the reforms were seen as a way to largely promote, consolidate and reform a 
fragmented sector the news of Escobillo’s sacking in August 2007 did catch me by 
surprise: 
“President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo sacked Insurance Commissioner Evangeline 
Escobillo whose tough reforms had earned her many detractors along with 
several graft charges, by accepting her courtesy resignation. She is replaced with 
one of her predecessors, ex-IC chief Eduardo Malinis42
Such is the start-stop reform process in the Philippines. The attacks on her person 
proved to be too much and so the issues that were underlying her reform remained. She 
was replaced by the previous commissioner who would not rock the boat as much. The 
departure of the Commissioner was a common occurrence in the country. Regulatory 
authorities who are openly defied by those they regulate are not supported by the 
executive (see Chapter 9). This episode was an open display of the government not 
supporting its public servant or the reforms she was instituting. This echoes Ghosh’s 
observation that the current regulatory environment deters regulators to make 
substantive changes. Even if regulators do wish to exercise their duties, forced 
resignations or legal actions – as in this case - are direct consequences of pro-active 
regulation
…Reports of Escobillo's 
replacement circulated in June, amid calls for her ouster by public-transport and 
insurance agents and brokers because of her alleged counterproductive 
decisions.” (Gonzalez 2007)  
43
5.5.4 AIG and the Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on the Insurance Industry 
.  
 
On 21 June 2007, I attended a joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce Luncheon with the 
                                                     
42 In Tagalog, malinis means ‘clean’. 
43 “Several factors may deter regulators from tackling substantive issues. The first is a lack of 
industry knowledge and experience, which is natural given that regulators are often drawn from 
civil-service backgrounds, but difficult to address unless salaries can be made sufficiently 
attractive to attract practitioners to work in regulatory agencies. The second is a lack of 
protection from legal action; this can be addressed by laws granting suitable immunity. Third is a 
fear of political interference or of displeasing powerful market participants who could separate 
them from their jobs. A high turnover of regulatory staff, who are commonly rotated across 
departments, ministries, or agencies, or headhunted by the market, can also reduce an agency’s 
capacity to retain the necessary knowledge and expertise and thus the capacity to regulate 
effectively. A final factor that can seriously compromise effective enforcement is fragmented 




then British CEO of the then largest insurance company in the world American 
Insurance Group (AIG), Martin Sullivan, as guest speaker. Sullivan was on a flying visit of 
the East Asian subsidiaries of AIG. AIG through its subsidiary PhilAm Life has had a 
presence in the Philippines since 1947 and celebrated its 60th year in the country. In his 
speech to the audience, Sullivan emphasised the potential growth of the country: 
“AIG wishes success in the Philippines so that it can catch up and experience 
growth like the rest of Asia. The Philippines can be the bridge between the USA 
and East Asia.”- Martin Sullivan, 2007 AIG CEO 
On the issue of corporate governance, Sullivan emphasised the importance of 
transparency: 
“Transparency in corporate governance [is necessary] to attract FDI. In attracting 
FDI, there must be connected standards and a transparent level playing field in 
the country. All must be playing on the same field if you’re looking at investor 
confidence and increased trade in country. Transparency is important in the level 
playing field. Nobody wants corruption. You can be compliant and have good 
corporate governance. It is not mutually exclusive. The last thing any investor 
wants is corruption and increased corruption reduces foreign investment.” – 
Sullivan 
I submitted a question asking Sullivan his views about the challenges and weaknesses of 
the corporate governance environment in the Philippines. He paused as he could not 
answer for the Philippines but instead, he spoke about the experience of AIG in the mid-
2000s when the company had been targeted by shareholder activists over accounting 
irregularities (Minow 2008). He stated the company was undergoing internal reform: 
“Good governance is expected for all corporations around the world. They vary 
but they shouldn't. Before we received a 2/10 score in corporate governance in the 
USA. Now it's 9/10. We are now a role model of corporate governance 26 months 
after the corporate crisis, and we are asked on corporate governance. The 
Philippines needs to establish to clear and transparent guidelines for people to 





Sullivan also spoke of AIG as a good corporate citizen being at the vanguard of the 
climate change debate: 
“We have a clear position on climate change. We were the first US insurance 
company with a climate change policy. We are the world's largest environmental 
insurer. In the climate change arena, we look at carbon testing, and CSR in 
investment strategies. We are investing in companies that take CSR seriously. 
You can believe the science or not but our planet is becoming a warmer place. If 
we're good citizens, we'd be creating life for generation after generation.” - 
Sullivan 
Later that year, the global financial crisis erupted and AIG was caught in the centre of 
the maelstrom as the underwriter of unsavoury financial instruments that underpinned 
the present crisis. (Shelp 2009) This event exposed the hypocrisy of Sullivan’s rhetoric. 
He, whose hands I briefly shook at that luncheon in June 2007 and who spoke of good 
corporate governance, had presided over the near-extinction of his company. (Sherwell 
2008)  
The recent CEOs who were in charge of AIG were paraded before the US Senate 
Committee. (US House Oversight Committee 2008) AIG was bailed out by the American 
government and was deemed too big to fail given its extensive and web of business 
interests in the USA and around the world including the Philippines.  
The AIG near-collapse has had two effects, firstly on the immediate future of its 
Philippine subsidiary and secondly, the effect on the insurance industry in general. At 
the time of writing AIG’s Philippine subsidiary, PhilAm Life held a 35% market share in 
the industry. PhilAm Life’s assets were P108.3B in December 2007, a third of the entire 
industry’s P367B (Rimando 2008b). In a follow-up interview I conducted my interviewee 
submitted a coda on the effect of AIG’s collapse: 
“PhilAm in the Philippines has around 35% of the life insurance market and it is 
up for sale. A couple of PhilAm’s subsidiaries have already been sold (e.g. its 
bank). AIG is selling many assets around the region and is looking for minority 
partners hopefully to support repayment of the loan. While it is true that “AIG” 
could go down, the reality is that AIG cannot access policyholders’ funds which 




uncertainty if PhilAm’s parent went bust – policyholders here would be ok.” – 
private sector (2009 update) 
Reforms that Escobillo was trying to implement in 2007 to increase the financial war 
chests of insurance companies in order to absorb external shocks were similar to the 
unpopular reforms that the banking regulator had undertaken earlier (Balea 2008). The 
piecemeal reform of the insurance industry has resulted in the country lagging behind 
the region and the weak capitalisation of some of the smaller firms has deterred 
consumer confidence in the sector 
“The regulator was apparently caught between a rock and a hard place. Chiong 
explained the order would guarantee the safety of investments of consumers, but 
was too ambitious for small players whose sales and returns are not really that 
high. She said they had to compromise.”(Balea 2008) 
“Insurance industry reforms are progressing in a typical fashion – where differing 
parties views are accommodated in respect of implementation of new 
regulations. Commissioner Escobillo was dismissed (and I believe no longer in 
the country) and the retired commissioner (Malinis) is back until President 
Arroyo leaves office in 2010. The increases in required capitalisation progresses 
albeit at a lower rate while the other aspect – risk based capital has been shelved. 
Previously suspended companies are again operating.” - private sector(2009 
update) 
The global financial crisis and the fate that befell AIG echoed the 1997 Asian crisis and 
the near-collapse of pre-need companies. The reforms instituted by Escobillo were 
vindicated by the events of 2007-2008. 
5.5.5 The Future of the Industry? 
 
Similar to other parts of the private sector, a two-tiered standard of corporate 
governance and professionalism exists in the industry. The leading players have gone 
beyond the minimum capitalisation requirements in place so they can be in synch with 
the rest of the region. The smaller companies face consolidation and greater 
competition. It is foreseeable the Insurance Commission will be occupied in appeasing 




regulated. One interviewee suggested that the structure of the regulatory bodies be 
themselves reformed in improving the corporate governance of companies: 
“I’ve tried to reconcile the SEC and Insurance Commission corporate governance 
standards. The SEC’s is quite detailed but it doesn’t address the insurance 
industry. There are a number of independent corporate governance standards 
that are issued [and the issue is] which has the higher priority. The Insurance 
Commission answers to the Department of Finance. What can be done in the 
financial services could be a review of the structure of the regulatory bodies 
themselves. Look at the financial services industry in Australia which is under 
one umbrella –it is streamlined across several industries…perhaps [here they 
could have] an administrative split into consumer and prudential aspects as there 
is a long way to go on the consumer side here.” – private sector  
Regulatory institutions in the country are not strong and the independence of the 
regulators is easily undermined. Public displays of dissent are common and when there is 
a lack of support for the reforms (from the regulated and/or the executive) then that 
undermines the imprimatur of the regulator as the arbiter, and referee of a level playing 
field. The Insurance Commission is indicative of this. All regulators covered in this 
chapter are in different stages of becoming truly independent – independent of 
government, politicians, and vested interests. Until such a time when strong, 
independent regulatory institutions are unequivocally supported, these organisations 
will find it challenging to be able to function and exercise their duties, instil consumer 




CHAPTER 6: BUSINESS GROUPS - THE OWNERS OF COMPANIES 
 
This chapter looks at the issues of ownership for companies, and the internal and 
external challenges they face. In the Philippines, most companies are part of large 
conglomerates known as business groups. Business groups are the most common form of 
corporate organisation outside Anglo-American countries. 
The chapter is divided into the following sections: 
• An introduction on family-owned business groups as the dominant form of 
organising in the Philippines, their dominance, ensuring family control, the 
holding company, cross shareholding and the experience of business groups 
under the Marcos dictatorship. 
• Financing business groups is mostly through banks but the capital market is 
providing another outlet; the owners’ attitudes towards listing on the local 
bourse are explored.  
• Complementing the previous section, the investment strategy of business groups 
are discussed and the portfolio strategy of their holding companies. Competition 
between business groups and the present and future investment opportunities in 
the country are mentioned. 
• Relationships with outsiders are explored in the section on shareholders and 
stakeholders of the company. The importance of the majority shareholder is 
undeniable but it is the way business groups treat their minority shareholders 
that signal the true practitioners of corporate governance in the country. This 
section also looks at the dividend policy as it relates to shareholder value, the 
interaction with foreign investors and the stakeholder view of the firm. 
• Similar to other countries in East Asia, an ethnically-based minority, the Filipino-
Chinese business groups, have provided most of the entrepreneurial zeal in the 
country over the last half century. However, this research concludes that identity, 
rather than ethnicity is more relevant amongst Filipino-Chinese business groups. 
• The rise of China is awe-inspiring and could be advantageous to the economic 
growth of Philippines. As part of the Chinese supply chain, some Filipino 
business groups are expanding into this billion-strong market in anticipation of 




system of corporate governance is also discussed and contrasted with the 
Philippines. Ultimately, China’s rise must be placed in the context of its wider 
geopolitical role in the region. 
• Finally, the family values of the owners of business groups are discussed. 
Concerns common to business families such as succession planning and 
generational issues are explored and a case study of a family corporation in 
decline is related. 
This chapter also provides evidence that proves my second hypothesis while disproving 
the third hypothesis in my research: 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance 
practices are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships 
The second hypothesis emphasises the importance of the pre-existing business 
conditions while the third hypothesis shows the inappropriateness and limitations of the 
dominant corporate governance theory of the firm - agency theory - in non-Anglo-
American countries.  
6.1 Dominance of Business Groups 
 
Family-owned business groups are the dominant form of economic organisation in the 
Philippines: 
“Most of the businesses in the Philippines are controlled by single family groups. 
This, of course, poses challenges to an effective overall corporate governance 
framework.” – private sector 1 
Or more intimately as one put it 
“…the company is the extension of the family” – private sector 2 
Family-owned business groups in a weak and authoritarian state have the advantage over 
other forms of economic organising which supports Carney’s hypothesis of business 




“It’s a weak state – see Hutchcroft on the relationship between business and 
state. Hutchcroft’s book is set in the banking context. The role of the families, 
eventhough you can talk about the problems of corruption, there is also the 
history of some in the private sector with intent to strengthen themselves at the 
expense of the public.” – academic 
“The advantage [of family corporations] is quick decisions are made faster. The 
view is long term and not short-term decisions. There is closer coordination with 
exceptions…In the Asian culture, if you look at which are the successful entities, 
most of the successful ones are family-owned corporations. They decide fast, they 
look long-term. If you’re [not family run], you tend to look on the short-term. If 
you’re a family corporation, you look in 5 years’, 10 years’ time. You can’t compare 
developed countries and developing countries.” – private sector 3 
Thus, in this work, the umbrella term ‘business groups’ cover other colloquialisms such 
as family corporations (FAMCORs) and commercial industrial groups (CIGs). Business 
groups in the Philippines are characterised by kinship ties with ownership dominated by 
one individual and/or one family. Some companies are dynastic business groups having 
been in the same family for generations, while others are new entrepreneurs. The 
phenomenon of old money versus new money is not unfamiliar in the Philippines: 
“The Sys founded and grew [their business]. This is the same with the 
Gokongweis. They started from below. The Ayalas have always been there for 
long, long time now. New players such as Andrew Tan, Lucio Tan, George Ty. 
Ty’s family wasn’t poor as he built from previous wealth, invested it and spin-off 
its growth. Jo Concepcion (RFM) was there after the war – a spin-off from a 
separate organisation.” – private sector 4 
Business groups are the norm in the East Asian corporate landscape. This was observed 
by one of my interviewees: 
“[The Philippine business groups is] not dissimilar to family corporate entities 
with the exception of Japan and Korea. Most of the region has companies where 
control is in one large company. [We] mimic models of publicly listed companies, 




Sheng), the Philippines is no exception – the Ayalas, SMC. What is underlying 
[this] is the ability of families to recognise these developments.” – private sector 5 
The following table from Forbes Asia shows the richest 25 individuals/families in the 
country with their business interests and/or affiliations: 
Table 27: Top 25 Richest Individuals/Families in the Philippines in 2009 (Forbes 
2009) 




1 Henry Sy SM Investment Corporation 3800 
2 Lucio Tan PNB, PAL, Asia Brewery  1700 
3 Jaime Zobel de Ayala Ayala Corporation 1200 
4 Andrew Tan Alliance Global Group, Megaworld 850 
5 John Gokongwei JG Summit 720 
6 Tony Tan Caktiong Jollibee Foods 710 
7 Eduardo Cojuangco Jr San Miguel Brewery 660 
8 Enrique Razon Jr Container Terminal Services 620 
9 Manuel Villar Vista Land; Philippine Senate 
President 
530 
10 George Ty Metrobank 515 
11 Emilio Yap Philtrust Bank 510 
12 Iñigo & Mercedes 
Zobel 
Mermac 440 
13 Beatrice Campos Unilab 410 
14 Vivian Que Azcona Mercury Drug 390 
15 Oscar Lopez Lopez Group 350 
16 Andrew Gotianun FilInvest Development 310 
17 David Consunjui DMCI Holdings 300 
18 Robert Coyiuto Jr Oriental Petroleum and Minerals 290 
19 Alfonso Yuchengco Yuchengco Group of Companies 230 
20 Mariano Tan Unilab 180 
21 Menardo Jimenez GMA Network 160 
22 Gilberto M. Duavit GMA Network 159 
23 Felipe Gozon GMA Network 135 
24 Jon Ramon Aboitiz Aboitiz Equity Ventures 125 
25 Betty Ang Monde Nissin 120 
 
Furthermore, business groups in the Philippines have filled the institutional void 
normally reserved for government. A weak government with a limited amount of 
resources which does not have the efficiency to apply them to its utmost effectiveness 
does not have the capability to fulfil all its institutional and infrastructure obligations 
(see Carney 2008: 598). 




area with the development of the central business districts of Makati and Mandaluyong. 
Indeed, several comments were made to me during my fieldwork compared and 
contrasted how the landowners developed these two business districts with minimal 
contribution from the state.  
However, while they fulfil part of the institutional void, business groups themselves are 
not substitutes for government nor do they wish to be substitutes for government. I 
would often hear comments such as “We are doing what government is supposed to be 
doing. This is supposed to be their job, not ours.” Business groups and their owning 
families - at least the ones I interviewed – showed little desire to rule the country even 
though their economic interests rival that of the state. 
6.1.1 Downsides to this Dominance 
 
There is a downside to the dominance of business groups in the Philippines. The private 
sector is an uneven playing field between affiliated companies and unaffiliated 
companies overlooked by government which enforces rules and regulations haphazardly 
and inconsistently: 
“Certainly there is an uneven playing field. It remains a serious problem. This 
family-based form of economic power translates into familial politics. It’s an issue 
of control that’s why the stock market hasn’t developed. There are conglomerate 
problems: walls dividing various aspects of investment and banking are not 
followed.” –academic 1 
The domination of business groups also deters continuous investment and deters 
competition: 
“Most companies are owned by families, there is limited liquidity.” – private 
sector 1 
“There is no way to do business [in the Philippines] without working with a 
business family. Look at Metrobank. Schools and colleges are owned by families – 
other than the religious orders. There is no sector in this economy that is not 
dominated by a family business. It makes us difficult to move, to grow. [Their] 




For foreign entrants, if they have not been deterred by the ownership restrictions, they 
face an uphill challenge to enter sectors which are dominated by certain business groups: 
“The top oligarchies here of which there are 12 organisations are diverse in their 
holdings, so for a large foreign group to challenge that, it’d be difficult.” – 
consultant  
Affiliating and allying with a business group allows them a foot in the door. Indeed, that 
was an advice given to me at a chamber of commerce meeting on how to successfully 
operate in the country. The business groups are reflective of the oligarchic nature of the 
country: 
“People who affect the life of the country (political intellectual circle) is very 
limited. Elitist.” – private sector 2 
Internally, a business group structure of inter-affiliated companies fosters a culture of 
insider information: 
“Guys who own company have superior information. The owners are insiders – 
unlike in the USA where the insiders are managers. [You need to] increase the 
right information provided to make an informed judgement and not be taken for 
a ride.” – private sector 3 
Business group structures may facilitate opacity which makes it difficult for the capital 
market to function efficiently. 
6.2 A Matter of Ownership: Inapplicability of Agency Theory 
 
Business groups which make up the majority of the real private sector of the Philippines 
still resolutely hold and control the power in their companies. In Anglo-American 
corporate governance, a major shareholder or blockholder is considered to be one who 
owns around 5% of total ownership. In the Philippines, a 5% ownership is considered a 
very minor stake. Most groups would have a major shareholder that would own at least 
over 50% of the company. Control is in the majority: 
“To balance the major shareholder’s interests of shareholder intent is realistic - 
it’s human nature. Agency corporate governance issues here are different. It is 




problem here. There’s no situation here where the biggest shareholder owns 5%. 
It doesn’t happen. There’s a controlling shareholder, a block ownership and 
minority shareholders.” – economist 
Most of my interviewees spoke about the major owners and the percentage of ownership 
they have. Seen from an Anglo-American context, the extent of their control is 
staggering: 
“The dominant family is the Montinolos. They have 40% ownership of the shares; 
the next is the SM Corporation (Henry Sy) which has 24%. There are foreign 
investors and although they would like to invest in FEU there are not many 
shares available.” – FEU 
“We have two main shareholder groups: Hong-Kong based First Pacific (private 
investment group) and Japan’s NTT Comm (landline) and Docomo (wireless) 
NTT representatives are here as well with NTT within advisers within the 
company in an advisory capacity. Our notable shareholders are Philippine 
Telecoms, Metro Pacific, SSS, NTT Comm, NTT Docomo, and JP Morgan.” – 
PLDT 
“Ayala Corporation is 51% owned by the holding company of the Ayala Family 
named Mermac.  10% owned by Mitsubishi. The rest is owned by the public. 
There are foreign investors: 20% of outstanding shares, around 15-20%” – Ayala 
“[T]here are two major shareholders at 40% each and the remaining 20% is 
widely distributed among individuals, firms, Filipino or foreign.” – Petron 
As one pointed out, having big blocks mean a great deal of control and influence is 
exercised: 
“Once you get that size, a shareholder block of around 35% the block is still in 
control due to the sheer amount of money involved. We are still a relatively small 
company so if we list at all the number of shareholders will be spread out. One 
shareholder has a 20% ownership but there isn’t one shareholder that has 
control. They are all buddies. We’re generating money on our ROI.” – unlisted 
company 




principal-agent is rarely an issue. Based on the ownership structure of Philippine 
companies, hypothesis 3 is disproven: 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance 
practices are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships 
Agency theory can only be applied in companies and countries where there is widely 
dispersed ownership, not concentrated ones. 
6.3 The Holding Company  
 
Astride the largest Philippine business groups is the holding company. The holding 
company is the apex of control as it represents the family’s ownership interests in a 
corporate structure. Justifying this corporate form in a developing country, Wright 
quotes Ayala CEO Zobel on this use: 
“The issues with respect to conglomerates have been argued about at academic 
and investment levels, and there are many valid arguments on both sides…We [in 
the holding company] have a slight tinge of the merchant banks of old who 
provided capital and management in emerging markets settings globally.” –Zobel 
in Wright (2006:26-28) 
The holding company would normally contain the smallest number of employees in a 
business group structure. Below are two comments from one small holding company and 
the more substantial holding company of the Ayala group.  
“There are 18 employees here. It is a holding company so it’s a skeleton 
staff…almost like a shelf company. We have subsidiaries including one which has 
200+ employees. We own 60% of it.” –small business group 
“Ayala Corporation (AC) the holding company has around 100 employees. In 
1998, we had an early retirement program and farmed out services to subsidiaries 
or outside companies. In Manila Water, there are around 3,000 employees. In BPI 
around 5,000; at Globe: 3000… Integrated has around 15,000 mostly based at 





The importance of the holding company for business groups is that they do provide the 
overall strategic guidance over the rest of the group: 
“Yes [the holding company] does [provide strategic guidance]. The general 
guidelines are formulated at the listed [holding] company. This is translated to 
each operating company. We do get guidance from them. The overall direction is 
directed by them.” – company subsidiary interviewee 
Where the holding company is listed, the controlling family would have majority control 
through various related entities. Below is comment from Aboitiz Equity Ventures, the 
holding company of the Aboitiz Group explaining their ownership structure: 
“Approximately 65% of Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) is owned by the family. 
About 7% is owned by two foundations controlled by the Aboitiz Family. The 
balance is widely dispersed. We have over 10,000 stockholders, including various 
foreign institutional investors.” – AEV  
The following figure contains the ownership structure of the Aboitiz holding company: 
Figure 25: Ownership Structure of a Listed Holding Company 
 
For the Lopez Family, the listed holding company is majority owned by a Lopez 
investment vehicle, BenPres, which in turn is 100% owned by the family: 
“As of May 8, 2007, Lopez, Inc. owns 55.31% of BenPres outstanding shares. 
Lopez, Inc. is owned by holding companies which are 100% owned by the Lopez 
Family.”-BenPres 













Table 28: The Top 10 Shareholders of BenPres as of March 31, 2007 
Top 
Shareholders 
Names No. of Shares % 
1 Lopez, Inc. 2,533,012,402 55.29 
2 PCD Nominee Corp. 992,582,424 21.66 
3 PCD Nominee Corp. 720,123,760 15.72 
4 Paul Gerard B. Del Rosario 104,467,000 2.28 
5 Manuel M. Lopez &/or Ma. Teresa 
Lopez 
10,985,000 0.24 
6 Oscar M. Lopez 8,597,182 0.19 
7 Lucio Yan 7,450,000 0.16 
8 Siao Tick Chong 7,128,500 0.16 
9 Manuel M. Lopez 7,089,114 0.15 
10 Alan L. Montelibano 6,629,604 0.14 
 
For one unlisted company with multiple-owners, major blocks continue to dominate the 
holding company structure: 
“In the holding company, there’s a significant corporation just under 40% that 
represents the owner. In the holding company each of these significant 
shareholders have various companies in the region. They haven’t listed anywhere 
– so its corporate governance standards are as private.” – private sector 1 
The holding company plays a pivotal role in the Philippine business group structure. 
6.3.1 Ownership Complexity: A Web of Companies 
 
Having a web of companies or cross-shareholdings in the business group structure is also 
reflective of the volatility of the Philippine political environment.  The effective control 









The explanation of this figure follows, pointing out how through an intricate ownership 
structure, control of a company by a dominant player can be achieved even if the player 
does not own a majority ownership of the business: 
“Consider a family that owns 60% of a holding company named Holding Inc. The 
rest, 40%, the investing public owns. But since 60% ownership is majority, the 
family effectively controls 100% of Holding Inc. Thus the family’s control to cash 
flow ratio is 100% to 60% ownership or 100%/60% = 1.67 
“Suppose Holding Inc owns 60% of A1 Inc. Since the family owns only 60% of 
Holding inc., the family owns 60% of 60% of A1 Inc. or 36%. The rest, 64%, the 
invest public owns. But since 60% ownership of Holding inc., is majority, 
Holding Inc. effectively controls 100% of A1 Inc. Since the family effectively 
controls 100% of A1 Inc. Thus, the family’s control to cash flow ratio is 100% 
control to 36% ownership or 100%/36% = 2.78 
                                                     
44 Dumlao, Luis (2006) Economic Assessment of Corporate Governance, Loyola Schools Review, 5: 
31-64 
Holding Inc.
* Family owns 60%
* Family effectively controls 100%
* Control to cash flow ratio: 1.67
A1 Inc.
* Holding company owns 60%; family owns 
36%
* Family effectively controls 100%
* Control to cash flow ratio: 2.78
A2 Inc.
*A1 Inc owns 60%; family owns 21.6%
* Family effectively controls 100%
* Control to cash flow ratio: 4.63
B1 Inc.
* Holding company owns 60%; family owns 
36%
* Family effectively controls 100%
Control to cash flow ratio: 2.78
B2 Inc.
* B1 Inc owns 60%; family owsn 21.6%
* Family effectively controls 100%




“Suppose A1 Inc. owns 60% of A2 Inc. Since the family owns 60% of Holding Inc., 
and Holding inc owns 60% of A1 Inc., the family owns 60% of 60% of 60% of A2 
Inc., or 21.6%. The rest, 78.4% the investing public owns. But since 60% 
ownership of A1 Inc is majority, A1 Inc effectively controls 100% of A2 Inc. Since 
the family effectively controls 100% of A1 Inc., the family effectively controls 100% 
of A2 Inc. Thus the family’s control to cash flow ratio is 100% control to 21.6% 
ownership or 100%/21.6% = 4.63 
“A similar story goes if A2 Inc. has a majority control of other companies. Even if 
the family has little ownership of a certain company, it controls 100% of the firm. 
Even if the investing public owns an overwhelming majority of a company, it has 
no control of the firm. The same story goes for the right side of the figure, B1 Inc., 
B2 Inc and so on. If the family controls all these companies, these companies will 
behave consistently wit ht the best interest of the family…But this is not 
necessarily in the best interest of the investing public.” (Dumlao 2006: 39-41) 
The family’s holding company may own a majority stake in one company; in turn this 
company owns a majority stake in another company; however the effective ownership of 
the family’s holding company is less than the majority and may be a minority stake – 
however the effective control rests with the holding company: 
“This is a web of businesses, of companies. Ayala Corporation can be 49% owned 
by the public but 51% still owned by Mermac. Mermac is 100% controlled by the 
family. Another example is the Cojuangco Group of Companies with the sugar 
mill company. There’s a company in Negros. The majority, the biggest owner has 
less than 5% ownership of the company but up to 60% of ownership is scattered 
1% or 2% stakes - all belong to the Cojuangcos, they have worked at this…More 
like dummy companies controlled by 1 or 2 people.”  – commentator 
Such transactions are widely covered by the media. The effects of an intricate cross-
shareholding benefiting the holding company are encapsulated in criticisms of the 
control structure of several companies including that of the electrical company Meralco. 
The political connections of the owning family and the resultant higher power costs for 
the consumer exemplify how business is done in the country. Meralco was explicitly 




“…the culture of rent seeking is to capture politicians - to capture the decision 
making so you’re not accountable. For example, with the case of Meralco – it’s 
owned by the Lopez Family. That’s why we have high power costs. The Lopez 
Family only owns 18% of the company and the government owns more. So what 
do they do? Through their power company, they purchase at a higher rate and 
sell it back to Meralco. There is no good governance there. The Lopez Family has 
a minority listed company but what they’re doing is to the detriment of 
government, consumers and shareholders. The oligarchies here are above the law 
in a weak state. They own the politicians.” –private sector 1 
Such a web of shareholdings was a contributing factor to the collapse of the Italian dairy 
company Parmalat owned by the Tanzi Family (Clarke 2007); while in the wake of the 
East Asian Crisis, Korean business groups, known as chaebols were pressured to reform 
for eventual dismantling of these corporate complex structures (See Chung 2005 and Li 
et al 2006): 
“In Korea, it was like that before, now they have disallowed it. They forbid cross-
ownership for small companies, but not on listed ones. They haven’t adapted it 
more here. You just need to look at Parmalat.” – academic 
The application of this intricate web with varying degrees of ownership ensures control 
across entities does query the form of corporate governance in the country: 
“Family-owned corporations (FOC) are so dominant in the country as in many 
countries in Europe. One thing I’ve observed is companies in these countries 
with greater concentration ownership have poorer corporate governance. There 
are specific corporate governance processes of protection of minority 
shareholders. Is management competent? There are layers and layers of 
ownership. The main family have minority ownership but has 100% of control. 
It’s a problem of control to ownership ratio.” – academic 
Does such a structure hinder the implementation of good corporate governance and 
effective functioning of corporations? Intricate ownership complexity is not directly 
causal, but may facilitate for poor corporate governance:  
“The million dollar question is how do you address it? It is not as if the case in 




reason here, there’s a trend, those who are controlled by families have poorer 
corporate governance. This structure allows for poor corporate governance. But 
having this structure doesn’t mean poor corporate governance but allows poor 
corporate governance. Just like [trade] liberalisation allows financial stability, 
some realise you have to stop liberalisation for stability – the stability to be poor 
or stably rich. [Ownership complexity] only allows [poor corporate governance] 
but doesn’t cause it. It’s not only a Filipino phenomenon. ” – academic 
Another perspective behind this ownership complexity takes the political perspective. 
Does the political- environment of the Philippines make this type of ownership structure 
an effective buffer against a predatory state? Is ownership complexity an economic 
justification of protecting one’s assets? 
The Lopez Family, for example, became a vocal opponent under dictator Marcos’ reign. 
Consequently, the Lopez Family paid for this dissent and their companies under the 
Marcos regime were expropriated and assets transferred to cronies of Marcos. It was only 
after the dictatorship fell were long (and sometime protracted) formal proceedings 
undertaken to have these assets formally transferred back to the Lopez Group. The 
Lopez Family also had the support of President Corazon Aquino which allowed the 
family to “to reacquire a substantial portion of their original assets” as a form of natural 
justice in the wake of the Marcos years (Lopez & Gonzalez 2001: 118). As one interviewee 
pointed out, the resilience of business groups and their structure has been shaped by 
surviving the tumultuous political environment of the Philippines: 
“The Ayalas, the Aboitizes, they are better governed. They anticipated the [East 
Asian] crisis and worked well during and after it. The Ayalas, they survived two 
World Wars and Martial Law. You don’t do it ad-lib; you do good management 
and corporate governance.” – corporate governance advocate 
The next section is a commentary and examines the dark period of the dictatorship when 
some business groups were targeted by Marcos and his cronies. For some business 





6.4 Business Groups and the Predatory State –Effects of Marcos’ Dictatorship 
 
“Hostile environments create a situation where individual entrepreneurs face 
significant moral dilemmas. They can either comply with the law, thus forfeiting 
the success of their businesses and their own economic well-being, or they can 
attempt to work within the context of a corrupt system in order to survive. Most 
choose survival.” (Dyer and Mortensen 2005: 253) 
The years of the Marcos dictatorship still loom largely in the minds and hearts of the 
business elite of the Philippines. Those long years were turbulent, unsatisfactory and 
uncertain for the private sector. 
For some interviewees, they saw the early years of Marcos' ruling as an opportunity lost. 
In those early days, people obeyed, did what they were told under his rule and the ‘what 
if’ possibility that certain choices in economic development could have been made and 
applied. For others, they see their fellow Filipinos as an undisciplined lot, where family 
reign supreme because there is a lack of trust in the main arms of civil society such as the 
judiciary, the government, the police and other arms of government. Therefore, in the 
absence of trust in the techno-bureaucratic elite, the family reigns supreme because 
families are the underwriters of last resort: economically, emotionally, and 
psychologically. 
The opportunities were lost as absolute power absolutely corrupted Marcos regime. 
Striking fear into people’s hearts can only last for a brief period of time and as history has 
shown, dictatorships are a rather unstable form of governing. 
In this sense, when talking about the Marcos years, there was some ambivalence 
amongst interviewees. Some yearned for a 'powerful' figure such as Singapore's Lee Kwan 
Yew who turned a pirate-infested ridden island into one of the most successful island 
economies of East Asia in the latter half of the 20th Century. However, none doubted 
that Marcos' benign power became malignant.  
Instead of Lee Kwan Yew, or pro-business dictators such as Francisco Franco or even 
Augusto Pinochet, the Philippines was saddled with a Robert Mugabe – whose early 
years brought so much promise (and perhaps hope) but whose lengthy rule oversaw a 




Under Marcos’ rule, selected favourites and cronies, received rewards. In some cases, 
whole companies were seized and transferred to favoured Marcos cronies. 
At the nadir of Marcos' rule, there were few business groups that did not feel the effects 
of his avarice. Should Marcos turn his eye on a select group of companies, it became a 
game of cat and mouse: a politically risky strategy of ensuring the control of your 
companies without offending the political ruler of the country. This game was almost 
always to the detriment of the business groups critical of the regime.  
6.4.1 Managing Political Risk 
 
However, anecdotal evidence suggested that one strategy to offset the interest of Marcos 
in a business group was to invite foreign ownership in a company. Marcos' power was 
limited by the natural borders of the Philippines - he was a dictator of disparate islands. 
Should a business group have a major foreign investor present in its companies, it would 
be to Marcos' detriment to seriously offend another foreign government if he decided to 
expropriate the assets of a foreigner whose political masters were bigger and mightier - 
economically, politically and militarily  - than an archipelago on the western coast of the 
Pacific. 
Managing this political risk has been applied before in corporate history with varying 
degrees of success. In Mitterrand France, the presidential decree of nationalising 
strategic sectors and companies was met with fear, loathing and futile acceptance. 
Making overtures to a foreign investor to mitigate government expropriation is not an 
uncommon business strategy. Indeed one French bank invited the “U.S. Treasury to 
threaten France with retaliation if the takeover went through. The Treasury refused.” 
(Byron, 1981)45
                                                     
45 This 1980s strategy had ramifications for another business twenty years on. For the French 
cosmetics company L’Oreal - in anticipation of the Mitterrand regime - invited the Swiss 
multinational Nestlé to take an ownership stake in the company in 1974. This fear proved to be 
unfounded as Mitterrand did not seize the company nor saw the fashion sector as strategic 
enough. Nevertheless, Nestlé’s ongoing ownership stake in the company through the decades 
means that in light of the global financial crisis and family disputes of the L’Oreal owners, the 
Swiss conglomerate is being touted as a potential buyer of the French company. (The Economist 
2009a)  
 Unintended consequences emerge when the lines between political and 





6.4.2 The Legacy of the Dictatorship 
 
The legacy of Marcos continues to loom large in the Philippines and the shadows of his 
rule continue to reign over the Philippines. In the Philippines, a majority ownership 
rarely goes below 50% because of the fear and loss of ownership and control. The 
psychological effects of the dictatorship cannot be underestimated. Understanding the 
rule of the dictatorship is a start to appreciating why business functions thus - in a highly 
complicated web but necessary way - in the country: 
“[There is a] risk expropriated by the minority – a golden share. If I happen to be 
a powerful local investor whether government or not, I have the golden share – 
powerful to do what or not [and it doesn’t matter how much percentage of 
control you have.” – private sector 1 
“If there is a presence of a significant shareholder on the board - what would they 
do, for example, expropriate and other certain issues. 46
Like various figures throughout history where power is concentrated in one person and 
in one office, Marcos' dispensation of favours was a corrupt process that poisoned the 
efficiency of commerce and hampered the country's economic development. The 
possibility of a repeat of another dictatorship is not a remote possibility amongst owners 
of business groups. The attitude to the government can be encapsulated in a great 
mistrust towards the national government.  
” – private sector 2 
The national government under the direction of the executive is capable of expropriation 
(see Chapter 9: Corruption). Expropriation breeds insecurity and uncertainty in a 
business environment. This political risk is not far from the minds of the private sector 
as this is a high political risk that can be unmanageable and unmitigated in a country 
like the Philippines: 
6.4.3 Makati Business Club47
 
For the private sector, one legacy of the Marcos dictatorship was the realisation that an 
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independent voice needed to be established for business. Makati Business Club (MBC) 
was established in 1981 to provide a common outlet for the large business groups who 
were increasingly dissatisfied with the increasing oppression of the regime. Martial law 
had made a mockery of the country’s democratic principles and placed its citizens under 
enormous insecurity. A state of siege had evolved where dissenting voices were 
suppressed. This period of time also saw businesses being seized by Marcos and 
transferred over to his cronies. A divide and conquer rule was implemented and for some 
businesses, it was more secure and safer to be co-opted by the regime than opposing it. 
Some members of the MBC flip-flopped their support to the dictatorship to the 
detriment of their reputation post-dictatorship. 
When the regime fell, MBC fully supported the next presidential administration with the 
transition to democracy under the late President Corazon Aquino. To this day, MBC 
continues to lobby for less protectionism and more liberalisation and is strongly 
supportive of presidential administrations that implement reforms that open up the 
economy as the country has been hobbled by protectionism.(Rushford 2009) This has 
made the Club unpopular with other presidential administrations that do not support 
greater liberalisation. Hence MBC was supportive of the reforms by President Ramos and 
less so of Presidents Estrada and Macapagal-Arroyo. The other notable business lobby 
group, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI) takes a less active 
approach as its membership base is 85% comprised of SMEs and therefore cannot be as 
vocal or independent-minded. Aside from economic reform lobbying, activities of MBC 
include CSR projects, Congresswatch and the Coalition Against Corruption. The MBC 
represents nearly 800 CEOs and senior executives. Membership to MBC is by institution 
with individual representatives nominated to the Club.  
6.4.4 Contribution to Resource Theories 
 
In a highly politicised, unstable and economically corrupt environment, trust reigns 
supreme. Companies that were strongly perceived as allied with the government 
administration, waxed and waned with the popularity of the administration and the 
policies that gave them an advantage (Bello 2005). The country still operates in a climate 
of paranoia. Who you can trust and depend on is the key to doing business in the 




technically the most proficient but whose loyalty is undeniable. It is difficult for an 
outsider to assess why the Philippines has developed thus.  
However, those who lived through the Marcos dictatorship can easily account for their 
fears and provides a strong reason why Philippine business culture can be insular. With 
dispersed ownership but effective control of several companies, a government intent on 
expropriating assets of the private sector will have to unravel the ownership structure of 
a business group before such a process may be completed. The complex ownership 
structure of Philippine business groups may ultimately reflect not only the absolute 
control-orientation of a majority shareholder, but also symptomatic of a defensive 
response to the uncertainties and vagaries of an unstable political-economic 
environment.  
Precisely because the political risks are high in the Philippines that “diversified 
operations of kinship groups may actually facilitate development by compensating for 
the high levels of risk and the lack of organised markets that characterize preindustrial 
societies.” (Lamoreaux 1986) The evidence builds upon, and is consistent with, the 
resource-based view of the firm justifying the continued dominance of family business 
groups in unstable, developing economies (Guillen 2000), and the resource dependence 
theoretical perspective of organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Firms in developing countries expand not only to take advantage of their market 
dominance but also to mitigate the risk of expropriation by a predatory state. 
Conglomerates are large and complex so they have several jewels and crowns to survive 
in an unstable environment. In effect, should a fickle government come into power with 
the view of expropriating company assets, the business group is diversified enough to 
survive such a political move.48
6.5 Financing 
 This perspective of the business group as bulwark against 
a predatory state builds upon the resource theoretical perspectives and also offers future 
explorations for research in the area. 
 
The bank-based model of financing is the most common form of raising capital in the 
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country. Participating in the stock exchange to finance growth is still the domain of a 
few. This section looks at the importance of banks in a business group structure; the 
experience of listing; and the investment strategies of business groups. 
6.5.1 The Banking Industry 
 
The country’s banking industry is fragmented, highly competitive and a growth sector. 
Remittances from Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) - which the country’s economy is 
dependent upon – is allowing competition to flourish in the sector, is changing the 
country’s banking practices to meet the OFW consumer segment, and is providing the 
strategic impetus for international expansion: 
"Remittance flows were facilitated by easier access of overseas Filipinos to formal 
remittance channels....high level of remittances supported by increased presence 
of remittance agents abroad through establishment of overseas centres as well as 
tie-ups with other remittance companies and financial institutions abroad."- BSP 
Governor Tetangco in Lucas (2007) 
“The OFW [phenomenon] means there is a remittance market. There are the 
banks but also other companies that thrive in the market. Western Union came 
here only a couple of years ago and is competing in the remittance market with 
the banks. The banks used to hold the [remittance] money for 15 days [before 
they released it]. Western Union and others have changed that.” – private sector  
“Metrobank has remittance offices in Singapore, USA, Hawaii, Canada, UK, Italy, 
Spain, Germany and Bahamas. Next to the Philippine National Bank, Metrobank 
is the biggest bank that handles remittances. We have 600 branches nationwide. 
For OFWs the service we provide makes it easier for the OFW’s family, who for 
example lives in Ilocos. The OFW sends the remittance from the Middle East, 
and the family can immediately withdraw the money. We have six remittance 
offices in Hong Kong.” - Metrobank 
With 39 large commercial banks, the industry remains attractive for future acquisitions 
with active encouragement from the BSP to merge: 
“China Bank is majority owned by the SM Group which includes the Sy Family. It 




wants to] be more aggressive. China Bank is a very old bank and Sy is interested 
in expanding. After the merger of BDO and Equitable PCI, SMI will have the 
second biggest bank in the Philippines after Metrobank and just ahead of BPI. 
“Over the medium-term the BSP requires us to consolidate. This will encourage 
further consolidation as there are too many players in the industry. Banks are 
scale economies. BDO will consolidate with Equitable. China Bank is growing on 
its own. China Bank is interested in Manila Bank. Manila Bank has many 
branches. SM Investments has 2% and is the significant minority and BDO with 
40%.” – SM  
The banking industry in the Philippines is an attractive growth sector and is ripe for 
consolidation. 
6.5.2 Business Groups and the Central Role of Banks 
 
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 5, banks finance the private sector development of the 
country. Indeed, the large business groups have a bank in their portfolio of companies 
and this reinforces the insider nature of the Filipino business culture: 
“In accessing capital, funding comes from banks owned by families and it still all 
about relationships. “ – ICD  
Arguably the bank is the most important entity in the group and a couple of interviewees 
supported Leff’s (1978) thesis that in the absence of strong capital markets, bank-based 
financing is the best way to go: 
“In the Philippines, a typical Commercial Industrial Group (CIG) would be owned 
by a family. At the core is the family, then the bank, then the other businesses of 
the group. At the centre of the industrial group is the bank owned by the family. 
A CIG exists because of weak capital markets. External finance is not through the 
capital market but sourced through the bank. Some 98% of external finance is 
sourced through the bank system, the rest - 2 or 3% is through the capital market 
(PSE). This is typical of a country where there is bank-based finance and a non-
existent capital market with weak enforcement.” – private sector 1 




banks to finance development. The capital market in other countries finances 
development. Here, there is the comparative advantage of the big players. There 
is an exploitation of the small but numerous shareholders.” – CG workshop 
For one group, the holding company invests in certain areas but needs the backing of 
different banks to finance its investments. This is a cornerstone of the bank-finance 
model: 
“At the holding company we make certain investments. We don’t use internally 
generated funds. Banks are [the] important stakeholders for operations.” – 
private sector 2 
Similarly echoed by another, both local and foreign banks are tapped to provide 
financing for the group beyond its own affiliated bank: 
“As part of AC, the banks would occupy [our] high tier stakeholders. In the past 
and present, AC in all its undertaking, banks are important partners - both 
domestic and foreign banks. After the [East Asian] crisis, we couldn’t borrow 
locally as there were not enough funds and we were restricted by the BSP…In the 
case of AC, we can’t borrow unlimitedly from [the group-affiliated] BPI (Bank of 
the Philippine Islands). So we go to foreign borrowings. From 1995-1997, we 
resorted to USD borrowings from Citibank, Japanese Banks, BSP, and ANZ Bank 
(the latter providing a USD75M loan)”.  – AC 
Banks play a central role in the financing of the private sector due to the weak 
institutional environment of the country. 
6.5.3 Bank Finance vs. Capital-Market Financing 
 
The bank-based model of financing a transaction is generally straightforward. There are 
normally two parties involved: the lender and the borrower. The following figure is the 
simple transaction between the borrower and bank in this model: 
 





By contrast, the capital market requirements mean a complicated process must be 
undertaken involving and satisfying various stakeholders. In addition, a new level of 
disclosure must be made by the listing entity with several stakeholders that need to be 
satisfied. Below is a figure of the capital finance model and the various institutions and 
stakeholders that are involved in the capital market: 
 
Figure 28: Capital Market Model of Financing with a Variety of Stakeholders 
For a developing country like the Philippines, this complicated infrastructure is not ideal 
in an economy where several institutions underwriting the capital market are missing. 
According to one interviewee - an economist - the bank finance model is the easier way 
to finance: 
“Banks are very dominant in the Philippines – around 80% of financing comes 
from the bank. This is the case in many developing countries. In the bank finance 
model, you only need a bank and borrower.” - economist 
In the capital market model which is dominant in most developed countries, a higher 
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“Capital market activity needs a PSE clearing system, payment system, rating 
system, financial analysts and so on. Essentially, what’s done by the bank as 
intermediation. The investor depends on several agencies – PSE, SEC, analysts. 
You need a high level of sophistication to have capital markets and higher levels 
of infrastructure.” – economist 
The Philippines capital market is one of the smallest in the region. Third parties that can 
provide impartial information are still unreliable: 
“There are peaks and troughs although it could be better; there are hardly 
analysts that cover us so the trading activity is limited on our shares.” – private 
sector 1 
“However, at the end of the day, you can’t discount the credit agencies and 
investors who [rely on them to look] at corporate governance [of the company]. 
Corporate governance is an important decision making tool for them to invest.” – 
private sector 2 
What the East Asian Crisis also highlighted was that regulatory institutions in the region 
were unprepared for the speed of the capital outflows that devastated the economies of 
the region: 
“The crisis affected the stock market. For awhile, all stock market followed the 
downward trend with many of them in the Far East excluding Japan. Japan is in 
the big league. All stockmarket activity went down… It’s fine now. From July 2006 
it has increased, gone better, we foresee a better shape of things to come.”-
stockbroker  
The crisis highlighted the downside to unfettered capitalism during periods of 
irrationality. The volatility of the capital market is an issue and reiteratively, the PSE may 
not reflect the economic situation of the country: 
“[The PSE] is sentiment driven market at this stage. [It’s] not accurate, not on the 
street - whether the economy’s doing well or not. It’s likely to be cyclical.” – 
private sector 3 
The 2007 bull-run on the PSE was deemed shallow by one regulator stating that foreign 




“The way of trying to raise money through the capital markets but what kind of 
depth is here? How much of an effect [does the market have on] everything? We 
may be lulled in believing we’re moving. We have perked up, there is an 
adrenalin rush [on the exchange] but how deep is that? How real is it? Hot 
money pulls out if there’s a [Presidential] impeachment filed.” – SEC 
As a largely still developing stock exchange, capital market transactions which can swing 
from exuberance to fear can have a devastating impact on such a small stock market. As 
one interviewee pointed out, the East Asian crisis exposed the capital market model to 
countries so unprepared for its volatility: 
“The East Asian Crisis proved that a system of non-transparency and lack of 
information system can make countries prone to shocks such as ours so that 
there are runs to exit. There were wild swings from exuberance to fear. Since 
then, is there a solidification or free flow of information so that there are no 
surprises? No, adjustments have been discreet. There is always a possibility of 
herding with the bulls running mindlessly. It will ring that way time and again 
and this will always happen with the capital markets.” – private sector 4 
The ravages unregulated financial liberalisation can wreak on countries has prompted a 
debate on whether the capital market model of financing is appropriate and promoted in 
developing countries. World Bank Chief Economist Justin Lin states that the capital 
market model should be dissuaded in developing countries: 
“Stockmarkets are unlikely to be a major force in poor countries in the near 
future. Microfinance companies and other non-bank financial institutions will 
play a more important role in financing poor households. And stockmarkets are 
not the best conduit for providing finance to the small- and medium-sized 
businesses that characterise the early stages of countries’ economic development. 
Instead, the banks will be much more critical when it comes to financing 
companies… Leave the developed markets to worry about how to reform their 
highly evolved financial systems.” -Lin (2009)  
Therefore, Lin suggests that governments of these countries should promote the 
integrity and stability of their existing banking system to encourage entrepreneurs and 




over by other, more established banks. Underlying his argument is developing countries 
do not have the resources for the institutional infrastructure for complex financial 
transactions that capital markets require.  Lin supports the position that in a developing 
country context, simplicity in financing rather than complexity is best suited to the 
majority of companies in the private sector. 
6.5.4 Going to Market: Listing the Businesses  
 
“I discovered a little truism: when you go public you get two things, money and 
trouble, and Cargill has enough of both, thank you.” – James Cargill of Cargill 
Incorporated49
For business groups that have evolved in size and complexity, tapping the capital market 
to meet their growing financing needs is an option some have exercised. The step of 
listing is a paradigm shift as the family business is taken to another level - opening up to 
outsiders. Listing for the largely family-owned business groups can be an emotionally 
charged decision. 
 in Carlock (1994: 300) 
Nevertheless for those business groups prepared to jump through the hoops, listing on 
the stock exchange has a profound effect on the company and its culture, and the 
financial rewards generally more than making up for the administrative obstacles.  
For business families, listing can profoundly alter their relationship or attitude towards 
the business. The emotional attachment to the business when it goes public is 
remarkable. This section reflects the emotional issues of having publicly listed 
businesses, opening to the outside and riding the rollercoaster of going public. 
6.5.4.1 Barriers to Listing  
The business environment and family-related issues were the main barriers to listing 
according to my interviewees. One company mentioned the East Asian crisis postponed 
their listing and made them reassess which of their businesses should go public: 
“SM was not ready. As a company it has always had corporate governance 
entrenched. SM Prime listed in 1994. Prior to that the founder Henry Sy had been 
strict in implementing formal corporate governance measures. There was a very 
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strong risk and cost orientation. He takes his roots in the retail business in 
managing on cost and having a culture of not spending more [than necessary]. In 
1994 SM Prime listed. In between 1994 (SM Prime) and 2005 (SMI), there were 
some planning. We thought of listing the retail arm. There were discussions of 
listing the property [company when] along came the 1997 crisis. There was no 
intention to delay but at the same time there was no urgency to list.” – SM 
Interviewee 
Listing requires disclosure. For a privately held company that is thinking about listing, 
there is a shift in culture when the business is required to be transparent. The 
requirements for listing mean improving standards of disclosure especially in terms of 
material disclosure that could affect the share price of a company. Failing to disclose 
market sensitive information can trigger financial penalties. This is a big deterrent for 
some: 
“When you list, you open your guts to the public. That’s a reason why some have 
preferred to take the backdoor route [where there is] no due diligence 
[required].” – stockbroker (1) 
Attitudes towards transparency and disclosure may reflect the extent to which a 
company is still being family-run and not professionally-run. Indeed, the stock market 
takes a prejudiced view of unprofessionalised firms that have insider trading by owners. 
One family-run company sold corporate bonds instead of listing allowing the owners to 
maintain control over their business activities while allowing them to finance their 
expansion. However, once this company decided to list, the failure by its owners to be 
more transparent (such as not immediately disclosing share transactions by key 
executives) saw a valuation discount on their company share price.  
For smaller companies, the main barrier to listing is the resource, time and cost of 
meeting the exchange’s requirements as there is much to attend to when a company 
lists. In general, smaller companies do not have the same resources or capacity as their 
larger counterparts to help them list: 
“We’re getting there, if I’m looking to list in a few years’ time we are being 
prepared. While we’re not into formal planning, the intuitive we have [is to 




and be progressive from what has happened. We have much to cater to when we 
list.” – unlisted company 1 
For another company, the financial costs related to listing and the PSE requirement to 
show three years of successive profitability were cited as the main deterrent: 
“Our clients are global [but] we’re too small for listing overseas and it is very 
expensive to list overseas (I asked why they did not list overseas since the 
business derives most of its income offshore). We’re small and we don’t know 
their listing rules moreover we have had a loss. With the PSE listing you have to 
show three years of successive profits. If we list, we go through (a bureaucratic 
process). We would go on to the small board [on the PSE] so there is no reason to 
list now.” –unlisted company 2 
Listing rewards but also demands. The capital market rewards companies that are 
transparent, and willing to share and offer information. 
6.5.4.2 Motivations for Listing 
The main motivation for listing is the financial rewards it brings: 
“If we list, we’ll do it for growth and capitalisation reasons.” – unlisted company 
Listing unlocks the market value of the company and finances investment. Listing allows 
the owners to reap the financial rewards and is the material evidence of their success: 
“We were 500 times oversubscribed. There’s liquidity. The P/E is 12 – 14: 1” – listed 
company 1 
For one company, the owner listed several assets and the capitalisation of his companies 
has placed him in an enviable dilemma: 
“Alliance is owned by Andrew Tan (no relation to Lucio) – which is 20-25% 
partially listed. It’s worth P18B. He owns Megaworld, Emperador Brandy, and 
49% of the local McDonalds franchise. He doesn’t know what to do with the 
money.” – private sector 1 
The bull market of 2007 renewed confidence in the capital market and its strong run 




“Our efforts to promote capital market growth continue to bear fruit." – Jose 
Vitug, PSE in Bloomberg (2007) 
For my interviewees, the stock market high of 2007 coincided with higher market 
capitalisation and volume for some of them: 
“Our market cap/value has increased. [It’s to do with] timing. We used to be 
trading P2 to P3 but now it is P5.50. Double the increase in the number of shares, 
almost double the market price. The volume yesterday was 2.5M shares.” – listed 
company 2 
The small stock market ensures listings are a momentous occasion not only for the 
company but also for the stock exchange. For the stock market to grow, new listings are 
necessary. In the Philippine context, successful listings that attract the majority of 
attention and investment are from established players that already have a reputational 
value prior to going public. In other words, most newly-listed companies are affiliated 
with business groups: 
“There are few listing on the PSE, maybe they’re coming. Many companies are 
family-owned. There are giant changes when family-owned corporations list. SM 
Investment Corporation - so much of their stock is spread. The listed ones are big 
companies for the most part and a lot of stock is floating. The family domination, 
there is a lot of public ownership structuring for now for IPOs.” – stockbroker 1 
For one business group, there was some discussion over which of their companies should 
be listed. Ultimately they decided to list the bigger company so that it would be included 
in the large company index rather than the small company index: 
“In 2005, we were ready to list. In 2003, we were planning to list, doing work. We 
realised if we listed the retail arm we would be in the small caps. We wanted to 
go the big capitalisation index and so we did not list the retail.” – SM 
The concept of nurturing a company internally before seeking external finance is a 
strong trait amongst my business group interviewees. This is also a reflection of the 
family’s own values as listing a company is strongly identified with the family. Only 
when the company is mature enough should it face the vagaries and sometimes brutal 




“The SM subsidiaries are developing, in the expansion stage and [we will decide] 
when it is the proper time for them to list.” – SM 
For one company, the decision to go public was made after talking to several other 
business families about their listing experience. The following box relates this family’s 
listing journey: 
Text Box 4: Listing - A Family's Journey 
The account in this box shows the different motivations and factors that made one 
business family take the momentous step of listing and going partially public. The 
company was established some forty years ago, however it was only in the last decade 
that they had listed. There is a lengthy gap between the establishment of the business 
and listing. Why it took so was long was due to a combination of factors. The main 
obstacles to listing were the external factor of the business environment and the internal 
factor of the family’s conservatism; the main drivers to list were the experience of other 
business families in listing and unlocking the market value of the company. The listed 
company is part of a business group. Like most companies, the major shareholder is a 
family. Overall the listing experience has been positive for the family. The following 
contains their journey of going public.  
 
Business Environment 
Reluctance to disclose information in a developing country environment and allowing 
competitors insight into the company was the main obstacle to listing for the family: 
“Why it took so long? Well on the PSE, in the Philippines, there is a traditional 
base. Companies are usually selfish with financial records. We didn’t want to 
share our financial information – listing on the PSE means we have to share our 
information. We didn’t want our profits to be public. The business culture here is 
conservative, same with Indonesia, Malaysia…There were aspects of disclosures 
such as financial information, operating information – we were worried that our 
competitors could see what we are doing and planning to do. So that took getting 
used to that. It was one step at a time. ” 
 
Capital Market Environment 
The impression that the PSE had listed companies that were simply speculative 
compounded this impression and therefore the risk of listing outweighed the benefits: 
“Before, there were cases on the PSE where companies would list shelf 
companies, such as oil exploration - using companies but there was nothing 
there.” 
 
Family ‘s Fiscal Conservatism 
Another obstacle was the family’s conservatism towards their fiscal position which eased 
the pressure to raise capital externally: 
“One reason why we didn’t list earlier on was our conservatism. We were using 
internally generated funds to expand. We are very conservative. It was not me 
and other people’s money. We basically worked on economic growth, and 
borrowed little during the 80s and 90s. There was no pressure to raise debt to 





This comment echoes a discussion by Glen & Pinto (1994) on how companies choose 
debt or equity financing to expand and how listing has its pros and cons for businesses in 
emerging countries. 
 
Experience of Other Families 
However, seeing the example of others made the family sit up and take notice. When 
they spoke to other families who were taking their businesses public not only in the 
country but also in other countries in the region, the family started reconsidering about 
their objections to listing. This was an important factor –  observing other business 
families’ experience: 
“It was very different to travel and compare business cultures in the region when 
the attitude towards remaining private started changing. The family felt it 
wanted to be more private about its successes. But then we started reading about 
listed companies and talking to people who have listed and listening to their 
experience. 
 
“Most of the IPOs have happened in the last 15/16 years. Few companies went 
public, more so the family-owned companies. It took a number of decades, 
typically Filipino-Chinese companies. There was a change in the late 80s, and the 
IPO wave. One by one, [companies] started to go public. Prior to that was the 
Ayala Group. They listed their company. Then there were listing of other 
companies. 
 
“In the 90s, there was the crisis; and then some companies went public. The 
Gokongweis, the Yuchengcos, [they are] strong [in] manufacturing, real estate. So 




After concluding that other families had a positive experience with going public, the 
family decided to list one asset and unlock the value of the company. The asset was 
considered as the weakest in the family’s business portfolio. Today it is the most valuable 
asset by market value. The family is thinking of listing other assets though this step 
would be taken reluctantly as there is no financial pressure: 
“[The listed company] was the smallest business arm of [the holding company]. It 
was a P200M business. We built it up through acquisitions, taking a twin-
pronged approach. [Today, the listed asset] is now the biggest company in the 
group. It’s a possibility, listing other companies of the group.” 
 
Experience of Listing 
Listing some managerial changes occur in the company: 
“In 2000, we were ready. [The listing] required exposing more figures. The first 
year of listing was awkward as it required the exposure of the figures. Even the 
prospectus [was difficult]. The IPO listing was the first step to get the founding 
family get their feet wet and navigate as a public company. [A family member] 
was the first chairman but didn’t enjoy it much, [so the non-family member 






Ownership and Control 
To ensure the dominant control of the family, only a third of the company was listed. 
Similar to other business families, partial listing ensures and protects family control of 
the business. This is a common trait in family-owned listed companies. The following 
figure shows the ownership structure of the group and where the listed company fits in 
the business portfolio: 
 
Figure 29: Ownership Structure and the Listed Company 
 
“The 100% owned subsidiary is the listed company vehicle of the holding 
company which is the controlling shareholder of the company. The listed 
company has been acquiring affiliated companies over the last year. The family 
indirectly owns 2/3 of the company with 1/3 being publicly listed.”  
 
To mitigate any potential blockholders, the family has also ensured that a third of the 
company in the public float is widely dispersed: 
“The 1/3 public shareholders are fragmented. There is no single owner holding as 
much as 3%. We arranged it with the underwriters to have dispersed ownership. 
We have over 1,000 shareholders. It looks small…but there may be a lot more 
than 1000 shareholders. 20% on free float would be big investors with the PCD 
nominee accounts, stockbrokers, managed funds, trusts and financial 
institutions. Last year we offered to increase liquidity as trading volume 
decreased; so we reinjected liquidity in issue, risk capital for [our] strategy.” 
 
Aftermath of listing 
Overall, listing for the family has been a positive experience with the financial valuation 
exceeding expectations: 
“The listing has been positive. In terms of unlocking shareholder value, the facts 
speak for themselves. 6 years ago the market value was USD12M, now it is 
USD180M.” 
 
The whims of the capital market has also taught the family the importance of responding 
to investor demands and market conditions: 
“We have had several years of experience now as a listed company. We have 
made it. We can show we have it on public: corporate governance, accounting. 
We adjusted fairly well. We are not actively looking at price targets, we don’t live 
for our quarterly reports. If you are too obsessive with the quarterly reports, it 
would make you miss out on something. The focus on the business – if the share 
price goes down, we want to know the fundamentals that are driving down the 
price. That’s why we’re on roadshows to get the investor’s perspective. 
[However], if the reason is a perception issue, we need to communicate better. 
We are on the periphery, so we’re trying to get more analyst coverage.” 
 
The holding company 
(100% family owned 
unlisted)
Listed company (1/3 
listed on the PSE)
100% owned 
subsidiary






Although the reluctance to disclose publicly available information outside the regulatory 
requirements still lingers: 
“In the last 6 years we’ve never had problems with non-disclosure. We sometimes 
pre-empt the PSE. We disclose immediately especially if there’s something in the 
newspapers which triggers a call or email. We try to be proactive. We still post 
our disclosures on the PSE website, but not on ours as the website is not fully 
developed. Before all these IPOs, there was the SEC Code which required 
disclosure. [There was a] natural reluctance to disclose because we’re going to 
niche markets and this points to our competitors where we’re going.” 
 
Nevertheless, listing has given renewed confidence to the family and their relationship 
with the business: 
“Our philosophy is to be fair to all shareholders. They worry the most if the value 
of the company depreciates .Over the last 6 years the managing/controlling 
shareholders significantly increased the value of the company. [We are] setting 
long-term growth plans though it’s early days yet. We’re doing it in a way in 
managing a business to be the best that we can. We have a strong penchant for 
the last 10 years of not borrowing too much. Our values reflect what we want to 
do.” 
 
As the business moves from member-entrepreneurs to member-stewards, the core values 
of the family will determine the future direction of the company: 
 
For one company, a rather unusual motivation to list was for local acceptance. As a 
company which had substantial foreign ownership, listing on the local bourse was a way 
to be accepted as a Filipino corporation. Another upside to listing – apart from achieving 
this perception and acceptance– was it also helped raise funding for the company: 
“The company listed just before the [East Asian] crisis. Why did we list? We 
listed because of the 40:60 principle here in the Philippines. No foreign owner 
can own more than 40% of the company. The foreign ownership (40%) has 
always been difficult, we wanted to be seen – the perception thing – to be more of 
a Filipino company. The people saw us a foreign entity and the advice that we 
had was that if we wanted to appear more Filipino then we ought to list. So went 
through the process of listing. I know it sounds like a funny reason but the listing 
helped us raise funding as well though that was not the prime reason.” – listed 
company 
For another which had substantial foreign ownership, demutualising on the PSE gave 




“The advantages include an increased local presence and providing a local market 
for shareholders in the Philippines.” – Manulife 
Listings will foster in an investment climate that is confident, encourages private sector 
development, and has a stable political environment.  
6.5.4.3 Partial Listing 
In most developed countries, when a company decides to take the plunge and go public, 
100% of its ownership is listed and openly traded on the stock exchange. In the 
Philippines, it is common for companies to be partially listed – that is, only a part of the 
company is publicly listed and traded. Partial listings are the norm for Philippine 
corporations:  
“Corporations usually publicly list only 20% of their own shares” – ICD 
In the Philippines, the main reason behind partial marketisation of the ownership of the 
company is to ensure control remains with the majority shareholder. This is the norm in 
emerging markets (see Davis 2008: 139-140). In developed markets, partial listings are 
common in the privatisation of state owned companies. An example is Australia’s Telstra 
Corporation where a staggered listing of the company occurred over a decade. This had a 
tumultuous effect on the board membership of the company due to the director 
appointments nominated by its major shareholder, the Australian Government (Hewett 
2009, Kohler 2004 and Brown 2004). 
As the previous section’s box on “Listing – A Family’s Journey” related, the floated part of 
the listed company was designed to ensure there was widely dispersed ownership. This 
would prevent the formation of significant blockholders that could challenge the family’s 
ownership. Thus partial listings do come down to a matter of control for the major 
shareholders: 
“The board will decide when the time comes to list. If [listing is] purely driven by 
capital requirements, [then a certain percentage] of the company will be listed – 
they (the owners) would wish to remain control. What the family wants.” – 
unlisted company 
“If we have 50M shares; 10M, 20M are only listed in what is known as a free float. 




40 shares are the family’s so they can trade. 60 are untraded and are unlisted - 
that is control remains with the company.” – listed company 1 
Listing publicly means accessing capital or unlocking the wealth that could have 
remained untapped. At the same time, there is a certain ability to have one's cake and 
eating it too: listing publicly does not equate to losing control over the company  
“On family ownership, it’s been changing. You don’t have to own 90%, you can 
sell to 51% and still control the company. Gokongweis have sold down its stake to 
retain the ownership. No more matter of co-borrowings. Robinsons, Robina – as 
long as he has control. He’s unlocked the value in the company.” – stockbroker  
The figure below depicts the explanation of partial listing which ensures that only a 
small portion of the company is publicly floated (40%) and publicly owned (30%)- so the 
family retains overall control (70%) of the company due to its overall ownership of listed 
and unlisted shares: 
Figure 30: Shareholders of a Partially-Listed Company 
 
The above figure is similar to Figure 25 which showed the ownership structure of the 
Aboitiz’s listed holding company and how the majority ownership remains in the family.  
In one interview, only 22% of the company was on the open market and the remaining 
stake remained with the family. For the company, there was reluctance to list but due to 
some minority investors within the business the major shareholder decided to go public 















“There were certain businesses with minority investors so [the family] revisited 
the bid to go public. It was a question of valuation and controlling interests.”- 
listed company 2 
The staggered listing also occurred for this company however the stakes remain small 
and limited: 
“22% of the company is currently on float. The first IPO free-float amount was 
20% then an additional 2% listing. There is a small minority group of investors. It 
is predominantly owned by the family with 78% belonging to their holding 
company.” – listed company 2 
Even where a company is fully listed, there is a majority owner: 
"All shares are listed. And it is at least 51% owned by the [family]. The ownership 
is divided between two brothers: We have 12,000 shareholders and nobody really 
owns a big chunk. The next would be 2% share belonging to [another family]. 
The only listed company is the holding company. All shares are listed, not partly 
listed. There are 2.5B shares available. 27% are foreign investors and they are all 
PCD nominees so we do not really know who the shareholders are as they buy 
through brokers.” – listed company 3 
Partial listings are an effective ownership strategy by business groups to retain control of 
their listed companies. 
6.5.4.4 Multiple Listings of Assets 
Multiple listings of assets are common amongst diversified business groups in the 
Philippines, but not so in developed markets.  
The conglomerate form is present in General Electric (2009) which has a variety of 
interests across different sectors. While it is a highly diversified business (whereas most 
firms are industry specific in the West), the listing is only of the one conglomerate. All 
arms of the business are assessed together under one umbrella and a market price is 
given. The Australian financial group, Macquarie Group (2009) has special investment 
vehicles for its different managed funds and these vehicles are then listed on the stock 
exchange with the controlling interest remaining in the parent company (Macquarie 




Anglo-American setting. Therefore, in the Anglo-American world, a listed parent 
company that spins off a related asset on the capital markets normally indicates that 
subsidiary has matured and can operate independently. Issues of strategy or divergent 
interests are catalysts for spinning off the entity. Such examples of these include the 
now-defunct Arthur Andersen and its consulting arm, Andersen Consulting now known 
as Accenture (2009); and BHP Billiton and a spin-off BlueScope Steel (2002).  
In the Philippines, listed business groups tend to be in the mature phase of their life 
cycle. They privately build up their businesses before utilising the capital market to 
unlock the market value of their assets. Business groups list one business after another 
and not at the same time. For one business family, with a diverse set of holdings, only 
one asset is listed while others remain private: 
“[The family is at] the cousin consortium stage – it’s an LLP (limited liability 
partnership). It’s 75 years old. They have one outfit that is publicly listed.” – 
private sector 1 
Therefore, a business group’s portfolio has assets that are listed and others that remain 
private. The next figure compares the listed and unlisted subsidiaries of two leading 





Figure 31: Listed and Unlisted Subsidiaries of Two Filipino Business Groups in 
2007 
 
In the above figure, both holding companies of the two business groups are listed. 
Several questions arise in this form of conglomerate structure: Is the holding company 
considered the most valuable asset of a business group since ultimately it is the 
parent/manager of the assets? In terms of market valuation, what would be the 
investment decision justification for one listed asset that has industrial operations to be 
considered more valuable than the holding company given the subsidiary company is 
directed by the holding company? How does a market value operational, rather than 
management, capabilities as more attractive? The indecision on how to treat this 
conglomerate form was noted by one interviewee who stated the variabilities in 
valuation over the holding company and its other listed assets:  
“We are fortunate to see that AC and its subsidiaries are the favourite picks of 
investors. For foreign investors, it’s been a dilemma to choose between AC and 
other companies. Previously, there was a shift to invest into the different 
subsidiaries, as all companies are making money before the benefits of good 
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performance were generated by AC. They sold AC shares to buy into the 
subsidiaries. This has now shifted lately with investment back to the holding 
company as AC has the capability of building good businesses.” – AC 
One possible reason for this dilemma by foreign investors is their trepidation with 
complex business group structures such as pyramidal business groups which were 
negatively affected in the wake of the East Asian crisis. Exploring the role of the modern 
day East Asian listed holding company and its subsidiaries could be a worthwhile avenue 
for future research. 
6.5.4.5 Related Party Transactions 
This issue of interrelated and affiliated company transactions is one of the more 
problematic aspects of business group structures. Company-subsidiary borrowing and 
lending is a reflection of two things 1) business groups in developing countries tend to 
finance growth internally 2) capital markets are weak and underdeveloped. The former is 
a substitute for the latter but it also creates distortions and in the context of increasing 
transparency in corporate governance, interrelated transactions remain problematic not 
only for the investors but for the owners themselves: 
The more a company is transparent, the better rewarded it is by outsiders. Not 
surprisingly, valuations vary: 
“In corporate governance, if you have that sort of blot in your history, such as by 
not being transparent, you get a valuation discount. This will affect your growth 
and P/E multiple. That blot in your reporting is a corporate governance issue, 
and the market will accordingly give you a discount on your share price. The 
market will give the valuation it thinks you deserve.” – stockbroker 
Market values of business groups depend on how transparent they are to the financial 
markets by making timely disclosure: 
“JJ Summit, the Gokongweis had an issue of intercompany borrowing. The parent 
was borrowing from the company subsidiary. The parent would borrow from the 
cash rich subsidiary, but the cash would be used for investments - using the 
funds of the subsidiaries for the parent. It didn’t help the Gokongweis, there was 




share price trade at higher multiples because they’re clean, spotless.” -
stockbroker 
The family did learn from this and bounced back; showing they were responsive, and in 
return the market was more receptive: 
“..the Gokongweis – they came back following an offering in 2005. Prior to 2005 it 
was a difficult time – they were unloved because of corporate governance issues. 
Corporate governance is bigger now than before. Things have turned around. 
With a dead market who the hell cares - but in the last 3 years [it is a bull market 
and] a growth market.” – stockbroker 
There is also focus on related-party transactions in business conglomerates involving the 
channelling of funds from the unlocked value of listed assets to weakly performing 
unlisted assets. While listing helps unlock the market value of a business, ensuring the 
listed business is not exploited for the private arms of the group are an important 
assessment for outsiders: 
“Another issue is the side business of the families. The side business can interfere 
with the listed company. It’s a corporate governance risk if there is a significant 
interest with the side business, [as the family] could take money from the listed 
company for private interests (see Parmalat case), milking the listed company for 
the private business. So we usually ask, what other stocks do you own besides 
your listed company? It is part of getting to know the company: ask. Who are 
your side businesses?”-stockbroker  
Unravelling the knot of related party transactions is not an issue that can be wallpapered 
over: 
“When you’re talking about principles of corporate governance, you have to be 
unpleasant. Related party transactions are not pleasant.” – investment banker 
while some follow corporate governance principles of transparency and timely 
disclosure, others do not: 
“The family are the insiders. For example, there is a company problem with the 
operations and they don’t publicise the information or not as timely as possible 




America- obviously this would affect the sales and revenue. This would also affect 
the major operation and [they don’t tell us how big the impact of this dispute is]. 
We ring up so they can usually provide more information. But by then it’s usually 
too late. There’s a leakage, there’s a rumour, there’s a problem. People are selling 
down. When news come out, it’s not transparency. There’s a saying here: “you 
buy on the rumour and sell on the fact” It’s an old saying. It’s an inefficient 
market.” – stockbroker 2 
Related party transactions do come down to the inefficiencies associated with the capital 
market in the Philippines, and depending on the largesse of companies dominated by 
family owners to govern well and fairly for all shareholders. 
6.5.4.6 Overseas Listing 
For local companies that have successfully listed on the PSE, another option for them is 
to list on an overseas exchange. Apart from the financial incentives, listing on an 
overseas exchange is a veritable challenge as it requires a higher compliance of 
disclosure. One interviewee pointed out listing overseas would test the mettle of the 
company: 
“The overseas market is very challenging. If I’m a professional, [it would] test my 
capability. Just look at PLDT. Difficult in Singapore/NASDAQ in terms of the 
[amount of] information you provide. But once you walk through, it’s easier to 
list within the time frame.” – private sector 1 
For the most international Filipino company on the PSE, the NYSE-listed telecoms 
company PLDT, overseas listing has meant a higher level of disclosure and transparency, 
and compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX): 
“The advantages [of listing overseas] are that you comply with higher corporate 
governance standards. The disadvantages are the costs of compliance. In light of 
SOX, compliance requirements are very costly, principally due to the 
intensiveness, the external auditors and time it consumes in regulatory 
compliance. The costs are very prohibitive. It entails lots of work to validate 
compliance requirements. The preparation for SOX compliance is because of 




Requirements. In s.404 all departments within the organisation have to revisit 
the processes with s.404.50
The reportorial requirements under SOX have also seen a competition for listings. For 
PLDT which is dually listed on the PSE and NYSE, and whose parent company is listed 
on the Hong Kong exchange, the company needs to meet the different requirements of 
the different stock exchanges: 
” - PLDT 
“If you look at developments in the USA, there are also the compliance 
requirements for listed companies and on the NASDAQ…There is competition 
due to regulatory compliance between the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
NYSE over the last 2 years. LSE has more listings than NYSE due to the reporting 
requirements of the latter. If you look at developments in Asia, the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKSE), the Singapore Stock Exchange – they have attracted 
foreign listings. Professor CK Low from the City University of Hong Kong said the 
HKSE has opened up listings to Filipino corporations. The parent company of 
PLDT is First Pacific which is listed on the HKSE. The parent company of PLDT is 
not a subsidiary but is amended to be a material affiliate to comply with Hong 
Kong financial requirements on internal control and risk management.”-PLDT 
In addition, the widely dispersed ownership in Anglo-American settings means the 
investor audience is different to the Philippines: 
“It is difficult to apply NYSE rules to the Asian setting. Stock ownership is not as 
diverse. No single individual or family own big chunks. In the Philippines it is 
either owned by families or owned by the state.” - PLDT 
Foreign listing is not an easy undertaking however the rewards include having an 
international reputation and recognition that the company is practising corporate 
governance on a higher level. PLDT’s corporate governance practice has placed the 
company at the vanguard:  
“For us to compete, it’s important to adapt to international corporate governance 
standards.” -PLDT 
                                                     
50 Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act deals with a rigorous assessment of a company’s internal 




For another group, a part of its banking company Banco De Oro (BDO) are listed on the 
London Stock Exchange in the form of global depository receipts (GDRs) to attract 
foreign investors: 
“For 10% of BDO the listing on the LSE was just GDRs. There was an increased 
float for foreign investors and certain portion of shares were exchanged with 
GDRs.” – SM 
The group chose the LSE because there is more market activity and was easier to 
underwrite for their investment bank: 
“The GDRs are not actively traded. The [investors] like the merger [BDO and 
EPCI]. It’s strong. They’d hold on it that would limit the liquidity of the shares. 
We listed on the LSE, because according to Macquarie Bank, it was easier to 
underwrite the BDO listing on the LSE or Singapore than to list on the USA. They 
advised us it was a choice between Singapore and London. The transaction for 
the GDRs was more active in London so we listed BDO on London more for 
convenience.” – SMI 
Nevertheless, critics of the global convergence of corporate governance standards may 
find some comfort that the requirements of each stock exchange ensures convergence 
will not be an administrative reality anytime soon. 
6.5.5 Unlisted Companies  
 
The Philippines still has a long way to go to have a fully-functioning capital market. The 
listed companies mentioned in this chapter are the exception rather than the rule: 
“The PSE is a pretty small exchange in the overall scale. Again it comes back to 
the structure of the country – families that control the powerful companies which 
aren’t listed.” – private sector 1 
Some large companies are still privately held while for some business groups, flagship 
companies and their profitable companies remain unlisted: 
“The Ortigas Family-owned 4,000HA land north of Pasig. Where the Ayalas 
owned the southside and developed Makati, the Ortigas sold off parcels of land 




Ayalas, the Ortigas Family has not listed its flagship company.” –observation 
notes 
While for the SM group, the jewel in their crown remains unlisted: 
“The retail arm is unlisted. In terms of revenue it has the largest contribution.” – 
SM 
Until there is enough trust and confidence in a well-functioning capital market, then 
moves towards this form of financing will remain the domain of a few. 
6.5.6 Listing and Corporate Governance 
 
Listing improves the corporate governance practices of companies as they are compelled 
to comply with the requirements set by the PSE and the SEC, and the BSP if they’re 
banks, or the IC if they’re insurance companies. There is a link between listing and 
improved corporate governance. 
In listing, corporate governance in a company must be incorporated. This creates a 
better environment for business as fundamental standards and rules are set out for doing 
business. Complying with the corporate governance requirements has pressured 
companies to be more transparent in their practices: 
“Corporate governance in the Philippines has come a long way. As more 
companies have taken the route of going public, this has forced these companies 
to be more transparent in their businesses.” – holding company 1 
“It’s changing more and more. Companies are now realising corporate 
governance per se will come with additional costs but there is also the benefit of 
corporate governance. especially if you’re going to be bigger. Ultimately you have 
to go [outside] for funding and practise corporate governance as seen as in 
developed countries in order to get funding.” – holding company 2 
For one company, corporate governance was one of the main motivations to list – to 
incorporate and improve the practice within the businesses: 
“It was in May 2005 that SM Investments [the holding company] listed. It used to 




family was busy but it was expanding fast. There was no need for the public 
listing. There was not much need for fresh capital. The operations they’ve had 
were relatively liquid. But they wanted to go to the market to further expand the 
business. One of the most compelling reasons is corporate governance. Being a 
listed family group, they would have had better reasons to formalise corporate 
governance practice. They saw this happening in the SM Prime [listing] in mid-
1990s [which formalised] corporate governance practice.” –SM  
Listing and corporate governance go hand in hand in a mutually beneficial virtuous 
cycle: 
“…[B]eing a publicly-listed company has had a very positive effect on corporate 
governance. We have no regrets at having taken the company public in 1994.” – 
holding company 3 
Listing can improve private sector development in the country due to the meeting the 
standards the market requires and the discipline it imposes: 
“Family firms have now the tendency of going public - that will help strengthen 
the private sector.” – listed firm 
“We like the discipline imposed on us by the capital markets. We achieve this 
either through public listings, independent governance structures and financial 
transparency even in our non-listed investments.” – Ayala CEO in Arce-Dumlao 
(2009) 
To list means a company has reached a modicum of professionalisation which can 
operate in a demanding capital market environment where disclosures must be made, 
and compliance to regulatory requirements. As one interviewee point it, due to the effort 
required, listing is the “external manifestation of corporate governance.”  
6.6 Business Groups and Portfolio Investment Strategy 
 
Once business groups sort out the best form of financing for their web of businesses, 
where and how to invest the capital they receive is a strategic challenge. The best way to 
conceptualise the investment strategy of a business group is akin to an investor who has 




businesses or companies across a variety of industries. Depending on the level and 
appetite for risk - as in any investment portfolio - a wide variety of assets are present 
across different industries. According to one interviewee, large business groups in the 
Philippines behave like a diversified investment portfolio with the holding company 
acting like the fund manager. Similarly with a business group, several companies that it 
owns may be classified as the aggressive/high growth entity, the conservative asset or the 
diversified business.  
“For example, you have the Aggressive, Conservative, Diversified [classification of 
businesses]. The public who owns shares in these companies have no luxury of 
being conservative or aggressive. So when you’re diversifying companies, one 
company goes extreme [either aggressive or conservative]. The bigger entity 
behaves like a fund manager.” – academic interviewee 
As opposed to Figure 31 which divides business group assets by listed and unlisted assets 
and is more useful for the investor, the following figure is the owning family/holding 
company perspective of the business group. The figure shows the business group as an 
investment portfolio with different businesses classified according to the level of risk 
appetite and growth strategy: 
Figure 32: Business Group as an Investment Portfolio 















the investment strategy of the owning family/holding company so their sense of purpose 
in the business is tempered by this knowledge: 
“If you have a host of these things, all executives have to comply with something 
bigger that is, one corporation is part of the greater good – it serves the wider 
family holding company interests. If you do what you’re supposed to do with 
intent of doing something bigger, you diversify.” – academic 
A well-diversified portfolio spreads the assets and the risks. Business groups generally 
take such an approach with companies under their umbrella. The next section looks at 
how this approach is applied in the property sector of the country. 
6.6.1 Competition in the Property Sector  
 
Certain industrial sectors in the Philippines are protected in the country. However, 
where a sector is opened up to the private sector, entrepreneurial activity flourishes and 
competition is fierce. This is the case of the property sector in the Philippines. Business 
groups dominate this sector and competition in this profitable industry provides an 
insight into how groups compete against each other. One strategy applied by business 
groups is to establish several companies (owned by the same business group) to target 
the different markets and different consumer segments: 
“In real estate, families have a web of two real estate companies, for example, the 
Sy Family with SM Prime. They have several companies: one for the high end, the 
other for the low end” – academic 
“[Our] retail property is listed with SM Development Corporation where there is 
a 59% ownership interest and is the residential arm. It develops residential 
condominiums. There is also Highlands Prime where there is a 32% ownership 
interest. It is a targeted type of company [aimed at the market for] second houses 
or weekenders in Tagaytay.”-SM interviewee 
This strategy was noticeable in Manila where real estate arms of business groups would 
have several different entities serving the various clienteles within the sector. This is a 
classic product portfolio strategy. Within the residential real estate sector, there would 
be one entity or brand that would serve the upper class; another would serve the middle 




would still be owned by the one real estate company of a business group.51
Figure 33: Residential Property in a Business Group Portfolio 
 The following 
figure summarises where the residential property companies are within the portfolio of 
businesses of a group: 
 
This sector is growing, in large part due to the remittances of OFWs: 
“The growth in the real estate sector over the last 2 years is due to OFWs. The 
OFWs will continue to boost the Philippine economy” – Jose Cuisia (2007) 
Residential real estate in Manila has an established history dominated by business 
families: 
“[The property sector is] dominated by families because it provides competition 
and challenges. For example, Ayala Land is reliable. Besides the Ayalas, there are 
other developers such as Henry Sy, Andrew Tan who entered the sector over the 
last 10-15 years. The Gotianuns since the 1960s have been quietly growing 
FilInvest/Alabang.” – private sector 1 
“Our real estate business has created this community in Makati. But we now have 
Ayala Alabang, Ayala Heights in Quezon City, Cebu – the principal residence; the 
Techno Park where the Economic Zone is, was developed by Ayala. In Pampanga 
                                                     
51 For example, Ayala Land, the real estate arm owned by the Ayala Group, has three brands for its 
different target markets in the residential real estate sector: AyalaLand Premier for the upper 
class; Alveo for the upwardly mobile; and Avida for the aspirational class 





















we are building a community; in Clark Air Base; we have a big tract of land as far 
south as Cagayan de Oro. Once the airport is built there, the big tract of land of 
90 hectares, development in the area can go ahead.” – Ayala  
The dominance of business groups and saturation of this sector has not gone unnoticed: 
“It is an oligopoly – [there are a] few of you within the market. If you control one 
industry, in such a case there are different players within the industry. The 
different players are owned by different companies.” – academic 
The competition in this industry is fierce and new entrants wait in the wings: 
“[Regarding] the old structures, the grey market is strong in our market. Like the 
Ayalas, the new frontiers [are fraught with] more difficulty; for the grey market, 
there are competitors to follow. The Ayalas [are doing] pretty well. We viewed 
their strategy and joined the real estate market. Competition is good for the 
public.” – private sector 2 
“We have relied on our core business which is real estate. During recent times 
there has been a lot of competition in the market. It is really a tough market in 
the real estate.52
However to grow too big and for one business group to dominate the sector is not 
socially acceptable: 
”- Ayala  
“[Ayala President] Zobel says there are other problems with scale. “Let’s say we 
wanted to be a pure real estate company. Size in the Western world is seen as a 
positive thing: you build economies of scale, market reach. Here, it’s socially 
unacceptable to become too big. So you start channelling things to new areas. By 
its very nature that’s why conglomerates continue to exist in Asia.” – Wright 
(2006) 
Healthy competition and selective restraint is more agreeable than a monopolistic 
domination of the sector. 
                                                     
52 As pointed out by Dumol:” Ayala was owned by one of the richest families in the country. They 
own substantial land and have built up a huge corporate empire. Yet, during the last few years 
prior to the [water] bid, they had lost three of the largest real estate bids ever held. Metro Pacific 
was one of the companies that had beaten Ayala, which had led to serious corporate rivalry 




6.6.1.1 Challenges in the Property Sector  
There are challenges in the property development. These are the speculative nature of 
the sector, foreign ownership controls and mutable property rights. 
Property is highly speculative and has had its share of busts. The investment drought 
that followed the East Asian Crisis exposed several property groups, while a large part of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) were in this sector: 
“The East Asian Crisis definitely had an effect. The crisis catalysed the need for 
reforms because that’s when you separated the men from the boys in a manner of 
speaking. Those who practiced good corporate governance such as the Ayalas, 
the MNCs, the banks survived the crisis. Those who weren’t practicing the 
principles suffered more such as Urbanbank, the Ramcar Group, and many real 
estate property developers.” –private sector 1 
“[The East Asian crisis] showed governance issues for example in listed 
companies. There were severe governance issues in the real estate business that 
was pre-selling and retailing items without too much disclosure.”–SEC 
“[There were some that] invested money in a property company owned by a 
family. [It was] not just very aggressive of selling products; the money received 
went to the sister company in real estate, and this sister company went under. It 
was actuarially unsound. 700,000 families were affected by the pre-need company 
and there was the real estate company. The SEC intervened when it was obvious 
it was a Ponzi scheme. When the music stopped, [they] tied up the hands, and 
seized the real estate.” –private sector 2 
However, while the property sector is open to local competition, it is protected against 
foreign investment. For one company, the issue of a foreigner not being able to own 
property in the country has made it rethink its strategy in this sector: 
“We’re into property development. We are principally driven by property. Some 
foreigners can own property for example we have a large foreign ownership of 
35% from Singapore. The 40:60 principle applies -you can’t own land if you’re a 
foreigner. The exemption is for a condominium. A foreigner can own condos. 
There are other ways to form a corporation as long as you make sure it is 




property. There’s also a 50 year renewable lease. We had a roadshow in the US for 
our property condominiums. [Our] property in the Alabang area is our condo 
project. We have formed a property group [in addition] to our other businesses.” 
– private sector 3 
This 40:60 principle has allowed the domination of the sector by the local business 
groups but has placed major obstacles to foreign competitors. The restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land and development will continue in the foreseeable future, in large part 
due to pre-existing political arrangements that favour domestic participants. This is a 
remnant of the resentment felt under colonial rule when vast tracts of land were seized 
from the local inhabitants: 
“Land developments and land for foreign ownership is constricted. The general 
feeling is to open up the economy remove restrictions [on land] but it’s 
emotional. [It may be opened to foreigners] probably for private use but the 
development of land will still be controlled by oligarchs: Foreigners can own land 
but [they cannot own it to develop] for shopping malls.” – consultant  
Another issue that must be considered by a company for any property development in 
the country is the combination of mutable property rights53 and grinding poverty. In a 
metropolis of 11 million people with a population density of over 40,000 inhabitants per 
square kilometre54
“[On the issue of] landtitling
, unoccupied land in Manila quickly becomes occupied. The matter of 
land titles becomes impractical with a teeming populace and unenforced laws: 
55
                                                     
53 On mutable property rights, see Rubio (2007) where an issue emerged over the dictator Marcos’ 
family seeking control of real estate land owned by the Ortigas family which was seized during 
the Marcos years. 
…[and] land acquisition, the law should be fair on 
the market price. If you [distribute] a buy-out notice to shops that there is a sale 
of land, people get to know the [project] and buy the land. The government 
[takes to the] court [and the] dispute is part of the system that wants to have the 
54 http://www.manilacityph.com/pdf/population.pdf accessed 25 March 2009  
55 An interesting debate on the protection of property rights as a necessary demand for long-term 
investment, improve investor confidence, and address poverty appeared in the Economist in 2006 
discussing Hernando de Soto’s insight that “the lack of title that explains why poor people have 
been unable to turn their assets into capital…History suggests that as well as property rights and a 
decent legal system, it requires sound economic policies, an educated workforce and political 
arrangements capable of regulating conflicts and minimising the risk to investment. Then again, 




law changed - once people find out there’s a road being built, people start 
speculating and buy the land even [if transactions are] temporarily suspended.” - 
consultant 
“It is hard to have the security of titles here. There are squatters on your land, 
they have rights to it. So you can’t just move the squatter. It’s difficult to remove 
them or enforce your title. Title of land can be easily copied so if you have the 
original, keep it under lock and key.  There are far more titles than there is land 
in this country.” – private sector 4 
Addressing this problematic issue has led to an initiative seeking to cap the distribution 
and amount of fake titles in the country (Manila Bulletin 2007). In practical terms, a real 
estate development must deal with existing squatters, how to co-opt the populace and 
mitigate community backlash before building can start: 
“Another area Ayala Land has gone into is certain areas of the community. When 
we go in, there are squatters. We allot a certain portion of the property and build 
a small community together with the Ayala Foundation to teach and generate 
income for themselves. We thus gain the cooperation of building a community.” 
– Ayala 
A real estate business is a mainstay of a business group’s investment portfolio. Less 
government interference in this area has allowed a flurry of competition to proliferate in 
this sector. Having established their core competencies and target market, this type of 
strategy provides an insight into how Philippines business groups operate and compete 
against each other in this sector (see also Kock & Guillen 2001 and Li et al 2006 for the 
different strategies available to business groups). 
6.6.2 Competition and Participation in Other Sectors 
 
Besides property which is the mainstay of a healthy business group portfolio, other 
sectors business groups are actively engaged and operate in include business-process 
outsourcing (BPO), resources and tourism. These sectors indicate where present and 




6.6.2.1 Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 
Business process outsourcing (BPO) or call centre industry is the fastest growing sector 
in the country with an expected workforce of half a million in 2010 due in part to 
English-speaking, American-acculturated Filipino workforce (Business World 2007, 
Sanchez-Lacson 2007a). The country’s pool of cheap labour force and English skills has 
made it attractive for multinational corporations to outsource their call centres to the 
Philippines although labour shortage and ensuring the English standards are consistent 
are concerns (Mangun 2007, Business World 2007):  
“The services sector is growing but requires educated people. You can get P15K 
from a call centre, but is four or five times that amount in the USA, Australia. 
There is a real shortage with skilled people needed. Government is opening up 
[this sector] allowing the entry of foreigners.” - consultant 
It is also an internationally competitive industry with the Philippines competing with 
another English speaking country, India, for call centres:  
“We are strong in services e.g. call centres. But I suspect the bottom line of the 
call centres are going to the Indian companies as they have gone to the high end 
of call centres. There is a boom in a call centres but we should be in the higher 
level not lower given our English skills so I am not happy about that. 
Nevertheless it provides employment.” – private sector 1 
As largely Anglo-American companies outsource their BPO, international standards 
apply which allows a transfer of international business practices to the country: 
“Globalisation is competitive internationally. For example look at call centres. 
Foreigners want corporate governance. [They want] disclosure, co-investing with 
owners of Filipino entities. [We are] competing with India but Indians are 
[competitive]. Even for Europe. We have to do [corporate governance]. BPO in 
the medical transcription sector is substantial.” –private sector 2 
“Local Business Process Reengineering Organisations (BPO/Call Centre) who 
have American parents have seen their contracts comply with American Sarbanes 
Oxley, or if they have contracts with European organisations, the local BPOs 




and the EU but are not equivalent to local laws. For American contracted BPOs 
the standards are that of SOX.” – private sector 3 
Call centres are also influencing where the local government pension fund, Social 
Security System (SSS, see Chapter 8) sets up its branches in order to capture the 
economic activity this industry: 
“In the service sector, call centres are up so we factor in that to decide where our 
branches will be situated. We put up the branches where the economic activities 
will happen. The transaction contribution is mandatory for the private sector. 
The contribution for them in total is 10.4% per month. 3.3% is deducted from the 
employees' salary so the rest of 7.1% is the contribution from the employer”-SSS 
The BPO sector has also managed to survive the downturn of the global financial crisis: 
“Investors have not left in droves, although a few foreign corporations in affected 
industries are closing shop, such as Intel and other electronic / computer 
providers. There is of course very little foreign investment and export industries 
are being hit. Outsourcing though is expected to continue to grow at a high rate 
i.e. there is some foreign investment. – private sector 3 
BPO is a growth industry and provides a bright spot in private sector development in the 
country: 
6.6.2.2 Resources: Mining and Biodiesel 
Since foreign ownership restrictions in the mining sector were loosened in the country, 
Australian mining companies have made their presence known. At the monthly meetings 
of the ANZCHAM, it was notable to see that a substantial proportion of Australian 
investors present were from mining companies: 
“[Mining is] currently a growth sector for the exchange. A lot of Australian 
mining companies are investing the country. During the 1950s and 1960s there 
was a substantial foreign investment in the sector a (boom) but then during the 
70s and 80s there was the process of nationalisation and a 40% limit on foreign 
ownership which discouraged the sector’s growth. The mining sector declined in 




The PSE has also adopted the Philippine Mineral Reporting Code (PMRC) which would 
require listed resources companies to meet global disclosure standards. (Sanchez-Lacson 
2007b) However, the players remain small and substantial investment from the big 
Australian resource companies are yet to materialise and make an impact. In particular, 
practices by some small Australian mining companies in local Filipino communities have 
come under scrutiny placing their corporate social responsibility practices under 
scrutiny (see Chapter 9: Corruption).  
Notwithstanding the controversy mining brings, the Philippine’s next door neighbour - 
China -has a resource-hungry economy, the country may be a far more acceptable 
partner for the middle kingdom than some Anglo-Australian mining companies (The 
Economist 2009b): 
“As long as China requires stainless steel we have endless supplies of nickel. This 
country is so fertile you can spit on the ground and in one year’s time, there will 
be something growing from the ground.” -SEC 
“Mining is an economic potential. [China is the] biggest buyer of resources. You 
will have one dominant player in one sector. China will dominate operations.” – 
consultant 
The other growth sector in the resources industry is biodiesel. For two of my 
interviewees, alternative sources for diesel include crops from sugar cane, coconut and 
jatropha: 
“We are in jatropha which is a 100% diesel substitute with 5% of its emissions. 
50% of fuels now come from fossil fuels. It used to be higher but the Philippines 
has now reduced its reliance on oil I’d like to say we are into two types of gold: 
Black gold of petroleum products and green gold of ethanol, alternative, sugar, 
air, and wind. We are focused on green gold. At BP we have 500 gas stations. 
[However, the industry has its share of] feast and famine when it comes to 
exploration.” – energy company 1 
“It’s a new market, bio-diesel. We use coconuts for the crop. Only in the 
Philippines is there a thriving export-based coconut industry. Indonesia [has a] 
bigger [market] but they use a lot of [coconuts] for food. So we are a surplus 




they have coconut milk. The coconut oil miller is a fragmented market, there are 
many coconut farmers. It is market driven. There is no cartel. No single entity. 
But there are layers of middlemen. On the manufacturing side, there are coconut 
suppliers.  
“The passing of the bio-fuels laws will provide long-term stability; bio-diesel for 
transportation and shipping, power generation, automotive, public transport. In 
the Philippines most of the transport here runs on diesel, so there are lots of 
consumers for private vehicles. It is a diesel-driven market. There are 1.43M 
vehicles here in the country and we are a dumping ground for used transport 
such as the second-hand Korean and Japanese buses that make the bulk of public 
transport in Manila. 
“Biodiesel is a pollution mitigator. It improves fuel, reduce emissions, it’s a 
solution to pollution. [We are] at the forefront of the legislation that created the 
biofuels industry. The coconut farmers look at us to sustain the new market. The 
coconut farmers have a stake in our success. The biofuels industry [is] higher 
value added – we convert to higher value product for the export market. ” – 
energy company 2 
With peak oil and energy crises a dominant feature of global geopolitics in the first 
decade of the 21st Century, demand for alternative sources to carbon-based fuel is 
growing. Opportunities are being seized to meet demand for cleaner energy and to 
reduce dependence on fuel produced externally. 
6.6.2.3 Tourism 
A tropical country with thousands of islands, the Philippines has the combination of surf, 
sand, beautiful coral atolls and weather to rival other tropical countries such as Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The Visayan island of Boracay is internationally famous for its 
white sands and several of my interviewees encouraged me to visit the island (which I 
did). There is potential in the Philippine tourism industry (PDI 2007) but to realise this, 
it is dependent on various factors such as the availability of infrastructure; guaranteeing 
the safety and security of tourists; and better promotion of the country as a tourism 
destination. While Thailand has largely attracted Westerners, the Philippines is 




group, targeting the growing middle class Chinese tourists to visit the Philippines is one 
strategy they are undertaking: 
“We are not looking at other countries outside of China. China is close to the 
Philippines. We are looking at the tourism industry. Five years from now, there 
will be more Chinese tourists in the Philippines than the USA.” – SM 
Government support of the industry will be crucial to the sector’s success especially in 
the areas of aviation, transportation and basic infrastructure such as roads and 
sanitation. The following exhibit is a scan of a full page advertisement in The Economist, 





Exhibit 9: Philippine Tourism (2008) Ad: The Philippine Economy - Strong and 
Growing 
 
Blurb: Why just wish for a place in the sun when you can own one? Find your perfect 
home on one of our 7,107 islands. The Philippines. http://www.liveyourdreams.ph 
accessed 24th October 2009 
This ad appeared in The Economist, October4th-10th edition, p.32 (pp. 28-32) 
 
The three sectors mentioned in this section complement the fusion of Western and 
Asian influences of the Philippines. English-speaking Filipinos are a cultural fit for the 
BPO industry, while the advantage of geography is allowing the Philippines to position 




section on privatisation of government owned utilities also provide opportunities for 
business groups to expand commercially. 
6.6.3 Privatisation 
 
Successful transitions of formerly state-owned companies to fully-fledged private sector 
companies take time. As state-owned companies, politicisation is a known hazard and 
the organisational culture differs from private-owned entities. When the government 
enterprise becomes private, the organisation is depoliticised from politicians but other 
pressures are enhanced: a profit-oriented culture, rigour in risk management and 
compliance with corporate governance guidelines. The next section looks at one of the 
more successful privatisations in the country, Manila Water, and how the company 
transitioned to a well-run and well-governed profit-making company. 
6.6.3.1 Case Study of a Privatisation: Manila Water 
Access to clean and potable water is critical in urban Philippines (see Chapter 9 on the 
lack of access to clean water and the breastmilk powder industry in the country). The 
privatisation of water is a sensitive politico-economical issue in any country. The 
decision to privatise the water supply of Manila was justified on the grounds the city did 
not have a 24 hour water supply, illegal connections proliferated, and it was a financial 
burden on the government. (Wu and Malaluan 2008: 213)  
In 1997, Metro Manila’s water was divided into two concessionaries: the East Zone and 
West Zone. The decision to divide the water privatisation into two zones provides an 
almost textbook exemplar into comparing and contrasting the positive and negative 
effects of a privatisation experience. The winning bidder for the East Zone was the Ayala 
family-backed international consortium Manila Water, while the Lopez family-backed 
international consortium Maynilad Water won the West Zone concessionary (2008: 213, 
217).  
One criticism of the winning bids focused on the family owners as this reinforced the 
power and concentration of wealth of the two business families. However, an official 
involved in the privatisation thought this a moot point as business families dominate the 
country’s private sector and it was stipulated that the winning bids had to come from 




“People raised the issue of the overwhelming political and economic power held 
by the Lopezes and Ayalas, which needed to be held in check. Otherwise, these 
families could abuse this power....[but] if the largest water privatisation in the 
world was being carried out, you would expect that only the largest companies in 
the country would have the resources to participate in the bidding.” (Dumol 
2000: 102-103) 
A decade on from the water privatisation, the outcomes between the two companies 
could not have been more different. Manila Water, the operator of the East Zone, turned 
a profit in 1999 and listed successfully on the PSE in 2005. Manila Water is still in the 
hands of its original bidders and is now expanding internationally. It is also the subject 
of a Harvard Business School case study (Rangan 2007) and has received many corporate 
governance awards in the region. Maynilad Water, on the other hand, never managed to 
turn a profit under its original owners and suffered various problems. In 2005, the 
original consortium withdrew from operating the West Zone and is now in the hands of 
new owners and operators.  
Ceteris paribus, why did the experiences of these two private sector operators differ so 
dramatically? 
Wu and Malaluan link the successful outcomes of a privatisation to several factors 
including the initial vision towards the privatised company; instilling a new corporate 
culture; and co-opting the former government employees by training and upskilling 
them into becoming professional private sector managers. Co-opting the former 
government employees  Manila Water had open tenders instead of engaging in 
intercompany (or related party) transactions which proved to be of better value than 
sourcing within a related party. (2008: 218, 221). 
Furthermore, Wu and Malaluan argue the success of the East Zone’s operations can be 
largely attributed to the corporate governance principles instilled in the company. The 
culture of the parent company passed on its values to the privatised company generating 
an atmosphere of inclusiveness amongst employees. Five years after the privatisation, 
95% of Manila Water’s employees were retained from the old public sector company. For 
Maynilad Water, the opposite happened with new senior management personnel 




Wu and Malaluan strongly suggest that pre-existing corporate governance practices of a 
bidder plays an important role in the quality and successful outcomes of a privatisation 
and future privatisations ought to take into account a potential bidder’s corporate 
governance practice before awarding the contract: 
“Although a private water company’s management determines the quality of its 
corporate governance practices, the public sector has ample opportunities to 
influence corporate governance processes through the bidding process, 
regulatory actions and asset ownership. Government officials guiding the bidding 
process would be wise to pay attention to each bidder’s corporate governance, as 
these could be an indicator of how that bidder might perform if awarded the 
contract. Government can also include good corporate governance practices in 
concession agreements. (2008:219; see also 225-226) 
It is difficult to implement good corporate governance in a newly acquired company 
when it does not exist in the first place. In this case, the owner practised a culture of 
good corporate governance and this was inherited by the privatised company.  
6.7 Unaffiliated Business Groups 
 
There are some stand-alone, unaffiliated companies in the country such as subsidiaries 
of foreign companies. The Philippine subsidiary of Manulife, a Canadian insurance giant, 
demutualised and listed on the PSE as it had a large policyholder base in the country. 
Asking what effects listing on the PSE have had on the company especially in terms of its 
corporate governance, Manulife Philippines responded:  
“Indirectly, there has been some effect. Being a listed company, Manulife 
reaffirmed its commitment to adhere to the highest standards of corporate 
governance and further reinforced its corporate governance practices, setting the 
tone from the top.  This was then cascaded to all its subsidiaries, including 
Manulife Philippines. Further, local regulations have appreciably changed in 
recent years, giving added attention to corporate governance.  Especially 
considering that Manulife Philippines is a subsidiary of a listed company, it has to 
comply with these corporate governance regulations. Manulife does not have 




However, Manulife’s non-affiliated ownership and listing is the exception rather than the 
rule. The following box is my interviewee from ATR Kim Eng describes his company, an 
unaffiliated investment house, and how it bears the hallmark of a Philippine business 
group. ATR Kim Eng has its origins after buying out a subsidiary of an MNC, divesting 
this subsidiary and expanding into other sectors: 
Text Box 5: Development of a Non Family-Owned Business Group 
Origins 
“Our company [ATR Kim Eng (2009)] is in a different situation [compared to most family 
business groups]. We used to be called PhilTread Holdings. PhilTread was in tyres and 
rubber. Prior to that it was called Firestone, the American tyre maker. Firestone here was 
set up a 100% owned subsidiary. Once it was divested the stake was less than 25%. There 
was a trademark dispute between Firestone and Bridgestone; Bridgestone is the Japanese 
tyremaker. Firestone said the Bridgestone name was similar to theirs. Bridgestone argued 
that the Japanese name was Stonebridge which was Bridgestone in English. Firestone 
started to lose its position when it announced in the 1980s that it was only aiming to be 
the second biggest manufacture of tyres instead of number one. It was going well until it 
was hit by a product liability suit stating that there were faulty tyres in the USA which 
caused cars to explode. Eventually, Firestone was bought by Bridgestone. In 1994, 
Firestone Philippines was hit by severe labour problems. It had a militant union and 
Firestone closed off the plant. It fired off the militant union. After 13 years the Supreme 
Court judgement found in favour of ATR which had bought the Firestone subsidiary in 




“ATR formed a property group called Sucat Land and SMF - a leasing property - for the 
tyre manufacturing. However, the militant union gave Michelin problems so Michelin 
shut the plant in 2001. We were the lessor of the property so the Asian crisis didn’t hit us. 
However, as far as I am concerned though, it was a turning point of the partners of ATR. 
Just before the crisis there was the management buy-out. ATR has always been conscious 
of good governance prior to current legislative requirements. There was the acquisition 
by ATR Kim Eng of the PhilEx mining company which had a diverse shareholder base. 
PhilEx is still listed. Both Philex and Bridgestone/Firestone had a public shareholder base 
so they were always used to operating under good governance. 
 
Ownership and Control 
“At ATR there is no dominant family, just dominant groups. ATR stands for the names of 
three partners: Arnaiz, Tordesillas and Roxas. All three were at Peregrine Capital when 
they decided to do a leverage buy out of it December 1996. ATR owns around 45% of the 
company, KimEng – which is the largest publicly listed brokerage in Singapore - 35% and 
the public the rest. The two histories of both [PhilEx and PhilTread] companies show 
they were never family controlled. PhilTread had pretty prominent families in its 
shareholder list. But if you check PhilEx, it had the most diverse ownership. Apart from 
SSS, there was no single stockholder which had more than 6.8% stake. We are an honest 






“At ATR we had professional officers even when it was Peregrine Capital. Peregrine was 
not a family corporation. There was no dominant family. Even in the case of KimEng. 
The largest ownership stake is 6%. The biggest owner of KimEng is from Taiwan. We’re a 
professional corporation and our flagship business is investment banking with property 
and insurance as the other two arms. So we have professional people, stock brokerage, 
money broking, mutual funds. We are a mutual fund company of the Philippines. We 
make sure we have distinguished hands. We’re fortunate our seniors are very Western 
oriented. We’re coming from an MNC environment. We don’t see any cultural 
hindrance.” 
 
Business groups are the common corporate structure in the Philippines even for those 
which have non-family owners. 
6.8 Relationship with Minority Shareholders 
 
Business groups and how they communicate with, and respect the rights of, minority 
shareholders are major indicators on whether they practice good corporate governance 
or not:  
“If you are an analyst, you have a track record of how management is. For 
example, on the equities side of corporate governance, if the company looks after 
the minority shareholder interests, then it’s a good investment if they look out 
for all shareholders and how they treat minorities…How do [they] deal with 
minorities? Do owners screw the minorities? So do your homework for 
investing.” – stockbroker 
This section covers minority shareholders (or domestic retail investors), foreign investors 
and stakeholders. 
6.8.1 Minority Shareholder Population 
 
The number of minority shareholders (or domestic retail investors) in the Philippines is 
subject to some debate. However, most agree that it is quite small. Unlike Australia 
where a series of privatised assets and mandatory superannuation for workers saw the 
shareholder population swell to over half of the citizenry, the Philippine shareholder 
population is still the domain of the elite and a few despite the bull market of 2007: 




nobody has written a thesis (for which I am willing to fund) on how many 
shareholders are there in the Philippines. My guess is 0.5% to 0.75% of the 
population because I don’t think even 1% of the population or 800,000 people 
own shares.” – stockbroker 
“The shareholders are thinly dispersed, nobody really owns a chunk. There’s 
around 9000 shareholders who own at least 1,000 shares, and 3,000 owning less 
than that.”-private sector 1 
With a population where at least half of the population subsists on less than USD1 a day, 
stock market investing is far from the minds of many: 
“[It’s an issue on] how to build culture of investment in the country when 80% do 
not have the means nor the interest in investing.” – private sector 2 
While the privatisation wave of the 1980s and 1990s was a contributory factor in 
developed economies to increase the shareholder population in countries, this process 
did not have the same effect in the Philippines: 
“With regards to privatisation to spread the shareholder base, with the listing of 
Petron it didn’t occur. I don’t think there are enough people here with excess 
savings to put money in the stock market. There is a high concentration of 
wealth in the country and only a small percentage of the country that can afford 
to get into the stock market: institution and big brokers. Most people are just in 
traditional savings.” – academic 
As a small listed exchange, the private sector needs to be bolstered and not necessarily 
by making more investments in the few companies that are listed, but fostering other 
activities: 
“The retail investors are very rich Filipinos. Improve the investor base [but at the 
same time], address the problem of poverty. In the long term, address inequality 
at very low levels of income. What people need is microfinance and new 
entrepreneurial initiatives.” – academic 
Improving the domestic retail shareholder base must be linked to generating wealth for 




6.8.2 Rights of Shareholders 
 
For minority shareholders of Filipino corporations, their rights are covered and provided 
for under the Philippine Corporation Code overseen by the SEC. These rights include 
voting, dividend, derivative, appraisal, and the ability to access company information: 
“Shareholders of the company have all the rights provided for in the Philippine 
corporation code: 
• Voting right 
• Dividend right – in January this year, the board of directors of the company 
voted to adopt a policy of distributing at least one-third of the company’s 
earnings for the previous year as cash dividend to its stockholders. 
• Derivative right – the right of a shareholder to institute proceedings on behalf 
of the corporation in a derivative action in cases where the company itself is 
unable or unwilling to institute the necessary proceedings to redress wrongs 
committed against the company or vindicate corporate rights, as where the 
directors themselves are the malefactors. 
• Appraisal right – right of a dissenting shareholder who voted against certain 
proposed corporate action/s to require the corporation to purchase his shares 
at a fair value.  
• Right to inspect corporate records in accordance with the Philippine 
corporation code.  
• Right to information” – private sector 1 
Most interviewees mentioned voting rights on the top of the list as what shareholders are 
entitled to. Others included receiving information and attending AGMs: 
“Voting rights, right to dividends, directors voting, rights to information, copies 
of information of operations. The Philippine Corporate Code provides basic 
rights to shareholders.” - PLDT 
“We inform investors on what’s happening. We send the notices in an agenda. 
The investors may thus respond: on item #1 we vote yes; on item #2 we abstain. 




shares are issued, there is a privileged few who get first dibs. We have removed 
that and it was a popular move.” – private sector 2 
The right of appraisal - where a dissatisfied shareholder may be bought out by the 
company - was mentioned by a couple of interviewees although this right is rarely 
exercised: 
“If the shareholder doesn’t like the way the company is being run, we can buy 
him out but it is not invoked here much as you can just sell the shares. Our 
philosophy is to be fair to all shareholders. They worry the most if the value of 
the company depreciates.” – private sector 3 
“Appraisal rights – in any instances of the law, a claim of appraisal rights – inform 
the company to repurchase back the shares but we are not aware of a shareholder 
exercising their appraisal rights.” –private sector 4 
However, the reality of minor shareholdings mean rights such as the right to vote may be 
merely be symbolic: 
“The shareholders have a right to be notified to the meetings. These are standard 
rights. There are voting rights on the reduction of directors, changes in the 
articles of incorporation, if you dispose of all the assets. They vote on directors. 
They nominate, but in the past two years I haven’t seen a [minority] shareholder 
nominate other than the [major shareholders].” –private sector 5 
“There’s cumulative voting. It’s not like 2.5B shares divided by seven and you get 
a board seat but obviously if you have that big enough shareholding (1/7 of 2.5B 
c.357M shares) you’ll get a seat. If it’s less you can still get a board seat through 
cumulative voting. A band of minority shareholders can get together and 
accumulate their voting. Each shareholder is entitled to vote for seven directors 
and they could use their votes to elect one director. But in general, shareholders 
don’t have much say as nobody owns big chunks. On paper they have rights but 
they are small and can’t really do much.” –private sector 6 




6.8.2.1 Annual General Meetings or AGMs 
Another right every shareholder has is attendance of annual general meetings (AGMs) 
where the company’s performance over the past year is presented, company directors are 
elected, and board queries from shareholders are fielded and answered.  
“Every year the company also sends out to all shareholders together with the 
notice of the annual stockholders’ meeting an information statement containing 
the audited financial statements of the company as well as the management 
discussion and analysis of the financial results. The management team of the 
company also presents to the shareholders during the annual stockholders’ 
meeting the operational results of the company. An open forum, where 
shareholders can directly ask the management team questions, is held right after 
the presentation.” –private sector 1 
However, in the Philippine corporate environment, AGMs are passive affairs, similar to 
the rest of East Asia: 
“The SEC used to attend AGMs but not anymore. AGMs are only open to the 
stockholder. AGMs are scripted; most shareholders do not attend and are there 
by proxy.” - SEC 
“The AGMs are open to shareholders but the AGMs here are staged, unlike AGMs 
in Australia. There used to be questions on the floor for nominations but not 
anymore. AGMs here last for half a day.” – ICD 
“The AGMs are mild. Basically, there are no fireworks. The shareholder on the 
floor is free to query us.” –private sector 2 
“The shareholder meeting is more procedural” –private sector 3 
And in a society that values face and non-confrontation, awkward questions are equally 
not as welcomed from the company side: 
“In Filipino culture, we are not that aggressive. When corporations hold annual 
meetings, they accomplish and achieve, new directors are elected. It is a very 
passive environment.” – GSIS 




shareholders congratulations and they’d approve acts of our directors. In other 
words, we don’t practically get questions at all on our financial statements over 
the past 20 years. During the shareholders’ meeting, the chair will announce: if 
you have any questions ask the CEO. Hardly anybody asks questions even for 
clarification. The questions I get are from board members, not from 
shareholders.” –director 
AGMs are also not well-attended: 
“Shareholders are passive. During the annual meeting, there are 300 out of 5000 
attending. We organised a merienda (tea) and show bags for them. Most are retail 
investors. There is a mail out but there is very little communication from them. 
We send out a communication once a year which is the notice for the AGM.” –
private sector 4 
“At the AGM we distribute our annual report and each shareholder receives it 
(the annual report itself is quite small and thin, it’s an A5 size). Every year we 
distribute it. This year there were less than 150 people attending.” –private sector 
5 
AGMs are important fora for disclosing company information as some listed companies 
still do not disclose information on their websites – if they have one: 
“The investor relations function here is informal. Most shareholder interest is 
around the AGM. There is mandatory quarterly reporting. We hope to provide 
disclosure in terms of infrastructure, but we’re not quite there yet. Eventually.” –
private sector 6 
For one company that does have an investor relations (IR) department, this function has 
allowed to publicise the success of the business and facilitated better communication 
with outsiders: 
“When the company listed in 2005, it took a while to get the investor relations 
(IR) department established ourselves. There was a matter of the share price. 
When the company was listed, it was a new way of organising. The share price 
wasn’t performing much. People couldn’t understand what the company was 




it got established. The share price has increased since I have been here. [While 
the PSE is doing well] we have outperformed the market from August last year. 
The company is playing catch up with the market. Putting modesty aside, I’d like 
to say the IR department contributed in part in getting [the attention of] 
investors. The company has solid fundamentals and will continue with an 
increasingly aggressive coming campaign. It is a growth story despite its size. It 
has competent managers and professionals.” – SM 
For listed companies who do not have a dedicated investor relations department, the 
AGM remains the most important venue for disclosing information on company 
activities other than the PSE. 
6.8.2.2 Communicating with Shareholders 
Most interviewees spoke about disclosing information to shareholders in terms of 
complying with the requirements of the PSE and SEC.  
“In accordance with the Philippine Securities Regulation Code, the company 
releases information about a material event to the Philippine Stock Exchange 
(PSE) immediately after the occurrence of such material event, copy furnished 
the Philippine securities and exchange commission. The company also releases 
the information to the news media and through its corporate website 
immediately after disclosing the information with the PSE.” – private sector 1 
“There are several ways we communicate: If there are major happenings 
acquisitions, we’re required to disclose it to the PSE. The PSE publicly makes the 
information available” – private sector 2 
For the established players, an investor relations or corporate governance office is a 
formal division within the company: 
“Trust is an issue. The PLDT Corporate Governance office is here to address the 
interest of shareholders. These policies are there to protect and address the needs 
of shareholders.” – PLDT 
“As mentioned earlier, all our disclosures are posted in the company website. 
This includes financial reports, quarterly and annual as required by SEC. In 




from the Philippine Stock Exchange. Our Investor Relations group also conduct 
periodically sessions with media and the financial sector/markets and investment 
analysts.” - Petron 
Companies also use websites, newspapers, telephones, faxes and emails to communicate 
with shareholders: 
“Manulife communicates with its shareholders’ regularly and through a number 
of avenues: On a quarterly basis, Manulife releases its quarterly financial results.  
Specific disclosures include Manulife’s quarterly shareholders’ report, press 
release and quarterly statistical information package. We also hold a quarterly 
earnings conference call which is hosted by our President and Chief Executive 
Officer and our Chief Financial Officer. Annual communication includes our 
Annual Meeting and various documents including Manulife’s annual report, 
proxy circular and annual information form. Ongoing communication includes 
widely distributed press releases and our external website (www.manulife.com) 
which contains a significant amount of information on Manulife.” – Manulife 
“The company has a corporate website which contain information on the 
different businesses the company has interests in, latest corporate news, 
corporate disclosures, quarterly and annual financial reports and stock price. 
Shareholders may also subscribe to an electronic newsletter published by the 
company. Shareholders can also email or call the company’s investor relations 
group for questions about their shareholdings.” – private sector 3 
“The company has minority shareholders and foreign investors who are free to air 
their concerns during stockholders meetings, or by writing, calling, faxing or 
sending an e-mail. Management listens to their concerns and tries to address 
them.” – private sector 4 
However, for less well-resourced companies it does come down to a matter of cost in 
disclosing actively apart from the mandatory regulatory requirements: 
“We have to point out [to our employees] that corporate governance is not a cost 
but it’s an investment. However corporate governance can be costly as not 




For the smaller players, company secretaries are the main point of contact: 
“We have regular media releases it goes through the company secretary. The 
prospectus issued at the IPOs and that’s still in place. The shareholders are 
treated equally, they can buy/sell. That’s fine. We have around 10,000 
shareholders.” – private sector 6 
A particular Philippine trait, mobile phone text messaging, is widely used to 
communicate with investors. Landline phone access never took off in the country and 
the waiting list for a landline was half a dozen years according to one source. Given the 
paucity of telecommunications infrastructure in the country, mobile phone technology 
has leapfrogged this altogether and Filipinos are one of the highest users of mobile text 
messaging in the world: 
“Yes, our shareholders can contact us through text message, email, telephone. All 
disclosures are posted in the company website. Shareholders are furnished ahead 
of time copies of the notice of meeting, Information Statement and Annual 
Report.” – Petron 
Texting places the country at the vanguard of this mobile technology and during my 
fieldwork, was the main form of business communication: 
“We are the world leader in texting; around 30% of the world’s texts come from 
here.” - consultant 
The PSE is an active user of texting in ensuring disclosure requirements are being met by 
listed companies: 
“We don’t text official communication, but we use text as a medium to 
supplement communication. For example, the PSE can serve notice requiring an 
explanation to respond before 9am. If we don’t come up at 8am, one of the PSE 
disclosure officers texts us “when can we get your response?” We request a formal 
communication for it to be official and we have an official number imprinted in 
our communications with the PSE.”-private sector 7 
“The PSE have a nasty habit of texting me for information. The PSE texts me 
while I’m in traffic or on the road and I ask them to give me two minutes extra. I 




nobody will be at the office. I am worried that if anything happens I must answer 
by 9am. They send an email - If my secretary comes at 8 to 8.30am, I have to 
verify the answer without knowing the exact details.” – private sector 8 
In this regard, the PSE is at the vanguard of capital market regulators in using this 
technology to regulate companies. 
6.8.2.3 Dividends 
The declaration of dividends is the main way companies acknowledge shareholder value. 
As one interviewee pointed out, dividends are “corporate governance by value”. Unlike 
Anglo-American companies where share price rise and gain is the material point of 
shareholder value creation and destruction, the ability of a Philippine company to issue 
dividends is how a company emphasises shareholder value. 
“Yes [shareholder value] is very important. We make it a point every year to 
declare dividends and that’s the form of increasing shareholder value. However 
we’re focused on long-term shareholder value… We are careful to identify 
opportunities that will be profitable for the company and the shareholders so 
that’s for the long term. The focus is to increase shareholder value. But we are 
more focused in the long term. Short-term is one year. Every year we’re able to 
make dividends.” – private sector 1 
“We do emphasise shareholder value a lot. We measure shareholder value 
constantly, and we do attempt to balance the long- and short-term shareholder 
value needs. We have instituted a policy of paying out cash dividends annually 
equivalent to 33.3% of the prior year’s earnings. The balance allows us to grow the 
business, either through acquisitions or through organic expansion. This long-
term growth in shareholder value we measure primarily through the stock price.” 
– private sector 2 
Declaring dividends is also a way to appease shareholders. One interviewee pointed out 
receiving dividends is the main shareholder right: 
“What kind of shareholder rights exists in the company? Dividends. An average 
3% of 20P a year.” – private sector 3 




“The retail investors are not active. They get their dividends regularly so they 
don’t complain.” – private sector 4 
Most Western corporations issue cash dividends. One Philippine company – under the 
direction of their major shareholder – issued shares in lieu of cash payments in 2007: 
“[The] company especially the board of directors always look into creating 
shareholder value. Every stockholder meeting, it is important that we generate 
shareholder value in investments. In the shareholder meeting: we issue stock or 
cash dividend. This year it’s a stock dividend. Last year the shareholders 
expressed the view that they want a declaration of a stock instead of cash 
dividends (which we have done for the last 2 years). So this year, we declared 
stock dividends and this will be paid out in June. The long term purpose of good 
corporate governance is to create shareholder value. We are conscious of this 
role. In fact, whenever we have had a bond offering, growth from shares, 
opportunity to make additional investments in bond offering -to give 
opportunities to any shareholder to make a bond offering which offers a higher 
yield.” – private sector 5 
For FEU in particular, shareholder value maximisation is an alien concept. The goal of 
the listed entity is not to maximise profit but to ensure the ongoing operational existence 
of the school. The dividend policy differs with an emphasis on retained earnings being 
ploughed back into the school rather distributing what is available back to shareholders: 
“We issue dividends every year. There are regular cash dividends in January and 
July. With stock dividends, we issue them whenever it is allowable. We declared 
50% of the dividends to be stock 3 years ago. The FEU website has a history of 
our dividend declarations. The website also shows our investor relations. When 
you look at the retained earnings, even our dividend policy, it’s not like the other 
corporations. We are not distributing more to shareholders; we are not exceeding 
our yearly income for cash dividends. This is limited to 25% or 35%. Our income 
flows back to the school. ”- FEU 
For a company which has had problems in the past with its debt levels, issuing dividends 




“Shareholder value enhancement is the primary objective in dealing with the 
creditors with respect to the ongoing debt restructuring process, in making 
investment decisions, and in setting policy decisions governing the conduct of 
the various business operations under the group.  At some point hopefully in the 
not too distant future, the plan is to distribute regular cash dividends to the 
shareholders.” – private sector 6 
Issuing dividends is a sign that companies are conscious of this fundamental shareholder 
right, and this contributes to greater awareness of corporate governance in general. 
Issuing dividends wasn’t the norm before: 
“I’d assume corporate governance in the past few years have been strengthened 
probably because rules have changed and tightened. Investors and shareholders 
are more familiar with the responsibilities of the company. Before, you didn’t get 
dividends and that was ok. But now, the norm is to give back to shareholders. 
Lots of companies now distribute dividends. For a listed company, it’s becoming 
the norm to issue dividends. There’s also transparency – companies that are not 
being run well, you see lots of items in the newspaper. We want to institute 
governance mechanisms so you don’t get these kinds of disputes.” – private 
sector 7 
Reiteratively, maximising shareholder value is a recent largely Anglo-American concept 
that has its fair share of detractors as it has benefited the managerial class. As one 
interviewee pointed out, corporate governance is more encompassing than the market 
value of a company: 
“There are issues of the control of land that needs to be addressed once you talk 
about corporate governance in family corporations. You need a broader view of 
stakeholders, communities and where they come from. Corporate governance is 
inadequate (if you simply take the narrow approach). [The] shareholder value 
discourse benefits the [foreign] institutional investors.” – academic 
For well-governed companies in the Philippines, short-term shareholder value 
maximisation is not common. Philippine companies exist to benefit their owners and 
long-term goals of owners. While there are corporate governance problems in the 




remains a particular and pertinent problem for Western corporations and their 
stakeholders. 
6.8.3 Shareholder Value 
 
Another way where Philippine corporate governance practices fundamentally differ from 
Anglo-American corporations is in the concept and perception of shareholder value. For 
most companies, shareholder value represents the majority shareholders’ interests and 
the orientation is long-term: 
“Of course [we emphasise shareholder value]. One advantage is our 
management’s view is effectively the same on shareholder value. Our seniors are 
owners themselves. They are not looking at shareholder gain as they’d be killing 
themselves as shareholders [to meet quarterly reporting]. They own substantial 
chunks. [This is] good for smaller shareholders as the management team is led by 
shareholders themselves. It’s a congruence of objectives. The family-run 
corporations won’t share [the value with] the public. We do.” –private sector 1 
The alignment between majority owners and managers mean shareholder value and 
long-term company performance is intimately linked and aligned. Indeed, too much 
short-term shareholder value is not a good thing as Western corporations and 
shareholders have realised .Unlike Western managers who are rewarded with several 
remunerative devices, owner-managers in the Philippines have a less complex approach 
to risk and reward: 
“The Board represents the stockholders’ interest in perpetuating a successful 
business, including optimising long-term financial returns. It is responsible for 
determining that the Corporation is managed in such a way to ensure such 
result.” – private sector 2 
“Manulife is focused on creating shareholder value, which we believe requires a 
long-term perspective.” – Manulife 
Maximising shareholder value in the shortest time possible is not a mantra to be found 




6.8.4 Minority Shareholder Protection 
 
While maximising shareholder value may not be a problem in the country, minority 
shareholder protection- or lack thereof - is a big issue in Philippine corporate 
governance. As listed companies have dominant owners, the force and will of their 
principals are undeniable. Minority shareholder rights can be disregarded or 
unprotected. Demanding a greater form of participation in businesses that are run like 
mini empires can be challenging. Listing on the PSE means greater transparency and 
information for all shareholders, not just a few. However, some business groups have not 
realised this. Indeed, one interviewee was critical of the demands made by minority 
investors: 
“Here in the Philippines, the publicly listed corporations have so many 
shareholders everybody wants to be generals not followers.” -private sector 1 
This is the downside of listing for a business family – being accountable to many small 
shareholders all with different interests and perspectives on the company. Untimely 
disclosure, insider trading, mismanagement and misinformation are common devices 
where a major shareholder can exploit minority shareholders in a business group 
structure as Bonbright & Means pointed out: 
“’Mismanagement is used herein to mean management of the subsidiary in the 
interest of the dominant company adversely to the interests of the minority 
stockholders. The various types of mismanagement against which minority 
stockholders have complained may be divided into three main classes: 1) 
diversion of funds or of business, 2) unfavourable contracts, 3) consolidation and 
dissolution.” (1969: 344-345) 
While there is not the classic agency problem in the Philippines, interviewees generally 
support the Agency Theory II problem identified by Villalonga & Amit and others (see 
Chapter 2 Literature Review: Limitations of Agency Theory) and the concern over 
minority shareholder protection. Some interviewees, including the regulator, concurred 
that minority shareholder rights are flimsily protected. 
“Yes. In law they have enough protection but shareholders need to be educated 




sleeping. If minority shareholders are active, they are not practising. [Minority 
shareholders] should make the necessary noise about corporations who are in 
violation so they’ll be helpful to the SEC.” – SEC 
“[Most companies deal with minority shareholders] not terribly well. One has to 
be careful on the issues and companies that you deal with. You don’t have 
minority suits in this country. Broad shareholder value is not here yet. In time, 
shareholder value is getting rigour. One swallow does not a summer make. In 
terms of companies and how they handle minority shareholders, if they are 
sensitive to stakeholder management - it’s not there yet. There is a cultural shift 
and a resistance of the board. It’s changing but changing with resistance assisted 
by the younger generation. It is a global phenomenon. [It’s companies] not 
wanting to change dramatically, not as rapidly as we would like to see.” – private 
sector 2 
 “The problem is minority shareholders’ interests are not considered as much as 
there are so few people [who are shareholders]. There is no protection of 
minority shareholders. It is a question of enforcement.” – academic 
A couple of interviewees mentioned preventative measures against insider trading as this 
would have an adverse impact on their minority shareholders: 
“As head of the corporate governance group, when there’s a material event, we 
make a disclosure. It’s part of good corporate governance practices on adopting a 
trading blockout of executives and covered persons.” – private sector 3 
“No employee of the company can take advantage of material information. There 
is a trading blockout 10 days prior to disclosure and 3 days thereafter, no affected 
executive should buy or sell shares in all publicly listed companies. We are 
conscious of material information and of acquiring because of our position and 
gain economic [advantages].” –private sector 4 
While a booming stockmarket makes insider trading attractive: 
“Insider trading is hard in the case of [a widely owned company.] But with a 
booming stockmarket [in 2007], the family [insider owners] is much more 




“Many small markets that are vulnerable to influences are driven by insider 
information.” –investment banker 
For those who practice good corporate governance, it comes down to the will and self-
control not to abuse one’s position of power and privileged information in ensuring the 
rights of all shareholders are protected. 
6.8.5 Rewarding Minority Shareholder Protection  
 
Minority shareholder protection is a big indicator of whether the company is a good 
investment or not for an outsider. If listed companies are opaque and aren’t materially 
disclosing financial information in a timely manner, then that forms part of a corporate 
governance assessment. Therefore, companies that do protect minority investors are 
rewarded for doing so. As one interviewee bluntly put it: 
“The equities with corporate governance, if the market’s dead – who cares? Even 
in dead markets it’s harder [to find value]. What happened from 1996-99, 
companies had difficulties rebounding when they weren’t protecting their little, 
minority shareholders. Ayala Land, PLDT were rewarded far more quickly 
because they protected their minority shareholders, political immunity, and were 
clean, solid blue chip names – faster than those who didn’t. In emerging Asian 
markets, with a trustworthy management, [they were rewarded.]” – stockbroker 
While in one workshop, one speaker mentioned that especially in emerging markets, 
companies that rise above their environment and practice good corporate governance 
are rewarded highly above their peers (see also Chapter 2 Literature Review on 
Corruption, Poverty and Corporate Governance): 
“In managed funds, they want a safe haven for investments. No country has the 
perfect corporate governance. But we have learnt that companies that practice 
good corporate governance have a 25-30% premium.” – CG workshop  
However, the fact remains minority shareholder protection or lack thereof, is one of the 
main hazards of investing in a developing market. With a dominant shareholder, not all 
shareholders are treated or expected to be treated equally. But those companies who do, 
they are rewarded for going against the general trend and disclosing above and beyond 




6.8.6 Minority Shareholder Activism 
 
Minority shareholders are perceived as being quite passive at exercising their rights:  
“Shareholders are on the passive and restrained side.”-private sector 1 
“By Philippine standards, the investors are not demanding.” –private sector 2 
While the rest of East Asia is awakening to minority shareholder activism, this concept is 
generally alien in the country: 
“There is not a culture of shareholder activism in this country as there is so much 
familiarity. Multinationals are not proactive and most of the foreign investors are 
very nice. Shareholders are on the passive and restrained side.”-private sector 3 
“The minority shareholders of PLDT are not really active. Minority shareholder 
activism lately such as some groups in South Korea, some groups in Japan with 
one organised asking for particular representation on the board. But not on 
PLDT, not in the Philippines. SSS is not active.” -PLDT 
When there is minority shareholder action, it does receive coverage as so few of them 
occur. Whilst collecting data, a case occurred of minority investors actively exercising 
their right to be informed and have information disclosed to them. The minority 
investors of the listed company Philippine Racing Club Inc. (PRCI) took to the media in 
their want for more disclosure against the majority owners who were Malaysian foreign 
investors. The racing club owns the Santa Ana track which sits on prime real estate land 
in the heart of Makati and the foreign investors were property developers: 
“…the Santa Ana race track is PRCI's prime asset and sole and exclusive location 
on which it conducts the business of a race course. The majority shareholders 
haven't disclosed a thing about the plan at all. We (minority shareholders) 
requested for pertinent documents, request for copy of all records, documents 
contracts etc related to acquisition. Again they denied our request. Where is the 
transparency there? Our rights as shareholders have been completely ignored. All 
that we in the minority are after is full transparency and disclosure from the 





Foreign ownership limitations and the SEC’s enforcement of existing corporate 
governance regulations were also highlighted by the investors: 
“PRCI's foreign ownership limitations were breached...We will continue to 
oppose moves by the Malaysian-led group to transfer ownership of Santa Ana 
racetrack to JTH Davies through their proposed swap. We may be the minority 
but we still have rights and we deserve to be heard. All we want is full and 
complete transparency and disclosure. The Philippine Code of Corporate 
Governance mandates such transparency and disclosure for the protection of the 
investing public and shareholders whether majority or minority. The 
government, through the SEC, must ensure that provisions of the Code are 
adhered to by all listed companies doing business in the Philippines. It should 
step in quickly to prevent the mockery of the Constitution and its own Code of 
Corporate Governance. Otherwise, why bother putting it in place at all?” – 
minority shareholder (Arnaldo 2007) 
Several communications made to PRCI asking for an interview went unanswered.  
The above case is one example of minority shareholders trying to be active in the 
country. At the very the discourse of corporate governance is spreading and minority 
investors are realising that they do have and are entitled to exercise their rights.  
6.8.7 Minority Shareholders Association 
 
Frustration with the lack of disclosure, lack of enforcement and not so active regulators 
were the topics of a conversation I had with one minority shareholder who happened to 
be a senior executive at a blue chip company. There was the all too familiar story of lack 
of information, the SEC and PSE’s lack of regulatory oversight over the quick decline in 
the company’s share price, and the principals’ severe lack of transparency. I could only 
repeat the comments made to me that the PSE is an emerging market and the safer bet 
for one’s money would be with the blue-chip stocks. Anything beyond companies that 
aren’t covered by the index funds or financial analysts places the investor in the 
speculative realm of insider trading and a gambling scenario not so dissimilar from a 
casino. The conversation was not encouraging. 




shares for the long-term. Minority shareholders make an assessment based on publicly 
available information on the PSE or in newspapers. Minority shareholders generally do 
not have the insider connections within the company.  
The general passivity of minority shareholders and the lack of a collective, cohesive voice 
against a dominant shareholder prompted some to establish a minority shareholders 
association along the lines of the Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA 2009) – an 
activist group that represents the interests of minority shareholders. The ASA has been 
active in scrutinising companies that have been less upfront about information, critical 
of the remuneration reports of several Australia companies and have contributed to an 
improved corporate governance environment. While the ASA does not claim to 
represent all minority shareholders, their influence is such now that their activism is 
regarded on the same level as a top ten institutional investor in the country (Matthews 
2009). 
The Minority Shareholders’ Association of the Philippines (or MSAP) is nascently the 
ASA’s equivalent.  
“MSAP has been formed and incorporated with the SEC. Most incorporators are 
coming from the Management Association of the Philippines (MAP) in 
partnership with the Corporate Governance Institute of the Philippines (CGIP). 
One incorporator visited the Australian Shareholders Association in 2002.” –
private sector 1 
Other countries in the region have also been setting up this type of an association. In 
Malaysia, a minority shareholders group was given funding by the government to 
support its cause: 
“In Malaysia, the government has given seed money to set up a shareholders’ 
activist group. The government here has not sufficient funds.” - SEC 
Promoting the rights of minority shareholders has been bolstered by at least the 
establishment of an organisation that would represent the cause of them. Nevertheless, it 
will be a challenge for the voice of a minority to go up against the dominance of one: 
”There is a plan under MAP of establishing minority shareholders association. 




independent rating. The majority (shareholder) is still the majority…The 
economic control of resources is in the hands of the few. The few dictate. It all 
depends on how it’s employed. There are benefits to business, and can work 
against the minority. This can be good and can be bad.” – private sector 2 
Nevertheless, it has received strong encouragement from the regulator: 
“In three years’ time [I hope to see] more minority activism. The SEC will have to 
be strong on that.” – SEC 
Having a minority activist group is evidence of changes that are slowly occurring and 
reforms happening in the Philippine corporate governance environment: 
“MSAP is part of our advocacy now. It’s an uphill battle. The majority is still the 
majority. We still need to get the commitment of the majority. If you are not 
committed, to get commitment you have to get back to values – in government 
or in business. You must start from that.” – business advocate 2 
The sophisticated institutional infrastructure that needs to be developed to complement 
the capital market is starting to take shape. 
6.8.8 Foreign Investors 
 
The other prominent group of minority investors are foreign investors. Unlike domestic 
retail investors, foreign investors generally are backed by strong and highly capitalised 
institutions. However, like domestic retail investors, they are passive, and not the 
shareholder activists that they are in their home countries.  
Foreign capital market investment in the country reached new heights in the bull market 
of 2007 and they are a double-edged sword for the local capital market. However, foreign 
capital investment is generally seen as fickle and as hot money. Foreign investors may 
have the money and funding but they are not investing in the sectors where they can 
contribute to the development of the economy. For foreign direct investors, ownership 
restrictions prevent them from exercising much influence and activity, therefore relying 
much on the goodwill of their local partners.  
The fickleness of foreign capital and their impact on developing economies is a source of 




in the country so that it will be a positive force for improved private sector development 
rather than regressive economic development? (See also discussion in The Economist 
2008b) 
In this section, foreign investors mentioned by interviewees are large institutional 
investors such as pension funds. In Anglo-American corporate governance, institutional 
investor influence is high especially when it comes to the structure of the board. 
(Cadbury 2002: 106, 115) Foreign investors mentioned by my interviewees are from four 
different cultural orientations: Anglo-American (Australian, American, British); 
Germanic (Dutch, German, Swiss), Middle-East (Saudi) and Asian (Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, Malaysian, Singaporean, Taiwanese) investors. The last group is increasing due 
to intra-regional trade.  
The following relates how foreign investors are tentatively testing the waters of the 
Philippines and how they are viewed by the companies they have invested in. 
6.8.8.1 Blue Chip Companies 
Foreign investor participation in blue chip companies is present. On the stock market, 
the blue chips attract most of the foreign investment. 
“We have 2000 shareholders, of which 16% are foreign investors from mainly US 
and Europe institutional funds that have satellite offices. The Asian funds are 
based in Singapore. [Our] market cap is USD5.5B. 16% owned by foreigners so 
that’s USD1.82B. We encourage [them to invest], make them appreciate what 
kind of a company we are. [That is] part of our wealth creation, to be able to 
realise the best value of our stock. There is a lot of goodwill in SM. 60-70% of SM 
trading value is from foreigners. There’s a big market cap and is the second 
biggest after PLDT. It’s very hard to sustain a [high] share price level [with the] 
domestic [investors] only.” – SM 
“Ayala: it’s blue-chip. It’s the first choice in the Philippines as a partner for a 
foreign investor.” –private sector 1 
“The companies worth investing in, their reputation is well known” –private 
sector 2 




best form of corporate governance in the country. 
“Is [corporate governance] happening in form and substance? There is plenty of 
form and size although substance is a long way off. There is a growing awareness 
of governance. There are pragmatic arguments as we are increasingly borderless. 
Capital is fungible. Investors favour entities that are more transparent.” – private 
sector 3 
Blue chip companies are generally the first port of call for foreign investors entering the 
country. 
6.8.8.2 Foreign Investors in the PSE 
Foreign capital market investment was behind most of the volume and activity on the 
PSE in 2007 (Sanchez-Lacson 2007c). They move the market: 
“It’s foreign investment that drives the market. On an average 70-80% of the total 
trading volume are due to foreign investors.” – stockbroker 1 
“Foreign investment in the market is actually closer to 70%. The domestic market 
isn’t that developed, unfortunately, but we’re taking steps two remedy that and 
encourage local investors. For the market as a while, it’s 55, 45%.” – PSE 
Unlike domestic retail investors, foreign investors are very active in buying and selling 
parcels of shares on the stock exchange. However, the influx of foreign investors to the 
PSE was not positively received by all. The East Asian Crisis is a reminder of the 
fickleness of foreign capital inflows: 
“Prior to the influence of foreign capital of the early 1990s, [the PSE] was rumour-
driven. In the 1990s, the influence of institutional investors contrasted with 
smaller stockbrokers…In the mid-1990s, there were lots of foreign investors. Post-
1997, they realised foreign investors were using language of ‘good governance’ 
different from locals, so there was more attention to quality research of 
companies. But the foreign investors were following the herd. The institutional 
investors pulled out in 1997, then came back after the crisis.” – academic 
Foreign investors are seen as hot money and contributing to the volatility in the market. 
They leave as easily as they enter. As the PSE reached new highs, concern about the hot 




2007c-2007d, Remo 2007b): 
“Overseas capital is very fickle, very opportunistic.” – private sector 1 
“The PSE is not an indicator of the market. Better to attract foreign direct 
investment [instead of hot money]” – private sector 2 
The indiscriminate flow of foreign capital to the stock exchange was also criticised as 
neither contributing to the development nor showing a substantial understanding of the 
dynamics of the economy: 
“I see them as hot money. Not the kind of money we really need. It’s helpful to 
start the market now but hot money doesn’t love or hate the Philippines. Hot 
money goes wherever it things it can earn their profit for the moment. The 
owners of hot money see opportunity. It has ceased to a lesser degree. They’ll 
have to go to some place else. In and out, hot money over the last year. God help 
us if they start to sell, it won’t be absorbed by the local market and we will 
sharply depreciate.” –stockbroker 
The Philippines, despite being out of rhythm with the region, is seen as part of East Asia. 
Therefore, investment in the Philippines forms part of the regional investment or 
emerging market portfolio of any foreign investor: 
“[There is a] hierarchy created at the PSE– locals following rumours, not 
sophisticated information, not following corporate governance per se. 
Institutional investors follow sophisticated information – the Anglo-American 
corporate governance investor. Supposedly they are sophisticated. As for 
institutional investors, who really has power? Ordinary shareholders or fund 
managers in financial conglomerates? [But] why are [foreign investors] here in 
the first place? We’re in the region growing, potential and so forth. Not to do 
with sophisticated understanding of the economy.” –academic  
“The financial markets [here] are emerging relative by the power of pension 
funds…They’re telling what gives liquidity and value to the stock markets. [The 
markets] need higher transparency.” –private sector 3 
Foreign investment in the PSE will continue to influence the way the market movements 




6.8.8.2.1 A British Hedge Fund Investor at the PSE 
In 2007, a London-based hedge fund manager, GLG Partners, became a significant 
shareholder of the PSE guaranteeing them a board seat on the PSE board. They had 
bought the stake from the San Miguel pension fund, one of the largest pension funds in 
the country. This was the first case of a foreign institutional investor-hedge fund that 
had bought into the PSE (Sanchez-Lacson 2007e). For observers, the introduction of an 
Anglo-American investor to a board that is still dominated by insiders and brokers was 
an interesting event: 
“GLG Partners LP was able to secure exemptive relief from the SEC to execute the 
transaction. By law no single person or entity can own more than 5% of the 
exchange…GLG will have only 1 seat and 1 vote, but at least its representative can 
help keep the discussions professional and may even impart and contribute 
whatever good experiences GLG may have experienced along the way.” – PSE 
“[The] jury’s out on that significant minority investor. As hedge funds - caveat 
emptor. They may have taken a sophisticated take on their role. [They are] babes 
in the wood [here]. Governance practice [is different].” – private sector 
Two years onwards, the hedge fund has not sold out of the PSE even during the peak of 
the global financial crisis. And far from being active, they have remained quite passive: 
“GLG is still around though since they bought their shares in PSE they have done 
nothing significant, if at all.” -  PSE 
GLG Partners was acquired by another hedge fund in 2010. 
6.8.8.3 Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance 
While GLG has remained a passive institutional investor, other interviewees pointed out 
foreign investors were demanding improvements in the business environment. Foreign 
fund pressures are real and present and the regulators are well aware of this: 
“(Question: I said there’s criticism of the OECD corporate governance principles 
because it’s from Anglo-American cultures and for developed countries.) That’s 
the most common complaint we get from covered corporations. Why enforce 
principles that are not adaptable to Asian/Filipino culture? It is not for Asian 
culture. But my response to that is, but we want foreign funds in our respective 




that’s what investors expect. People, especially investors, hear a lot of good 
corporate governance so domestic corporations should follow suit. The foreign 
investors tell the domestic corporations they assess the company’s corporate 
governance.” – SEC 
“[Foreign investor activism would be] a development I would welcome, if only to 
kick start best international practices and pure governance, protecting its 
investment and ensuring good ethical and business practice within the 
organisation.” – PSE 
Corporate governance is part of a foreign investor’s checklist prior to making their 
investments. Foreign investors as catalyst for improved corporate governance in 
companies were a common sentiment. To attract foreign investment, practising 
corporate governance in substance is part of the criteria:  
“There is nothing happening [in corporate governance], unless driven from the 
outside. If it’s outside, it’s interference for example from foreign investors.” – 
private sector 2 
“(Do foreign investors look at the corporate governance of the companies before 
they invest?) Very much so. Foreign investors look at corporate governance 
before they invest.” -stockbroker 
“We have realised it – we are isolated in the world. Globalisation is competitive 
internationally. Foreigners want corporate governance. They want disclosures. 
They want to be co-investors with owners to Filipino entities.” – private sector 3 
For business families, foreign investors can be more demanding than the domestic retail 
investors: 
“Foreign Investors: they ask more in away, like who are the principals. Here the 
corporation reflects the principals. How serious are [the principals] on corporate 
governance?” – private sector 4 
“The challengers to the families are foreign investors. Those calling more for 
good corporate governance are those who feel they’re not given a fair share. 




traditional large corporations which families control. Challenging those practices 
will benefit the new players.” – academic 
From a company’s perspective, the foreign investor may have a substantial holding but 
does not represent the controlling owner. The following passage is a reflection of the 
regional variations in corporate governance practice and the cultural conflict between 
Eastern and Western standards. In this case, one Anglo-American investor demanded 
better disclosure practices from the company, while the company’s response was rather 
muted as the investor is an outsider: 
“Before this interview, I got a call from an overseas fund manager based in 
London. We declared a big dividend and he was complaining to me for not 
telling them. He was emailing us and calling us frequently. He didn’t study the 
tax laws when he went to place the investment. We settled it and is now quite 
happy with the result and the solution he proposed. If a shareholder asks and 
comments, we reply to it promptly. At least they’re content. The UK fund 
manager – I couldn’t understand him with his accent. They had between 
USD500K to USD1M dividends so it was sizeable enough. But the shares are PCD 
nominated so he could have had multiple clients.  There’s no institutional 
investor that can dictate. They don’t have that kind of shareholding. He said in 
Malaysia this was how things were run. He tries to compare different systems. He 
wants to apply the rules in different countries to us which isn’t possible.” – 
private sector 5 
Demanding external investors have started challenging the insular nature of the business 
environment. 
6.8.8.4 Communication with Foreign Investors 
Similar to the interaction with domestic retail investors, larger companies normally have 
a formalised approach towards communicating with foreign investors through the use 
face-to-face presentations, investment roadshows and use of new technologies: 
“The IR department serves the function of communicating with shareholders. We 
would have one on one with meetings, investment briefings, roadshows, 
teleconferences, email, and web services. Our annual reports are now much more 




publication. We are quite used to dealing with foreign investors and we have very 
good relationships with the large institutions. [We] satisfy [their] requirements 
through financial ratings and giving them an explanation.”  – SM interviewee 
“Foreign investors are normally invited to an investor relations meeting. There is 
an investor relations office. They go around in roadshows to inform foreign 
investors what’s going in the company. They are properly informed with plans of 
the company with respect to minority shareholders – our shares are publicly 
listed and they get their information from their brokers if they need to express 
any settlements. They can email/write to our investor relations unit.” – Ayala 
“Our institutional investors include HSBC, Standard Chartered, ING, UBS, 
Citigroup. If they have any questions it goes straight to investor relations. There 
are also pension funds. Sometimes they ask if they can send a 
representative/observer to us.” – private sector 1 
For companies that have listings overseas, the quarterly briefing is in line with Anglo-
American practices: 
“Manulife has a number of institutional and retail shareholders who reside 
outside of Canada.  The rights of these shareholders are the same rights enjoyed 
by our Canadian shareholders.  If they have any concerns, they can contact either 
Shareholders Services (for retail shareholders) or Investor Relations (for 
institutional shareholders). We make every effort to respond to questions in a 
timely manner.” – Manulife 
“Communication with investors is with a briefing at the end of each quarter” - 
PLDT 
Another outlet for communicating with foreign investors includes investor roadshows. 
For one medium-sized company, roadshows provide the opportunity for them to engage 
and be exposed to demands of foreign investors: 
“We went to roadshows in Singapore and Hong Kong to tell them we are a 
company worth looking at. We faced institutional investors as to how much, who 
owns, as we are not known. We have foreign investors but we don’t know who 




level of foreign shareholders. The roadshows are places where we can expose 
ourselves more to the institutional side. In the last few months, we have had a 
foreign investor come to us once a week.” –private sector 2 
Philippine private sector companies with an international outlook are engaged in 
communicating with their foreign investors. 
6.9 Stakeholders 
 
In contrast to the shareholder value of the firm, the stakeholder view recognises the 
company as an interconnected, networked entity that has relationships with various 
organisations and individuals. The company has various stakeholders to whom it is 
reliant upon and equally, these stakeholders are reliant on the company. Stakeholders 
that were present in my nodes include banks, community, creditors, customers, 
depositors, employees, environment, external stakeholders, internal stakeholders, 
government, investors, media and shareholders. 
In response to my question about the stakeholders of their company, two sets of 
responses emerged: the most immediate stakeholder is nominally the financial, majority 
shareholder; and the secondary which includes most non-financial stakeholders. 
6.9.1 Primary Stakeholders 
 
The financial stakeholders or the majority owners of the company are the primary 
stakeholders: 
“Our stakeholders are shareholders, officers, depositors, creditors and the public 
at large. There are two tiers to our stakeholders – the real and intangible. The real 
or main stakeholders are the shareholders which is really the family due to their 
money and investment and depositors (lending and saving). Our intangible or 
secondary stakeholders in the broad sense it includes directors, officers due to 
personal interest, employees in general, and the public.” – bank 
“Stakeholders: holding company 1, holding company 2 and the public.” -private 
sector 1 
“[Stakeholders of the company are] majority shareholders, minority shareholders, 




is to take care of the controlling owners. There’s no choice. Responsibility and 
good corporate governance is about taking care of controlling shareholders.” –
academic 
Without doubt the primary stakeholder of the Philippine company is the owner or 
dominant family. 
6.9.2 Secondary Stakeholders 
 
The secondary stakeholders of a Philippine company largely depend on the industry or 
sector the company is in. For business groups, the stakeholders depend on the variety of 
businesses: 
“[Our stakeholders include] outside shareholders, employees and customers. The 
banks [are stakeholders because they] provide funding for projects. For Ayala 
Land, the stakeholders are lot buyers, residents/condo owners, construction 
companies.  For Globe Telecom it would be subscribers. At AC it would be 
shareholders, employees and banks. We also have a Stakeholders Relations Office 
previously known as the Public Relations office headed by the former cabinet 
member of government in the early years of GMA. The office is where creditors 
and suppliers can talk about their concerns.” – Ayala 
“The majority stakeholders are the shareholders. Depending on which business –
tenants for our malls, retail merchandising of a supplier. Banks – it’s composed of 
lenders. For property it’s developers.” – SM 
One interviewee mentioned the importance of the supply chain in conceptualising the 
company’s stakeholder relationships: 
“Stakeholders upstream: customers, suppliers; stakeholders downstream: the 
industry, government, employees There are a lot of stakes upstream and 
downstream” – private sector 1 
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Government was also cited as a very important stakeholder in its regulatory and revenue 
capacity: 
“The government is a heavy stakeholder. We pay taxes.” – private sector 2 
Additionally, employees featured prominently as valued stakeholders of the company. 
Some employees also crossed over as shareholders of the company: 
“A lot of our employees are shareholders as well. The employees subscribe 
directly to share offerings so they can say that they own part of the company. 
They usually own the minimum which is around 1000-3000 shares. Around 75% 
of our employees own shares.” – listed (4) 
“(Who are Manulife’s major and minor stakeholders?) Example of stakeholders 
may include employees, the public, media, interest groups etc. Manulife’s 
stakeholders include our shareholders, customers, employees, distributors and 
governments where we do business. (What is the opinion of the company of its 
stakeholders?) We value all of our stakeholders.” – Manulife 
For one company which has had problems in the past, its creditors are a prominent 
stakeholder; 
“Benpres’ stakeholders are its stockholders, employees, regulatory agencies, 
affiliates and creditors. Benpres despite its failed investment and difficulties with 
the creditors, has been very transparent to all its stakeholders and in return have 
over the years continue to enjoy very strong support.” – Benpres 
While for one business advocacy group, the main stakeholder is the business 
community: 
“MAP has a good spread of stakeholders. It is the whole gamut of business. We 




Specifically on stakeholders they mainly are businesses.” – MAP 
Having a good reputation amongst stakeholders transfers to the financial value of the 
company as well: 
“In general, Aboitiz has a good reputation among its various stakeholders. We 
have a reputation for integrity, for social commitment, and for considering our 
people as our greatest resource.” – Aboitiz 
“Way back in early 2006, we launched a bond offering amidst economic and 
political crises. The offering got a AAA rating. One Hong Kong publishing 
company made a comment that Ayala could do it because of its reputation 
despite the Philippine environment. Private companies are contributing to 
significant developments in the business community.”- Ayala 
Good stakeholder relationships complement the shareholder value of the company. 
Together they form the aggregate value of a company.  
6.10 Effects of ASEAN membership 
 
The Philippines is a member country of the Association for South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). ASEAN is the largest free trade association in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
attitudes of the private sector in the Philippines towards greater intra-regional trade, 
integration and cooperation have been mostly positive: 
“We feel it’s important to be part of the broader ASEAN community, and the way 
we intend to do that is by attracting partners from overseas. Secondly, we plan to 
invest with partners in these countries. We hope that that would blossom into 
relationships that can be cross-cultural in nature and encourage the flow of 
goods within the region.” Ayala Group CEO in de Borja (2005: 127) 
Trade within ASEAN is increasing and foreign investors from the region are having an 
effect on the commercial landscape of the country. One interviewee mentioned that 
Asian foreign investors were less likely to demand transparency as opposed to their 
Western counterparts: 
“For foreign ownership, look at the indices where foreign investors are: Europe, 




are somewhat lower down the scale. If they’ll be major foreign investors, will they 
be as clean? The Asian Chambers of Commerce aren’t interested in pursuing 
transparency as the Western ones.” – private sector 1 
The impact of ASEAN and intra-regional trade mean having common corporate 
governance standards are also gaining import through foreign investment pressures and 
there are moves towards harmonising such standards (in addition to IFRS and Basel II 
requirements): 
“Because we’ve integrated too rapidly 58% of our trade is intra-regional. We are 
looking at – and compelled to harmonise attitudes…we are getting basically to 
recognise governance and understand corporate governance practices.” – private 
sector 2 
However, another interviewee spoke about the glacial pace of regional integration: 
“We’re part of the ASEAN group. We compete with India. For us to move to 
international standards there has to be a corridor of regional acceptance to move 
in that direction. We compete against each to be the first one to take the step. 
We can suffer. Unfortunately moving towards regional free trade will be gradual, 
and it can’t be done quickly.” – private sector 3 
The rise of ASEAN is a counterweight to the US economic development model which 
was criticised by one interviewee: 
“There was the apex of US influence and power in the economic model of 1950s, 
1960s with the great middle class being built. We’re talking about reversal now 
with the low Income disparity amongst ethnic minorities. We have learnt a lot 
from the Western development model but there are limitations. These very 
distinct limitations are: 
• very capital intensive 
• environmentally invasive 
• socially disruptive 
“My point is we really need a new paradigm. Development-inclusive growth, 




levels of development. Take into account poverty levels, align investments with 
that.” – private sector 4 
The above comment reinforces the view that unilateral acceptance of Western corporate 
governance standards is unwise not only for what it is seen to be representing, but also 
for what it is overlooking: 
“If you’re looking at corporate governance practices, the weight of capital and the 
dynamics suggest we have to look to other points of view. In the old days 
CALPERS, Oregon, Ontario had lots of muscle. Now it pales to insignificant to 
the reserves of China, Japan and South Korea.” – private sector 5 
The rise of East Asian investors reflects the progressive development of the investing 
countries. Indeed, the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) such as Singapore’s Temasek, 
China’s Investment Corporation (CIC) and South Korea’s National Pension Service (NPS) 
signals their economic strength and all three SWFs have already made major 
investments in and outside the ASEAN region. 
6.10.1 A Single Currency? 
 
The prospect of moving towards a single currency, akin to the euro is not discouraged in 
the region. In a private dialogue with members of the Chinese bankers’ association56
“We need a regional currency in Asia which is strongly resisted by the USA [as 
regionally it is the] yen zone. Now it’s a yuan zone. However, the process has 
began and it is irreversible, there will come a point where there must be 
agreement on economic standards to value.” – private sector 
, 
there is some support for a single currency unit. The EU experience saw the poorer 
countries of Europe receive infrastructure development funds from Brussels especially in 
the area of infrastructure. Exposure to the single European market accelerated the 
economic development, in particular, of Spain and Portugal. While the practical 
introduction of a single Asian currency unit is a long way off (especially with the fixed 
currency of the Chinese yuan), the possibility of its introduction is not remote: 
A single currency unit for the ASEAN region will be a catalyst for greater regional and 
economic integration though many administrative, political and economic obstacles are 
                                                     




in the way for this to be reality anytime soon. 
6.10.2 The Bridge Alliance: Telecommunications Cooperation in the ASEAN 
countries 
 
The Bridge Alliance is symptomatic of greater regional cooperation. Its members are 
made up of mobile telecom operators from 11 countries. Established in 2004, this alliance 
covers mobile coverage for nearly 300 million people in the region. The following 
contains a screenshot of the website of the Bridge Alliance and its 11 operator members 
from the Asian region. The alliance comprises of Airtel (India), AIS (Thailand) CSL 
(Hong Kong), CTM (Macau), Globe (Philippines), Maxis (Malaysia), Optus (Australia, 










6.10.3 A New Group of Entrepreneurs: Korean Investment in the Philippines  
 
As a sign of South Korea’s economic prosperity and development, there is now 
substantial South Korean investment in the Philippines. Akin to Japan’s investment two 
decades earlier, the increasing wealth of South Korea has seen the outflow of investment 
into other countries in the region. After the flight of middle class Filipinos and Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFWs), there is a reverse migration occurring: Koreans are entering 
the not merely as tourists but as a new class of entrepreneurs serving the large expatriate 
Korean population in the country. Due to the historical legacy of the Japanese 
occupation of the Philippines, there is less the aggressive resentment of investment 
towards South Korean investors. (Zhao 2004: 114-115)  
The presence of South Korean investors is a phenomenon of the rising middle class of 
that country. Being a richer and wealthier nation, being well-educated is a goal for some 
Koreans. Koreans first started coming to the Philippines because learning English was 
easier and cheaper to do in the country. This had a domino effect as services were 
provided for expatriate Koreans, and the Philippines’ tropical climate made it an 
attractive and cheap tourism destination.  
For one interviewee, the arrival of the Koreans is a sign of increased intra-regional 
investment but it may mean a less transparent way of doing business, as they are under 
the radar: 
“There are many Koreans here as it’s cheaper to learn English. There is a large 
enough community so it feeds on itself. There are around 400,000 of them here. 
They come here for English but the lifestyle is laidback and it’s cheaper here. 
Taiwan is also a big investor. They are reasonably clean [in their own countries]. 
Whether they want to be clean in the Philippines is another matter.” – private 
sector 1 
The Koreans in the Philippines are entrepreneurs and are bringing in long-awaited 
investment into the country. There is tension between the locals and this new 
entrepreneurial class as the former adjusts to the economic power of the latter. 
“The Koreans are coming in silently and slowly although there is now Philippine 




country.” – GSIS 
The perception of the secretiveness of Korean investment coming into the country was 
commented upon by one regulator. Issues facing this regulator include their 
contribution to the informal market, flouting of migration laws and monitoring issues 
(Cabreza & Moulic 2007, Quimpo-Espino 2007). The Koreans seem to have quickly 
caught the locals’ penchant for avoiding formal institutions and regulations: 
“The Department of Affairs have granted 67,000 resident visas to Korean 
nationals however there’s 200,000 of them here. Every corner now there is a little 
Korean store. At the end of the day, Koreans bring P65B worth of investment into 
the Philippines. The genuine figure is probably P100B [but there’s no 
administrative evidence of that]. The Koreans here are mostly in the retail trade 
and are on the grey side or indifferent section of the law. They are skirting our 
migration laws and are quite hidden. It is a major problem for us in monitoring. 
How do you monitor if they’re not complying? If they’re under the radar, you 
can’t find them.” -SEC 
Ironically, out of all the East Asian countries that experienced the crisis, it was the 
Koreans that made the most fundamental changes in their corporate governance system 
such as breaking up the power of their chaebols and imposing corporate governance 
reforms unilaterally. Their corporate governance reforms in the aftermath of the East 
Asian crisis shook the foundations of the business establishment in that country: 
“Korea had a choice – they could have done due ready adjustments or avoided 
things. But they needed - no - they wanted to change. They did not just satisfy 
the international norms, they went beyond that. They did not just want to be 
better but be the best [in corporate governance practice]. They put you in jail if 
you flout corporate laws. The attitude is there. They are targeting higher forms of 
corporate governance and targeting the best. Here, we’re trying not to be the 
worst, and not to be in the last place [in terms of corporate governance]. If you 
compare across countries, Korea has done most in its corporate governance 
reforms.” –private sector 2 
Korean investment is looked upon ambivalently in the Philippines. There is still a great 




sustainable economic development of the country. 
6.10.4 Deterring Foreign Investment 
 
The ambivalence towards foreign investment is partly historical and partly cultural. As a 
colonised country for nearly 500 years, exploitation of the country by foreigners does 
loom indelibly in the psyche of the Filipino. Both Spanish imperialists and American 
colonialists have left a nationalistic almost xenophobic attitude towards foreigners. 
Similar to the experience of a former colony and another great democracy, India, 
restrictions on foreign ownership left the country in a protectionist dome. Import-
substitution policies instituted since the end of World War Two protected local 
industries leaving them uncompetitive once certain markets collapsed or were opened. 
Protected sectors remain politicised and highly lobbied for by certain business groups: 
“It’s hard to be competitive here. We can’t do that, that’s the difference. If you’re 
going to attract foreign investment, it’s down to the 40:60 principle. The PSE 
agrees with this but [certain] families don’t want [liberalisation] to happen...they 
control the Philippines. There are political strings happening…There are vested 
interests of the families that control the economy and politics.”- private sector 1 
Not surprisingly, despite the interest foreign investors are showing in the country, there 
is some way to go before it can attract the same amount of foreign investment of other 
countries in the region: 
“According to the US Chamber of Commerce, the bureaucracy is difficult. This 
comes from foreign businesses. One of the challenges is the process of 
establishing business in the Philippines to go through. A long the way, foreign 
investors get confused.” –private sector 2 
While there are Australian mining companies and at least one Australian bank has a 
presence in the country, Australian pension funds aren’t investing in the Philippines as 
the country is not an attractive destination for conservative funds, compared to their 
speculative peers: 
“Australia is investing on its own market rather than looking at other countries. 




At a monthly membership meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Chamber of 
Commerce in Manila, one foreign investor told the Finance Minister about aspects of the 
Philippine environment that were making business conditions difficult: 
Foreign Investors: I am an investor in the UK and UAE. I have recently come 
here. There is an incredible capacity to make it difficult to do business here. Is 
there a service of encouraging foreign ownership? It’s not like Dubai where there 
are tax opportunities that create new businesses. Difficulties here are apparent. 
There are opportunities and hope that one is transparent with start-ups. My hope 
is that [all investors] are treated even-handedly as in Dubai, and that all rules 
become apparent. How would you encourage foreign investment so it creates 
openness, understanding, transparency and a consistent application of laws? 
Minister Teves We are struggling with those issues and parameters. Compared 
with other countries we are not doing too well. There is increased foreign 
ownership and we continuously work in parameters. These issues you mention 
affect increased investment. It is important the element of openness, 
transparency and consistency, without them we cannot expect too many 
investment to come in especially with long-term, large investors. Hopefully in 
time we will see more trade and to reduce red tape with a gradual climate for 
investing. The macroeconomics is essential such as fundamental investment in 
infrastructure and to encourage more long-term FDI.”  ANZCHAM July 2007 
meeting 
Opacity in the country’s business environment and protectionism of certain Philippine 
industrial sectors has deterred further investment in the country.  
6.10.5 Foreign Ownership Controls 
 
There are foreign ownership restrictions in certain sectors and limits in the percentage of 
foreign ownership of listed companies: 
“In the stock trading system there is the Philippine Depository Receipts who are 
owned by non-Filipinos but we are not sure who the owners are (20%). We ask 
for disclosure on private ownership as the foreign limit is 40% and we will get 




“There is a shift of foreign investors into AC. But there is a foreign ownership 
limitation. No more than 40% of AC should be owned by foreign investors as real 
estate must be owned by Filipino citizens. We are looking forward to revisit the 
proportion so foreign investors can go beyond the limit.” – Ayala 
“There is an increased liquidity [in the trading of a bank when] foreign investors 
[buy in]. [However there is a] 40% ownership [limit for them] in a listed bank. 
There’s a force to push, to slacken that limit and increase the foreign investor 
base, and also institutional investors.” – listed company 2 
One interviewee mentioned how the majority owner, a foreigner, did not accumulate the 
same voting rights: 
“We have a majority economic interest in the listed company. If you go back to 
the annual report, there is a high majority interest in the company. But the 
voting interest is below 40% because of the 40:60 principle. The majority holder 
is a foreigner so you can’t have more than 40% voting rights.” – foreign company 
However, there is lobbying to remove the protectionist barriers in infrastructure sectors 
in order to increase competition, attract investment and new technologies: 
“We don’t have as good a road system, aviation is protected. [Protectionism] is 
not creating jobs. These are macroeconomic issues. We need more openness, 
more competition. We are still in the Middle Ages. Industries are protected. 
Competition will bring more technology, relying on performance by foreign 
investors. If there’s competition here, we become more efficient, it raises the 
labour skills, and creates a virtuous cycle. 
“What is the point of forcing [foreign investors] to bring technology? What 
incentive is there to become more efficient if they’re protected by being the 
lowest risk and they do not bring the most updated technology). How can 
government force them to comply? There are recent incentives in industries in 
the national resources but it is not helpful. Our position is to take [that clause] 
out of the constitution (incentives to invest) and to get rid of restrictions and the 
limit on foreign ownership as well to determine in the legislation what can be 




investment and ownership is not conducive for foreign investment.” – Makati 
Business Club 
In the case of the telecoms sector of the country, once barriers were removed, the 
oppressive weight of protectionism gave way to a flourish of entrepreneurialism. This not 
only benefited the former monopoly PLDT: 
“After [former President] Ramos broke up the telecommunications monopoly, 
the talent of the Philippine people began to shine. The Philippines has famously 
become the text-messaging capital of the world—and even PLDT, the former 
monopoly, has learned to compete. Today, the profitable company, run by 
professional executives, is in the growth portfolios of sophisticated investors 
around the world.” (Rushford 2009) 
But consumers as well: 
“Since the telecoms monopoly break-up, 20M people or more have cell (mobile) 
phones. 5M people have landline. [The industry has] grown since they’ve broken 
up the telecoms monopoly. It’s a growth industry57
The basis for foreign ownership restrictions is set out in the post-Marcos constitution. 
For foreign ownership limitations to be altered, the constitution needs to be amended 
and amending the Constitution is a challenge:  
…The Philippines has well-
trained, well-educated people – we know what has to be done. We have booty 
capitalism (Hutchison) here:  a few rich families, entranced our politicians 
keeping the law tailored to favour them. We have to break up their monopoly 
over power.” – private sector 1 
“For foreign investors there is the fundamental question of the 1987 constitution 
which would allow the private sector to come back.” – consultant  
One regulator was not convinced that lifting investment restrictions will guarantee more 
                                                     
57 The telecommunications arms of some business groups may also come under threat from 
disruptive, new technology:  “But for the foreign market. I can count on the number on my fingers 
how many [companies from a foreign investor’s perspective] are worth buying into. On the other 
hand, I am not an expert. PLDT, Globe have to reinvent themselves. There’s the threat of through 
the internet – the minutes would be a lot cheaper. Smart has a lot of users of cellphones, not too 
many landlines. People use the phone or text due to the non-availability of infrastructure. VOIP is 




foreign investment across all sectors but admitted it had the intended effect in the 
resources sector: 
“What makes a direct relationship to lift restrictions mean foreign investment 
will come in? It doesn’t mean necessarily foreign investment will come in. There 
is that situation in the mining sector which fits the equation: lift the rules; they 
come in.” – regulator 
The issue of majority ownership does come down to a matter of control. Where the 
investor does not have control of the investment even though most of the funding comes 
from the investor, not having that control deters investment. 
6.10.6 Improving the Pool of Domestic Investors 
 
Due to the ambivalence towards foreign investment, others have suggested encouraging 
domestic investment so there would be less reliance on external capital. While foreign 
investment in the capital market is tolerated, local investors would be more welcome as 
the money would be from domestic participants. There is a perception that local 
investors would not move the money out of the country as a large foreign institutional 
investor would. Whereas a foreign institutional investor would see the Philippines as 
part of a basket of investable funds generated for an East Asian fund, the money invested 
by locals would be deemed more patriotic, supporting national champions: 
“[Local money] is beginning to be more available for the stock market. In the 
next 10-20 years, hopefully, the market [will have] much more a proportion of 
local money.” – stockbroker 1 
“We have to educate our people. Give courses in college now about stock market. 
Educate more people to invest and make investments. Some in real estate, 
manufacturing, stock market etc. Make [local money] dominant so it becomes 
75:25 (local: hot). We don’t have to worry about that money running away. The 
money made here, stays here. Hot money is in and out. No more profit to be 
made.”- stockbroker 2 
Educating local investors about the risks and rewards of the capital markets comes down 




domestic investors who bought into the privatisation of Petron, the pendulum of the 
share price movements left some of them with an unsatisfactory experience: 
“We (retail investors) all knew how to buy, but we didn’t know how to sell. We 
watched the share price go up and down. We didn’t get to sell the shares. Retail 
investors were new to the money trade.” – Petron shareholder 
The sometimes speculative and volatile nature of the share market requires greater 
explanation as one fund stated:  
“[It] must be explained why this is thus, why your investment [moves erratically]. 
There is a lack of [investor] understanding [in the country].” -GSIS 
Regulators acknowledged the dearth of knowledge in this area. However, there is some 
progress with a couple of initiatives being undertaken. One initiative includes educating 
students about the capital market with an MOU between the PSE and universities 
(Business Mirror 2007b). Another includes improving the financial literacy of the 
population through the banking system: 
“We are promoting financial literacy amongst depositors. Consumers are just 
used to traditional deposits. Other banking products are not well known. We 
hope to promote certain amount of financial literacy in coordination with the 
SEC, IC, an NGO called EPRA (based at Ateneo). This is also an issue with the 
Financial Sector Forum, starting with the school children.” - BSP 
Nevertheless, there is a long way to go to encourage domestic investment participation 
and to improve the financial literacy of the population. 
6.11 Rise of China 
 
My interview questionnaire had a section on China and I aimed to find out what the 
growth of China meant for the future of business in the Philippines. China’s emergence 
impacts each country in her vicinity as the balance of power and trade alters to 
accommodate her rise and influence. This process of transition is occurring and is 




from the USA to China58
Where arguably Filipino-Chinese business families have a distinct advantage compared 
to other business groups is the opportunities that present themselves with an emerging 
China. Knowing the language, cultural norms, cultivating familial and civil relationships 
and sharing similar ethnic origins possibly gives them an insider’s view of the country. As 
China opens up, its diaspora is reciprocating with “governments increasingly see their 
ethnic-Chinese populations as assets rather than threats.”(The Economist 2008c): 
. The impact of China on the Philippines and the region is 
enormous. 
“In the Philippine economy, the business climate here is very Chinese. There are 
a lot of [Chinese] migrants [here]…The Philippines can be fantastic outlet for 
China. The Philippines is ready made. China’s already here.” – regulator 
Some business groups have already established commercial entities in mainland China. 
The rise of China, in general, was mostly seen in a favourable, albeit cautious, light by 
most interviewees.59
“We see it as the next superpower. There is no stopping it. It offers all so many 
opportunities.” –private sector 1 
China’s growth and economic power in the region and in the world 
is undeniable: 
This section looks at how business groups see China, China’s corporate governance, how 
China’s rise will impact Philippine businesses, the Philippine economy and geopolitics of 
the region; and the successes and pitfalls greater interaction with the mighty power in 
the immediate west of the country brings. 
6.11.1 Business Groups in China 
 
Several of my interviewees have expanded into China. For the Philippines’ largest mall 
operator, the founder was born in China and there are strong emotional links to his 
country of birth. This link has translated into building malls in China though they are 
located in provinces where there is less competition. Oft-repeated amongst my 
                                                     
58Other moves by multinationals such as by the global bank HSBC to move the principal office of 
the CEO from London to Hong Kong is but one of many activities that chart their readiness to 
take opportunities of the market and the region. See Cheng & Poon (2009). 
59 This concurred with most press coverage during my fieldwork with government supportive of 
more links with china. However, my fieldwork ended just prior to the NBN contract scandal. See 




interviewees who have expanded into China is the potential market size as the middle 
class grows in the country: 
“[The holding company] is not in China but the family has another financial 
vehicle which finances their own malls in China. It’s not a joint venture. It is 
privately owned. There are malls in Xiamen, Chengdu. It was established there 5, 
6 years ago. There are affiliations and opportunities. 
“China will be a power. It will continue to grow. We will have malls there but not 
in Shanghai or in Beijing. These two cities are already crowded. If there’s 
opportunity [it will be in the provinces]. The Philippines has a population of 87 
million. That is the population of one province in China. There are 22 provinces. 
In Chengdu, we have a third mall, very similar to Metro Manila. We have 16 malls 
in Metro Manila. They are profitable malls. The mall in Chengdu we are doing 
studies, the demographics are different and the land values are different where 
we can’t own land, we can’t lease; time is 25 to 30 years. The next 10 years is 
leasehold. The Chengdu mall is a medium sized mall. It is one third the size of 
North EDSA. The Mall of Asia is the third biggest after China. We have the 4th 
biggest in SM Mall EDSA and the 5th with MegaMall. China is building bigger 
malls than what we have. They are Chinese owned.  
“We go to smaller cities so we don’t get the same competition. We are not 
looking at other countries outside of China. China is close to the 
Philippines…Whatever you need will be made in China. This will happen in the 
next few years. The biggest province in China [is bigger than the Philippines 
population]. SM has 60,000 employees the government has over a million. We 
hire locals [in China]. Only the top level executives are Filipinos. (My interviewee 
makes a call to China inquiring about the population of a province)” – SM 
For Metrobank, the founder has also personal ties to China and the bank has expanded 
into China. Unlike SM, it has established a branch in the competitive, highly 
commercialised city, and the most international of all Chinese cities: Shanghai. The bank 
is competing against other international banks that have set up in the country. The bank 




“We have now a branch in Shanghai. We are the only Filipino bank there. We are 
converting it into a foreign-owned branch. It is a regular Chinese branch but 
foreign-owned. The Articles of Association prepared by the Chinese lawyer have 
already corporate governance conditions (my interviewee takes out article). On 
China’s connective transaction there must be a controlled committee regarding 
how much directors can borrow from the company. Modern Chinese corporate 
governance has adapted to global standards theoretically. 
“If we expand in China, it will be in Shanghai and the surrounds. The business 
will be at least double of the entire business we have in the Philippines and it has 
tremendous potential. I was asked to lecture to Oushi, a maker of crackers and 
candies. They are based in Shanghai. They are expanding like the rays of the sun 
which gives credence [to establishing there]. [If successful] our business in China 
will double. [Other foreign banks] are present, undergoing conversion to meet 
regulatory requirements. Standard Chartered are partly in situ…In Shanghai, the 
buildings have mushroomed…[We want to] attract the business of the Chinese 
who have connections in the Philippines.” – Metrobank 
Banking is crucial to international trade and this sector is necessary to facilitate business 
transactions between the two countries. Some harmonisation in corporate governance 
practices in both countries at some point in the future could also be one result of greater 
interaction in the banking system: 
“A lot of large banks in the Philippines are owned by Chinese families. Allied 
Bank - Lucio Tan, BDO – Henry Sy, RCBC – Yuchengco, Mr Tan, Mr. Sy and Mr 
Gokongwei have business interests in China. Business with China would forward 
the way of banks. Banks must have correspondent relationships. Progress of 
corporate governance in China could [have an] effect and be supportive of what’s 
happening in the Philippines.” -BSP 
International companies with subsidiaries in both the Philippines and China are able to 
compare and contrast the way of doing business. Restrictive ownership in the Philippines 
is the compelling difference between the two countries: 
“There is a lot of investment in China in the last 10 years. There’s a big difference 




When we started business in China, they were very concerned that we were 
foreign investors as we were involved in what they’d term as strategic. When I 
first started, foreign investors could own less than 50% (shareholding). But now, 
China realised we bring value and are not a threat so they allow a 60-70% 
(majority shareholding) with the government SOE as a joint venture partner. The 
biggest hindrance is in terms of the vetting up back to the 40:60 principles. We 
can only get a 40% foreign ownership here. Things have shut down here and 
moved to China.” – private sector 
“Manulife operates in China through Manulife-Sinochem Life Insurance Co. Ltd, 
a joint venture company between Manulife (International) Limited (51 per cent) 
and China Foreign Economic and Trade Trust & Investment Company, a member 
of the Sinochem group (49 per cent). China’s fast growing is stimulating the 
growth of most of the countries in the Asia, including the Philippines. Manulife 
has an optimistic view on investment in the Asian region.” – Manulife 
China’s business environment currently is more accommodative, agreeable and less of a 
struggle than in the Philippines. 
6.11.2 As Part of the Chinese Supply Chain 
 
The subservient, and sometime pessimistic, outlook of the country to the economic giant 
was present with most interviewees seeing as part of China’s supply chain especially in 
the provision of raw materials: 
“The Philippines would be a supplier to China in some form or another. The 
Philippines can’t compete. We have to find our niche. There are currently a lot of 
questions regarding these investments signed with China to set up new 
agricultural business. We’ll be suppliers and compete in certain industries. Some 
[would look at us because of the advantage of speaking] English and so on but 
the number of Chinese students learning English – English as a [Filipino 
competitive advantage will be no more]. At the end of the day, it is the drive of 
the work ethic of China that will make us suppliers to that country.” – private 
sector 1 




chain. China plays a big role in the supply chain. A growing China will result in 
greater in Philippine economic development. The danger is if [China] turns 
inwards. Now, they’re growing big by exporting to the US but they have a big 
internal market and as the market grows prosperous, [they] may now produce 
instead for their own market. They are producing for the export market, as the 
international market, [eventually] they’d start selling to themselves [although 
that’s] still a long way off. In the meantime, we’re going with them.” – private 
sector 2 
Like other countries, manufacturing in the Philippines has been hit hard by the rise of 
China. Production has migrated there and this situation is not likely to change in the 
near future. Producing goods in China is seen as more cost effective than in the 
Philippines and the country is no match for the efficiencies of Chinese manufacturers: 
“Almost everything these days is Made in China. China is having a big impact on 
the Philippines.” – public sector 1 
“China has an enormous impact on the Philippines. Previously the country had a 
cheap manufacturing base. Many of the manufacturing bases have now moved to 
China itself.” – private sector 1 
“China’s economic impact is so strong we can’t compete with China for example 
in the manufacturing sector. In the steel industry, the demand for steel is 
growing. Plastic resin, plastics industry, garments, smuggled plastics resin is 
going to China.” – private sector 2 
“We feel that a growing China is good for the global economy as a whole. As for 
the Philippines, unfortunately, we have seen a lot of manufacturing businesses 
exit the Philippines to move to China where they can produce at lower costs. At 
the same time, China is becoming a very large market for the Philippines for 
certain products and services. Agricultural and mineral exports are a good 
example.” –private sector 3 
Labour costs in the Philippines are far too high, and the unreliable infrastructure in the 




“Basically [China’s growth] is affecting local industries as labour is cheap in 
China. Even here, there are a lot of Chinese items available locally. It’s all about 
globalisation. All are affected indirectly; the Chinese economy is affecting Hong 
Kong where a lot of OFWs are.” – public sector 2 
“[If you look at] manufacturing labour costs, China, Vietnam and India have 
proved to have lower costs dramatically. Labour is a significant cost [here] and 
electricity [prices] is high.” – consultant  
However, the upskilling of Chinese labour could increase that cost: 
“[China is] very competitive in the pricing. I’m not too scared for now. The 
Chinese are getting more expensive because their highly skilled workers are 
much in demand.” – private sector 4 
Several interviewees mentioned the enormous consumption of resources by China to 
fund its manufacture-led economic growth and how this has a positive effect on 
resource-rich countries such as the Philippines: 
“What are particular things Philippines can export to China? Tropical goods. The 
Philippines has rich minerals such as nickel, copper.” – private sector 5 
“[The] effect [of China] is like a ripple in the pond. In the Philippines it will 
increase in the mining sector, [and increase the] mineral output.” – private sector 
6 
“China is investing in Africa. China wants to tap into the resources here. [The 
country is an] energy consuming machine, not driven by ROI… As competition 
for natural resources increase, [things will] become more difficult.” – private 
sector 7 
Chinese reliance on natural resources is persistent and its energy needs for industry will 
continue in the foreseeable future. Geopolitically, there have already been tensions over 
this reliance with supplier countries. 60
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was highlighted with the debacle over Chinalco’s attempts to buy the coal reserves of Anglo-
Australian mining company Rio Tinto and the jailing of four Rio Tinto executives for corruption 





6.11.3 Corporate Governance and China 
 
My interview questionnaire also asked about the impact of China on corporate 
governance in the Philippines. For example, one Chinese corporate governance reform 
requires 50% of its company boards be comprised of independent directors, far greater 
than the 20% requirement in the Philippines. The most articulate response I received on 
the effects of China’s implementation of corporate governance came from my ICD 
interviewee. His rumination covers the impact of Chinese corporate governance on 
business families, the enforcement of rules and regulations, and the central coordinating 
role of the Chinese government: 
“FDI is going to China not because of its better governance practices. It is all 
other things than governance. China has greater governance challenges than the 
Philippines. The impact of the emergence of China on the Philippines is not 
direct. We talk about FDI – China has other things to offer. China seems to have 
a plan. They have a plan and are more serious in executing this plan and it is 
government related.  
“If and when in form and substance there is a market environment in China but I 
know for a fact that there is a concerted effort by the Chinese government to 
improve corporate governance level of China and this may have an effect. I would 
like to say if and when corporate governance arrives in China – there is a status 
quo in the Philippines. We are in Asia, governance is a concept from the West. 
Last time I looked at China and saw what it is doing. We’re now losing on 
number of things of governance. There will be an impact if they (the Chinese) 
improve their governance practices and that will be an issue for the Philippines. 
We use the improvement of China as leverage to tell companies here to improve 
corporate governance. 
“The attention of the companies is that they look at what China has done and the 
Chinese have a plan. In the Philippines there is no central point. Society is so 
fragmented and I say this on the policy level and not because I am at all being 
unpatriotic. We are aware of governance developments. The myth of China (i.e. 
economy booms on the coast but not the interior), but for all its worth, looking 




“For Filipino Chinese, I feel that we have heard about corporate governance in 
China when they do this not to say when they hear about the process in China. 
Guanxi, relationships still dominate in China. What part of that is corporate 
governance? Corporate governance is relatively new, there are government 
related moves in regulatory authorities. In China, the country requires 50% of the 
board be composed of independent directors, in the Philippines it is 20%. In 
Hong Kong and Korea it is 40%. But of course is it 50% in reality? The Philippines 
is more open than China.”– ICD 
Enforceability of rules and regulations in China was echoed by several others. Chinese 
law allows for capital punishment of white collar criminals is a deterrent to engage in 
wider malfeasance. This penalty is a strong incentive for greater compliance by 
companies: 
“If you look at China as a growing economy, you can enter the market and 
predict what will happen. Rules are clean, well-defended such as the number of 
board seats. Violations are punished in a draconian way. If you’re corrupt, you’re 
shot. Here, when you’ve done so (corruptly), you get away scot-free “ – private 
sector 1 
The command economy of China also means reforms are quickly implemented: 
“In a way, the system they have in China allows quicker reforms if they want to. 
For example, rules requiring to have listed companies to have independent 
directors. In the Philippines the minimum requirement is 2. In China it’s now 
about 50% of board seats. You must do it here in the Philippines. But the 
Philippines has more freedom and there is more debate here.” – private sector 2 
China’s form of corporate governance is shaped internally to suit its local conditions, and 
also externally through participation in regional forums on corporate governance: 
“China is socialist with capitalism thrown in. If [China] wants to institute 
corporate governance, they can do it more quickly. I’m not sure if they’re 
completely convinced [about corporate governance]. Corporate governance is a 
capitalist complex, not sure if they can put that into the system. We get to 
interact with them through the East Asian Institute of Directors. China joins us.” 




“There are corporate directors’ regional meetings attended by China. China has 
still a fledging culture of corporate governance. China has own home-grown 
initiatives where 50% of boards must have independent directors. You’d better 
prepare and comply as there is a strong power of government. It’s harder not to 
comply. China is a command economy.” –private sector 4 
China’s corporate governance practices take a different form to the Western model:: 
“The logic for corporate governance is to be investor friendly. In China, with 
independent directors – how independent are they? China, Vietnam. They are 
planned economies on being founded as they are covered. [China does] not 
respond to Western corporate governance practices. It’s to do with realpolitik. – 
private sector 5 
However, most interviewees were not convinced that the Chinese form of corporate 
governance would have an impact on the Philippines: 
“The impact of China is not so critical on the Philippines compared to other 
Western counterparts. In the Philippines, Circular II is not as structured as SOX. 
SOX s.906 is on the criminal liabilities of CEOs. In the Philippines there is no 
such equivalent. There is the Penal and Corporate Code, there is some non-
compliance penalties but it does not have far-reaching jurisdiction. There is no 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. There is not much of an impact. It would be good 
if China practices corporate governance. There is an Asian Conference for 
Internal Auditors. The quandary is applying Western practices in an Oriental 
context the same way Western companies are adjusting to the practices in 
China.” – IIA 
“[China’s growth] is going to affect every economy. The effect on the Philippines 
will be similar as in everywhere else. It’s nothing unique. [However, China’s 
growth] won’t change corporate governance. Will it affect Filipino investors in 
China? Foreigners can be as bad as Filipinos can be as good abroad. Filipino 
companies can adapt to the structure in China. Whether Filipinos will change, I 
doubt it.” – academic 
Chinese corporate governance practices take greater import when they do business 




strong sentiment amongst interviewees that Chinese firms ought to practice good 
corporate governance and behave in an ethical manner or there will be regrets and 
disappointments on both sides. This perhaps reflects the lack of trust in the process of 
government contracts and tendering in the Philippines: 
“Westerners are usually upfront on the surface. There are big questions on 
contracts with the Chinese. There has been no open bidding and it’s more 
agricultural based. The government is prepared to give up a lot of land for China 
to come here and set up entities for export: fisheries, land. They are projects that 
are supply driven that they set up with the government. The government is 
giving up government land, orchestrating, purchasing and expropriating more 
land for these projects.” – private sector 6 
During my field trip, there were covert deals made between the government with 
Chinese firms in the telecoms industry (see Chapter 9: Corruption – NBN) and the 
agricultural sector (Reuters 2007 and BTN 2007). Opacity in the tender processes 
undermined trust and confidence. Several interviewees suggested these cases may have a 
long-term detrimental effect on the Philippine business environment if the covertness of 
these deals continues:  
“The rise of China and its effect on the Philippine economy through 
infrastructure, railroads and telecom contracts – it would be good for us if they 
practice good corporate governance. If they don’t, we’ll pay for it…We’d prefer to 
trade and to practise good corporate governance (with partners) who practice 
good corporate governance. That is key to global competitiveness. In an IMD 
Global Report, there were 7 criteria on corporate governance. It’d benefit us if 
China will reform itself and if they practice corporate governance. ” – private 
sector 7 
“Long term I am very concerned about China. China will establish a hegemony in 
Asia if it’s not doing so already. Japan is the second largest economy in the world 
which China will soon overtake. China has to learn to be more socially 
responsible. China is far too much money oriented at the expense of doing 
anything else. There are three questionable contracts [here], large amount of 
bribe money paid to local government officials. If America does that, the locals go 




really needs. If China grows, will we be part of a major part of the economy? Will 
we be part of this dominant culture?” – private sector 8 
Well-governed Chinese companies that invest in the Philippines will contribute best to 
helping the impoverished country develop economically. 
6.11.4 China and ASEAN 
 
As the giant that dwarfs other countries in the region, China’s economic superpower 
status emitted opinions of enthusiasm, ambivalence and trepidation. Positive views on 
China were mostly based on the economic angle such as its role in stimulating the region 
to recover from the East Asian crisis, contribution to increased world trade, and by 
making a substantial input to the role and future of greater regional trade and 
cooperation through ASEAN: 
“In 2004, things were getting better, dollar debt in corporate value shares, more 
restricted. Banks found buyers from non-performing loans. Currency picked up 
in 2004, then commodities in 2005. For Indonesia, the commodities took them 
out of the crisis. China was also growing strongly. China helped, and she began to 
take (the rest of Asia) out of the slump.” – stockbroker 
“China will help the Philippines. China is contributing to the world with low 
inflation everywhere. Trade benefits all participants.” – private sector 1 
“China, and to a lesser extent, India are the 800 pound gorillas. Down the 
pipeline, India’s coming on board.”  – private sector 2 
China’s reserves were also highlighted as a sign of her economic strength and source of 
influence: 
“There is a whole notion of Asian response which is ambivalent in many respects. 
We have to put that in the context of how we are seeing the centre of gravity of 
the world shifting from the West to the new Asia: ASEAN + 3 (the three is China, 
Japan, South Korea). The region that now accounts for half of the world’s 
population, in excess of global net reserves. There are proposals where growth 
from the region would exceed the OECD countries by 100%. This is the region 




“Japan has became the major investor [in the region] and provided development 
assistance. China is not at that level yet. There are challenges for China in areas 
of government requirements, corporate governance, public lending. China is 
sitting on reserves and will heavily influence its neighbours.” – private sector 4 
“China has produced a rapid transition. But there are still the inequalities 
between the coastal vs. interior. China has accumulated huge surpluses and is a 
major investment behemoth which will influence behaviour.” – private sector 5 
Like Japan a quarter of a century earlier, some interviewees expressed the view China 
could take some leadership role and invest regionally: 
“China has become the dynamo of the region. China exports to the West. This is 
the interval growth of China and it is going to be a dynamo like US or Japan was 
in the region. [The challenge would be] sustainability over high term. It is a 
competitor to the Philippines in garments and China is actually exporting more 
and growing.” – private sector 6 
“The best way to look at it is not as a threat but as an opportunity. Eventually, 
[China] would have to invest in other countries such as Japan previously. China 
could be a catalyst in the region as Japan did decades ago. It’s inevitable and the 
US has to adjust to an economically powerful China.” – private sector 7 
If China is to have good relations within the region, strong arguments were made for 
China’s wider participation and greater cooperation with ASEAN: 
“From a regional perspective, on a macro-level: the political economy perspective 
is that the ASEAN group is coming up well with a Free Trade Area along the lines 
of the European Union. China is a mass market, member-countries will face a 
large potential market.” – regulator 1 
“We’re working with our ASEAN neighbours – to be one trading group and 
dialogue with China, to be one group with Japan. When these things happen, we 
can become a trading bloc (ASEAN agreement with China, then ASEAN 
agreement with Japan). So we can compete as a trading bloc with US and 
Europe.” – private sector 8 




two trading partners: US and Japan. There is now a renaissance in East Asia. The 
World Bank looked at this study as a new phenomenon: Middle-income 
countries trading with each other (ASEAN) and China. This is a new phase, not 
just big and small countries trading with one another.” –private sector 9 
Ambivalence on China’s impact was largely based on issues of equality and democracy. 
Interviewees expressed hope that China would exercise its economic power in a 
responsible manner: 
“China is a young power. They’ll cooperate more closely with the other powers 
and the Philippines will benefit from the competition. One hopes it does not 
transfer and get captured by a few. That there is something left for most of us.” – 
private sector 8 
”When China gets angry with Taiwan, that’s going to cause a political struggle for 
support for and against in the region” – regulator 2 
“It’s a good thing for [China] to grow. Hopefully, [they would] have a lot of 
wisdom to develop that growth. They are under pressure from the G8 to open up 
completely and democratically.” – private sector 9 
“Worldwide there’s an anxiety of China being an economic superpower. For the 
next decade, we hope China would consider the Asian countries as little brothers 
and not impose its own will on Asian countries. We’d like to see China take the 
lead the way Japan has. Big nations like China, US, Europe, look at the interest of 
developing countries in the world. Anything you see in the US is made in China. 
Everybody would be concerned with the extent of influence generated as a 
superpower.” –private sector 10 
In 2008, the first trilateral summit between the three biggest economies in the region – 
China, Japan and South Korea – was held in response to the global financial crisis and in 
attempts for greater regional competition. The summit was a strongly symbolic event 
and did not include a significant Western power. Political differences and historical 
grievances were set aside to discuss issues of the economic bent as an increasing sign of 
the growing maturity of the region economically and move towards greater regional 




Similarly to the way the EU has developed and struggled with regional cooperation in the 
latter half of the 20th century, the 2008 summit is indicative of the seeds of greater 
regional cooperation that is now taking place in East Asia. The most developed 
economies of the region are starting to take the lead and providing guidance with the 
emerging China taking a pivotal role. If the EU experience is any indication, the 
emergence of ASEAN+3 is widely anticipated as greater regional integration helps less 
developed economies such as the Philippines. Regionalism, rather than the China 
syndrome seems to be the sentiment of the new emergent world economic order in Asia.  
6.12 Family Values 
 
The last section of this chapter looks at the importance of family values of the business 
groups that dominate the Philippine economic environment. Behind each business 
group is a business family. Behind each business family is a set of family values. Each 
family has its own distinct or set of values that permeates through the ownership 
philosophy of a company, and is inadvertently reflected on the culture of the 
organisation. 
This section emphatically shows why this chapter is supportive of hypothesis 2 but not 
hypothesis 3 primarily due to the existing cultural norms and business environment in 
the country. Below again are hypotheses 2 and 3 that were tested: 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance practices 
are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships. 
Even if companies have adopted Western-style corporate governance, the form of 
ownership that is prevalent in the country makes hypothesis 3 difficult to support. One 
interviewee pointed out that it is not a matter of being “right” but having the “right fit” 
for the country; therefore agency theory is not applicable in the country: 
“The nature of family corporations here, to what extent is it cultural to have 
family corporations practice? US theory tend to look down on family 
corporations. The tendency is to assume that family corporations or family 
controlled firms are necessarily inferior to other forms overlooks the evolution of 




The Philippines’ strong familial culture is reflected in the dominance of family-owned 
business groups. The family’s influence is embedded in the national fabric. Family values 
cannot be underemphasised in the country: 
“It’s the family. It’s unique compared to the US-UK structures – the importance 
of family. They carry heavier, louder voice. People listen to them. Not because it’s 
more correct, it’s because they have a bigger say, a bigger stake.” – academic 2 
The values that drive family corporations were strongly articulated during my interview 
with the Ayala Group.  
“Ayala has 5 core values embedded in the work place: 
1. integrity and privacy of the person (honesty in the workplace) 
2.dignity of work 
3.pride in excellence 
4.social awareness 
5.commitment to development 
“These core values make practising good corporate governance easier as we have 
developed a culture of accountability and integrity in the corporation. In 
addition, the champions in the organisations [practise this]. The champion as the 
CEO and Chairman, this kind of culture filters down, and makes it a natural way 
of practising good corporate governance. 
“Ayala has been in existence for the last 175 years. We are the oldest 
conglomerate in the Philippines. Even before corporate governance was a byword 
in the business community, we had long practised good corporate governance. 
“Recognise that most businesses in the Philippines are family-owned as well as in 
most of Asia. Family culture influences doing business in the Philippines. In AC, 
family culture instils the core value of honesty, integrity, to national economic 
development, continue to sustain AC. Without commitment to core values, you 
won’t see what Ayala is today.” – Ayala 
A business family’s values come to the fore in periods of crises. In late 2007, an incident 
occurred at the Glorietta Mall owned by the Ayala Group. 11 people were killed and 




terrorist or other attack.61
“We at Ayala Land (ALI) are deeply saddened by what has happened. We, too, 
are victims of this incident. We will cooperate with the investigating authorities 
to determine the cause and nature of the explosion. In solidarity with the victims 
and their families, we are extending moral and financial help, and providing 
them maximum care and assistance. ALI provided medical attention for the 
injured, bereavement assistance to families of casualties, and offered counselling 
services to those affected by the incident.” – Ayala Now (2007) 
. The mall was one I often visited whilst in Makati. Disaster risk 
management is a pertinent issue for businesses operating in the country. Even when 
there was some query over the cause of the blast, In keeping with the perception and 
wider corporate social responsibility of the Ayala Group, the company compensated 
those affected: 
“The bombing or rather explosion here did not have any longer term impact. The 
explosion was not a bomb but rather a build up of chemicals. This has been 
attested by foreign experts who were brought in from various countries. Of 
course, all has gone quiet as people who are affected in the explosion have been 
appeased – Ayala has provided those impacted with significant benefits privately 
(e.g. house & lot).” – private sector (2) 
Family values are the foundations of the corporate culture and they strongly influence 
attitudes towards corporate governance in a business group. 
6.12.1 Sentimental Value in Family Ownership 
 
A sentimental relationship is fostered in the family ownership of a business. The 
                                                     
61 The low level of trust in the state saw disputes between the company and the authorities over 
the cause of the blast on whether it was a bomb or a methane gas explosion. Conspiracy theories 
abounded. If it were a terrorist or external attack, it was a violent message sent to silence 
criticism. If not, it was an internal problem requiring an internal solution. Several inquiries 
proceeded including a company investigation which conflicted with the official findings. In the 
end compensation was received from the company, not the state. Perhaps this issue will never be 
resolved. The complex and sometimes complicated environment of the Philippines is such that 
the true cause of the incident will probably be never uncovered. However, the incident highlights 
the hazards of doing business in a country where 20 years after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, 
formal institutions aren’t or cannot be trusted, and the state is still under suspicion of causing 
harm to its own citizens. For newspaper articles on the bomb/explosion which ripped through 
several levels of the shopping centre see the following: Samonte et al (2007), Carvajal et al (2007) 
and Yap (2007). Two years after the blast, there was still some debate on its cause .See the 




sentimental value in owning a business founded by a parent or ancestor may define the 
relationship a business family member has with the business, especially if the member 
takes an active rather than a passive role. Heroic stories of the founder/entrepreneur 
generation and the survival of the business provide a basis upon which business family 
members across several generations can unite around and have a profound sense of 
belonging. 
In the Philippines, some families have managed their business/es through several wars 
and periods of political instability. Stories of business families under the Marcos 
dictatorship are strong organisational/cultural artefacts. These stories have become part 
of family history, folklore and in turn become part of the organisation’s fabric. 
Out of all my interviewees, one of the strongest sentimental ownership of a family 
business was exemplified with one particular listed company, a university. A listed higher 
educational institution is not common in developed countries62
The association between the family and its ownership of the university is high. Far 
Eastern University (FEU) was founded by an academician, Nicanor Reyes, whose wife 
was from Santa Maria, Bulacan. They were both killed at the closing stages of World War 
Two as the retreating Japanese army murdered civilian occupants inside their homes as 
part of that army’s scorched earth policy. The university’s president is the daughter the 
founders and so a great deal of sentimental value is attached to the ownership of the 
university. The university is strongly identified with the family and she identifies with 
the institution as her father’s legacy
however the country’s 
dismal public education sector has seen a strong private sector presence in education. 
The Philippine tertiary sector is unique in this respect that there is a market value 
attached to a couple of higher education institutions that have listed on the PSE. 
63
“40% of the company is owned by the family. The father of this dominant family 
was the founder. The loyalty of the Chair – who is the daughter of the father – is 
unquestionable. She would not be looking at the financial return on investment. 
To her, this is her father’s mission. She considers FEU as taking care of her 
father.” - FEU 
: 
                                                     
62 Apart from the Philippines, I am not aware of any other country that has universities that are 
publicly listed on a stock exchange. I gladly welcome corrections in this regard. 
63A personal account of the wartime experience in Manila during the Japanese retreat can be 




FEU listed due to reasons of tax and transparency: 
“The reason for listing on the PSE is to be more transparent. Listing on the PSE 
requires us to deal with lots of reports. There are also benefits for the 
stockholders so that they can trade their shares freely. If it was unlisted, the 
shares would have go to through a capital gains procedures and hence the tax 
issues is different if you want to transfer ownership. When we listed in 1986, the 
corporation did not offer to the public first. There was no IPO. The holders of the 
shares started trading hence they became publicly available. Stock dividends 
have been declared since then." - FEU 
Delicately balancing its role between a tertiary institution and a publicly listed 
corporation is no easy task: 
“To balance our role: our management of the school is divided (between 
academia and administration). Our academics would hold certain standards [and 
expectations] of education for our students. Then there is the administrative side 
of finances and facilities. For as long as people handle this responsibility, all 
concerns will be addressed. This university has gone through thick and thin. We 
are doing very well in the academic field as well as the financial – our 
shareholders are happy, our employees, and our students are happy.” - FEU 
Generally, shareholders would ensure steady returns on investment and this is one of the 
enduring debates in corporate governance - the rights of all shareholders to be treated 
equally. Fortunately in FEU's case, the shareholders are "not the normal, speculative" 
type. They are not shareholders merely for the sake of financial returns but actually have 
a stake in the company for more sentimental reasons. The shareholder membership is 
atypical of a listed company: 
“Our shareholders are not traditional investors who’d buy and sell. They are not 
speculators. Many are holding onto the shares for sentimental aspects. Most of 
those shares come from parents who taught here and who have been connected 
with FEU. The holdings are held closely. Many of our shareholders are also our 
own faculty members. The faculty enjoys scholarships for their children, but not 




This sentiment was echoed by another company where there was minority shareholder 
loyalty shown by employees 
“Usually the shareholders here are former employees. [The company] used to be 
diverse with many subsidiaries. Most shareholders here are former employees e.g. 
power companies, mining, employees of former companies. A lot of them are 
quite old so that shares would pass on their kids. We see a lot of transfer of 
shares from fathers to sons.” – private sector 
The uniqueness of this listed company is reflected in the stable movement of the FEU 
share price in 2007: 
“There is something unique about FEU shares, the price of the shares don’t go 
down as would in others. The FEU shares are the only ones that have gone up. 
We have a 100 par value with an 800-900 market value. It went up gradually. 20 
years ago it was at 300, gradually it went up and reached 1200. It has gone down. 
It was at 1200 because of our declaration of 100% stock dividends.” - FEU 
Thus, in this particular case, the orientation is less that of shareholder value, but an 
emphasis on the educational and long-term stewardship vision for the institution. A 
share ownership is a stake into the university. Reporting therefore takes two forms: the 
company’s annual report as required from a listed company, and in parallel, the 
president’s report which charts the activities of the institution: 
“For us the number one emphasis is to educate well …Even when you advise the 
public what FEU has to do [with regard to] the financials, the profits are of less 
priority. There is an emphasis to the top-notchers such as your deans, your 
officers in the other academic sector and this is not really emphasised in our 
financial results. The president’s report is also issued at the AGM as this report is 
the university’s scholastic record of achievements of the past year.” – FEU 
For FEU, the culture of the company-university is heavily familial with undertones of 
loyalty and obligation: 
“In FEU, we are used to consider ourselves as one big family. Some employees 
would say they graduated from here, studied here, I met my husband here, I can 




In the Philippines, behind each company name is a family - the listed company is the 
public face of the family. The performance of the company is personal - the reflection of 
its performance on the stock exchange in some way is a reflection of the family's. This 
personalisation of the company embodies the relationship-based culture of the 
Philippines. 
6.12.2 Succession Planning 
 
When it comes to succession planning, the tangible set of family values guides the 
process of transferring control from one generation to the next is achieved. Like many 
other issues in family-owned business groups, support from the controlling owner is 
needed for succession planning to progress. For most business groups I interviewed, 
succession planning is in place: 
“For family companies, succession is an issue. Some families have adapted better 
than others. When the patriarch dies, how do you preserve the company? Some 
have done better than others. For example, the big names in the 1970s are no 
longer around.” – private sector 1 
“The family-owned corporations have done well. Many have done well. The SM 
group has done well. Those are exceptions. [Some] families are successful in the 
transitioning to next generation and this is due to the enlightenment of people at 
the top for a more smooth transition for governance.” – private sector 2 
“The [family] has provided for succession…There is a sophisticated estate 
planning in place” – private sector 3 
Only one interviewee was affronted when asked about succession plans for the business, 
which unusually, was not owned by a dominant family. For one consultant that provides 
succession planning advice for big business families, discussing succession requires a set 
of diplomatic skills and the passage of time to keep all parties on side64
“Succession planning is a big issue for family companies. The key to succession 
planning is to introduce good corporate governance practice when times and 
: 
                                                     
64 Chapter 7 briefly mentions succession in SMEs. Succession is an issue that unites most business 




relationships are good between family members. We develop corporate 
governance improvement programs.  
“In the family corporation, it is important not to oversell the source of an idea as 
this might create tension with another member. Say a brother has a good idea, 
the other brother might resent that and the tension resulting from the idea is not 
good. Before introducing the programs, I have to be introduced to the brothers, 
sisters and other family members to get their trust. 
“With real reforms, you have to introduce it diplomatically. It is important that 
there is a great deal of trust first especially amongst Filipino-Chinese families. 
Introducing reforms take time as you have to talk to different members of the 
family. It takes time. On corporate governance, family corporations can talk 
about succession planning and how to attract human capital.” – ICD 
Another interviewee echoed this view of the challenge facing Filipino-Chinese families in 
succession planning: 
“Succession is always an issue in family companies. The Sy Family has 5, 6 
siblings in the business. People have begun asking, who’ll run the empire when 
the patriarch dies? Do you appoint someone to be the new CEO or carve it up to 
different interests? For example one sibling has one subsidiary and so forth. The 
Chinese traditionally see the company as their family business. The family is 
involved in the business. Very few [family members] do something else [besides 
the family business].” – stockbroker interviewee  
Most Filipino-Chinese business families are transitioning from the first to the second 
generation. Whether successful succession practices will follow the theoretical 
perspectives above, only time will tell. It should also be noted the Philippines has 
inherited the Spanish Civil Code provision on joint heirship and this impacts the 
succession plans of business families and the transfer of wealth: 
“There’s inequality in the Philippine civil code with its law of the civil 
relationships. There’s a whole book on inheritance and succession with 
compulsory heirship in succession. It is used by the offspring to be able to inherit 




wealth to tie it up where he can’t transition where he would want [to such as in 
making investment decisions]. 
“In the Philippines we have the Spanish Civil Code provision and the Roman law 
of heirship operates here. You’ve a son that doesn’t do anything but profit from 
his dad. You protect the dad against the banks, against corporate governance, 
against independent directors. Everything he can do to ensure that the fortune of 
his dad will be his. There is no fluidity, no movement of capital because it’s down 
from day one.” –regulator 
Continental European business families share similar issues regarding inheritance (see 
Economist 2009c). In the wider context of the current structure of the Philippine 
economy, this paralyses wealth creation and generation. 
6.12.3 Generational Issues 
 
One of the advantages in researching business families in the Philippines is in the variety 
of experience they offer and the stage of development they are in. For new enterprises, 
succession is a pressing issue. For the old, established enterprises, succession has been 
experienced and other issues await them. They are commonly referred to as generational 
transfer issues or how to ensure the business continues beyond the first, second or even 
third generation. 
Several interviewees pointed out that the second and succeeding generations will not 
have the same passion or feeling for the business. An entrepreneur who rose from 
poverty to build a great business will need to pass on this drive to his/her children in a 
different manner: 
“The challenge is generational - between the builders (imaginative, risk takes, 
softer on administration) vs. the next generation. The next generation are more 
risk averse, fundamentally less hungry. You cannot artificially create hunger.” – 
investment banker 
The protection principle comes into play once a business moves to the second 
generation – how to ensure the wealth built by the first generation is not dissipated by 
the time it reaches the third generation. Luckily for business families, history is full of 




“The old families, the Rockefellers, the Mellons etc. In Europe even in investment 
banking such as the Rothschilds, the families see professionals to look at 
managing the transition. In Asia and the Philippines, there are the Zobels and the 
Lopezes are beginning to look at that, then the Gokongweis.  For families, the 
next generation has the protection principle mindset to grow the business. 
[They] begin to adopt management practices to conserve, protect [the business 
and the wealth]. The family has a unique advantage. [They have a] visionary 
driving it. [They are] less susceptible to quarter to quarter pressures.” – 
investment banker 
The following figure shows the concept of a business family in three generations: 
Figure 34: Family Ownership in Three Generations (Gersick et al 1997: 19) 
 
In the first generation, the controlling owner is the founder/entrepreneur with his/her 
children. This generation builds the business. When the company is inherited by the 
second generation, siblings must elect an heir to represent them or they need to 
cooperate with each other to manage the business. For one company that was set up by a 
group of siblings, the protection-principle has set in and the second generation of his 
family are not the risk-takers: 
“The company name is down to the names of the two older brothers because we 
couldn’t decide on the name of the company so we finally came up with that as 
our choice. We don’t plan to change the [company name] to something that 
would reflect all the siblings as there is now a lot of goodwill [in the brand] in the 
export market. The second generation work in some parts of the group. One is 
Australian-educated. They are being conservative, quieter.” – family member  
While for the third and succeeding generations, how to manage a complex structure of 
cousins who are co-owners but who would not have shared the intimacy of growing up 
in the same household is the most complicated generational challenge out of all three. 
How does a business family deal with company issues when membership goes beyond 
the immediate family to the extended family of in-laws and cousins?  




“The challenge is to effectively manage the dynamics of a family-owned business, 
i.e., having to deal with family members who are involved with the business, 
having to balance the interests of non-working and working family members, and 
keeping the unity of the family through succeeding generations.” – private sector 
1 
“After several generations the business remains a partnership. I am trying to 
convince the cousin consortium to convert the partnership into a corporation.” –
private sector 2 
For some business families, more formal mechanisms such as Family Councils have been 
established to manage conflict. (See Chapter 7, section on Family Councils.) For some 
business families that endure to several generations, emotional separation from the 
company is likely to occur as pressures to professionalise require a greater definition of 
boundaries between family issues and business related issues: 
“We have family businesses that have evolved to family run where distinct family 
issues are kept away from the family business. The Cadbury family started as thus 
and evolved that way.” –private sector 3 
However, not all business families can grow and expand upon their legacy. Some are at 
the other end of the organisational life cycle of maturity or decline. The following box 
contains such a story.  
Text Box 6: A Portrait of a Business Group in Decline 
"Thomas Buddenbrook did not contemplate the future of little Johann with the weary 
dejection which was now his settled mood when he thought about his own life and his own 
end. The family feeling which led him to cherish the past history of his house extended itself 
even more strongly into its future...He said to himself that, however hopeless and thwarted 
he himself felt, he was still, wherever his son was concerned, capable of inexhaustible 
streams of energy, endurance, achievement, success - yes, that at this one spot his chilled 
and artificial life could still be warmed into a genuine and glowing warmth of hopes and 
fears and affections." From Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks (1999: 499)  
 
Most business groups I interviewed were and are highly successful. They were 
implementing corporate governance as part and parcel of doing business in the modern 
age. They gave their time freely to me and had no compunction with implementing 
corporate governance in their organisation because for the most part, they were the 






However, as to each rule there is always an exception. This case study is a portrait of one 
exceptional corporation. Exceptional in that it was not like the others. It was a family 
corporation in decline. The following is a narrative of my thoughts after I had 
interviewed this company. The usual adages apply: the profligacy and the squander of 
the third generation; the life cycle of a company; and how for everything and every 
company there is a season, in this case the time of decline... 
 
Interview Observations:  
 
Families rise and fall. This one is in decline. You can sense it as you enter the building. 
The corporation used to be powerful and strong with a prominent family behind it. The 
present company must be the outcome of what happens when clans fight over the soul of 
a business. It is akin to living the later chapters of Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks. 
 
I am privileged to access this corporation. Unlike the others, it is not in active 
competition to sustain its position. It is in quiet decline, or perhaps a steadfast position 
after divesting itself of its other arms and financial responsibilities. 
 
The family, in the words of the Chairman, want to be passive. They want the peace after 
the long, weary war. The corporation is past its glory heights, but it is still an on-going 
concern. It is now in the hands of the third generation. There is a fourth generation in 
the wings, perhaps not waiting as eagerly - or dreading -  as they wait for time to render 
them the responsibilities of a family corporation. I ask who is in the fourth generation 
and the response is a twenty-something who is enjoying the freedom of youth. 
 
Perhaps after the battles over the corporation, it is time to savour the fruits of the profit 
of the previous generations. This is what they mean about quiet enjoyment. 
 
The office of my interviewee is in an open plan floor. There is a sea of cubicles but no 
guarantee of privacy. He is young but already hunchbacked, a decade added on his 
youthful face. He is studious with a maturity beyond his years. Perhaps they saw that 
when they hired him.  
 
There is an underlying current feeling that this is the post-bellum corporation. The 
whole floor looks like a medium-sized office of a not so busy accounting firm. There is 
no hurried efficiency that I see in other corporations. There are no young assistants with 
make-up or hairstyles rivalling Marie Antoinette’s. My interviewee constantly refers to 
the loyal, older, female employees who bear witness to the trials and tribulations of the 
company's life. He says they have been there all the time. They must have seen the 
heights and downfalls, the tensions, and now the quiet enjoyment after the turbulence. 
 
This is what research truly is, it allows you to access corporations like these – insight into 
slivers of corporate life. 
 
My interviewee and I also spend some time discussing his tribulations with a London 
fund manager who was very demanding over the phone. I tried to explain to him how 
powerful institutional investors are in Anglo-American countries. He said he couldn’t 
even understand his accent at times. His superiors kept passing the demanding London 
manager to him. He says that over email he had been pissed off with his demands but 




in London to have rung them in Manila during office hours. That was, at least, 
considerate of the Londoner, but my interviewee seemed pre-occupied about the 
requirements of the institutional investor. 
 
He says he’s not even a major shareholder, a minority shareholder who presumably must 
be managing various accumulative funds. I told him the London manager probably 
needs a big enough shareholding to warrant the company’s attention. The hazards of 
doing business in a developing market. It’s how big you are, not who you are. Not all 
shareholders are treated equally. My interviewee doesn’t seem to care about it. He just 
wants the Londoner’s demands to be over and done with. As a shareholder, he’ll 
probably want to demand more. He mentions “pagkikisama” – the cultural concept of 
getting along with each other. The Londoner doesn’t know it. It’s a cultural clash. When 
a Western foreign investor clashes with a Filipino company. The manager probably 
looked at the company list of the PSE and thought the company a worthwhile 
investment. Perhaps the listing on the PSE is a reminder of its previous existence when it 
actively moved the market. Its legacy as a major corporate player. Now, the ticker symbol 
is a reminder of history and how things once were. 
 
It is in these moments that one appreciates research and the wealth of data produced. 
These insights of human interaction are revealed on this level. These little anecdotes, 
these little pieces of corporate life. My interviewee sees me smile. He asks, are my 
responses so very different from the others? I say to him that I am looking for a variety of 
responses. He doesn’t know that he’s made my research so very worthwhile.  
 
He says this is the second interview he’s done on corporate governance and considers 
himself able to respond. I don’t ask him what the previous interviewer's questions were 
but I can gather from his responses – disclosure seems to be the same, but on my other 
questions about culture, about opinions…they are different. He says my questions are 
broad. I’ve never heard another respondent say that. I reply these questions are broad so 
my respondents have the leeway and the flexibility in their response. 
 
This research is not just about the biggest corporations, it’s also about the others like this 
one. What happened? Is it about competition, is it about ego? Like life, it’s the variety of 
experiences that make it possible to explore and wonder about the human existence. 
 
I started the interview thinking this will be the usual responses. It wasn’t. With the 
realisation this entity was echoing that Hanseatic trading company at the closing stages 
of the 19th century made me more appreciative of Thomas Mann's writing. For Mann, to 
write about the rise and fall of his family and his family’s company must have been 
achingly personal. For me, I’m just a mere observer. I’ll collect this data, analyse it with 
others and perhaps realise how unique this interview has been. 
 
He starts the interview by looking at my print out of the company’s PSE listing. He 
immediately seizes the printout and corrects some of the information. Throughout the 
interview he scrutinises what I write. 15 minutes into it, he realises how different this 






In the foreseeable future, business groups will continue to dominate the private sector 
landscape of the country and corporate governance in the Philippines will be applied, 




CHAPTER 7: THE BOARD AND MANAGEMENT – CONTROLLERS OF 
THE COMPANY 
 
This chapter looks at the internal governance aspects of the company, in particular the 
role of the board and management as controllers and directors of the company. 
In the Philippines, the managerial agency problem as found in Western, listed, non-
family-owned companies do not exist. Western agency problems do not exist in the 
country because the managers are the owners. However there are family-agency 
problems where the executives act wholly for the interests of the family at the expense of 
others including that of minority shareholders (see Chapter 6). However, this can be 
mitigated when the family-owned company is run professionally. Furthermore, the 
influence of the family is bounded by professional managers. The introduction of 
independent directors to Philippine corporate boards is another important reform to 
limit the family’s self-interests in the business.  
Philippine corporate governance is bounded by the cultural norms and values of the 
country. While Western corporate governance reforms have had an impact in 
formalising the conduct of Filipino companies, corporate governance is implemented in 
a manner that reflects the visions and values of its family owners. This chapter is divided 
into the following sections: 
- The different roles and various structures of the typical Philippine company 
board are discussed: the CEO, the Chair, duality and separation of both roles. 
These two roles are normally filled with representatives from the major (family) 
shareholders and are the ultimate expression of their control of the company. 
- The introduction of the independent director on Philippine boards. As the 
seismic corporate governance reform, this outsider function has had a profound 
effect on the insider culture of Philippine corporations. Firstly, how the 
independent director is viewed and defined. Secondly, the pool, reputational 
value and ‘independence’ of directors are also explored. Finally, how independent 
directors are perceived as a threat to the business and its future are discussed. 
- In contrast, executive directors who in most cases are also members of the 
owning family are faced with their own issues as owner-manager and pressure to 




professional managers while others are transitioning towards this. 
Professionalisation is a major concern at the SME end of the business spectrum 
and director training and education are discussed in the smaller family 
businesses. 
- Board committees are structured by the board to oversee its management. The 
most cited committees amongst interviewees are discussed: audit, risk, 
nomination and executive. The conduct and culture of Filipino board meetings is 
also explored. Filipino boards manage conflict that reflect the national culture 
which values non-confrontation and consensus decision-making,  
- Finally, the last, albeit no less significant section, discusses other decision-
making bodies that have an impact on the company board and management: the 
family council, family board and advisory board. 
Similar to Chapter 6, hypothesis 2 is supported while hypothesis 3 is not supported in 
this chapter: 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance practices 
are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships. 
The reasons are familiar. Management is under the guidance and control of ownership 
interests. The independent directors’ section of this chapter exposes the tensions that 
occur in trying to bring well-defined principal-agent relationships in the country. 
7.1 Board Structure 
 
All Philippine companies I interviewed follow the unitary board model. There is the 
Chair (who is normally the patriarch, founder-entrepreneur or family member 
representative) and the CEO/President (who may or may not combine this role with that 
of the Chair). The rest of the board is comprised of executive directors, who comprise the 
majority of the board, who sit on various board committees. The 2002 reforms have a 
mandated requirement that 20% of the board is comprised of outside, independent 
directors or two independent directors whichever is less (SEC Corporate Governance 
Code 2002).65
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fifteen members. The figure below is a simple model of a typical Filipino listed company 
board: 
Figure 35: Structure of a Typical Philippine Company Board 
 
While the Philippines may not follow the two-tier board model as in Germany, there are 
other fora where the controlling family’s power is expressed and whereby they exercise 
their authority as owners. These forums include supplementary board-like structures 
such as the family council; family board and an advisory board. The next sections discuss 
members of a Filipino listed company board: CEO, Chair, Independent Directors, 
Executive Directors and Foreign Directors 
7.2 CEO 
 
The Chief Executive Officer (or CEO) holds the most powerful leadership position in the 
company. The CEO leads, champions, and sets out the culture and direction of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
1. Composition of the Board 
The Board shall be composed of at least five (5) but not more than fifteen (15) members elected by 
shareholders.  Public companies shall have at least two (2) independent directors or such 
independent directors shall constitute at least twenty percent (20%) of the members of such 
Board, whichever is the lesser. All other companies are encouraged to have independent directors 
as well. 
“The Board may include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (including 
independent non-executives), having a clear division of responsibilities such that no individual or 
small group of individuals can dominate the Board’s decision making. 
“The non-executive directors should be of sufficient qualifications, stature and number to carry 
significant weight in the Board’s decisions. Non-executive directors considered by the Board to be 
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company. According to Landbank CEO, Gilda E. Pico, her” idea of an effective CEO is 
one who empowers and inspires his/her people to contribute to the attainment of the 
organisation’s goals. One who has a clear grasp of where he/she wants to see the 
organisation down the road and knows what and how to execute strategies to make this 
vision a reality. Effective CEOs are also those who have the ability to make crucial 
decisions even with limited information on hand.” (Reyez 2007: C1) 
In some Philippine companies the title of President is interchangeable with that of the 
CEO. The use of President to refer to the most important person in the company is 
influenced by American business culture that spread to its former colony. The President 
of the company “mirrors the [American] President’s position as Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief.”(Cadbury 2002:114)  
The family-oriented, personalistic culture of the Philippines also renders the CEO as the 
paternalistic figurehead commanding loyalty that can border on the unprofessionalism. 
As pointed out by Dr. Ricardo Lim from Makati’s Asian Institute of Management, the 
perception of CEOs in the Philippines is dissimilar from the emotionally distant CEOs of 
Western corporations. The CEO is seen as the father or mother of the company and 
CEOs in the Philippines need to navigate through this perception: 
“Asian corporations are more paternal or maternal, but there is a very thin line 
between fraternalism and professionalism. They don't mix well. When a CEO 
becomes a cult-like figure...where employees put their lives in his hand, not make 
any decision because he is 'dad', and follow him through the depths of hell, if 
necessary, then there's something wrong…CEOs need not be stern. They can 
actually be personally pleasing and quite reasonable to be with...They can 
sympathise [with you] if there's sickness in the family; any human can feel that. 
But to be very 'chummy' or friendly with your employees is dangerous." 
Accordingly, forging a close relationship with an employee might affect a 
superior's ability to discipline him: "There might be a feeling of familial betrayal 
because the relationship is already too personal. So there has to be a distance." 
(Bobadilla 2007) 
In first generation companies, the CEO is usually the founder/entrepreneur. In second or 
third and succeeding generations, the CEO position is usually held by a member of the 




7.3 The Chair 
 
Equally as powerful, if not more influential, in a Philippine company is the Chairman. 
Where the CEO controls the company, the chair controls the board. Some companies 
have the role of chair and CEO combined (see next section), in which case the chair is 
seen as the ultimate leader of the company. The chair is the voice of authority on the 
board and sets out the culture of the board.  
“As chairman of the company and as mentor, and as manager of the listed 
company we manage in the Western business practice and we have done so for 
years. Since I have become Chairman, I have insisted that we run in a particular 
manner. Hopefully we are doing the right thing: profits, checks and balances and 
the audit practice distilled by the directors.” – Chair 
Where the chair has an executive stance, the decision-making process becomes 
unilateral: 
“It’s part of the culture [here] where the chair is normally occupied by the 
patriarch, then by the children. It is an omnipotent founder-chair with the 
children as part of the governance management team. Culturally, because of that 
structure, it’s difficult to discuss on a strategy and policy level when there is a 
strong father sitting as chair and dictating to the board. The Philippines is not 
known as confrontational. [The board] won’t exhibit open discussion and the loss 
of face is also important. There is a one-way traffic [in decision making] with the 
patriarch…One of the top five banks [here], can’t accept criticisms. They can’t 
stand people who say the emperor has no clothes.” – private sector 1 
Similarly, as the chair is usually the biggest shareholder or family member 
representative, what the chair envisions for the company will be the direction the 
company takes: 
“It’s family-owned, so whatever is the vision of the Chairman, then that is the 
[direction] we’re going to take…We keep a pretty low profile, not much 
happening, no drama, stable composition. Previously it would have been full of 
drama but now the Chairman doesn’t want that anymore hence we want passive 




“For the President, he is on day to day activities, implement activities and 
implement ideas that the Chairman thinks brilliant. Many ideas also come from 
the other officers. [This is] the decision making process in action; The Chairman 
has an idea; Management will study the idea: - the President decides on whether 
it should go ahead. He communicates the idea to his VP, Treasury, Marketing, 
Study Group etc. The study group reports – the board decides whether to go 
ahead on the basis of the results.”-private sector 3 
A different reasoning on why the authority of the chair is so omnipotent and 
concentrated was proffered by a regulator. He suggested the legal liabilities associated 
with signing off certain documents promote this autocratic oversight: 
“The biggest shareholder is the patriarch-founder that is usually attached to [the 
company]. When the banks lend to the corporations, the banks require them to 
sign with liability. This man needs to sign with the company secretary, with the 
corporate officer. That in a sense breeds a control aspect from the family to put 
its foot down on corporate governance. Several families here put their foot down. 
It’s a bad situation – they don’t want to let go of control. The patriarch being 
made to sign off the loan [that is] continuously rolled over - the father’s fortune 
to fall into a situation where it can be foreclosed.” –regulator 
The enormity and awareness of one’s responsibilities as chair was echoed with one 
interviewee: 
“At the end of the day, the annual report has my signature on the bottom.” –
Chair 
The following passage describes how the Philippine board culture operates due to the 
influence of the chair: 
“The chair isn’t like the rest. This is cultural thing that you can’t have a board of 
trustees of one person, one vote environment. It’s not one person, one vote. 
What’s your decision? Four board members saying yes, three people saying no? It 
doesn’t happen.  
“Many times it goes this way: seven people talk, they get together, [there is] 




[a] more convincing power than most. He can speak softly, people will listen. 
This is the cultural consensus building.  
“The Chairman selects the independent/executive directors. The board of 
trustees creates the nominations committee. They choose the nominations 
committee. [The] same goes with the remuneration committee. The board of 
trustees selects people who’ll decide the remuneration. The board of trustees 
selects the committee who’d select independent directors. [For] independent 
board members – who decides to puts you on the board? It is the Chair. 
“The consensus building is due to the voice of the Chair. It is definitely not 
proportional to what it should be. It’s not one vote, one person. But it’s not the 
environment here. Does the board say ‘Let’s vote’? No, almost [always] there is 
never [not unanimous] voting on the board. If a board member is not convinced 
[by an issue or decision], the tendency is they convince one other [before voting 
takes place].” –academic 
This view on how voting takes place on the board level was echoed by another: 
“The compliance officer simply fills out a form that everything has been 
completed [to fulfil this as part of] substantial compliance. [The board members 
are] independent but not independent. The Chairman tells them how to vote. It 
is the omnipotence of the chairman - over 50% of Philippine business is 
dominated by family corporations. Who can really be an independent [director] 
asks [Washington] Sycip on boards. Sycip can speak independently but he is part 
of the very few people who can.” –private sector 4 
Precisely because of the overwhelming authority of the Chair that this issue has become 
one of the main corporate governance problems in Philippine corporations: 
“The corporate governance dilemma facing the Philippines and East Asia is the 
omnipotence of a chairman vs. the board. This is in contrast to the Western 
corporate governance dilemma of trying to discipline the omnipotence of 
managers vs. the board” – CG workshop 
Consensus-building is the distinguishing feature of Philippine boards and this is due to 




members on an issue. Conflicts are rare, mediated or informal. Formally, there is no such 
thing as a split board, if there is, members have to be convinced or swayed to support an 
argument. Far from primus inter pares, the chair is über alles. 
7.3.1 CEO Duality or Chairman-CEO Combination 
 
The roles of Chair and CEO are the most important and powerful in the company. When 
they are combined, it is the ultimate expression of concentrated power and absolute 
control by the majority owner or owning family. 
In the 2002 SEC Code of Corporate Governance, there is no mandated preference over 
the combination or separation of the CEO and Chair position in the company. However, 
when the role is combined, the Code requests that proper supervision be exercised by 
the board: 
“Where both positions of the Chairman and CEO are unified, there is clearly one 
leader to provide a single vision and mission. In this instance, checks and 
balances should be clearly provided to help ensure that independent, outside 
views, perspectives, and judgments are given proper hearing in the Board.” (SEC 
Code 2002) 
In reality, monitoring a CEO-Chair can be an unsurmountable challenge. The CEO-
Chairman duality is a feature of Philippine corporate governance and is common in 
companies as the business is seen as an extension of the family. In companies that I 
interviewed that had CEO duality the main reason for the combination was the 
overwhelming wish by the majority owners (usually a family) of the corporate entity to 
have this in place: 
“The combination has always been like that. The CEO, Chairman, President, 
Management. The family practically owns the company. Because we’re a holding 
company, we don’t operate much. Our investment is in passive investments, 
bonds, hedge funds. There’s not much need to separate the Chairman, CEO. Even 
if it gets separated between the brothers, it will still be under the same family.” –
private sector 1 
“I consult with the board. This combination of Chairman and CEO – I don’t 




When we list it’s possible [for the separation to occur]. I do think there are 
advantages of separating the board and the management. But that will be 
applicable in large corporations with no real controlling shareholder. I own 
almost half of the company so [this issue] doesn’t really matter.” – CEO-Chair 
“In the Philippines, it is common for the chairman to be chief executive officer as 
well. This is because the board which sets policy and directions for the company 
normally wants its chairman to have management responsibility to better oversee 
the activities of the corporation and have control over its progress. The day-to-
day management is delegated to a chief operating officer66
The following comment from a holding company interviewee begs the question whether 
separating the two roles is a matter of image – if investors see the separation, does that 
instil confidence amongst outside investors?  
 with the rank of 
president and this is the case in Benpres.” –private sector 2 
“The separation of Chair and CEO? It’s not practical. The family runs the 
company. There’s a family chairman. During the IPO the roles were separated.” –
private sector 3 
For the company in question, after the IPO, the two roles were united again. This brings 
to mind the important distinction between a company that is simply family-owned and a 
company that is family-owned AND family-controlled.  
The duality seems to be most present in companies where there is a strong family 
involvement in the business. This was reinforced at a corporate governance workshop I 
attended which had participants from family-owned medium sized enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the primarily Anglo-American concept of separating 
the two roles is gaining currency: 
“In the Philippines many of the family corporation owners - many of them say - 
the separation of Chairman and CEO can’t be implemented as we are the owners, 
we’re entitled to run the companies themselves. There’s also malasakit 
(empathy). But it makes sense later on to separate. The trend is now, we are now 
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are more likely to have COOs when they are also board chairman…CEOs who fulfil these two role 




seeing the owners who are in their 60 and 70s being convinced to start 
professionalising. Just run the board, let succession [happen] or [allow] the 
professional executive run from the President-down - to let it be run by 
professionals and appoint the President and CEO.” – CG workshop 
The CEO duality is a common structure for most East Asian corporations. The positive 
side of having an omnipotent chair was highlighted in a workshop discussion at the 
annual 2009 International Corporate Governance Network conference held in Sydney67.A 
partner with an institutional investor firm Taiyo Pacific Partners68
7.3.2 Chairman-CEO Separation 
 which oversees three 
Japanese funds comprised of 42 companies, stated that while most boards in Japan were 
insider boards, dealing with someone who has both combined roles (Chairman and CEO 
or CEO and President) is akin to dealing with someone who has the power of a North 
Korean dictator. The positive side to this dictatorship is one need only engage with one 
person on corporate governance. If the person is supportive of corporate governance, 
this spreads to the rest of the board as it isn’t necessary to convince other board 
members. Thus, from at least one institutional investor perspective, a combined role can 
be a positive influence in introducing corporate governance reforms. 
 
In companies that have separated these two positions, the family owners made a 
conscious decision to have this segregation with the division of labour and responsibility 
the main motivation, and as effective corporate governance practice: 
“When the IPO was done, there were three independent directors on board out 
of seven including the Chairman. The Chairman and CEO roles are segregated to 
this day. The CEO of the company is the executive management and part of the 
significant shareholder group. The Chairman is not involved in the executive 
management. The board wants to separate the two functions – the CEO is day to 
day management.” – private sector 1 
“The Chairman and CEO roles are separated. This serves as a check and balance, 
and is effective as a corporate governance policy.” –private sector 2 
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“The reasons for the separation are the Chairman wants to be on his own on 
policy, presiding on the board.” –private sector 3 
The separation is normally between two family members usually father and son: 
“The Chairman/President is usually the father/son separation. At Ayala it’s two 
brothers who take each of the chairman roles in their group of companies. The 
president would be a professional manager.” – private sector 4 
“The role of Chairman and President is separated between father and son. My 
principals are adverse to the label of CEO. The President is like the CEO. He is 
also the COO which we say stands for the title “Child of the Owner.” –private 
sector 3 
There is the less common separation between a family member for chair and non-family 
member professional for CEO: 
“The Chairman and President [role] is separated. The Chairman [represents the 
family owners] and has a different set of responsibilities from the President [who 
focuses on other issues].” –private sector 5 
“The CEO of the company is the executive management and part of the 
significant shareholder group. The chairman is not involved in the executive 
management. The board wanted to separate the two functions as the CEO is day 
to day management. There is also the COO which is separate and different.69
Separating the Chairman and CEO roles take on a heavily significant ceremonial display 
especially when the company and the family owners are undergoing a succession 
process: 
” –
private sector 6 
“There is recognition of the Chairman as the elder person – as one transfers 
power, [there is a] generational transfer of power. Beyond family corporations, 
                                                     
69 This statement suggests reasons of size and performance – as this medium enterprise company 
grows, so do the operational and professional requirements. In Hambrick & Cannella Jr’s study 
they focused on the relationship between CEOs and COOs including a contentious finding that 
“COOs provide CEOs with ready scapegoats if performance problems arise.” (2004: 977). 
Investigating the different roles of members of TMTs were beyond the scope of this study but this 
sliver of insight into their functions show that this research field is a fecund ground in exploring 




the Chairman is the older person, the guiding spirit. The President has to get 
things done, there’s value to that.” –private sector 4 
In the case of Petron, an energy company whose major owners in 2007 were two 
government owned corporations (since altered at the time of writing) – PNOC 
(Philippine National Oil Company) and AOC (Aramco Overseas Company BV) of Saudi 
Arabia - the role of CEO is alternated between the two major shareholders. The Chair is 
executive, and the President is executive. These two positions represent the interests of 
their shareholders therefore the company does not have an independent chair: 
“The role of the Chairman and the President are separate and their individual 
approval limits are well defined. Beyond their individual approval limits, certain 
projects will have to be approved jointly by them or brought up to the Board, as 
the Approvals Manual may require. The CEO role is rotated between the 
Chairman and the President, once every two years. All these are essentially found 
as among the more important provisions of the shareholders agreement between 
PNOC and AOC. The CEO looks after the day-to-day affairs and he is assisted by 
a Management Committee (Mancom) composed of the Chairman, the President 
and all the Vice Presidents of the company which Mancom meets weekly.” – 
Petron 
Finally, from the perspective of a Chairman who has clearly defined boundaries between 
himself and executives:  
“I try not to be an executive chairman but just a chairman. There’s a President 
and Executive Vice President (EVP) and they’ll always come to talk to me. All of 
our CEOs in the region ring and talk to me on a daily basis several times a 
day…Some CEOs and directors don’t like it when I question things. A couple of 
directors ask all sorts of questions and I think that’s good.” – Chair 
Separating the role of chair and CEO eases the burden on one person discharging both 
sets of duties.  
7.4 Independent Directors 
 




Philippines, the introduction of the independent director is the most controversial and 
has had the most impact in changing the board structure of companies: 
“Corporate governance as practiced in other countries has had a measurable 
impact on Philippine companies. For example, the Securities Regulation Code, 
(Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on August 8, 2000) requires certain 
classes of corporations to have at least two independent directors on their 
boards. The qualifications and disqualifications of these independent directors 
are provided by law and by regulations of the SEC. As defined in Section 38 of the 
Code, an independent director is “a person other than an officer or employee of 
the corporation, its parents or subsidiaries, or any other individual having a 
relationship with the corporation, which would interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.  
“This has had a profound influence on businesses since, prior to the enactment of 
the Code, corporate boards were usually staffed by persons heavily involved with 
the company in a way that conceivably precluded the exercise of independent 
judgment. With the advent of the Securities Regulation Code, companies are 
scrambling to comply with the independent director requirement.” – PSE 
The implementation of independent directors has caused enormous upheaval in the 
corporations, especially when they were introduced on listed holding companies which 
are generally seen as the domain of the owning families. To speak of corporate 
governance in the country, is to elucidate how companies have tried to adjust to the 
introduction of the independent directors: 
“Initially, it was difficult to implement the rule that directors must adhere to the 
‘fit and proper rule.’ The [companies] questioned the legal basis, even if it was not 
in the Corporation Code. There is a basic corporate code in the 1980s. Chairman 
Bautista and the SEC took the position to include the ‘fit and proper rule’ in the 
Manual and Code as the main criteria of independent directors.” – SEC 
This section provides the various issues and differing perspectives on the introduction of 





7.4.1 Independent Directors Legally Defined 
 
With most corporations being family-owned and the company seen as the family’s 
personal fiefdom, having a family outsider (or two) sit on the corporate board was, and 
is, to most companies a source of discomfort. The introduction of the independent 
director was codified in the 2002 SEC reform: 
“SRC Rule 38 – Requirements on Nomination and Election of Independent 
Directors 
7. Number of Independent Directors 
A. All companies are encouraged to have independent directors. However, issuers 
of registered securities and public companies are required to have at least two (2) 
independent directors or at least twenty percent (20%) of its board size, 
whichever is the lesser. Provided further that said companies may choose to have 
more independent directors in their boards than as above required. 
B. The Exchange/s are required to have at least three (3) independent directors. 
To effectively carry out the provisions of Section 33.2(g) of the Securities 
Regulation Code, the Exchange’s independent director or a nominee for such 
director shall not solicit votes for himself.” 
A debate on this requirement was present during the course of my interviews when there 
were conflicting accounts over the phrase “whichever is the lesser” which appears in the 
first paragraph of Section 38 (7). One regulator stated this was a typographical error and 
the requirement was suppose to be more stringent – that is, to have at a minimum 2 
directors or 20% of the board to be independent. Thus, for boards that have 15 members, 
a minimum of 3 independent directors need to be present.  
“[If you look at the PSE board] they have introduced professionalisation in the 
stock market, so there are 20% independents on that board, 2 to 3 independent 
directors. There was actually a typo there [in the regulation], we meant 20% or at 
least 2 independent directors – whichever is higher. At the moment it appears it 
says ‘whichever is lower’. But we have this amendment ready for the bill.” – SEC 1 




response to a question on why one conglomerate only had one independent director out 
of seven directors: 
“[This requirement] was drafted in the commission. The 20% limit recognised in 
family-owned companies with 2 directors on board. One director in a board of 
five must be really independent. This would be sufficient in the selection whether 
he is an independent director. [Regarding that company], it would be 1.4 
independent director - 20% of 7 directors so you don’t have two directors 
whichever is less. It’s not a typo. [However] we hope we’ll see the requirement [of 
at least two].” – SEC 2 
The companies being regulated by the SEC were well aware of the original idea to have 
more independent directors than currently stated. As one pointed out: 
“In the provision of the law, there was the 20% requirement but there was an 
error which even now has not been rectified.” – private sector 1 
As with most changes, the corporate response to this legislated requirement depended 
on the company. For the few companies who had already professional managers 
educated in Western business schools and instituted Anglo-American corporate 
governance before the SEC reforms came in to effect, there were few problems in 
adjusting. Where the company is a large conglomerate, meeting the SEC requirements 
for independent directors occur on two levels – independent directors on the boards of 
the operating companies, and independent directors on the holding company or mother 
company board. The latter is where the interests of the family are exercised more 
comprehensively and where this reform was greeted most offensively. 
For the many companies who hadn’t professionalised, whose managers were mainly 
family members, and who weren’t exposed to Western business education or practices, 
the reaction to the introduction of the independent director was defensive, negative and 
highly critical. 
Appendix 5 contains a table that lists the extensive qualities that qualifies or disqualifies 




7.4.2 Concept of the Independent Director 
 
The SEC sees the independent director as the intermediary between the public at large 
and the company. Attendance of independent directors to board meetings is crucial to 
the way the SEC monitors how this reform is being implemented. 
“One of the requirements which we monitor every year amongst companies that 
we regulate will be 2 certifications: 
1. A certification issued by the corporate secretary certifying the attendance of 
directors during meetings. 
2. A certification issued by the compliance officer on the extent of the 
company’s compliance with its corporate governance manual.” – SEC 
The SEC also requires independent directors to submit a certification on their 
qualifications and disqualifications for the position70
“It is not enough to have disclosures in periodic reports for selected companies. 
When the SEC feels they require to submit more certification, they do so under 
oath so they are [reluctant to falsify their qualifications] before they exclude 
certain allowances. We’ve found inaccuracies [in the qualifications of the 
independent directors] when double-checking some of the periodic reports.” – 
SEC 
: 
Hence, there is great emphasis on the independent director as key corporate governance 
reform: 
“Why are these certifications important? We’d like to know if indeed the 
independent directors actually attend the meetings as they state. The 
independent director is like the equaliser. They don’t always necessarily agree or 
disagree with most of the board’s view. They give objectivity during the meetings 
and they can say yes when indeed they [want to] say yes, and no when it’s no. We 
ensure they are real independent directors and not just independent directors on 
paper and not attend the board meeting.” – SEC  
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The SEC requirements mean companies must formalise the process in which 
independent directors are nominated (see Nominations Committee later in this chapter): 
“Under the rules of the SEC, the nominees must be stated. In the nominee form, 
there must be a mark on who is the independent director. Independent directors 
must submit their resume. Together with a list of nominees, they must include 
indications to submit [their nomination] to the shareholders’ meeting, then their 
election as independent directors of the company.” –private sector 1 
The best indicator of a company’s practical implementation of independent directors is 
whether or not these outsiders attend or avoid meetings: 
“The best evidence is “my attendance in meetings”. If directors are absent in 
more than 50% of meetings, there is a temporary disqualification and they have 
to show why they ought not to be disqualified. So if independent and regular 
directors are absent for more than 50% of the meeting they are disqualified. 
When we find that a director has incurred more than 50% absences and they are 
renominated for direct re-election, then we expect the company to make a 
justification why they should be re-elected. 
“If there are reasons why they could not attend, they must advise. Not only can 
they say, ‘we can’t drop his name due to him being indispensable to the company 
or that the corporation/blockholder he represents has a substantial stake in the 
corporation’ they must give due reason. For example, teleconference meetings 
are acceptable but the company’s minutes must show that. For the SEC, there 
was a circular outlining the different requirements of the meeting via 
teleconferencing. There is reason why a busy director can’t attend. With 
teleconference they must document the meeting. If you can’t show the 
documented meeting then there must be adequate representation. 
“We get to monitor the attendance of directors. We look into the qualifications 
and disqualifications. Sometimes, [companies think] we aren’t capable of 
determining inconsistencies, we receive the information statements. When 
director election time comes, we compare these with the issuances and the 
disclosures in the past so that’s when we discover inconsistencies and even the 




Non-attendance by independent directors is considered a significant signal indicating 
poor practice of corporate governance. 
7.4.3 Welcoming Independent Directors 
 
For one company that has incorporated Western business practices, the introduction of 
the independent director was an easy transition: 
“Our independent directors are not a problem. We are used to them. It was not a 
problem appointing the new independent directors.” – private sector 1 
In one company at least, there were more independent directors than the requirement 
and the performance of their independent directors impressed the managers: 
“Under SEC regulations, there must be at least 2 independent directors. We have 
4. They are rare individuals. Not only do they meet the mandate but they also do 
a good job. Our independent directors are like clinicians. They come around 
twice a week and they keep clinical hours reviewing the company. Most directors 
have also attended the meetings. Our independent directors have their own 
companies. They are totally independent and not executives nor officers of the 
company. [The owner] didn’t want an executive officer and approve something 
which he had only recommended. The only executive director is his son. All the 
others are non-executive directors, no management positions.” – private sector 2 
One interviewee reflected that they had competent board members prior to the reform 
and the addition of independent directors has not made much of a difference. However 
the respondent concedes independent directors proffer a different perspective on the 
business: 
“Before 2003, there were no independent directors. The introduction of them has 
not had a big impact. The independent directors - while they contribute to good 
management – do not mean that previous board members were less capable. In a 
comparison between independent directors now and not being independent 
[previously] – there has not been much difference. The contribution is much the 
same [prior to the reforms and after]. Now we have independent directors, they 




opinions. It helps us but it doesn’t mean anything’s better than previously.” –
private sector 3 
For companies I interviewed, most were positive in their assessment of their 
independent directors’ contribution to existing business practice. 
7.4.4 Independent Directors in the Ayala Group 
 
The Ayala Group of Companies is held in wide esteem as being the most professionalised 
conglomerate in the Philippines. As such, the requirement of having independent 
directors has been met on the boards of the Ayala group of companies, including the 
mother company Ayala Corporation (AC): 
“To the extent of compliance, all public companies are compliant with the rules 
of corporate governance promulgated by SEC. In the case of the Bank of the 
Philippine Islands (BPI), we have three officially declared independent directors 
out of 11 directors. But we have more than three officially recognised ones. Since 
there are seven directors in AC, there are three non-executive directors out of 
seven.  
“Ayala Land has three independent directors, one executive director including 
the Chairman. Other publicly listed Ayala companies have two or three 
independent directors. There is balance of independent directors and non-
executive directors. [There is] greater [emphasis on] the non-executives part on 
the board of directors.” –AC 
Where there is a significant outside shareholder interest in an Ayala company, then they 
are represented on the board: 
“There’s a Mitsubishi representative on the AC board as Mitsubishi is a 
significant shareholder and is entitled to own a seat. Mitsubishi owns 10% of AC. 
The Mitsubishi representative is a non-executive director. 
“For Globe, it is an early, young core business. Our interest in old Globe Mackay 
which used to be a US company; we took control of in 1993. In 1995, Singtel 
(Singapore Telecom) became a partner. AC considered Globe a limited public 




rights. There are 2 Singtel directors on board, but we have nominees outside. 
There are independent directors, an ambassador to the Court of St James, an ex-
undersecretary of Finance, Secretary of Finance.” –AC 
According to another interviewee, foreign shareholders in Ayala companies have seen 
corporate governance improved or complemented in those businesses. Indeed, the 
presence of a foreign investor indicates confidence in the company as outsiders are 
expected to demand greater transparency and improved disclosure:  
“Globe is owned by two major blocks – SingTel and Ayala. There are around 4 
independent directors out of 11. On BPI, it’s the Ayala Group and the Singapore 
Bank. SingTel and Singapore Bank are both eventually owned by Temasek 
Holding. The partners of the Ayalas are the Singaporeans. They are very 
transparent, practising high levels of corporate governance.” – private sector 1 
The fiduciary duties of Ayala company directors are well-established and have been 
institutionalised to an extent: 
“Based on our corporate law, the board exercises a fiduciary capacity. As stewards 
of the company, due diligence [is applied] as a good father to the family of 
companies. AC through time has long been here. No particular shareholder 
complaint of negligence. All our directors are conscious of that role. Well-
advised, well-informed of responsibilities to shareholders and we’re very 
conscious of this.” –AC 
The following figure is Ayala Corporation’s board structure in 200971
                                                     
71 Source: Ayala Corporation (2009) Board of Directors 
and family council: 





Figure 36: Ayala Corporation -Board of Directors (2009) and Family Council 
7.4.5 Ambivalence Towards Independence Directors 
 
Representing minority shareholder interest is a factor in introducing independent 
directors on Filipino boards. Independent directors are supposed to represent the 
interests of non-family or non-majority owners: 
“The minority shareholders are represented by the independent directors, of 
which there are two (2) independent directors in the Petron Board composed of 
ten (10) directors. These two independent directors are nominated by minority 
shareholders, i.e., holding less than 10% of the outstanding capital stock; and the 
independent directors themselves cannot own more than 2% of the capital stock 
in their own right. The two independent directors are members of all board 
committees and therefore have a say in all matters that are considered by the 
board committees as well as the main board.” – Petron 
For one independent director, he sees his role on the board as representing minority 
shareholders: 
Ayala Family Council






























“As an independent director, I see my role, on top of my statutory obligations, as 
the particular member of the board who asks certain questions: how would a 
particular transaction benefit the shareholders, particularly the minority 
shareholders? Is an acquisition accretive to the shareholders? Is it properly 
valued? Is a convertible issue priced in such a way that it is favourable to existing 
shareholders? My task is to ask those questions on behalf of the minority 
shareholders. I believe that our role is to participate in the board discussions. 
That is my style – where one actively participates.” – Vincent S. Perez, 
independent director, SM Investments Corporation (SM Annual Report 2006: 75) 
However, the highly concentrated ownership structure of most companies in the country 
mean even international companies appreciates the difficulty of introducing 
independent directors: 
“The independent majority on boards cannot be applied here. If you follow the 
independent director model, this is contrary to the Philippine culture. People 
here do not speak bluntly and sometimes are not law abiding.” –private sector 1 
For one emerging company, appointing two independent directors is proving to be a 
challenge: 
“We’ve had an issue over independent directors. We currently have one. Within 
the corporate governance standards we need at least two independent directors. 
We will be appointing two independent directors sometime this year as under 
the law.” – private sector 2 
However, as a matter of pragmatism, the global business trend towards independent 
directors is the reality. If a company wishes to attract outside investment, a responsive 
owner would recognise and incorporate this requirement. This is one indicator of 
pressures towards the global harmonisation of corporate governance: 
“At the end of the day, if the company would like to grow but cannot grow 
through their means internally, they have to look outside for human and 
financial capital. External providers of capital from the Anglo-American world 
would have a checklist such as presence of independent directors.  




directors. We may not agree with that aspect of globalisation of incorporate 
Anglo American aspects of corporate governance and independent directors but 
we have to be pragmatic about it. 
“In the Philippines, we push more on director independence in mind than 
independent directors. All directors have to be independent – it’s the proper 
thing to do.” –ICD 
The concept of independent directors in the country is still very much a reform in 
progress. However, the Philippines is not alone in this process and given the family-
based nature of businesses, it is unsurprising that this has been challenging. But for 
companies who are willing and are able to embrace this reform, they are rewarded for 
doing so though the vast majority of companies have to be continuously convinced of 
the merits of this reform. 
7.4.6 Pool of Independent Directors 
 
What was acknowledged by most companies – blue chips and emerging alike – is the 
difficulty in finding truly independent directors. One view of the introduction of 
independent directors is that this particular corporate governance reform has created a 
new market for independent directors: 
“Corporate governance may be difficult for family ownership and self-interest but 
being an independent director is good business now since they are required to be 
recruited.” – public sector 1 
Family owners are also reluctant to pay for independent directors given that family 
members (who are also shareholders) can sit on the board at a more reasonably priced 
basis and would not require the same amount of recompense as professional non-family 
directors. As noted by one business advocacy group, to exercise true independence, an 
independent director in the country must be independent in mind and in wealth: 
“It’s hard for [independent directors] to be appointed. Maybe [the company] is in 
need of money for independent directors. Perhaps a truly independent director 
has to be independently wealthy. For an independent director to be truly 
different, there are two factors: 





2. Independent in mind 
“After you’re appointed [as an independent director] it is subsistence living on 
[the income of] being an independent director.” –private sector 1 
Or as one interviewee wryly pointed out: 
“Marry a wealthy spouse to ensure independence.” –private sector 2 
The debate over the lack of independent directors in the first place reflects the lack of 
recognition of the board director as a profession. This was the practical reality when the 
reforms came in the first place, and the supply of independent directors is an issue that 
has not abated. While the establishment of the Institute of Corporate Directors is in 
response to this demand by promoting this profession, the following interviewee reflects 
the widespread notion that whilst independent directors are a good thing, the reality 
means the reform falls short of the ideal: 
“Here, for example, there is no such thing as a 100% independent director – that 
[principle] should be revisited. It’s a good thing that there’s independent 
directors as that is best practice but that is not practical here. The pool of 
independent directors is quite small – joining from one company to another. ICD 
is there to train directors who can become independent directors. There is no 
limit to how many directorships one person can hold although with the BSP 
there is a ‘fit and proper rule’ which, when evaluated, would limit the number of 
directorships. There are mandatory two to three independent directors. The 
more [independent directors] the merrier, the better.” –private sector 3 
For banks, the requirement that there must be two independent directors on the board is 
an issue of resources. For the large banks who can afford outsiders, this is less of a 
problem: 
“Independent directors have no connection with us, are not related to us, and 
were hired for their expertise. We not only wanted to comply but we also wanted 
directors who can help the board. Independent directors are good for the 




flagship so he wants to make it good. He did not want only executive directors 
because he said they’d only be yes men and agree with him.” –private sector 4 
But for the smaller, rural banks which are run as family concerns, directors’ duties are 
not well-understood and recruiting independent directors is fraught with difficulty: 
“Independent directors are required for all types of banks. This is not so much of 
a problem for the bigger banks but [it is] for the small, rural banks. It is generally 
difficult to have independent directors on the rural banks. It is difficult for them 
to find independent directors as mostly they are run as a family business.” – BSP 
“Family-owned organisations observe BSP rules but not corporate governance. 
When I lecture before them, it’s all Greek to them. They do not know the 
liabilities of directors.” – private sector 4 
The supply of independent directors is also directly connected to the sometime 
incestuous nature of the corporate elite of the country. Similar to experiences of other 
developing countries where there is a highly rigid and oligarchical society (Lansberg & 
Perrow 1991), the pool of Manila’s independent directors is rather shallow, thus selecting 
appropriate outsiders is particularly challenging: 
“The rules of the SEC for independent directors are by a process of elimination. 
There is a negative list of who is or isn’t an independent director and you find the 
independent director if they don’t meet any disqualifications on the list. Manila is 
a small town. People you want to be independent directors have had a 
connection with [us]. All disqualifications are not present for a person to be an 
independent director. There is a screening process with the nominations 
committee, chaired by the board to look for independent directors.” –private 
sector 5 
Metro Manila has one of the highest urban populations in the world with some 11 million 
people. The perception that selecting directors in the metropolis is arduous due to 
scarcity struck me as rather unusual and even insular. Asking other interviewees about 
this comment one offered that this is the way of doing business in the country: 
“It is a small town. There are all these connections. They just have a different way 




Another explained reasons of quality, not quantity that makes finding the right 
independent director for the right company a time-consuming task. Interlocking 
directorates are the norm in the country: 
“There is the general reputation that Manila is a small town. Why a small town? 
In certain business circles, you meet the same people. It is a high level of 
concentration. Within the business community you have access to easy 
information. You don’t need to check the corporate governance of the company – 
just ask the people in the know. For the companies worth investing in, the 
reputation is well known. They not only set the standard, they want a name 
director. The US is just too large an economy but small town America would have 
the same gossip business columns. It makes sense. The people who affect the life 
of the country such as the political intellectual circle here is very limited. It is 
elitist. When I say small, the influentials know each other.” – private sector 7 
Offering an opposing view is the SEC. The regulator does not empathise with companies 
over their struggle in finding independent directors. From the SEC’s point of view, the 
difficulty in finding independent directors is not a matter of scarcity, but rather 
reflecting the pre-existing insular, highly concentrated elitist business culture of the 
country: 
“Another issue [companies] bring up is that there is a dearth of qualified 
independent directors. Look at corporate governance in Malaysia. This is not a 
problem here because you can pull out professors as independent directors. 
There are enough people but they don’t want to open up. If they open up, there 
will be a lot of people who can be potential independent directors – this country 
has a lot of CPAs, lawyers. But it is matter of time. Some of them came to the SEC 
and said the SEC should come up with a list of accredited independent directors. 
We want to increase [independent directors] to a majority of the board. They’ll 
have to open up or Philippine corporations will be seen as a pariah in 
international markets.” – SEC 
For one business advocacy group, a future reform would be to establish an association 
along the lines of other independent directors association in the region. This would be 




“There is the Institute of Independent Directors in Singapore. We need all of 
that: minority shareholders, rating agencies. Get our own independent 
association as the majority shareholder is still the majority.” – business advocacy 
group 
A future independent directors association would represent interests other than the 
majority owners’ and would formalise and promote the idea of the independent director 
on company boards. 
7.4.7 Number of Directorships 
 
The proliferation of directorships is linked to the perception that there is a lack of 
qualified directors. Like most countries, there is no statutory limit in the Philippines on 
the number of directorships one can hold. Only where there is high shareholder activism 
are company directors seen to limit the number of directorships they have. 
Are all directorships granted equally? Is a director holding a substantial number of 
directorships a working, trophy or token member of the board? Is a multiple holder of 
directorships a sign of their competence and/or popularity? 
Qualified directors are in demand but there are so few of them currently: 
“We would like more teeth in the regulatory bodies e.g. core supervision in the 
public interest such as more stringent requirements in directorships. The joke in 
[one bank] was it was run as a ‘sari-sari’ (variety) store and run by a barber as 
that was the former profession of the owner.” – private sector 1 
For one company board, most of the members are professional directors hence they hold 
multiple directorships: 
“On the business background [of our board members], the majority of directors 
are professional directors with one holding 28 directorships. They have all 
undergone corporate governance training.” – private sector 2 
Some interviewees mentioned the ideal amount of directorships and how this ought to 
be regulated. One interviewee cited resource and time constraints as deterring the 




“I believe a person should have 4 to 5 directorships maximum. If retired from 
management, professionally. You spend 20-25 hours per month for each 
directorship studying proposals prior to actual attendance of a committee 
meeting.” –private sector 3 
While another mentioned that a lower number of directorships reflect the perceptive 
approach he takes sitting in as a director in each company: 
“I used to have a lot of directorships – I had 20, but now have 7. I am now 
discerning from because it’s my reputation on the line.” – private sector 4 
For one regulator, limitations on directorships would come under a nominal number and 
also by industry demands: 
“How we can have [this person] hold 80 company directorships - how effective 
would that be? I’d like to see a limitation on directorships. Maybe a maximum of 
six directorships. I want a limit on directorships and the type of company. You 
can’t be a [director] on an airline industry, and be on a pre-need company the 
next. You need expertise.” – SEC 
For Philippine businesses to be competitive and become professional, the dearth of 
professional directors needs addressing. 
7.4.8 Reputation of Independent Directors 
 
Regardless over issues of sample and depth, introducing independent directors has 
rendered companies to assess the quality of directors they want to attract and keep. Akin 
to a shopping expedition, possible candidates are assessed according to their strengths, 
networks, and contribution to the reputation of the company: 
“The independent directors at PLDT they are there by strategy. Gokongwei tried 
to glamorise his [board]. [The company is] operating [the independent directors] 
as [they] want to operate them. SM is quite open, in more ways thorough but I 
am not sure who’s an independent director there.” – private sector 1 
“[He] was selected by the Governance and Nominations Committee – he is a son 
of a Taipan – to put new young blood in on the board and to reduce the average 




former president of the state university, ex-Department of Trade and Industry.”  –
private sector 2 
The quality of candidates for independent directors remains a strong factor for some 
companies. They must be ‘names’. Candidates who have government connections and 
international experience are well-sought after:  
“Independent directors are nominated by the President. They’d go through a 
screening process. [We] make sure we have very good names [in the shortlist] 
and that they are very independent. [One independent director] runs a 
worldwide operation. While I was in NY, I met him [and] you cannot dictate to a 
guy like that – he is no pushover.” –private sector 3 
“Most of the independent directors have reputable experience. Some come from 
the government sector. For Manila Water we had the former head of NEDA. 
Another independent director is the retired CEO of Philippines Shell, Oscar 
Reyes. Another independent director is a government representative. We try to 
get a list of nominees, then their resumes and dealings, their standing, then a 
shortlist and recommend them to the Board of Directors. All of them have 
undergone a training program for independent directors, to conferences and 
seminars abroad.” –AC 
Unsurprisingly, there is an element of trophy directorships amongst independent 
candidates: 
“There is status [associated] in [the] choice of independent director.” – 
independent director 
A high quality independent director for a highly reputable company is akin to reinforcing 
the image or brand of the organisation. The right director for the right fit. 
7.4.9 Value of Independent Directors 
 
Having a ‘name’ independent director takes greater import when the company is 
thinking of listing. There is a perceived, intangible market value attached to what an 
independent director brings. 




an independent director of [the company] needs a big profile, what can he 
contribute to the board? The independent director was organised for the IPO. 
We had an ex-Secretary [of government]." –private sector 1 
One independent director readily acknowledged his market value given his extensive 
experience and connections in both the public and private sectors in the Philippines and 
internationally: 
“Question: What do you think are the main reasons why you were invited to be 
an independent director? 
Answer: I guess you may have to ask that question from the Sy family; either 
there was a sense of familiarity with me, or they’ve heard of my reputation or 
hopefully my integrity. My feeling is that they wanted someone who could add 
value to their board. I am privileged to have been invited as an independent 
director of SM.” – Vincent S. Perez, independent director, SM Investments 
Corporation (SM Annual Report 2006: 75) 
The quality and type of independent directors on a company board are also part of the 
qualitative assessment made by financial analysts in determining the market value of a 
company. Having independent directors on the company board therefore, attracts 
outside investment: 
“[There are real] independent directors [on] small companies now. They are 
telling the public – we have more independent directors than before. [So this 
reform] is filtering to the smaller listed companies. [As a result these companies 
are] more in the limelight now for the foreign investors than if they were to 
remain in the shadows [of the bigger companies].” – stockbroker 
There is a premium attached to having an independent director on a company board and 
this premium increases when the company has traditionally been seen as not being 
transparent. 
7.4.10 Independence of Independent Directors 
 
For some interviewees, there was some debate on what constituted independence; 




truly independent directors in the country. The regulator posits a helicopter view on this 
particular reform and sees independence in directors in the following terms: 
“To ensure independence we look at the civil degree: affinity. Not only in a 
relationship by blood, but also this could be a social relationship. For the 
independent director the perception is, if you have the relationship - that could 
affect your independence. As a regulator, we must have specific parameters on 
what constitutes independence – who can and cannot be. If you’re a regulator, 
you need parameters. There may not be guarantees but do away with the factor 
affecting their independence. If you’re a substantial shareholder, it is in your best 
interest to have representation on the board.” – SEC 
The addition of independent directors must be seen in the greater macroeconomic 
context. If the country is to attract investment, then this particular reform is required. 
The SEC has taken a strong stance in ensuring independent directors are introduced; not 
only as a matter of board governance but for economically competitive reasons: 
“Some say that it is not applicable [to have independent directors] because the 
Philippines has family corporations. We believe otherwise. Even if corporations 
are owned by families, they should have independence from the outside to be 
competitive.” – SEC 
The perception and meaning of what constitutes independence and truly independent is 
no small matter. The impact was in the introduction, and the devil is in the details: 
“Look at Ayala. Look at their independent directors and see who is real – who is 
not connected at all with an Ayala [company]. Look at Washington Sycip’s 
background. He is very competent [but he sits on boards who were his] clients 
before. That is undefined [in what is an independent director]. From Day One [of 
the reforms] there is no historical aspect. Who is truly independent? Look at 
PLDT – which ones are independent directors that are not friends of the 
Chairman and President? It’s hard to ask difficult questions [on independence] 
here. Who are the real independent directors of corporate governance in the 
country? To be an independent director is not to be popular.” –private sector 1 
“It is not whether independent directors are truly independent. That’s debatable. 





In applying the independence rule, from a company’s perspective there are variations on 
what constitutes independence and what does not. What is independent to the company 
may not be perceived as independent in the law: 
“In terms of performance, an independent director based on criteria from the 
SEC, [they are] not officially declared [independent] but in terms of [our 
perception we consider them to be independent]. They sit on the audit, 
nomination and executive committees.” – private sector 2 
If a director used to be a significant shareholder of the company but is not anymore, then 
the company can view the person as an independent although regulations recognise that 
person is not: 
“There are seven directors in the company. It was down from nine last year. 
There were changes in the shareholder composition so there was no need to fill 
the vacancies. One director was a representative from [a bank] but they’ve since 
sold their holdings so they are no longer there. We’ve also divested from [these 
sectors].Most of our board is comprised of independent directors. There are 3 
independent directors out of 7. [This director] has less than 5% [ownership of the 
company] but that’s why he has a board seat. [This other director] he’s an 
independent because he doesn’t have a shareholding anymore but he is a regular 
director on the list. He used to have interests in [the company] but not anymore. 
He is not employee, he is not a consultant. He is the owner of [another 
company].” –private sector 3 
For a small company owner, the question for him is how can a director be independent if 
s/he is paid by the company for his/her services? 
“The independent director is not really independent. The benefits and salaries 
that they have are tied up with the company. They’re serving on the board of 
directors. I am not sure if any company has been sued by the shareholders or [the 
suit has] succeeded over the lack of independent directors on the board.” –private 
sector 4 




executive. The company captured their independent director: 
“We have only one independent director at the moment. We will move to 
increase that. He is currently overstretched. The SEC requirement says 20% of 
the board but doesn’t specify. The board membership is only 7 so slightly we have 
14% (with the independent director). [We are] moving to increase the board 
members. If you go by best practice, you need at least 2 independent directors. 
There used to be 2. [One independent director] had more work here so he 
became a working director so we were left with one.” – private sector 5 
The corporate governance reform of adopting independent directors has a long way to go 
before they are truly seen as independent and exercising independent judgment. The 
notion of what constitutes independence in an independent director will continue to be 
debated in the country until there is depth in the pool of independent directors. 
7.4.11 Independent Directors as a threat 
 
Given the insider culture of family businesses, the reactions by some companies to the 
introduction of independent directors have been highly defensive. Are independent 
directors the regulators’ spies in the company boardroom? The untrustworthy agents 
that threatened families? Several interviewees mentioned the threat posed by 
independent directors: 
“Initially, most companies viewed independent directors as interlopers who know 
nothing about the business of the corporation, and who shouldn’t be on the 
board, but over time I think that the benefits of having a fair and objective point 
of view will outweigh whatever perceived negatives are attached to the position 
of independent director.” – PSE 
For some companies, requiring an independent director is a deterrent to the normal 
functions of board practice. From one interviewee, independent directors are not 
conducive in conducting formal board meetings – if they were indeed formal in the first 
place - due to the presence of this family outsider: 
“Requiring outsider directors to be in place? It really is a parody. Most companies 




board doesn’t [even] meet. [The family] publicly hide [their meetings] from 
[independent directors].” – academic 
Similarly, having independent directors on the board are seen as a compliance matter 
and their possible contribution is likely to be restricted and undervalued by the 
defensive approach some families have taken: 
“Most of the corporations here in the Philippines are family concerns. The major 
controlling is held in one family. To relinquish decision-making to independent 
directors, they do so for compliance. Owners dictate.” – public sector 1 
“There was a sugar listed company. Because of poor governance, it was allowed to 
be abused by directors and management. The outside directors on the board 
were unable to perform their role as guardians of minority shareholders. It is 
currently in receivership, undergoing rehabilitation. Another was a publicly listed 
bank company which decided to practice good corporate governance with an 
independent director. [The independent director] tried to fulfil his role along the 
lines of the ICD training. He was not re-elected again. He lasted a year. He was 
too independent. An independent director here can’t be too independent and be 
sometimes combative. It would only be a one year term. Your term doesn’t get 
renewed. An independent director can’t really exercise true independence if the 
majority [of the board] aren’t appreciative of the role of independent directors.” – 
private sector 1 
For companies that have substantial foreign investment, foreign directors on local 
company boards are seen as independent. A foreign director occupying a board seat 
would represent the interests of a non-family outsider and his/her movements would 
send a strong signal to the market– positively or negatively: 
“For [foreign investors] that have made an impact look at Kirin Beer of Japan. 
They put equity into SMC. In the process, they were able to occupy seats on the 
board of trustees, 20% of the board supposedly. [Their presence] has gone in 
favour of SMC especially in terms of the shares. If you allow Anglo-American 
investors to sit on the board in Germany or Finland, the performance of the stock 
performs better. So, do you allow foreigners to come in and invest and sit on the 




it might improve [the prospects of] your company. [However], when [the foreign 
directors] go out and say bad things are happening in the company – a lot of 
people would believe him/her.” – academic  
It will take time for the majority of independent directors to have their presence from 
merely tolerated to being truly appreciated for their role and contribution. 
7.4.12 The Future for Independent Director Reform? 
 
Despite the dissent over their introduction, both regulator and business advocacy groups 
are keen on letting this controversial reform stay. Most interviewees spoke about the 
importance and presence of independent directors in future corporate governance 
reforms in the country. The SEC is keen to ensure this reform is enshrined in the law as 
their presence may contribute to a more transparent business environment and change 
the insular board culture: 
“If you are an independent director, you must at least attend a meeting at least so 
at least there’s [a mechanism in place for] minority shareholder activism. Ensure 
that some disclosure is made, and there’s a certain degree of transparency. 
[Ideally there’s] an atmosphere for more company disclosures, and that these 
disclosure be in understandable language (Plain English), from small and big 
companies.”- SEC 
Furthermore, a future disclosure reform includes emphasising the reasons behind the 
withdrawal of a director. Resignations by directors in the middle of their terms are rare 
and in a culture that values face, not seeking re-election is a less confrontational way of 
signalling there was a conflict in the board or a situation had become untenable for the 
independent director. From the SEC’s point of view, the withdrawal of a director is a 
strong signal of the real situation of the company. The reasons behind a director’s 
withdrawal are usually couched in neutral terms that reflect more on the individual’s 
personal situation rather than any conflicts one may have with the board. The 
introduction of noisy withdrawals may increase transparency: 
“I want noisy withdrawals – independent directors, lawyers, accountants because 
of certain policies. They should send notices to the SEC why they have 




my health, family matter – they have to be proven to be true. Don’t accept the job 
of an independent director if you cannot meet this. Little things like that.” – SEC 
On future prospects of ever requiring a company board that is majority comprised of 
independent directors, the regulator states that this will be a distant matter given that 
family ownership and family control are fundamentally intertwined in the country: 
“Would there ever be a board comprised of 50%, 60% independent directors? 
We’ll see how it goes. On the PSE board it’s moving little by little towards an 
independent director majority [Washington] Sycip said, we can’t import formats 
and templates [on majority independent directors] – or we’ll go under here.” – 
SEC 
This was echoed by a corporate governance advocate that the ownership structure is 
fundamental to the composition of the board: 
“The structure of our economy essentially belongs to family groups. They won’t 
have the majority of the board of groups [comprised of independents].” –
corporate governance advocate 
The regulator also wants greater awareness and professionalism: 
“[I would like to see] strengthening of at least all the institutes [of director 
training], to have properly trained directors, CEOs and middle management. Not 
just advocacy but to have independent directors as a profession.” – SEC 
This recognises that the nascent reforms in the introduction of independent directors in 
the country have a long way to go to match the reform by other countries in the region:  
“In Korea where their San Miguel Corporation has to have 50% of their board of 
trustees to have independent directors, we haven’t done that. Directors there are 
going to jail. Any company as big as SMC and half of the board of directors have 
to be independent. Literally, they must be independent. No cross-ownership. 
That’s revolutionary. In five years’ time [I doubt] we would have the Korean 
model. Things won’t change, nothing as revolutionary will happen like that will 
happen here.” –academic 




group. The stance of the group is that giving up on the independent director reform 
would be akin to surrendering to inferior standards of corporate governance. Hence, 
while it is difficult for families to have outsiders sit on their company boards, the 
transition to this particular global standard of corporate governance standards is 
necessary and worthwhile. Reflecting the cultural dilemmas of converging to a form of 
global corporate governance standard, if Philippine companies are to attract investment 
and ensure a competitive business culture, having independent directors on boards must 
stay and continue: 
“The biggest problem [here] is to have complete independence from directors. 
The separation between Chairman and President is difficult as so many CEOs are 
Chairmen. The Philippine business is family-owned, and some can’t remove or 
separate these two. It’s the Oriental system of corporate governance. But it needs 
some transition. For independent directors – mahirap. It’s hard. It’s resisted. It’s 
something to aim for [to introduce independent directors]. We don’t want that 
diluted. We culturally aim for it. It is not out of the radar. It’s possible [to have 
independent directors on Filipino boards]. As businesses globalises we have to 
compete in a global market so we ought to adopt the [global corporate 
governance] standards. We have no choice. The market is global. No matter how. 
"The problem is with the independent director. Strictly, it’s not independent. 
Independent by definition in the rule book. But independence in mind, in 
reality? In mindset? In substance it may not be but [companies] can comply with 
the rules and you can comply with the rules of independence but not in 
substance. 
“We feel it’s not acceptable for the business environment to aim for a rather 
diluted [form of corporate governance]. People would say it’s the culture that’s 
why we fail on practice of [corporate governance] although it may not be under 
the rubric of cultural difference. Knowing [this to be] a surrender to inferior 
standards of corporate governance, to be less stricter – we don’t want to give up 
on this reform.” –business advocacy group interviewees 
The following box contains the account of an independent director and his views and 
perspectives on his role. His story covers issues of personal reputation, mitigating family 




board governance. In short, his story is the challenges an independent director on a 
Filipino board faces should s/he accept the role.  
Text Box 7: An Independent Director's Perspective 
 “I am an independent director on several boards – some are family firms, some are 
transitioning to becoming a professional family firm. Some are converting from a closed 
family firm to an open one. Previously I worked in government although I left 
government in 1996 just before the [East Asian] crisis: timing is everything. Whilst in 
government, I sat as the representative on a private sector board. I wore two hats – to 
look after the minority shareholders, and to represent the government. 
 
“After I retired, the phenomenon of independent directors was introduced and people 
recognised the position as important in the higher order of corporate governance. Hence 
independent directors are enshrined in the requirements of the SEC. As an independent 
director, I focus on the interests of minority shareholders to ensure that there are no 
transactions that can hurt the general public. That is my primary responsibility. 
 
“Companies want a name director. It is not enough to be independent. The companies 
ask - what does he bring? What type of skills? What value? He must bring value to the 
company. What are his networks that bring value? The company is a brand after all.” 
 
“The role of the independent director is protecting the interests of the public 
shareholder and taking an impartial role. The people who own the company have 
superior information. The owners are the insiders – unlike in Anglo American 
jurisdictions where the insiders are managers. One has to request to be provided the 
right information and to make an informed judgement based on this information and 
not be taken for a ride. 
 
“I do not accept a directorship unless the company pays for the director and liability 
insurance. If management doesn’t give you the information then you could be liable. You 
would be collectively liable. More fundamentally, if management wants to play games, 
there is self-dealing - they don’t want anybody there, it makes it harder.  
 
“For the independent director there is a level of compliance to the letter of the law. But 
in the context of fulfilling the role within the spirit of corporate governance – some 
companies simply go through the motions and are not really committed to allowing 
independent directors exercise their role. I do not stay long in those corporations. My 
own reputation is at stake if the company doesn’t behave properly. 
 
“Do directors resign in the middle of their term? No it rarely happens. There is a sense of 
delicacy – delicadeza72
                                                     
72 The following article provides an insight into the concept of Filipino delicadeza: “Redefining 
delicadeza – The business of governance” by Leonor Magtolis Briones (2009) ABS-CBN News, 
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. If you’re the owner, you don’t nominate an independent director 
who can potentially be hostile. Resigning in the middle of the term is a very hostile act. 
We emphasis multi-personal relationships and value face. In the case of one company 
where the directors resigned, the act of resigning was an issue where self-preservation 
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took over. Being a director is to be conscious of one’s reputation and the risk of being 
implicated. 
 
“The way you’re able to leverage influence [in the boardroom] is to work closely with the 
other independent directors and minority shareholders. A single independent director 
has minimal impact. But leverage it with others. And set up committees so management 
reports to the committee. Be diligent in doing that. 
 
“Here, we emphasise the importance of face and relationships. Never confrontational. 
There is not an active independent director not like the US system. One makes known 
one’s views in a polite way. A formal vote has never been taken. Decisions are 
consensually taken. Confrontation doesn’t happen in the boardroom. If the difference 
between directors is of a fundamental nature, it does not get sorted out in the 
boardroom but backroom through a mutual intermediator. 
 
“We are still making the transition to good corporate governance. Most companies you 
see today have been founded by the grandfather so it’s part of the family. There is a 
change of mindset that is required. Is an independent director a threat to the family 
business? Yes and no. Some would say it’s simply a requirement from the SEC. While 
some companies appreciate to be professionalised.” 
 
7.5 Executive Directors  
 
In professionally run businesses, there are more non-family professional executives than 
family member executives. The advantages in having hands-on owner-managers are that 
goals and interests especially on issues of business strategy are one and the same, and 
that decision making is faster: 
“The advantage of a largely family-owned company is having a pool of family 
members who are owners of the business, and therefore own interests that are 
aligned with the company…The major shareholders play a very active role in the 
day-to-day management of the company and we currently have 17 family 
members working in the group. Of the seven members on the board, five of them 
are active in day-to-day management. The majority of the board represent over 
60% of the shareholders, and this is why the interests of the board/management 
are quite aligned.” –private sector 1 
“Family members from both the first and second generation are in their 
respective areas of specialty such as accounting and focus. Everybody knows 




management team and the product group meets once a month. There is no 
remote management.” –private sector 2 
“One advantage is our management effectively views on shareholder value at the 
same. Our seniors are owners themselves. They are not looking at shareholder 
gain as they’d be killing themselves as shareholders [to meet quarterly 
reportings]. They own substantial chunks. It’s good for smaller shareholders as 
the management team is led by the shareholders themselves. There is 
congruence of objectives.” –private sector 3 
The disadvantage is owners can blur their directors’ responsibilities with that of 
managing the company:  
“When I came in, the company had no strong controls running the business 
itself. It is not run like a family corporation but leaning towards that. The 
difficulty for them (owners) is to recognise the difference between the board and 
the management. We have the same and one board for both businesses so there 
is one board to fix the problem in one company. The situation you have is with 
one board overlooking two businesses, there is the same management but it is 
run separately. There is a potential conflict of interest, and decision making is 
blurred as you’re competing for the same clients…There was a general lack of 
quality as the management was never really good. The owners would be caught 
in the conflict between ownership and management – it became a vicious circle. 
The owners were participatory. So once the problems have been fixed the owners 
have now been hands off.” – private sector 4 
“Most corporations are still run like a family business, a ‘sari-sari’ store and not 
professional. Lawyers prepare documents for directors to sign. Corporate 
governance is not yet part of Filipino corporate culture. The ones that observe 
corporate governance are the big ones. Big corporations are run by professionals. 
Others are run by family enterprises, glorified corporations run as a family 
business. Most are still run as a family business with the driving force being the 
father or mother. [One bank has] 12 members on the board, each representing a 
member [and branch] of the family.” – private sector 5 




policy direction. The major decisions are made by them but it’s department to 
department, done by the professionals group.” – private sector 6 
Too much family involvement may lead to an unprofessional environment in the 
business (Davis 2008): 
“We are fortunate to have professionals as major shareholders as we do speak the 
same language. Families speak a different language. [Family members] are part-
time directors. They’re paying lip service [to professionalism]; it’s still the family 
roadshow.”- private sector interviewee (1) 
Having owners that are hands-off and allowing professional managers to run the 
business makes a difference in the operations of a company.  
7.6 Foreign Directors 
 
Several interviewees mentioned the problems when a board director is a non-Filipino 
citizen or resident. As some companies have substantial foreign blockholders entitling 
them to board seats, the residency requirements can be quite onerous, procedural and 
bureaucratic. The following interviewee mentioned the different residency requirements 
by professional category: 
“As a company, under immigration laws, it is difficult to have a non-Filipino 
president. Under the immigration rules, they’d only allow a foreigner considered 
to have technical expertise. We are a registered regional HQ so we are under a 
complete set of different rules. For the President, the image is important for the 
listed company. It is important to have the technical expertise. The EVP – any 
foreigner can apply. An engineer qualifies. The company had a struggle for 
approval to get a foreign president however it’s less of a problem for the 
Philippine office as the EVP looks after the day to day. With major foreign 
investors, there is a similar structure and they need to fit [in with the] 
government requirements.” –private sector 1 
For another company, the chair is a foreign citizen and nonplussed when he found out 
certain things were not possible: 




difficult to apply.” –private sector 2 
This comment came about after a discussion on anti-money laundering and how for a 
foreigner it is difficult to open up a bank account in the country.  
For companies who bring foreign managers in, the advantages to the host country can be 
quite positive as the skills and experience outsiders have bring a different perspective. 
Once those skills are transferred to the locals, the necessity to rely on expatriate 
management is reduced: 
“We also have a management contract with the listed company. For the expat 
managers we have just under 10 and now it is just under 5. They managed the 
business but it gives us the confidence of what’s going on that the expat 
management has now been reduced) and other major Filipino shareholders are 
extremely supportive of our level of control and discipline that we as foreign 
managers bring to the company.” –private sector 1 
While one is required to always respect the country’s local laws, not being able to bring 
the best qualified candidates to the Philippines in a straightforward manner can be a 
deterrent in attracting investment as restrictions on foreign directors show. This also 
prevents substantial intellectual capital and skills from the international managerial class 
being transferred locally.  
7.7 The Board Committees 
 
The board monitors a company’s management through the establishment of various 
specialised committees. Both directors and managers are members of these bodies. 
These committees are the workhorses of the board as they deal with the minutiae of 
management:  
“The board monitors management through regular reporting. The President’s 
report details everything. There is the financial report of the controller. It takes 
two hours to study the financial report before the board meeting. All directors 
discuss and review this report prior to the board meeting. The report contains 
information on the growth of deposits, past due loans. Apart from the financial 
report, there are regulations to study. There are also various reports from the 




Executive Committee. There are other committees such as those that are looking 
at foreign branches, legal and tax to review legal or tax cases. These are regular 
items for discussion as part of the agenda. This is how the board closely monitors 
the activities of the bank.” –private sector 1 
“We have a monthly board meeting. All financials and operations are discussed. 
Operating and division heads present to the board. All major transactions and 
decisions require the approval of the board.” –private sector 2 
In the Philippines, the following figure shows the most commonly mentioned board 
committees amongst my respondents: the audit, risk management, nomination and 
executive committees. The audit committee, by far, is the most important board 

















The following section discusses these committees in detail. 
7.7.1 Audit Committee 
 
“The board monitors management through committees. The most active is the 
audit committee which meets every month.” – private sector 1 
The introduction of the 2002 corporate governance code in the Philippines formalised 
the function of the audit committee for companies and is a regulatory requirement. With 
formalisation came increased activity in the committee. The regulation surrounding the 
formation of the audit committee transformed what was once a relatively benign board 
function into one which allowed external assessment of the company, emphasising the 
integrity of the process along the way: 
“The audit was previously an ad-hoc committee but is now formalised.” – private 
sector 2 
 “The [board] committees came into being after the 2002 [SEC Corporate 
Governance Code]: the audit, nomination and compensation. The compensation 
was never formalised or not really used. The audit is active every first quarter – it 
goes through the audit of the committee. The committee sits with external 
auditors, follow the audit procedures, pass approval and the enforcement.” – 
private sector interviewee 3 
“The audit committee was established before 2001. It was not really active before 
2001. Not active at the time. The predecessor of [the current Commissioner] tried 
to set up the audit committee at the time but it was only there for 6 months…We 
now have an internal audit committee which is active; it is subject to a 
commission on audit.” – public sector 
For some companies who are on the verge of setting up board committees, the practical 
matters of establishing these bodies do come into play: 
“For bigger corporations, they have the infrastructure in place to implement 
corporate governance but not for small companies. Mum and Pop corporations 
cannot come up with audit committee, this is a practical reality.” – IIA 




committees. Companies must seek out what fits them best at their current stage of 
growth and organisational life: 
“We have three committees on the board level. These were introduced late last 
year: Audit, Nomination/Remuneration (which looks at board membership and 
executive salaries) and Investment. It is one thing to have immediate 
requirements - the issue is as an organisation if we are able to do it. Last year we 
have put in place the process of policies and practices. The practicalities come in 
to play – if we had set up the [audit committee] immediately [when I first arrived, 
the company] would have been busy for 24 hours a day.” –private sector 4 
The responsibilities of the audit committee are now being appreciated in company board 
practices: 
“With the audit committee, [we are] seeing the start [of good corporate 
governance]. [This is a] very conscious [effort].” –private sector 5 
The corporate governance reforms for the audit committee recognise this body’s pivotal 
role. 
7.7.1.1 Audit Committee Membership 
Under the Philippine SEC Code, companies are advised to have in their audit committees 
at least one independent director and another who has audit experience - preferably 
both: 
“9. Board Committees: The Board shall constitute Committees in aid of good 
corporate governance. 
A. The Audit Committee shall be composed of at least three (3) Board members, 
preferably with accounting and finance background, one of whom shall be an 
independent director and another should have related audit 
experience.”(Philippine SEC 2002) 73
Most Philippine corporations comply with this requirement: 
 
“All [board] committees (audit, nomination etc) must be chaired by an 
independent director. All audit committees must be chaired by independent 
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directors.” – private sector 1 
“Some of the committees such as the audit committee have at least two 
independent directors. There is one independent director in the audit 
committee. Most [companies] are complying. The biggest number of 
independent directors is six independent directors at the Bank of Commerce. But 
with the merger between Equitable PCI and BDO – a large bank, the [merged 
entity] will meet more than the requirements.” – BSP 
Whether it would ever be feasible or advisable in an East Asian environment to have an 
audit committee to be entirely composed of independent directors as in Western 
countries is another issue altogether. However, some have recognised the value 
independent directors contribute when they sit on the audit committee. For one 
business group, introducing independent directors is a sign of best practice in corporate 
governance. Hence, independent directors sit on their companies and committees even 
when not legally required: 
“Integrated Microelectronics, which is an unlisted company, a semiconductor 
concern, practices good corporate governance practices within the company and 
in line with the other Ayala companies. They have also created independent 
directors and have audit committees. With respect to practices, this company has 
already started good corporate governance even if it is not required as it’s not 
publicly listed.” – AC 
In the case of PLDT, its dual listing on both the PSE and NYSE means their adherence to 
the latter’s listing requirements of the audit committee exceeds the former: 
“Our Audit Committee is composed of three (3) members all of whom, including 
the chairman thereof who has been chosen from among the members, are 
independent directors meeting the independence requirements under Rule 10A-3 
under the Exchange Act as required by Section 303A.06 of the NYSE Listed 
Company Manual.” (PLDT 2008)74
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However, the chair of PLDT’s audit committee75
“The audit committee in listed companies are chaired by directors who have no 
financial background. The Audit Committee of PLDT is chaired by Father Nebres 
SJ (Ateneo chancellor) – he has the virtue for being very pious. He is aged 70. But 
he has no financial background. He may know [financial issues] but we can’t 
profess that [he has the] financial requirements of the job. In other words, it’s not 
conclusive. If we study the function of the audit committee: knowledge of 
standards, relationships - How can a non-accountant chair the audit committee? 
Still, you need nuances of front.” – private sector 2 
 is seen by some as not entirely fulfilling 
the principles to the letter and spirit of corporate governance: 
Reiterating the disconnection in the representative quality of an audit committee 
chairmanship, the following story is from an independent director and his experience of 
being an audit committee member: 
“I was invited to join a board committee by a close friend to sit on their audit 
committee. I found this committee to be composed of one retired general, myself 
and another. The Chairman was the retired general. After the meeting I said to 
my friend that I didn’t want to be in the committee after the year was up. It 
would be a non-working committee with a retired general as the Chairman who 
had no knowledge of audit. It was command and control. Not an audit 
committee in substance. It was going to be useless to be a member of the 
committee. So I decided not put myself again for renomination for the following 
year as board members don’t resign in the middle of their term.” – private sector 
3 
Furthermore, the requirements for having at least an independent director sitting on the 
audit committee have unearthed some disgruntlement from family owners on this ‘cost’ 
of compliance as it has required some companies to seek candidates externally as 
internally-generated talent will not do: 
“If you look at the investment profile of companies listed on the PSE, only 20% of 
the top tier can afford [meeting] all the regulations. It is not practical for them to 
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follow it strictly as it written more for education of corporate governance. It is a 
matter of culture.” –private sector 4 
Audit committee membership has focused on the value independent directors bring to 
the company. Mandatory requirements mean independent directors on company boards 
should have strong audit skills. 
7.7.1.2 Internal Auditors 
The corporate governance reforms in the Philippines have prompted the formal 
recognition of the internal auditor due to more stringent disclosure requirements. An 
association, the Philippine Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), is tasked with continuous 
education of its members in their internal audit function. The IIA was also instrumental 
in drafting the SEC Corporate Governance Code. Input from the IIA appeared in the 
financialisation aspects of the Code such as on the issue of internal control. The IIA plays 
a corporate governance advocacy role with the ICD and is an active participant: 
“We have a responsibility to our members in bringing corporate governance in to 
the audit committees. Not all companies have audit committees. The big listed 
corporations, public companies with big shareholders base, 200 members with 
100 shares totalling P50M are required to have audit committees and are subject 
to the same [SEC] circular…partnerships (such as SGV) are not covered.” – IIA 
For one unlisted company, the increasing reportorial needs have seen a move towards 
establishing its own internal auditor: 
“This year we are also proposing to have an internal auditor. We decided to have 
our own internal auditor. We had a dilemma on whether to carry out or appoint 
an external auditor to do our internal audit, but we decided to appoint our own. 
The internal auditor will be under another company, it will take another couple 
of months.”- private sector 1 
At the other end of the spectrum, in the Ayala Group, in view of its extensive portfolio of 
businesses, the internal audit function integrates risk management activities. Internal 
audit is highly formalised: 
“Risk management is also an important element of good corporate governance, 




enterprise-wide, chaired by the CEO with the Chief Internal Auditor. This 
committee assists the audit committee of the board of directors to inform not 
only the risks in holding company but also in the subsidiaries. Monitoring is 
done regularly.” – AC 
For companies which already have internal auditors, interviewees spoke about their 
internal audit in terms of the frequency of communication with external auditors and 
the importance of having the outsider’s perspective from an external audit function: 
“The Audit Committee meets quarterly or as necessary if there’s an issue with the 
[external] auditor (SGV)” – private sector 2 
“We have quarterly board reports as the board meets on a quarterly basis. They 
are very lively meetings. The chairman is head of the audit committee. [We] put 
more teeth in the external audit two years ago and assigned them tasks. The 
audit committee sits with external auditors. [As a family], we understand the 
value of these things. [They have] helped enlighten us on the value of a strong 
audit function.” –private sector 3 
The second statement is also an indication of the role of leadership an audit committee 
plays in supporting the audit function. 
7.7.1.3 External Auditors 
The importance of the external audit function was made poignantly by one of the 
regulators I interviewed: 
 “External auditors are valued allies of regulators.” – BSP 
Arguably, external auditors are seen as carrying a supra-regulatory function where a 
time-poor and resource- limited regulator cannot be as vigilant as it could be over the 
companies it supervises. Chartered Practising Accountants (CPAs) are seen as exercising 
an independent role and they are given independent assurance by helping the company. 
Eventhough the responsibility and the veracity of a company’s financial information 
ultimately lies with the business and not with the CPAs, the source upon which external 
auditors base their verification may place this function in a bind: 
“You exaggerate performance. An outside capital firm comes in. You exaggerate 




don’t attract foreign investors. You submit [your financial statements] to the 
independent auditor. The auditor says ok. That becomes the basis for [financial 
reporting] to the SEC. That becomes the basis for investors to put money into the 
company. It’s irritating [the lack of transparency]. That’s the rule.” – academic 
The qualifications of external auditors are regulated with a list of accredited external 
auditors available at the regulators. For banks, the BSP has developed 
accreditation/selection guidelines: 
“The financial statements have to be audited by external auditors and these 
documents must be vouched for what is contained in the statements.” – BSP 
For an insurance company, an external auditor would be hired from a list of companies 
duly accredited by the Insurance Commission as meeting certain standards such as IAS; 
similarly for listed companies, an external auditor would be chosen from a list of seven 
auditing firms qualified by the Philippine Stock Exchange. Current corporate governance 
reforms in the Philippines also require mandatory rotation of auditors though it is seen 
as lacking substance in its current regulated form: 
“You can have the same auditor consecutively for 3 years. You can change 
auditors intermittently. You pick [the] auditor who agrees with your [financial] 
statements. Auditor B can’t communicate with Auditor A. If B would like to know 
how A was fired, B can’t do that. [It’s] more about loopholes.” – academic 
It was not within the scope of this study to explore the effects of auditor rotation on 
publicly listed companies in the Philippines. Further research is required to study the 
outcomes from this particular corporate governance reform. 
7.7.1.4 The Big 4 
The institutionalisation of audit has seen the rise and power of the established global 
four auditing firms: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), KPMG, Ernst & Young and 
Deloitte. The integral nature of the services the four provides mean companies are 
reliant on this oligopoly. As in any form of concentrated market power, there are 
disadvantages. These disadvantages were articulated in terms of cost of the external 
audit expenses and the practical implementation of new rules: 




we question those new rules. The audit expenses are becoming higher because of 
these rules.” – private sector 1 
Significantly, for a small company, auditing expenses can be prohibitive. The following 
account is from the viewpoint of a small company who was dissatisfied with the 
performance of PWC. This dissatisfaction stemmed from issues such as the membership 
of the auditing team, costing and the sense that treatment was somewhat different if you 
were a small company as opposed to a blue chip company (which presumably would also 
command blue chip prices):  
“It is difficult for small companies right now. The expenses of the audits, we have 
to negotiate every time. Our auditor is cheaper than the big auditors. We’ve 
found them to be more meticulous than the previous auditor. Whether it’s PWC, 
SGV – they charge almost international rates but the quality is lacking. These 
guys [who run] small audit firms are too detailed so they can prove themselves. 
When we had PWC, there was no partner that got involved and they didn’t have 
the skills. The auditors we had from PWC were trainees. Then they submitted an 
invoice that was three times the negotiated fee. I asked them for justification of 
the new fee amount - they said they spent more time on our audit]. But I have 
not received any justification. I said to them we agreed that you were going to 
advise us before. I have paid the quoted price but not the balance as they gave no 
justification. I asked them to show costings. They must have poor record-keeping 
or were embarrassed. I asked them to show me the time allocation but they never 
did.”-private sector 2 
The personal touch of smaller auditing firms won my interviewee over: 
“So I searched the market place so I found this one small firm, Ramon F. Garcia. 
Garcia is part of this big religious movement. He’s evangelical. [He has] a strong 
work ethic. If you wanted to cause fraud, you wouldn’t want to be involve him - 
he appeared at the audit as well” –private sector 2 
Another of my interviewees was also dismissive of the big 4. In an informal exchange he 
stated, as company chair, he was going to get rid of SGV due to his dissatisfaction over 




formed and stemmed from some incidents in the past that afflicted SGV, the local Ernst 
& Young affiliate: 
“[The principal76
While having a prestigious audit firm approve the company’s financial statements might 
not necessarily mean the quality that goes with the perception, nevertheless the cachet a 
big auditing firm carries mean that having one’s financial statements audited by one of 
them leads to an amount of recognition nationally, if not internationally. This can be a 
helpful factor for a company wishing to expand internationally: 
]] used to be at SGV and I think was head of the [---] committee 
and he’d know which firms literally got away with murder – lax accounting, not 
as dramatic as Enron. But there were some pretty big companies that were 
involved.” – private sector 3 
“We are not listed although eventually we will list. That’s the reason we’ve hired 
internationally renowned auditors such as KPMG. They are internationally 
recognised…we want to adopt international best practices. There are few 
companies that have that. We try to establish the best business practice. We 
started thinking big, hence [we have] KPMG [as our auditor].” – private sector 3 
While my interviewees had a mixed approach towards the services provided by the big 4, 
it is foreseeable that their services will continue to be required due to the reliance 
regulators place on the external audit function. 
7.7.2 Risk Management Committee  
 
Complementing the audit committee is the risk management committee (RMC) which 
may differ in its responsibilities from the former body depending on the company’s 
needs and scope. At a Management Association of the Philippines (MAP) corporate 
governance workshop in June 2007, it was impressed upon attendees that managing and 
being aware of risks are not necessarily negative: 
“There is no business without risk. Many opportunities are created out of risk. 
However, the board needs to have an understanding of risks.”-CG workshop 
                                                     





Setting up an RMC is a matter of a resource issue and whether there is leadership 
support for its establishment (Subramaniam et al 2009: 335). According to one 
interviewee: 
“At the end of the day if your management wants good corporate governance, 
they’ll institute it. I’ve refined our processes, policies. We’ve brought in proper 
actuarial services to ensure we have proper reserves in company. We have the 
investment manual, the investment policy. We’ve introduced detailed delegated 
authority for the board, for the management, for control procedures. We are 
implementing a risk management framework for both companies. So these cover 
a lot of things.” – private sector 1 
In most companies interviewed, the RMC was amalgamated with the audit committee. In 
these organisations, the audit committee role carries with it the extra responsibility of 
ensuring potential company risks have been discussed and measures taken to mitigate 
them.  For one company the decision to establish an RMC was dependent on how the 
RMC would differ from the audit committee responsibilities. Furthermore, risk issues 
mentioned were industry-specific: 
“We are also looking at a potential, separate risk management committee but 
that could be consolidated with audit. Risk management overlaps with audit. 
Risk management in the industry covers product pricing, actuarial reserving, 
operational risk management and disaster recovery.” – private sector 2 
For companies that have separately formed an RMC, there were certain differences in the 
roles and responsibilities of these two committees. A separate RMC was normally present 
where the company was bigger, more established, and where organisational complexity 
required a different committee to thoroughly discuss risk reporting. For one group, the 
activities of the RMC are described in detail in the following passage: 
“The risk management committee sits down with the head of the risk 
management unit in each of the subsidiaries. There is face-to-face meetings with 
the risk management officer of the subsidiary and what possible risks are 
involved, what possible solutions and exposures are involved. This is collated and 




committee, and then it goes to the board level. This is an effective oversight 
function and this has been established for the last two years since 2005.” – AC 
The East Asian Crisis was the catalyst for establishing an RMC for one company, as the 
crisis raised awareness of risk management: 
“As a result of the East Asian crisis, we have instituted a financial risk 
management system throughout the group, to address foreign exchange risk, 
liquidity risk, and interest rate risk.” – private sector 3 
“After the East Asian Crisis, corporations became aware of what risk management 
was all about.  The East Asian Crisis showed there was more to business risk than 
with financials. It prompted a bigger picture of [the type of] risk [that] can 
happen. [It’s] not only [about] operational risk, but currency, reputation, political 
and industry risk. Other forms of business risk in a larger scale. How to manage 
risk? [There is a] new jargon of risk management, broadened to enterprise risk 
management due to governance issues, [there is now] talk about managing the 
business risks.” – private sector 4 
The BSP, the most active out of all the regulators, have also taken a more stringent 
approach in risk management for the industry and the Central Bank issued guidelines 
based on the Basel II framework77
“After the BSP issued its guidelines based on Basel 2 compliance, the following 
committees were established at the DBP: Risk Management (2001/2002), the 
Governance Committee (2001/2002) and the Audit and Compliance [committees] 
were merged. Five committees have since been established after Basel II - the 
number of committees has doubled. The concept of risk management and the 
concept of good corporate governance, transparency, disclosure and financial 
reporting have since been [formalised at the DBP].” – DBP  
 prompting all banks under its supervision to establish 
an RMC. An example of corporate governance reform by committee was articulated by 
the following banking interviewee: 
The RMC ensures companies are well aware of the risks they face and ensure mitigation 
strategies are in place to meet them. 
                                                     




7.7.3 Nominations Committee 
 
With the 2002 corporate governance reforms and the mandatory introduction of two 
independent directors on Philippine corporate boards, the nomination committee has 
become formalised for most companies. The nomination committee is preoccupied with 
undertaking the process for which candidates qualify as an independent director in order 
to meet the compliance requirements. Regulations from the SEC under Rule 38, Section 
8 of the Securities Regulation Code (see Appendix 5) provide guidance on the 
composition of the nominations committee. As a result of these reforms, the nomination 
committee has become a more rigorous decision-making body requiring more formal 
discussion and processes: 
 “There is a nominations committee. Before the AGM, the nominations 
committee [convene], pre-screen candidates and submit a shortlist of [members] 
to be nominated. The nominations committee is composed by three members of 
the board and HR.” –private sector 1 
“In the past, people stood up on the floor, nominating a person to be a board 
director. Now, the nominations committee deals with that. The committee will 
certify nominees. The nominees must have all the qualifications without 
disqualification. The nominations committee will nominate directors.” – private 
sector 2 
“Two (2) out of ten (10) directors are independent directors; they are nominated 
through a nomination period which lasts or one week and is announced in the 
newspapers; nominations for independent directors are screened by the Board 
nomination Committee and endorsed to the Board for the election at the annual 
meeting.” – private sector 3 
The nominations committee can also be a battleground for potential contenders: 
“All directors are nominated by shareholders. The nominations committee go 
through the process not to count the vote but to ensure those have been 
nominated to qualify reach the AGM. If there are 12 nominees, by the AGM we go 
through the vote process of getting the vote down to 10 directors. [There are 




For one growing company, the committee has sought candidates nominated by the 
public with little success: 
“We’ve accepted nominations from the public but none have come up as people 
with experience. We do our homework, and we look for outside experience. For 
example, we are looking towards [those with experience of] risk management, 
tax, SEC regulations, audit, market, networking, financial management.” – private 
sector 5 
The ownership structure of most companies also mean that potential independent 
directors must have cultural fit with the sitting family board members: 
“Directors are elected by shareholders. The code of corporate governance 
requires all directors must be screened. [The nominations committee] determine 
[which potential board members] have all qualifications and none of the 
disqualifications [of being an independent director]. There is a provision 
enumerating all this in submitting nominees. [There is a shortlist from the] 
nominations committee, [which is then] submitted to the board. [Directorship] 
tenure is normally a year. In the case of three members of the holding family, 
they have been [board members] for the last 10 years.” –private sector 6 
Exercising its control in this committee, the major shareholder generally nominates the 
candidates for directorship: 
“We have a nominations committee but in reality the nominees come from [the 
owner]. He consults people. Frankly, the Chairman decides who should be the 
members of the board.” –private sector 7 
“We have two dominant families (who are owners), they choose representatives 
to sit for them on the board. It’s not [the owner] sitting on the board, it’s his 
choice of representative. There’s a lot of consideration on who would be a 
director. The director is renominated ever year.” –private sector 8 
More significantly, being nominated to a directorship is considered an honour and 






Text Box 8: The Inner Sanctum - Issues and Conflicts  
“Family firms are notorious for investing in the ‘values fit’ of new employees, new 
directors on the board, even new strategic partnerships.” – Ward (2008: 4) 
 
How a director in the Philippines is nominated to a board is culturally defined. When 
you join a board – the inner sanctum - you are joining a family. By extension, you don’t 
betray your family. 
 
The Philippine concept of the board as a family is sustained in an unstable environment 
because the lack of strong civil institutions in the country render the family the 
institution which best provides solidity and reliability. 
 
In the family-oriented culture of the Philippines, a board membership is an honour 
because the implication here is the Chairman has personally chosen you to join his/her 
board, which is an extension of his/her family. When you resign from the board you are 
showing disrespect to the Chair. If you leave the board abruptly, that can be construed as 
a hostile act and in essence you are betraying the family. As the following interviewee 
points out: 
“It is about Asia here. The culture is non confrontational unlike in Australia 
where you call a spade, a spade. All boards try to become polite. It is difficult for 
directors who have a differing opinion to present their views. A director does not 
resign in the middle of his term as this sends out a signal to the market – to 
resign is impolite to the Chairman who most of the time has chosen you to be on 
the board, to join the family. The board values harmony. If a director wishes not 
to continue his tenure, he asks not to be renominated. They don’t step down in 
the middle of the term.” - ICD 
 
Equally, the omnipotence of the Chair also means that if s/he is displeased with the 
performance of a director, then the member’s days on the board are numbered: 
“Directors are elected so technically they exercise on behalf of the shareholders 
but in practical terms, the chairman controls. If he’s unhappy, he won’t 
renominate a director.” –private sector 1 
 
In this culture, there is conflict where the interests of the independent director in 
representing minority shareholders may not share the interests of the majority 
shareholders. The term ‘pagmamalasakit’ came up during a corporate governance 
workshop. The comment came from a family owner who was having a hard time 
understanding the professionalisation required for family businesses. This word 
translates to deep concern or empathy. The justification is that because the family are 
owners, their money is invested in the company therefore one has personal affection and 
involvement with the company as opposed to having outside professional directors who 
have no family connection but can see things more objectively. The self-interest in 
ensuring the company is run well is due to the owner’s own interests as opposed to 
outsiders who do not have the same embedded interest. 
 
The way board members are nominated, the possibilities of compliance conflict vs. the 
family conflict is extant. There is a compliance conflict because regulations state 
independent directors must sit on the board. However, by joining a family-owned and 




the board is your family. In most companies there are family members on the board so 
the board is a true extension of the family. Incoming non-family members need to be 
trusted before they are invited to the board. Board members who join are treated as 
family members. This is a cultural norm which ensures 'independent directors' or 
directors independent to exercise their duties a challenging task. 
 
Nevertheless, the perception of the board is undergoing change in the Philippines 
requiring a more emotionally distant and professional approach from members. 
Whether such a level of distance and professionalisation could be achieved will largely 
depend on the changes in ownership structure and the family culture within the 
business. 
 
The introduction of the independent director has propelled the nominations committee 
at the forefront of board concern.78
7.7.4 Executive Committee 
 
 
As a committee that is compromised of senior managers of the company, in one business 
group, the executive committee is the forum for addressing the strategic operations of 
the company. For another, the executive committee also fulfils the role of the board 
when the board cannot exercise its duties.  
“In the absence of the board, the executive committee under the by-laws can 
perform delegated authority from the board. The executive committee consists of 
the CEO, President and [major shareholder] representative.” – private sector 1 
The above comment supports Kesner’s observation (1998: 83) about executive 
committees. As the majority of board members in the Philippines are company insiders, 
there is some overlap with the membership of the executive committee and the company 
board. The board is generally seen as being tasked with reviewing corporate strategic 
decisions of the executive committee: 
“[After] executive committee meetings, the minutes are given to board members. 
The [board members] are given the opportunity to comment on all actions of the 
                                                     
 
78  This is not necessarily a disingenuous factor in improving and promoting the company director 
as a professional occupation as Cadbury points out: “An advantage of having a formal nomination 
committee is that it provides a forum for carrying out such reviews and for doing so regularly, not 




Executive Committees. Four of the members on the Executive Committee are 
members of the board.” –private sector 2 
“All actions taken by the executive committee are submitted to the board of 
directors in regular meeting for ratification. With any disclosures management 
must submit to the regulators, management must email all members of the board 
informing them beforehand.” –private sector 3 
This brings an interesting perspective on where the real decision-making lies in family-
owned businesses: in the executive committee or the board? If important strategic 
decisions are made in the executive committee, there may be better use of the board’s 
time beyond the review and ratification of the committee’s decisions.79
“We have regular board meetings – quarterly – so there’s no need for the 
executive committee.” – private sector 4 
This overlap of 
responsibilities prompted this statement from one interviewee whereby the executive 
committee was seen as unnecessary: 
Future research could explore the intricate nature and separate responsibilities of the 
board from the executive committee. For example, to what extent does the board 
overrule decisions made at the executive committee? In an insider-dominated board, 
how do an executive committee’s responsibilities differ from that of the board? How 
does this differ from outsider-dominated boards? There is currently a dearth of 
knowledge on executive committees and future research may yield a different way of 
viewing the relationship between this committee and the board. 
7.7.5 Other Board Committees 
 
Other board committees mentioned by interviewees include industry specific 
committees (such as technological or technical committees), those relating to business 
group structures (finance or investment committees) and the remuneration or 
compensation committee. In one company the remuneration committee is combined 
with the nomination committee: 
                                                     
79 As pointed out by Cadbury, “The management proposals which come to the board have 
probably been thrashed out at an executive committee chaired by the chief executive. If the chief 
executive is then in the chair at the board, it requires a deliberate effort on their part not to have a 




“The [combined nomination and remuneration] committee looks at board 
membership and executive salaries.”- private sector 1 
In Philippine boards, the nomination committee is seen as the more influential and 
powerful committee than remuneration. Executive compensation is almost seen as an 
operational afterthought. Astronomical levels of executive compensation are not a 
corporate governance issue in the Philippines. This contrasts positively to public outrage 
and anger at senior executives in Anglo-American companies80
“Executive compensation is not such an issue as the executives here do not 
receive as high [a compensation as in] other countries.” – private sector  
: 
Excessive Anglo-American executive salaries are largely unheard of in the country, and as 
a consequence this committee is underutilised. Interviewees stated that meetings by the 
remuneration committee were “rarely convened”, “met annually” and “never formalised 
or not really used.”  
Thus, with regard to board committees in Philippine corporate governance, the 
remuneration committee is not seen as a powerful or influential committee as it is in 
Anglo-American companies. This is simply due to the reality of Philippine corporations 
where families are the largest shareholders and executive pay is kept in check.  
7.8 Culture and Conduct of Board Meetings 
 
The boardroom is still largely seen as the domain of an elite boys’ club and the following 
comments reinforce this perception: 
“Relationships are important here. We value relationships – members of the 
board are personally related in terms of business, ex-classmates. We value 
relationships which is common here in Asia. This is an obstacle in terms of 
governance implementation because with relationships, people are not open to 
making disclosures.” – private sector 1 
“Our board is governed quite well. The board don’t see the formality, preferring 
to run with less formality as by and large they are all friends…The board meets 
                                                     
80 Executive compensation remains a sore point and sensitive issue in the reform of Anglo-





every 4 months, most of them are semi-retired. The Chairman lives in Hong 
Kong. The local directors, others reside here.” –private sector 2 
However, corporate governance reforms have seen some changes in the culture such as 
moving towards a professionalised board and having formal procedures in board 
meetings: 
“We are influenced to do things. In the conduct of board meetings, we are now 
more formulaic, for board meetings we require all board recommendations to be 
given to all members 10 days before the meeting. [This gives board members] 
enough time to read [the recommendations] and be prepared. So in meetings we 
are prepared, questions of discussions. I am the ‘sacristan’ or workhorse in 
preparing the agenda – the proponent. Clarificatory questions are held before the 
meeting. This has had an impact on the conduct of the board meeting.” – 
corporate secretary 
The comments from interviewees in this section are insights into how board meetings 
are conducted. They reflect each company’s ownership structure, the commanding 
presence of the chair, the culture of the company and its sector-specific situation. 
The following account comes from a CEO who sat on different boards – both 
government and private – over the years. The following is his impression as a former 
independent director of a listed conglomerate and how board meetings were not exactly 
the professional discussions he expected them to be: 
“I complained about receiving a two-page financial statement when it was given 
to me. As a big company how can you have a two-page financial statement? Also 
we had two-hour board meetings per month. Lunch was included in the two 
hours. I got paid P10,000 per month as a director. I was also told that I had asked 
a lot of questions and this had not happened before. When I sat on a government 
board, we had boardroom fights but we were friends afterwards. Totally different 
culture.” – private sector 3 
As the concept of a ‘professional board director’ is quite nascent, those who receive 
directorships as a matter of prestige or are trophy directors tend to confront other 
directors who ascend to the board as working directors. Striking the balance between 




observation related by a director who realised his peers were not qualified to discuss 
complicated financial issues but were more than able to channel their energy to discuss 
the perks of a directorship: 
“When I was sitting on a Financial Committee, there were two items on the 
agenda. The first item was about a new car each director was getting. The second 
item was about a complex financial issue. It took five minutes to discuss the 
complex financial issue. For the car, the discussion was one hour as it was easier 
to understand and people were exchanging opinions about the dealership, the 
type of car, the concessionary etc. 
“For the board, they wanted something easy to understand. For the car, it was 
difficult to make a quick decision because the committee understood the issue. 
In a board, if you have a 70 year old accountant, they won’t know much about 
current developments in standards or policies.” –private sector 4 
How to discuss sensitive strategic issues when the family owner is present is a major 
block in having professional board discussions as pointed out by the following 
interviewee: 
“The culture prevents independent directors or independent-minded directors to 
raise questions during the board meeting as the meeting is there to bask [in the 
glory of the] CEO, Chairman. [The board] is not comfortable with 
[confrontation].” –private sector 5 
Criticisms are compounded when there is the unprofessionalised family board and there 
is no disguise whatsoever of the distinction or separation of the family from the 
company. Board meetings are not held whilst fraudulent board meetings are invented to 
meet SEC certification compliance requirements. A board comprised of insiders 
accordingly will test the enforcement and regulatory capacity of the SEC: 
“Some of the family corporations do not really have formal board meetings. For 
example, some satellite companies don’t follow corporation rules but have 
informal meetings.” –private sector 6 
“Most of the SME boards don’t meet. Most boards don’t actually meet. [The] 




requirement as many boards don’t meet. [Management] circulates resolutions for 
the board to sign. [They] ask the corporate secretary to sign for meetings [that 
were never] held. Even in a large family [company] this is the case. The publicly 
listed [companies] demonstrate good corporate governance [by having 
independent directors] because they select [those directors] who will agree with 
family members.” – academic 
From one end of the spectrum to the other, the following account is from a listed 
professionalised company run by a professional non-executive chair showing the 
formalised procedures and manner of conducted meetings: 
“I conduct board meetings early. I made them an hour early in 2007. Here the 
President made the Filipino directors come and do something as they were only 
coming here to get their per diem. We have military people on the board so they 
do turn up on time for a 10 am meeting. If there’s a quorum already then I’ll kick 
it off. We follow basic good corporate governance principles. 
“We have HR&OHS, RM and audit reports. There are 6 boards meetings per year.  
We discuss what the challenges are in the industry, if the marketing plan is on 
track. In August we’ll have a 5 year planning for our projects. There will be a 
presentation on budget and tax. We review the listed company on an annual 
basis.  
“There are also [industry] issues: they rely on me and who are in the business and 
the industry. I tend to leave the day-to-day [business] to the President. The board 
meetings tend to last for three hours long.” – private sector 7 
The motivation behind running a professional board was imprinted on this interviewee 
while attending a corporate governance course. This had an effect on his perception of 
how boards should be run and his expectations from board members: 
“One speaker said: If you sit as a director, there’s a general principle. Have a 
feeling for what is going on. A feeling for the business. You can’t afford to sit 
there and do nothing. Have the courage to challenge. Don’t go to the meeting to 
make the management feel small. You can’t let management steamroll you into 
doing the same. Be pretty vocal on the various boards. They (directors) hate to 




the listed company board, they (directors) read the board papers. There are a lot 
of meetings where they don’t read board papers. So here they ask good questions. 
Have the courage to challenge.” –private sector 7 
Having intact human relations or pagkikisama and emotional intelligence reigns 
supreme in the Filipino board culture: 
“The advice HR people give – you give bad news sandwiched between the good 
news. In between you give them hell, but give the book ends a good stuff. A pat 
on the back. There is the emotional quotient: bridge the emotional divide, 
sympathise with you. There are consequences of not meeting deadlines. Criticism 
is not well accepted here. You need to bridge emotional gaps and empathise with 
their needs.” –private sector 8 
Given a choice between making difficult business decisions that could lead to conflict 
and a culture that emphasises consensus and harmony, pragmatism dictates when there 
is a little compromise, it is better to err on the side of the latter. 
7.8.1 Board Culture in Contrast  
 
In contrast to the Philippines where formal voting on the board level is not known to 
occur, Australian board culture does formally allow for dissent and contrasting opinions 
amongst its members. Hence voting is seen as a necessary tool to mediate conflict on the 
board level. How Australian corporate boards handle conflicts and potential issues that 
could split a board can be seen in the following two examples (see box). One was a board 
which badly handled the issues facing the company, the management and the board – 
necessitating the departure of several board members and senior management. The 
other was an exemplary board which handled a divisive issue in a professional, 
organised, and meticulous manner. The following text box contrasts the distinct board 
cultures of these two company boards. 
Text Box 9: A Tale of Two Australian Boards 
“The board of directors is…seen as the place where conflicting interests are 
mediated, and where the necessary cohesion is created.” (Corbetta and Salvato 
2004: 124) 
 
Foreign Exchange Trading Losses and the NAB Board 




currency traders lost the bank $185M. A week later, this loss doubled to $360M after 
further “concealed loss-making positions” were uncovered (APRA 2004: 15).  
 
To investigate the fallout from this enormous failure and the weaknesses of the 
company’s internal risk management procedures, audit firm Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PWC) were tasked with handling the inquiry (PWC 2004). However, this did not receive 
unanimous support from the board. Conflicts of interest issues arose as PWC and NAB 
had several business relationships including one board member’s previous employment 
as senior partner at PWC: “essentially PWC would have been investigating their own 
work.”(Thomson 2006: 20) 
 
Other issues emerged relating to board members’ roles on the risk and audit committees, 
and the inefficacy of a director’s oversight responsibilities to miss the glaring loss. The 
following month, in February 2004, CEO Frank Cicutto and Chair Charles Allen resigned 
as NAB took a battering to its once sterling reputation. Dissatisfaction and dissent in the 
NAB boardroom became public and extensive business media coverage ensured the NAB 
board in its then dysfunctional form was untenable. One director, Catherine Walter, was 
singled out as a ‘loose cannon’ and pitted against the interim Chair, Graeme 
Kraehe.(Askew 2004)  
 
An extraordinary general meeting was called by other non-executive directors to vote 
Walter off the board. Walter countered by proposing that all independent directors 
(including herself) not seek renomination at the end of their terms. The decision on the 
composition of the NAB board was now in the hands of the outsiders - the shareholders -
who were mainly composed of institutional investors. This was seen as an unsavoury 
prospect and provoked questions over the limited responsibilities of a bank’s 
institutional shareholder: 
“As a nation we still lack a culture of shareholder pressure and a culture of 
corporate accountability amongst non-executive directors. Part of the problem is 
that NAB pays huge fees to third party fund managers through its giant MLC 
division so institutional Australia is very reluctant to upset the bank by voting 
against a director. This is a good example of why Australia needs a church and 
state type separation between big banks and fund managers. You can't provide 
the debt and equity for an economy.”(Mayne 2008) 
 
The bloodletting over this episode saw the departure of four board members including 
Walter and the arrival of eight new board appointments. Kraehe left the following year 
(Murray 2005). Indeed, in its Annual Report for the year, the bank released the following 
understatement: 
“The [NAB] Board has undergone significant transformation during the past 
year.” (NAB 2004) 
 
In contrast, the next section relates how another difficult board issue was handled in a 
more positive manner. 
 
Succession Planning at the BHP Board 
In 2009, the BHP board faced the imminent retirement of its highly esteemed Chairman, 
Don Argus who in a previous professional capacity was a CEO of NAB of the preceding 
case (Gottliebsen 2009, AFR Editorial 2009). Succession planning was formalised with a 




transferring the position of Chair to another has been called as reflecting: 
“…the structural integrity of the succession process Argus has run here. The first 
thing to note is that while this process has been done in his name, he has been 
largely removed from it….Argus is, quite plainly, very determined to make his 
final succession plan an utterly certain, seamless affair.” (Stevenson 2009) 
 
The search was conducted by an outside executive search firm and the choice came 
down to two candidates. The board was split in this decision and to resolve this conflict, 
the new chair was decided by “the unusual method of a secret ballot amongst the board 
members to prevent lobbying by candidates.”(O’Doherty 2009) 
 
Demonstrating the lack of consensus amongst the board members and mitigating any 
destructive behaviour that could undo the professional manner in which the transition 
was being handled, the board brought another outside party to administer the process.  
“BHP used KPMG as the returning officer in the ballot of the 14-strong board and 
only KPMG knows how the votes fell.”(Fitzgerald 2009) 
 
“The decision to appoint Mr [Jacques] Nasser was agreed by the Board following 
an 18 month selection process. The international recruitment firm, Heidrick & 
Struggles, was engaged as independent adviser by the Board to assist the Board in 
its deliberations and consideration of both internal and external candidates. 
KPMG supported the final process as scrutineer.” (BHPBilliton, 2009) 
 
The process, described as unique, is rather uncommon in Australian corporate 
boardrooms. A financial commentator expressed his incredulity over this episode: 
“An international recruitment firm was engaged as "independent adviser" to 
assist the board. And most bizarrely of all, accounting firm KPMG "supported the 
final process as scrutineer". What are we talking about? An ALP [political party] 
pre-selection process? Counting the votes on the Brimbank council? I've never 
seen anything so extraordinary. OK, we might have moved on from "Jac's a good 
fellow, we can't have that Sydney chap". But scrutineers? Might one of the fellow 
board members be thought likely to discreetly stuff the ballot box in, again, a 
secret ballot as the port was passed?”(McCrann 2009) 
 
Thus, the sensitive issue of succession planning – which is pertinent in a company be it 
family-owned or otherwise - in this case was done well and above board in a highly 
formalised manner. This was corporate governance practice in form and substance and 
one example of a successful succession plan executed in an Anglo-American corporate 
governance environment. 
7.9 Professional Management 
 
This section covers professional management and director training.  
Professional managers exist in most companies I interviewed.  Professionalisation has a 
lot to do on whether different family businesses grew and expanded successfully or 
unsuccessfully. One interviewee stated that professional management (or lack thereof) is 




“The Philippines is at an early stage of development. The corporation is an 
artificial logical creation. In developed countries, the corporation has 
professional management. Here, the availability of finding ownership and 
management it’s still at an early stage. It’s partly cultural. The family [is 
dominant here]– still family-centric. [The] USA [was at this stage] at an earlier 
history.” – private sector 1 
One regulator pointed out that a distinction must be made between those family-owned 
companies which are professionally-run and which are still family-run. This difference is 
crucial in the competent running of a company: 
“Family ownership in most corporations it is not necessarily bad. It’s when 
ownership overlaps with management that brings about conflicts of interests. 
One of the bigger banks of the Philippines – BPI – is controlled by the Ayala 
group. But the management has been professionalised. The biggest difference is 
with ownership and management. There is nothing inherently wrong with family. 
But there is an emphasis on the separation of the nature of ownership and the 
management of the boards.” – BSP 
If the family does not professionalise, then family conflict comes to the fore: 
“What the founder established, [there is sometimes a] lack of leadership. If you 
can get professionals, [let this process be] started by founder. If you don’t have 
professionals, the siblings bicker. They spend all their energy fighting each other 
than running the organisation.” – private sector 2 
To mitigate inter-family conflict, siblings are given different positions within the 
business: 
“There are companies that give positions to siblings. There is a good mix in [this] 
Group. There is a strong personality of [one brother], no problem with that one. 
[He] doesn’t just give jobs to [family members] first. [They don’t] sit on board. 
[Another brother] has a chemical engineering degree; [The other] had experience 
from US corporations. He trains them and gives them a responsible job. He’s 
built it so they have professional managers. Their bank is being run by [a non-




Interviewees who spoke on this subject were cognisant of the reality that the family gene 
pool can only produce so many competent managers. One expanding family-owned and 
controlled company appreciated the need to professionalise to secure the long-term 
future of the business. A growing family operation needs to go outside to expand, and to 
start trusting outsiders with the business: 
“On succession planning, it is not wise to plan in such a way that people from the 
family run of the business. We might run out of talent in-house. The challenge is 
looking for good professional people to help us in running the company. We are 
lucky to have [a non-family member executive.]. [Professionalising] is a big 
challenge. We are running the company and it is heavily dependent on R&D on 
product application. We are strong there. We need capable people. [This is] the 
challenge for family.” – private sector 4 
“The investment-enlightened are intent in attracting good, professional 
managers, whether or not they’re family. The statistical odds that [all 
professional managers] would come from one family are low. For family groups, 
it makes sense to bring in professionals. [You are] putting too much at risk on a 
family basis.” – private sector 5 
Even for one business group whose principal does not have the reputation for practising 
good corporate governance, professional managers are also in place, perhaps in view of 
the forthcoming succession process: 
“With Lucio Tan there is a misconception about him. He is a highly centralised 
man but he hires able lieutenants. He buys talent. He does have professional 
people. Lucio got one of the top [executives] from Robinsons to head the Eton 
Group [Tan’s property group]. He’s the be-all and end-all. He has the professional 
management in place.” – private sector 6 
For one company which recently professionalised, there are certain advantages and 
challenges that the family and the company face in the transition from being a wholly 
family-run and controlled enterprise to one where the family owns the business but 
professionals run the company: 
“Advantages: Most companies in the Philippines big and small, are controlled by 




family members who meet, decisions are done much faster and execution by the 
professional executives is supported from top to bottom.  
“Challenges: There are family members who head some of the companies under 
the group and accountability for performance can become an issue.  In order to 
avoid conflict among family members especially when the 2nd generation family 
members decide to retire from management, the challenge is how to transfer all 
the day to day management responsibilities to the professionals, and yet for the 
group to continue to have the valuable services provided by family members in 
managing the different businesses .” – BenPres Holdings 
For the longest continually run business house in the Philippines, each generation has 
had several family member-managers represented in the companies but for the most 
part, professionals have run the companies. The ability of the family to engage in 
successful formal succession and mitigate any negative effects is a strong contributory 
factor: 
“Through the years, this has been built up to be a representation of a family 
conglomerate. We all see how after the third generation, the business dissipates. 
This is the 7th, 8th generation. Fortunately, successive generations were 
visionaries with succession that AC should be sustained as a profit making 
company with social awareness. We give credit to the family for its successive 
generations. It has been transferred from one generation to another.”–AC 
One interviewee mentioned the group when discussing the benefits of 
professionalisation on family-owned companies: 
“The Ayalas survived due to sound and wise succession planning. They have 
taken good care. I’m able to stay on. Even though there are many owners, only 
two of the family members take an active role.” –private sector 7  
Another concurred with this assessment but pointed out professionalisation is an 
enormous challenge for a family business and not all family-run companies can integrate 
them effectively: 
“I’m happy to see companies are professionalising. At certain [times] 




the Ayala Group. Ayala is a very professional organisation. It set up Globe, it 
didn’t put a family member to head it. They had someone from the professional 
ranks. That’s what distinguishes a family corporation that is professionally run 
versus a family corporation that remains family run.”-private sector 8 
Failure to professionalise affects the viability of the company to operate in the future. 
“The [companies] that have grown have professionalised. Those who insist on 
having members as core officers have remained small entities.” –private sector 9 
Professionalisation represents maturity in a family-owned business and professional 
managers bring an economic value to the company that is appreciated by outsiders. 
7.9.1 Professionalisation and Corporate Governance 
 
Most of my interviewees were formally trained overseas and therefore their 
understanding of corporate governance was seen in a more positive light: 
“If you look at the executives of (blue chip) corporations, most had overseas 
training in how they run companies so they are educated in the governance 
sense. Most of my [business] background, the corporations that I have worked 
with have been major MNCs – essentially all foreign corporations. All have had 
corporate governance guidelines guided by their country of origin listings. I have 
grown up with this discipline [of meeting corporate governance standards].” –
private sector 1 
The professionalised family-owned companies are considered the best run businesses in 
the country and are therefore more willing and likely to include corporate governance 
practices in their companies: 
“For George Ty, Metrobank is his flagship. Federaland (property) is a secondary 
business. This is his company and he wants it professionally ran. This is sacred 
and there is no hanky-panky and everything must be above board.81
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“The best run companies have professionals. There are generational differences: 
the young are interested in corporate governance and they expand to master 
business practices. Patriarchs are uninterested – partly unexposed. [With the] 
business environment, [there is a] bit of an assumption that enough of that 
[knowledge is sufficient]. It is routine. [However] if they’re 2nd, 3rd generation, 
they are interested in such issues. They are able to persuade to participate. They 
are intent on professionalising, not unlimited to corporate governance or unduly 
corporate governance.” – academic  
There is a strong link between professionally run businesses and a positive appreciation 
of corporate governance practices. 
7.9.2 Value of Professional Managers 
 
In practising good corporate governance, both the tangible and intangible value of 
professional management is recognised. Throughout my interviews I spoke with some 
highly capable professional managers with a strong vision for the company and clearly 
defined roles within the company. My interview notes bear this out: 
“All my questions were answered by [my interviewee] and there was an openness 
that was missing in some of my other interviews…At the end of the interview, he 
and I discussed the relative merits of the condominiums around Makati…Overall, 
this interview, which lasted around 2 hours, was very fruitful. The contact with 
him earlier in Sydney provided an ease of transition to the face to face 
interview…My opinion is [his] direct forthrightness and frankness stemmed from 
the company’s vanguard position. There was a good rapport with this 
interviewee.” – AC interview observation notes 
“[He] seems to be an active manager. I was impressed by the way he spoke with 
such clarity and forbearance. I thought [the family member] would speak more 
but being one of five brothers seems to have taken the laidback approach and 
have left the actual day to day managing to the professional managers.” – June 
2007, interview observation notes 
Another interviewee compared and contrasted the experience of two business groups – 




unlocking the market value of a company: 
“Look at Ayala vs. Gokongwei: it has a lot to do with professional management 
teams rather than having family members. In Ayala – they quickly began to build 
professional management teams. From the very start they let professionals run 
the business. You can see it in their hires. My observation is they pay the hires for 
that. They have well-paid senior management. They pay for a professional 
management team. 
“With the Gokongweis, the Chairman is now only opening up to pay professional 
managers. They have started (as they are traditional Chinese) in a more 
diversified manner. They are not afraid to pay top dollar. When you pay for top 
management, normally they (the top management) follow corporate governance 
to the letter. The traditional Chinese families, in rising markets, they need to go 
back to the market for funding. Or unlock the values of their companies. So they 
hire more executives from the outside.”” –stockbroker 
Reiteratively, professional managers in family-owned businesses make positive 
contributions to the value of the company in financial and reputational terms. 
7.9.3 Professional Managers and Working Family Members 
 
Issues arise when professional managers and family owners work with each other. For 
family members who intend to work in the business, grooming them for the 
responsibilities of the family-owned business and navigating them through their working 
relationship with non-family professional managers are crucial. 
Where there are professional managers in place and in a society that values seniority, the 
working relationship between family members who are younger than the non-family 
professional managers, challenges this cultural norm. The power dynamic is biased in 
favour of ownership. The optimal interaction between family members and non-family 
professional managers must be based on mutual respect for one another as the following 
story illustrates: 
“The Group Chairman is George S. Ty. Abacan is from the ranks who worked his 
way up. Abacan was the president and is now the chairman. The President is the 




first joined the bank, I was in Hong Kong and was using the Rolls Royce to come 
back from a meeting. I saw Arthur who was walking with an umbrella and I asked 
him where his car was and he said he had always walked this way. Except for 
Arthur, and his sister, the other board directors are not members of the family.” –
non-family professional manager 
In attracting professional managers to join a family-owned business, the rewards must be 
consummerate with the work performance: 
“If you want to attract the best and brightest, there’s a modicum of standards that 
has to be met and they are meritocracy and transparency to the fore: 
1. If I kill myself over 18 hour days, I have a reasonable chance to run the place. 
2. Metrics evaluations are fair. Tangentially increase in good governance 
presupposes that internal systems are transparent and fair.” – private sector 1 
Connected to this perception of meritocracy, where there is excessive nepotism within 
the business, the level of managerial competence suffers as hostility and resentment 
feeds non-family professional managers towards less competent working family 
members:  
“The cons [of family run corporations] are you don’t always get the best men on 
top in terms of qualifications. There could be some conflict.” –private sector 2 
As echoed by another interviewee: 
“A lot of these companies say they’re professional but family members are still 
dominating. For example family members would need a better, nicer office than 
the non-family professionals. Managers are relegated to [less nicer offices.]” – 
private sector 3 
Similarly, a family member wishing to work in a part of the business that may not play 
up to one’s strengths and competence can be an issue for professionals working 
alongside the member: 
“The sister wants to be involved in [this division], not [the other division].” –
private sector 4 




has applied the following system: 
“We have a performance appraisal system called EVALEX, which was developed 
for us by a foreign consultant. It is a very comprehensive tool used to monitor 
management performance.” –private sector 5 
In a family-owned business it is generally accepted that there would be family members 
who would be working in the company. To the extent that a family business has 
professionalised and has professional non-family managers on board, then the dynamics 
becomes that of balancing the needs of professional managers in being rewarded and 
continue to be attracted to work for the business, with the ambitions of the family to 
have continued involvement of members in the business. 
7.10 Director Education and Training 
 
Filipino executives in professionally run companies are well-versed with Western 
business practices. Some managers in blue-chip companies have been trained overseas or 
have had exposure abroad. Others completed their secondary and/or tertiary education 
usually in American educational institutions, while others have undertaken short courses 
in management and executive education in overseas business schools.  
“Many people here are sons and grandsons of businessmen who started their 
companies 50 years ago. They are educated at NY, London and the best 
universities in the world. They have some idea of corporate governance. They run 
companies more in the traditional US corporate manner. They have straight 
departments. More and more companies are run that way and are graduates of 
US business schools.” –private sector 1 
“Here in the financial business, a lot of leaders on boards studied abroad in the 
US – Harvard, Wharton, Stanford.” – private sector 2 
“The Vice Chairman comes from the same family as well. The Vice Chairman 
studied at Ateneo and did his MBA at Harvard.” –private sector 3 
“With Gokongwei, he sent his son Lance to Wharton.” –private sector 4 
For one company, ongoing in-house training is considered part and parcel of a director’s 




knowledgeable and kept up-to-date so their understanding and awareness of pressures 
facing the company are current and relevant: 
“We encourage, or insist that at least twice a year the directors spend a good day 
in the business and understanding what the business is. So when they sit on the 
board meetings they understand the terminology.” – private sector 5 
Ongoing executive director training is a valuable contribution to the continued success 
of a company. Not only does this improve the knowledge skills of the individual, but the 
lessons learnt make for well-prepared and well-qualified directors. 
7.10.1 SMEs and Director Education 
 
From one end of the business spectrum to the other, when I attended a MAP-sponsored 
corporate governance workshop, most participants came from the GOCCs and SME 
sector. The latter is heavily family-owned usually headed by a father and mother team. 
For most participants, this was their first exposure to concepts of corporate governance. I 
sat next to a second generation Filipina-Chinese woman whose father owns an import-
export business. The following exchange took place with her: 
“PARTICIPANT: I’m an AVP 
 ME: What’s an AVP? Associate Vice President? 
 PARTICIPANT: No. It stands for Any Vacant Position.” 
For family-owned SMEs professionalisation remains a big issue. It is at this end where 
corporate governance is a concern because it is rarely practiced at all. 
“The rural banking system is a pillar in the Philippine economy – but they are 
SMEs owned and operated by families in rural areas. They’re the ones who need a 
lot of help in corporate governance but they can’t afford [the training]. So some 
kind of grant and tax benefits [is needed] so that can further for those who can’t 
invest; and to start training these boards.” – private sector 1 
In this regard, the School of Management at Ateneo de Manila University is working 
with SMEs to help them on governance, succession, professionalisation and mitigating 




an external family businesses consultant. The following box contains an account of the 
School’s work with SMEs in the Philippines. 
Text Box 10: Helping SMEs - An External Consultant's Account 
 “85% of the economy is made up of SMEs. We mainly work with rural banks in Northern 
Luzon. We don’t advise them on rural bank legislation; rather we work with them on 
family business management. We concentrate on three issues: professionalising, family 
control, and succession planning. 
 
“On corporate governance, it is not happening in this country, not the way that we have 
tried it. It is not happening in the SME set. MNCs have good corporate governance 
standards because their parent company has to comply with corporate governance 
requirements in the countries that they operate in. The efforts to reform have not been 
effective enough. It requires a personal initiative from owners and management of the 
company rather than regulation. 
 
“We have established a family business centre here. Professionalising is a strong interest 
in family business. There are management issues related to family business issues. These 
are of huge interest to SMEs. However, the reforms are very slow because of the lack of 
desire on their part and the unwillingness to give up any degree of control. The 
governance issues are proof of that. Family control is not unique. 
 
“In the School, we are moving towards finding solutions and working with SMEs who 
wish to run their business well. Can we make a difference at that level? Might it not be 
frustrating? We deal with SMEs wishing to professionalise and who have the desire to do 
that. We help family corporates and we have a family business development. We help 
establish the family council and promote the benefits of having one. We have 
workshops, briefings and we work directly with the business families. We have active 
consultations with them. We help them with family constitutions. With constitutions 
they are bound. They are written documents and all family members must sign and agree 
to them. With SMEs we follow on the family dynamics. Some need to speed up, adopt 
professionalism and figure out who should be on the board of directors and how 
decisions are made. 
 
Emotional Baggage 
“The problem for us is everything is personal. Everything is related. It’s difficult to 
separate the personal from the professional. If you look at a family, there is a lot of 
emotional baggage. Culturally, we are more sensitive in our communication styles than 
Western families. Therefore the consulting activity is different compared to the Western 
environment. In Western countries, they deal with conflict, there is a level of openness, 
you can say things directly. Filipinos need to read between the lines. Everything is 
subject to the interpersonal, how it can be interpreted and misinterpreted. Values are 
different.  
 
“I have advantages as an outsider. I’m not perceived as a threat to the extended family so 




We are not here for a family therapy situation. That requires a different skill set 
altogether. If there’s a  deep conflict, there’s a Center for Family Ministries82
 
on campus 
where troubled families can go and have therapy. We only work with healthy families. 
There is enough to deal with s o we focus on them first. 
“We don’t deal with normal business where family dynamics are less important such as 
expanding into overseas markets or listing on the stock exchange. They are business 
strategy issues. Listing with the PSE is an investment banking decision so it’s not 
necessarily an issue for us. 
 
Succession 
“What we deal with is professionalisation and succession. In mitigating family business 
conflict, we come up with an issue which presents conflict and strategise family business 
issues around that to deal with the conflict. Conflict can be avoided if you 
professionalise.  
 
“On succession planning, so many people don’t plan their succession. The problem is 
how to select the successor. This does not necessarily mean the eldest son just simply 
because he came first. That’s why we advocate the Family Constitution. So they choose 
their successor this or that way, how to deal with in-laws, and non-family members, and 
rules by which they agree with and run. 
 
“We have a very active practice here. We don’t have to go out and seek clients. They 
come to us for help. We don’t deal with families that use us for leverage such as some 
family members wanting to have their decisions supported or reinforced. The entire 
family must support us. The people who manipulate us as leverage are unethical or weak. 
If there is leverage, it is to provide leverage as an external consultant and the 
constructive use of leverage is to move in the best direction for the company.” 
 
For an outsider looking into the sometimes chaotic world of the Philippine economic 
landscape, it is worth recalling Lansberg and Perrow’s observation on managers in 
developing economies:  
“Too frequently, outside observers from more advanced companies tend to 
misread and criticise what in fact are adaptive and appropriate responses to 
complex and often difficult conditions, erroneously concluding that these 
businesses are poorly managed and organisationally immature. Since many of 
these families look to the more highly developed economies for ideas and 
validation, such negative opinions may even lead them to devalue their own 
sense of managerial competence.” (1991: 129) 
Highly skilled Filipino managers have evolved to meet the needs of their company in a 
                                                     





developing country environment - meeting pressures and working under conditions that 
surpass their developed country counterparts. 
7.11 Other Decision-Making Bodies 
 
While it was not the intention of this research to explore other decision making bodies 
outwith the company board, comments and responses from some interviewees 
mentioned the influence these bodies exercise on the board and the corporation. In a 
family business environment like the Philippines, these formal institutions help 
contribute to the future growth and existence of the business by formalising and drawing 
boundaries between the family, the business and the management. 
As I did not anticipate the influence of these bodies, questions pertaining to their 
existence and functions were not in my interview guide. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
deny the power they have and influence they exercise and so this section briefly 
mentions the existence of the following: the family council, family board and advisory 
board. 
7.11.1 Family Council 
 
In the Philippines, having a family council and family constitution becomes of great 
import when there are succession issues that need to be discussed and resolved. While 
these formal mechanisms may not mitigate all sorts of conflict, they are useful aids for 
business families and prevent family conflicts spilling over into the business and the 
public sphere: 
“Many of our activities help family business transform into family corporations. 
We help them with the family constitution, family council, family members. The 
family constitution would deal with very complex issues involving family 
succession planning and compensation. There are 4 or 5 companies with intense 
family conflict because of the lack of a succession plan and a lack of clear policies 
which could play apart the wives. [The constitution] could be as simple as two 
pages long. It depends on the family business. A small family business wouldn’t 
need an elaborate constitution.” – private sector 1 
Lopez and Gonzalez in their study of Filipino business family succession cite the family 




“There was the tradition of the annual family meeting. Eduardo Aboitiz initiated 
the informal gathering of families involved in the business. It was at these 
meetings where ‘disputes are resolved and the rites of bonding take place.’ In the 
years that the family met, certain rules were drawn up based on what the family 
had learned from its experience. These rules were regularly reviewed and widely 
accepted as a guide in the family’s involvement in the business. These rules 
evolved as prescribed formulas for the family. (2001: 146-147) 
Other interviewees also mentioned the experience of the Aboitiz Family Council and 
their constitution as a guide for other business families: 
“If you look at the family council for example, the Aboitizes, the board of 
directors in their companies have independent directors, the companies have 
professional managers. In the Aboitiz family council – the Chair of the Council is 
not the same as the Chair of the Board. It could be the mother. [The chair] is 
someone else not involved in the business.” –private sector 2 
“The Aboitizes have adopted the family constitution. Any member of the family 
who is the head of the company must deserve it. These are principles that have 
been adopted. The family member in the business must earn [the head of the 
company] and be sustained. This is catching up, take a look at that –[ the 
establishment of] family councils. [Others have] started writing their own family 
constitution. It’s in practice – having seen the success of the constitution, people 
have taken note of it. [They] take note of [the constitution], that’s great, and they 
do it likewise. The Aboitizes don’t distribute their constitution so there’s no 
template. The succeeding generations get in trouble with no rules. So the 
Aboitizes has given [other families the] light, [by providing] solution to the 
problems that we have.” –private sector 3 
Other families known to have family councils include the Ayalas and Ortigas. The 
following comments are from a person who married into the Ortigas family: 
“In the Ayalas, the family council is chaired by Don Jaime. The family council was 
before chaired by an aunt, Mercedes McMicking. All sorts of organisation 
including smaller groups can run family councils. In the [Ortigas] family council, 




wife’s family is in real estate, we meet as siblings with parents, and spouses and 
children. We meet as 30 people and talk about business. Some assigned members 
talk. For more complex family structures there is the cousin consortium. [In this 
country], we have family businesses who have evolved to family run where 
distinct family issues are kept away from the family business.” – Ortigas family 
member 
However, these examples may be the exception, rather than the norm: 
“If there’s such as thing as a family constitution, that’d be rare. A very rare 
exception. Why is that? I doubt if they’d follow that. Filipinos don’t sign 
contracts in families. I haven’t seen anyone do that.” – academic  
One of the biggest challenges for family councils is when formal mechanisms, such as 
the constitution, do not reflect the situation of the family and the business. As advised 
by Ward, agreements should respond and be altered according to the changing 
circumstances of the family – and the business (Ward 2008b: 114-116) 
7.11.2 Family Board 
 
In contrast to the family council where several generations of the same family may 
gather and discuss family issues that are intertwined with business issues, the family 
board is a parallel decision-making body to the company board. Only one company 
explicitly mentioned the existence of the family board and this is the ultimate decision 
making body for the family enterprise. The company in question fits the description of a 
family-operator (that is, there is intense involvement with companies as stated by Davis 
2008: 144) type of business although it is undergoing transition towards greater 
professionalisation and generational succession. Not surprisingly, owner/control-related 
issues are made explicit in the family board. The company board, in effect, reinforces the 
decisions made in the family board: 
“SM has a family board. They would formally hold meetings every two weeks and 
there has to be a quorum. The meetings are minuted. Significant decisions are 
made on the family board level. Mutual decisions are made at the family board 




subsidiary related decisions. Henry Sy has six children and all of them are 
managing and running in the business: 
“The eldest daughter, Tess, has oversight function of head core businesses: retail 
and banking. The second daughter is into hotels and SM Prime. The eldest son is 
Henry Sy Junior and is in Sedona Property.  The second eldest is Hans and he is 
into SM Prime. The third son Herbert is in Supermarkets.  The fourth son Harley 
is the President of SM Investments and is directly involved in retail. While Tess 
won’t comment on it, it’s an open secret that she is the successor. She was heavily 
involved in building the organisation. She was mainly responsible for merging 
BDO and Equitable PCI banks. She has the vision and carried this out with a lot 
of passion. One of the daughter-in-laws is involved with SM Foundation, the wife 
of Harley. She is much involved with that. 
“The quorum for the family board is four out of six siblings. It is chaired by the 
eldest (e.g. Mr. Sy or Henry Jr.) or the most senior. There is consensus building 
through this board. The office of the family board is in Makati so most of the 
time the family board meetings are held there. The family board is a very small, 
tight community. There are two or three non-family members. Presently, they 
allow more members to come in and sit on the family board depending on the 
topic. In this, the group handles mergers and acquisitions, and minutes are taken 
down. The family board is more of a setting/agreeing direction of the policies of 
the group. There is more management. So the left hand knows what the right 
hand is doing. That is, coordinate all the different business activities of the group, 
and they are discussed at the family board level.” – SM 
The following figure is of the holding company SM Investments Corporation’s board 









7.11.3 Advisory Board 
 
Lastly, there also exists the advisory board as another influential body. The advisory 
board “primarily provides advice to a firm’s top managers” and is comprised of highly 
influential people that is held in great esteem by the firm (Blumentritt 2006: 67; see also 
Tapies & Ward 2008). Though some conglomerates utilise their advisory boards for 
external advice and strategic planning purposes, only one interviewee explicitly 
mentioned their advisory board and their importance to the group. Echoing what an 
advisory board should contain, this group’s advisory board is comprised of well-
connected elites: 
“We also have a board of advisers: they attend [a board] meeting on a rotation 
basis We have Dr. Placido Mapa who was previously an executive director of the 
World Bank, Washington SyCip SGV Founder, Attorney Hizon, Undersecretary 
of Finance, a former press secretary of [President] Estrada…Not only is the board 
strong but we have a strong board of advisers. Our boardroom only has 24 seats 

























The following figure is an abridged version of Ward’s ‘Governing the Enterprise Family’ 
(2008:104) and the structure sets out the different bodies available to large, complex 
family-owned businesses in the Philippines. This perspective places into context the 
company board is but one of many operating branches in a business family (under 
Holding Company). Future research could explore the influences and relationships of 
these various bodies, how they impact the company board, and where they fit in the 









































7.12 Closing Remarks 
 
In closing this chapter, it is worth reprinting the sage words from a group of family 
business academics. Their perspective on the particular needs and demands of those 
involved in a family-owned corporation show the different dynamism extant in these 
organisations: 
“The role of chairman of the board is different when the company was founded 
by your father and when your mother and siblings sit around the table at board 
meetings, just as they sat around the dinner table. The job of a CEO is different 
when the vice president in the next office is also a younger sister. The role of 
partner is different when the other partner is a spouse or a child. 
“Companies owned and managed by families are a special organisational form 
whose ‘specialness’ has both positive and negative consequences. Family 
businesses draw special strength from the shared history, identity, and common 
language of families.  
“When key managers are relatives, their traditions, values and priorities spring 
from a common source. Verbal and nonverbal communication can be greatly 
speeded up in families. Most important, commitment, even to the point of self-
sacrifice, can be asked for in the name of the general family welfare.” (Gersick et 
al 1999: 2-4) 
Family businesses, their owners and their values will continue to important 




CHAPTER 8: GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
This chapter looks at the impact of corporate governance on three government financial 
institutions: the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the Government Service 
and Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS). The DBP is a wholly-
owned government bank while the GSIS and SSS are the pension/superannuation funds 
for public and private sector employees respectively. In a country where financing and 
sources of funding are critical, the three government financial institutions covered in this 
chapter have at various times been politicised and their organisational functioning 
compromised.  
Corporate governance reforms must be seen in the context of their operating 
environment. This chapter provides a brief background on presidential appointments 
and what role they play in affecting the operationalisation of corporate governance 
reforms in government institutions. Being government institutions, all three 
organisations have experienced the delicate balancing act of pursuing organisational 
objectives concurrently with political wishes – more often than not, at the expense of the 
former to appease the latter. 
A brief history of the DBP, its turbulent time under Marcos, its consequent rehabilitation 
under Estanislao and corporate governance reforms in the DBP are examined. Following 
on from this, the organisational mandate and structure of GSIS and SSS are discussed 
and how this shapes their corporate governance function as the main local institutional 
investors in the country. One of the ongoing debates in Western corporate governance is 
the exercise of influence and activism by institutional investors. In this context, the 
institutional investor influence of GSIS and SSS are examined. The latter half of this 
chapter looks at the role of GSIS and SSS, their charters, the legislated investment 
limitations in their charters and their investments. The actions of the pension funds in 
an episode involving former President Estrada and a bank merger provide an insight into 
how institutional investor activism is exercised and conducted in a non-Anglo American 
corporate governance environment and a weak bureaucratic state.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the challenges facing public sector organisations and their 




8.1 Development Bank of the Philippines 
 
The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) is one of three remaining state-owned 
banks in the country. The other two are the rural bank, Landbank of the Philippines and 
the Islamic bank, Al-Amanah Islamic Bank. 83Originally known as the Rehabilitation 
Finance Corporation (RFC), the bank was initially established in 1947 to provide 
financing to rebuild and reconstruct the country after the devastating impact of World 
War Two84
8.1.1 Descent into Hell: DBP under Marcos 
. Initial funding came from the United States and the World Bank. The USA 
felt obliged to contribute substantial reparations to the country due to wartime damages 
as a result of being the main American colony in the Pacific. A decade after its 
establishment and the completion of reconstruction efforts, the RFC was renamed the 
DBP with a mandate to support commercial and industrial projects in the country. 
Annually, 50% of the bank’s net income is given to the government in the form of 
dividends. The DBP is a bank and a development institution.  Currently, there are no 
plans to privatise the bank which is in a relatively strong fiscal position compared to the 
other two government-owned banks. 
 
The experience of DBP under the Marcos dictatorship echoes common themes in 
similarly well-placed government organisations. As a financing institution, the DBP’s 
funds were diverted to serve the wishes of the dictator in so called ‘behest loans’ because 
the loans are made at the behest of the incumbent rather than in fulfilling the 
organisation’s purpose. A snapshot of the DBP under the Marcos years is set out in the 
next table. Note the increased deterioration and lack of solvency of the bank in the 
closing years of the Marcos dictatorship:  
                                                     
83 The Landbank of the Philippines is oriented towards financing rural and agricultural oriented 
projects; and Al-Amanah Islamic Bank is oriented towards operating and financing under the 
precepts of Islamic banking. Al-Amanah was established under Marcos with a “mandate to 
promote and accelerate the socioeconomic development of the autonomous region of Muslim 
Mindanao by providing banking, finance and investment operations using the concept of Islamic 
banking and is the only bank authorised by the government to conduct Islamic banking in the 
Philippines.”(Remo 2007e). In May 2007, there was an unsuccessful attempt to privatise 90% of 
Al-Amanah Islamic Bank. This was the fourth such attempt to privatise the bank. The Economist 
suggested “The lack of bidders was probably due to the bank’s incurred losses” especially with a 
portfolio containing substantial non-performing assets. The formerly government-owned 
Philippine National Bank (PNB) was privatised and its controlling owner is Lucio Tan. 
84For a substantial history of the DBP, see DBP (1997) Fifty Years of DBP: A Developing History of 




Table 30: Selected Chronology from DBP (1997) Fifty Years of the DBP 
1969: A cash crunch emerges. There is heavy pressure on DBP’s cash resources, as the 
emphasis on large-scale projects requires correspondingly large amounts of cash. To 
increase funds, DBP taps SSS and GSIS, and uses the overdraft and discounting lines with 
PNB.  
1970: DBP’s funding problems come to a head. The devaluation of the peso catches the 
DBP at a vulnerable time when its foreign exchange liabilities are at a peak…These 
[foreign currency] debts come due in 1980, and with its clients on the brink of defaulting 
on their debts, the DBP has no choice but to honour all foreign obligations. Thus DBP is 
forced to cut down on domestic lending operations and suspend almost all new 
guarantees. 
1981: The economy is faced by a banking crisis when businessman Dewey Dee flees the 
country with USD100M in unpaid debts. This creates a cash crunch for both banks and 
industries. Banks refuse to roll over short-term debt. Among the hardest hit are big 
industrial and mining corporations. To aver t their impending bankruptcy, Marcos order 
5 GOCCs – including DBP and PNB – to bail out the distressed corporations. These 
‘behest loans’ divert billions in badly-needed capital from productive investment...DBP 
serves as one of the primary conduits of funds in the government’s efforts to bail out 
many troubled corporations. Billions of pesos are utilised for this purpose. All other 
lending takes a back seat. 
1982: DBP suspends all lending activities in the second half of the year, as almost all its 
capital for lending has gone into bailouts of troubled corporations. 
1983: DBP continues to be strapped for funds; acceptance of new loan applications 
remains suspended and behest loans continue to take the majority of the bank’s lending 
capital. 
1984: Many of DBP’s projects fail to make payments; the acceptance of new loan 
applications remains suspended, as behest loans continue to take up most of the 
available capital. 
1985: DBP continues to experience difficulties in its operations. Many projects begin to 
default on their payments…Lending, the most vital operation of the bank, is at a virtual 
standstill. The bank no longer grants equity investments or guarantees. 
1986: DBP is in a dismal state. 90% of its portfolio is comprised of non-performing assets 
(NPAs) and it is weighed down by a large and unwieldy organisational culture. Jesus P. 
Estanislao is appointed Chairman of DBP. He develops an extensive Rehabilitation Plan 
which calls for the transfer of NPAs to the national government and the downsizing of 
the organisation. A new corporate culture of excellence anchored on integrity and 
competence, teamwork and professionalism was introduced. Chairman Estanislao leads 
the drive for DBP’s financial and spiritual renewal. (DBP 1997: 23, 29, 30-32) 
 
Like many organisations in both public and private sectors, the legacy of the Marcos 
years remains imprinted on the DBP. For those who lived through that era, the 
experience of being in a highly politicised government institution to serve the wishes of 
one person or one family remains a strong legacy issue. The dictatorship has left deep 
psychological wounds that are slowly healing. Every incoming presidential 




interests would they force the organisation to serve? Was the dictatorship an historical 
aberration or is it waiting to happen again? Can this cycle ever break? 
Organisationally, the culture of the DBP under Marcos was badly afflicted. During 
martial law, the DBP was used as a milking cow for Marcos. As a financial institution, at 
one point it was mooted that the DBP would merge with then government-owned bank 
PNB. With a surfeit of cows available for milking, merging the two would at least 
consolidate one’s efforts.  
For DBP employees, leadership by example saw bank officers dawdle as their superiors 
loitered. The DBP’s reputation in the private sector was held in low-esteem. Eyewitness 
accounts abound of many drinking sessions between supervisors and their staff in the 
middle of the working day. One wondered whether it would be best to approach the 
bank after lunchtime if being intoxicated was a contributing factor to a loan’s approval. 
According to Hutchcroft, “the DBP was said to have ‘the easiest touch in town.’ People 
with good political connections could get loans with only a few questions asked.” (1998: 
186). 
Compounding this impression was the internal procedures of the bank. If someone 
wanted to borrow P50M to fund a project, half of it would have already gone to paying 
off the DBP officers. The standard was a 2% cut for the loans officer, and upwards to the 
board level (Dohner & Intal Jr. 1989: 500). As one interviewee observed: 
“The moment a bank gets a bad reputation, they are tainted. After all, a bank 
deals with the business of trust. The DBP balances its development mandate and 
earning money with the government projects it funds.” – public sector 
Thus, the reputation of the DBP at the end of Marcos’ downfall was in tatters. Financially 
it was broke. Spiritually it attracted those motivated and unfazed to commit corruption 
and fraud. Organisationally, it was dysfunctional. It was no longer fulfilling its role as a 
bank. At the same time, the DBP was still widely considered as too important to be 
dissolved. It was with a certain amount of irony that the bank which was originally 
established to rehabilitate the country was in need of rehabilitation itself. The road to 
rehabilitate the bank after the downfall of Marcos was a main challenge for the incoming 
Aquino administration. The rehabilitation was tasked to one man whose reputation for 




8.1.2 Rehabilitation under Estanislao 
 
In recent times, Dr. Jesus P. Estanislao is known as the main champion of corporate 
governance in the Philippines. (see also Chapter 4) He has enormous goodwill in both 
the public and private sectors. He is held in high esteem and his influence is carried 
widely. He built this reputation and solidified it when he turned around and 
rehabilitated Marcos’s milking cow. He transformed an organisation riddled with 
corruption into a model of efficiency with clear governance functions. Estanislao rose to 
the enormity of this challenge and his success in reorganising the DBP cannot be 
overestimated. 
The law for the DBP was amended after Marcos’ departure. Addressing the legacy issues 
meant introducing new blood. Estanislao downsized a bulky organisation and hired 
people from the private sector. The concept of risk management was re-introduced after 
remaining dormant during those dark years. A risk management manual consolidated all 
banking guidelines and circulars and this addressed the window dressing of past loans 
and refinancing of past dues.  
At the heart of an organisation is the company’s corporate culture. During my interview 
at the DBP, my interviewee and I were interrupted at 3pm by prayers that were 
broadcasted throughout the building. My interviewee glanced at me and said: “That’s 
Estanislao’s legacy.” The imprint of Estanislao can be seen in the DBP foyer and the daily 
reminders of prayers: the Angelus at 12pm and the aforementioned 3pm prayer. 
Furthermore, at the start of the working week, DBP employees sing the national anthem 
and recite the DBP credo (see table below). 
Table 31: The DBP Family Credo (DBP 2009a) 
I belong to the DBP Family 
A family that puts country above self 
A family committed to a progressive Filipino society 
Where everyone is self-reliant and socially responsible 
Where opportunity for enhancement of personal dignity is open to all. 
 
I believe that the mission of DBP 
Is to make the Filipino productive and competitive 
So that the people’s basic needs are adequately met 
And so the nation’s aspirations can be fulfilled 





I share the hope DBP places in entrepreneurs 
Who seek to link industries, sectors, and regions 
To deepen and widen their interdependence 
Who seize the opportunities created by change 
And work as partners with those taking the lead in development. 
 
I dedicate myself to DBP as an institution 
Whose interest must be placed above my own 
Where commitment to service is before personal ambition 
Where the trademarks are: integrity and competence, teamwork and professionalism. 
 
With the help of God almighty 
I pledge my whole heart and mind 
To the pursuit of excellence 
Because I belong to the DBP Family 
Because I am a Filipino. 
 
The spiritual and organisational healing instigated by Estanislao is remembered fondly: 
“Jesus Estanislao came in after 1986 and rehabilitated DBP. Estanislao is a model 
of corporate governance. He came in as Chairman and turned around DBP. 
Previously we had 80% delinquent loans. The DBP employees dealt in graft and 
corruption. By 1989, three years after the government gave the organisation 
P17.5B to recapitalise the bank after Marcos, we were able to return that 
obligation. Internally we have grown to P35B. That debt to the government was 
repaid within 3 years. 
“The corporate culture here has changed. Employees were recruited from other 
private banks and a new board of directors came in. Everything has been 
professionalised. Estanislao was here [until 1989]. Those were the glory days as 
we were known as the best-managed bank. After Estanislao left, and when the 
new Chairman [Roberto F. de Ocampo] came in, the after effects were felt in the 
bank’s performance and this was due to Estanislao.  
“Estanislao’s legacy to the bank is the DBP credo. Every Monday is part of his 
legacy. Every now and then, Estanislao comes here and is applauded by 
employees. Of course there are younger employees now – those who don’t 
remember what the DBP was like before and after Marcos.” – DBP 




has wholesale and retail lending arms. For the retail arm, issues over money laundering 
and identity theft are growing. The wholesale lending arm deals with accredited 
commercial clients such as the main commercial banks in the country. The bank funds 
business and commercial projects.  
8.1.3 Introducing Corporate Governance in the DBP 
 
As a bank, the DBP is supervised by the banking regulator, the BSP. The main corporate 
governance reforms in the country were firstly directed at banks and so the DBP was 
initially affected by the introduction of Basel II reforms. Like other private sector firms, 
hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported, and given DBP’s ownership structure with the owner 
being government and therefore the ‘principal’, hypothesis 3 is not supported. This last 
hypothesis parallels private sector firms with active and controlling owners though as a 
government institution, it is largely due to politicisation – which arguably is a 
manifestation of controlling principal-agent relationships – that exposes why hypothesis 
3 is not supported.  
H1: Post-1997 corporate governance policies in the Philippines will exhibit similar ideas 
contained in Western principles of corporate governance 
H2: Post-1997 corporate governance practices in the Philippines institutions and firms will 
not diverge from indigenous customs. 
H3: Philippine firms that have adopted Anglo-American corporate governance practices 
are more likely to exhibit well-defined principal-agent relationships. 
The formal corporate governance procedure in the DBP consists of the following 
elements (DBP 2009b): 
1. Corporate Governance Committee: This board committee was established in 
response to regulatory reforms. It meets monthly and the committee has a 
charter which addresses the duties and responsibilities of directors. The 
committee also oversees how corporate governance principles are implemented. 
2. Corporate Governance Manual: A formal document that looks at how corporate 
governance is implemented within the bank. It contains information on 
compliance requirements, duties of directors and committee structure. 
3. Self-Assessment and Director Peer Assessment System: This is an internal 
procedure which evaluates and assesses the abilities of bank directors. Each 




performance and this peer assessment allowed an evaluation of a director’s weak 
and strong areas. There were six components in the peer assessment and 
weighted by percentage: 
a. Competence as a director (15%) 
b. Independence (15%) 
c. Preparedness as a director (20%) 
d. Practice as a director (20%) 
e. Committee activity (15%) 
f. [Contribution to the] Development process of the corporate enterprise 
(15%) 
4. Code of Ethics: This code provides guidance on behaviour expected of DBP 
directors and employees. 
These policies cement corporate governance’s introduction in the bank. 
8.1.4 DBP Board Committees 
 
The operationalisation of corporate governance in the bank can also be seen in the board 
committee structure and membership of the bank as outlined in Tables 32 and 33 on 
DBP’s Board and Non-Board Committees (see next two pages).  
There are 8 board committees. 5 of the committees were established after the main 
banking corporate governance (or Basel II) reforms (see Table 33). Management by board 
committee is seen as the most visible aspect of corporate governance reform in the 
banking system as these committees doubled the pre-2000 structure: 
“The introduction of these committees was the big change in the banking system 
and we have had to adapt to it.” – DBP interviewee 
The Executive, Trust and Human Resources Committees have been present since the 
Marcos years. After the introduction of corporate governance reforms, the Audit and 
Compliance Committees were merged into one committee. The Audit Committee 
existed before the Basel II reforms while the Compliance Committee was established in 
2000. The Trust Committee deals with the banking services provided by DBP which 
manages trust funds governed by the country’s law on trust for retirees, private, public 




recently established committees. This committee supports the specific advocacies of the 
bank such as micro-financing and the forestry fund. Advocacies of the bank form part of 
the organisation’s development mandate. Projects under the oversight of this committee 
are not expected to generate significant financial profits; however, they are expected to 
make significant environmental and societal impact and contribution for the country. 
Out of all the committees, the Risk Management Committee has the most ex-officio 
members reflecting the pre-occupation of the bank with the efficacy and standards of its 
internal audit and control, and associated risk management issues. 
These board committees have formalised the concept of risk management, good 
corporate governance, transparency, disclosure and financial reporting within the bank. 
There are also two notable non-board committees as set out below: 
Table 32: DBP Chart of Non-Board Committees (as at January 24th 2007) 
 Non-Board Committees 
 Provident Fund Credit (CRECOM) 
Established Prior to 1986 After 1986 
Membership Chair: Oliveros Ex-Officio Members: Dichoso; 
Durano 
 
The Provident Fund Committee was established for the financial security of DBP 
employees and has existed since the Marcos years.  From every DBP employee’s monthly 
salary, a contribution is made towards the provident fund. The fund provides earnings 
and profits; rewards are shared. The bank makes a co-contribution of 5P for every 1P 
provide into the fund. 
The Credit Committee or CRECOM was established immediately after Marcos’ downfall. 
This committee came into existence immediately after the introduction of a risk 
management manual to the bank. The bank’s risk manual was the main policy 
instrument used to reform and rehabilitate the organisation. The committee evaluates 
loans above P15M. The approval of this committee is required before the loan is granted. 
The assessment is made on the viability and recovery of the loan. If further discussion is 
required, then assessment of the project is escalated to the board level. The head of 
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85 * Quorum: all members of the executive committee must be present to muster a quorum 
** Quorum: majority of all members 




In recognition of the DBP’s stride in implementing corporate governance within the 
organisation, the bank received an award from the Association of the Development 
Financial Institutions in the Asia Pacific (ADFIAP) for having the best corporate 
governance program for a development bank in the region. (ADFIAP 2007)  
In contrast to its rehabilitation, operationalising corporate governance within the bank 
has not been traumatic. There is stronger sense of trust and confidence within the bank 
and its employees: 
“I can give my responsibilities to my staff office members and leave them for a 
week and things won’t collapse.” – DBP interviewee 
Corporate governance is welcomed and not at all dissuaded at the DBP - if at least to 
prevent another turbulent event in the organisation: 
“We don’t want another rehabilitation program [such as what happened in 1986] 
at DBP. This will be our legacy.” – DBP interviewee 
Introducing corporate governance reforms is seen as essential in enhancing the bank’s 
growth, development and reputation. The reforms are part of the natural evolutionary 
process for the financial institution. 
8.2 Government Service Insurance System 
 
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was created in 1936 during the 
American colonial period with the passage of the Commonwealth Act 186 to “look after 
the needs of the nation’s public servants when they could no longer look after 
themselves or their families.” 86
GSIS’ is one of the oldest social security programs in the region still in existence today 
with a mandate covering a variety of social security benefits: 
(World Bank 1995: 28) 
“…to provide and administer the following social security benefits for all 
employees of the Philippine government: compulsory life insurance, optional life 
insurance, retirement benefits, disability benefits for work-related contingencies 
and death benefits.”(GSIS 2009)  
                                                     
86 For more information on GSIS’ history and legislative changes that expanded the original 




As the overarching organisation dealing with government employee pension, 
membership is around “1.42M consisting of all employees of government regardless of 
status except for uniformed members of the military, police, jail management and fire 
protection.”(Palmiery 2002: 4) Administering the system are around 3000 GSIS 
employees with the majority located in a magnificent building on reclaimed land 
overlooking Manila Bay.  
Recently, reforms in the administration of GSIS have included changes to the premium 
based policy and computerisation of member records promoting transparency and 
disclosure: 
“The earth-shaking policy has been the premium-based policy. It was previously 
taken for granted that those who contributed [was] based on other agencies’ 
information. For example, the number of years you worked in a government 
agency, [it was] taken for granted that you also contributed to your pension 
calculated by the number of years you worked in the agency. But now, the 
rationale is, what you put in is what you get out. There has to be creditable years 
of service. Upon its development there were lots of protests. The new databases87
The GSIS the government owned pension fund of the country, and is therefore one of the 
largest institutional investors in the country. Where the SEC supervises publicly listed 
corporations, GSIS (with SSS) are indirectly supervised by the Department of Finance. 
Executive orders on corporate governance are administered by the Department allowing 
both funds to set up their corporate governance procedures. 
 
cleaned the premiums paid on the agency; not the premium based on services.” – 
GSIS interviewee 
8.2.1 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting 
 
Similarly to DBP, the introduction of corporate governance within GSIS is most visible in 
the establishment of new board committees. In 2006, GSIS formed “specific committees 
to assist the Board of Trustees in developing corporate governance principles, as well as 
in policy formulation and in the exercise of oversight responsibilities.”(GSIS 2007:21) The 
introduction of these new committees has rendered a sagacious board culture: 
                                                     




“[The following] committees were created to help it manage and function GSIS: 
* corporate governance committee 
* risk committee 
* audit committee 
* legal oversight committee to the board of trustees 
“These committees are oversight functions. These functions carry much weight. 
Committee members are members of the board. These reforms have made the 
board more careful, more prudent, and more circumspect in its actions.” – GSIS  
The Corporate Governance Committee oversaw the following activities in 2007: 
• “corporate governance and strategic guidance (over new technologies) 
• capacity-building activities (including seminars on best practices in corporate 
governance) 
• performance evaluation (awards and recognition and performance appraisal 
of employees) 
• compensation (“under which the Committee reviewed and recommended a 
policy on payment of benefits withheld from employees previously charged 
with administrative offenses but were subsequently exonerated.” ) 
• stakeholder relations and social responsibility (such as support for hospitals) 
• other responsibilities (reviewing of joint ventures with real estate interests)” 
(GSIS Annual Report 2007: 21)  
In its 2007 financial statements, GSIS reported “consolidated total assets (unaudited) 
amounted to P441.44B…the marked improvement was attributed to the growth in the 
Social Insurance Fund (SIF) which posted P410.08B. The SIF is the source of social 
insurance benefits of the more than 1.5M GSIS members, and thus makes up bulk of 
[GSIS] consolidated assets.” (GSIS Annual Report 2007: 34). The Social Insurance Fund is 
also the source of investible assets for GSIS (see Section on Investment Portfolio and 
Strategy). Thus It is difficult to fathom why GSIS’ financial statements remain unaudited 
(see pp.36 and 37 of the 2007 GSIS Annual Report). In this regard, good corporate 
governance practice of transparent, accountable reporting has not yet filtered through in 




8.2.2 Views of GSIS 
 
The wealth held and generated at the GSIS fund comes with a heavy weight of 
responsibility. As the sole pension fund for government employees, there is wariness as 
to whether the funds are being used for their intended purposes. According to one 
interviewee: 
“The monopoly powers of GSIS are basically its recipe for inefficiency. 
Government employees complain of unacquired loans. The budgetary constraints 
are institutionalised. They have the government employees’ money. There are 
sources of possible corruption – both soft and hard corruption. It happens in 
GOCCs. Whose money is it? Who’s making the decisions? How do they manage 
it from [political] interference to [one without]? [GSIS] doesn’t have full control. 
All of government want some contribution to a particular fund. They change 
rules of what public servants can do to any amount they [politicians] want.”-
former public servant 
Amongst other interviewees there remains the perception of GSIS as a heavily politicised 
organisation where investment and funding decisions are not done in an impartial way. 
8.2.3 GSIS’ President and General Manager (PGM), Winston Garcia 
 
The President and General Manager (PGM) of GSIS play a pivotal role in the investment 
decisions of the organisation. The PGM “exerts a strong influence on the direction and 
investment strategies of the portfolio” and the portfolio choices in both GSIS and SSS 
funds reflect “the preferences of the heads of the institution as influenced by their levels 
of experience, exposure and orientation.” (Palmiery 2002: 15) 
Presumably investments in government securities signal a more conservative approach 
in the financing strategy while investments in equities mean the organisation is headed 
towards a more active and risk-taking culture. As with any political appointee, the PGM 
must balance the demands between the political objectives, and organisational needs: 
“At present, all members of the policy making bodies of the pension funds are 
political appointees. Moreover, the CEO serves at the pleasure of the appointing 
authority. The situation makes the management vulnerable to political 




At the time of data collection, the PGM of GSIS, Winston Garcia is widely known for 
being a strong and close ally of then President Macapagal-Arroyo. His political affiliation 
is both a strength and weakness for the organisation. The advantage of his political 
connection is he has the political mandate and support to implement strategic reforms 
for GSIS. This can be seen in the organisation’s strategy to go global with their 
investments (see section on GSIS’ search for a global fund manager): 
“We are gearing up for our global investments. We have a headstrong PGM: he 
serves at the pleasure of the president. It is expected he would still be here for the 
next 3 years. We expect a lot of people to comment on reforms especially with 
our global investments.” – GSIS 
However, the weakness is his activities have come under scrutiny especially from 
political opponents of then President Macapagal-Arroyo. Being in the public eye and 
head of the government employees’ fund, investments of any kind are scrutinised. 
Garcia’s purchase of paintings by Juan Luna and Fernando Amorsolo, two of the 
Philippines’ greatest painters, caused some controversy due to the value paid and type of 
investment asset (Burgonio 2008, GSIS 2008). The paintings are now part of the art 
collection of the GSIS museum. (GSIS 2009b) 
Garcia’s father, Senator Pablo Garcia is a political representative from Cebu. A dispute 
involved between Senator Garcia and House Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr. spilled out into 
the public arena with suggestions from de Venecia that Senator Garcia was receiving 
funds for his election campaigns from GSIS because of his son’s position (Gagni 2007). 
GSIS’ Garcia challenged this assertion by filing a libel suit against a de Venecia supporter, 
Manila representative Bienvenido Abante. Abante had sought to open the books of 
accounts of GSIS (Esguerra 2007). 
Thus the PGM of GSIS requires a set of diplomatic and political skills that go beyond the 
organisational, professional and operational requirements of the position. The leader of a 
pension fund in the country requires having the innate ability to meet the needs of 
different stakeholders and navigate the unpredictable waters of Philippine politics. 
8.3 Social Security System  
 




war environment of the Philippines with the passing of the Republic Act 1162 in 1954. 
Whereas the GSIS serves the needs of public sector employees, the SSS was established 
to address the needs of people employed in the private sector.88 Over the decades, the 
SSS scheme was expanded to include: “the self-employed (1990), farmers and fishermen 
(1992), domestic helpers, overseas contract workers (or OFWs) and workers in the 
informal sector with monthly income of less than P1000 per month.”89
Administering the fund are around 4,000 employees and another 1,500 contractors 
mostly based in Quezon City. Due to some organisational rightsizing of the SSS in the 
past decade, there is a high amount of contractual workers (clerks, encoders and 
frontline people). Eventually the intention is to make the contracted workers part of the 
regular workforce but this depends on the limits of the SSS budget.  
 (Palmiery 2002: 4) 
Organisationally, SSS has resource issues regarding staff numbers: 
“SSS has 26M members, GSIS has 1.5 members but we have the same number of 
employees to look after different number of members.” – SSS 
The quiet rivalry between the two pension funds is also well-known especially when it 
comes to investments and member contributions: 
“[In 2007] our asset base is P235M, the GSIS is P400B. That wasn’t always the 
case. Until 2000 SSS was ahead of GSIS but eventually GSIS took us over. There 
has always been a silent rivalry between GSIS and SSS. There was a competition 
on projects. We were leading them on investments in 1997, but only in 2005 that 
we’ve fallen behind them. The functionalities are different. There’s a controlled 
membership base at GSIS. 1.5M vs. 26M. How can you compete?  
We have to work more on volumes, a catch up game as far as the volume is 
concerned. There’s flexibility in how they are concerned – they have higher 
                                                     
88 As outlined in Section 2 of the SSS charter: “It is the policy of the State to establish, develop, 
promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of 
the people throughout the Philippines which shall promote social justice and provide meaningful 
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability; sickness, 
maternity, old-age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. 
Towards this end, the State shall endeavour to extend social security protection to workers and 
their beneficiaries.” 
89 Section 9 of the SSS charter looks at coverage: “Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon 
all employees not over 60 years of age and their employers: Provided, that in the case of domestic 




contributions…The reputation of GSIS is getting better. There’s also a salary cap 
of P15,000/month as contribution from members. 10.4% contribution is applied 
only to [those with] P15,000. GSIS has no ceiling as far as salary is concerned. 
There’s 21%, 9% from 12% for a government agency. [Their contributions] are 
entirely different”. – SSS  
With more people employed in the private sector, the SSS is a much larger scheme than 
GSIS. In 2006, a World Bank study ranked the SSS scheme as the most important and 
biggest in the country (Ghosh 2006: 130). In 2002, SSS had 19M registered members 
although only 7M are actively paying. In 2006, the coverage remained stable with the SSS 
covering 74% of the private sector but only a 1/3 are active contributors. (2006: 132) In 
terms of the nominal contribution rate, the employee rate is 3.3% while the employer 
rate is 6.1%. The contribution from the scheme as percentage of GDP is only 0.7%. (2006: 
134). Regionally, the employee nominal contribution rate has some way to go to meet the 
Singaporean rate of 20% but it is above Thailand’s and Indonesia’s. Similarly, as 
percentage of GDP, the Philippine contribution is above those two countries with a wide 
gap between the bottom three and the regional leaders of Singapore at 8.5% and 
Malaysia at 4.9%.  
The SSS is the largest pension fund for the private sector in the country and is therefore 
one of the largest institutional investors in the country with GSIS. 
8.3.1 Corporate Governance at SSS 
 
For SSS, introducing corporate governance into the organisation has taken a more 
extensive form than GSIS or DBP. The motivations for implementing corporate 
governance at SSS happened in the wake of the Enron collapse, conversations with the 
ICD, the OECD corporate governance code for SOEs, and the imprimatur of then SSS 
Commissioner Corazon De La Paz.  
The organisation received help from ICD in formulating its corporate governance code. 
Its then Commissioner De La Paz also used to sit on the board of trustees of the ICD and 
had intimate knowledge of the work of the organisation in promoting corporate 
governance. The ICD has also extensively worked on introducing corporate governance 




“We are in the process of writing our own Code of Corporate Governance within 
the SSS but we are trying to align it with the code of corporate governance with 
the ICD for the GOCCs. [The current corporate governance codes] are mostly on 
the shareholder side so we plan to bring it down to the management level… There 
must be [input] from the management level and the employees. The corporate 
governance [code] will align with the ICD. It will be similar to the SEC code of 
corporate governance.” – SSS  
The influential 2005 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Stated-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) was another factor. Like its equivalent 1999 Corporate Governance 
Code for the Private Sector, the OECD Code for SOEs is becoming more influential in 
developing countries were the government sector is larger than the private sector and 
government owned enterprises are more extensive and wide-ranging. Illustrating this 
point, there are more government owned corporations in the Philippines than there are 
listed companies (Moreno 2006). 
Again, mirroring the experience of the 1999 Code, the 2005 Code has proven to be more 
relevant for developing countries when they were intended for SOEs in developed 
countries in the first place. Improving corporate governance in OECD SOEs carry with it 
the principal motive of eventually privatising these SOEs: 
“…good corporate governance of State-Owned Enterprises is an important 
prerequisite for economically effective privatisation, since it will make the 
enterprises more attractive to prospective buyers and enhance their valuation.” 
(OECD 2005: 9) 
SSS sees the value of the OECD Code but the question for the organisation is the matter 
of operationalising the Code and making it relevant within: 
“I attended a roundtable discussion on the Asian experiences of corporate 
governance for GOCCs hosted by the OECD. So the principles of the OECD on 
the public sector came up. We’re trying to come up with our own, and not just 
copy and paste it with the OECD [as the SEC did]. We’ll try to copy, improve it 
and make it more applicable. We are trying to adapt it to our situation here at 
SSS. There is a taskforce that will do that.” – SSS 




organisation is fundamental. Effective corporate governance in the Philippines is 
championed by respected members of the community. For SSS, then Commissioner 
Corazon De La Paz championed the corporate governance cause within the organisation. 
Having worked for most of her career in the private sector and wooed to head SSS, De La 
Paz was familiar with the principles of corporate governance being practised in the 
private sector.  
Under her tenure, four pillars of governance were established for SSS: financial viability, 
sound investments, quality service and corporate culture. All SSS programs revolve 
around these four pillars. The corporate governance lynchpin comes under the pillar of 
corporate culture with the various documents and training introduced: 
• Code of Corporate Governance 
• Corporate Governance Seminars and Training for Directors90
• Code of Ethics and Personnel Manual 
  
The Code of Ethics is seen to formalise expected ethical behaviour in the organisation: 
“We are going to have a Code of Ethics which will be completed prior to the Code 
of Corporate Governance and there’s also a Personnel Manual which covers the 
do’s and don’ts for an employee. We are moving on creating specific policies on 
governance.” – SSS 
For SSS, the two codes and manual are seen as guidelines on employee behaviour that 
are organisationally specific and relevant. This is how corporate governance is seen and 
operationalised at an entity-wide level at SSS. 
8.4 Amalgamating GSIS and SSS? 
 
In 1995 it was suggested that the two pension funds merge over the perceived 
duplication of their services. In the World Bank publication, “Philippines: An Agenda for 
the Reform of the Social Security Institutions”, the amalgamation of GSIS and SSS was 
one of the main recommendations of the report. While the document is an extensive 
scrutiny of the strengths and weaknesses of both pension funds, the report also 
                                                     
90 This was in order to follow an April 2007 Presidential Memorandum that required “All directors 
of GOCCs and GFIs are required to take an orientation seminar on corporate governance.” Slide 




contained – with the benefit of hindsight it may now be considered as optimistic - 
extensive plans on the structure of these two funds as they transitioned into one (1995: 
Annex D). Combining the two funds was justified according to reasons of rationalisation, 
portability, efficiency and improving asset management as reproduced in the following 
table: 






“… the current structure is beset with an artificial segmentation of 
membership, a multitude of plans for the public provision of social 
security, differing contribution and benefit rates, the absence of 
portability, and a lack of transparency. Since the SSS and the GSIS are 
the major players in the sector, a merger between them would go a long 




“Although recent legislation provides for portability, the specifics have 
not been worked out and might be complicated given the differences in 
contribution rates and benefits. It will also involve recurring 
administrative expenses. A merger and rationalisation of the basic social 
security programs into a common contribution and benefits formula 
would help resolve these difficulties.” 
Improving 
Efficiency 
“While specific financial and operational reforms can also contribute 
towards improving efficiency, efficiency gains can be achieved by 
economies of scale from merging branches. There are at least 27 
locations where both the SSS and the GSIS maintain branches. 
Efficiency gains would also be achieved by pooling the human resources 
from the two institutions. Some of the skill requirements are job-




“Through a comprehensive reform, it would be easier to pass new 
legislation which will cover all facets of social security including asset 
management and related policies. Changing asset allocation practices 
and adopting portfolio diversification principles would enable the social 
security system to play a more active role in developing the capital 
market. The privatisation of the asset management function will further 
deepen the financial market.” 
 
However at the time of writing this proposal remains a suggestion. The organisations 
differ culturally, in stakeholder perception and participation, and in serving the needs of 
their respective members. Unlike corporate governance reforms, this coercive 
institutional isomorphism from an external institution did not occur. Indeed, the 




8.5 Investment Portfolio and Strategy of the Funds 
 
The investment portfolio of both GSIS and SSS are legislated in their respective charters: 
“There are certain ceilings limiting the amount of investments that can be made 
in different financial products and sectors. These policy guidelines or parameters 
are issued to set out limits on domestic and global investments…Section 36 (j) of 
the Republic Act states that GSIS must make investments in companies that have 
shown profitability. This [Act] is our bible91
Therefore, the investment strategies of the pension funds are restricted by these 
legislated requirements and to meet social obligations as outlined in their charters. 
Decisions must closely follow their respective charters and cannot be overruled by the 
board: 
. This sets out specific guidelines [for 
our investments].” – GSIS  
“In private sector corporations it is the decision of the board that will prevail 
with regard to making company investments but that’s how they practice in 
industry.” – GSIS 
Both pension funds have a fund where members’ contributions are pooled. For GSIS, the 
fund is called the Social Insurance Fund,92 while the SSS equivalent is the Reserve 
Fund.93
                                                     
91 This description was prompted when I read the Useem quote in the Theories of Corporate 
Governance book. I told them the Theories book was my bible for my research. 
 
92 This is outlined in Section 34 of the GSIS Act: “All contributions payable under Section 5 of this 
Act together with the earnings and accruals thereon shall constitute the GSIS Social Insurance 
Fund. The said fund shall be used to finance the benefits administered by the GSIS under this Act. 
In addition, the GSIS shall administer the optional insurance fund for the insurance coverage 
described in Section 26 hereof, the Employees’ Compensation Insurance Fund created under P.D. 
626, as amended, General Insurance Fund created under Act No. 656, as amended, and such other 
special funds existing or that may be created for special groups or persons rendering services to 
the government. The GSIS shall maintain the required reserves to guarantee the fulfilment of its 
obligations under this Act. The funds of the GSIS shall not be used for purposes other than what 
are provided for under this Act. Moreover, no portion of the funds of the GSIS or income thereof 
shall accrue to the General Fund of the national government and its political subdivisions, 
instrumentalities and other agencies including government-owned and controlled corporations 
except as may be allowed under this Act.” 
93 This is outlined in Section 26 of the SSS Act: “All revenues of the SSS not needed to meet 
current administrative and operational expenses incidental to carrying out this Act shall be 
accumulated in a fund known as “The Reserve Fund.” Such portions of the Fund not needed to 




Each fund is then used to invest in different asset classes with expected returns meeting 
each fund’s future actuarial requirements. The type of assets these two funds are allowed 
to invest in and the legislated ceilings is set out in the table in Appendix 6. This table 
covers the mandated financial instruments and limitations on how much the fund can 
invest in that particular asset type or financial instrument and compares section 26 of 
the SSS Act and section 36 of the GSIS Act. For SSS in particular, the limitations and 
ceilings on the type of investment are extensively articulated in Section 26 of the SSS Act: 
“…cumulative ceilings as follows: 40% in private securities; 35% in housing; 30% 
in real estate related investment; 10% in short and medium-term member loans; 
30% in GFIs and GOCCs; 30% in infrastructure projects; 15% in any particular 
industry; 7.5% in foreign-currency denominated investments.”-SSS Act 
For GSIS, its Act gives it more discretion than SSS in terms of its investment ceilings for 
all asset types with the main exception being the limitation on housing loans to GSIS 
members which is capped at 40% (see Appendix 6; section 36 (c)). 
The investment limitations in pension funds from emerging economies like the 
Philippines have come in for some criticism as being too restrictive and conservative, 
while pension funds based in OECD countries have more flexible ceilings giving these 
funds more autonomy (Ghosh 2006: 135, Hess & Impavido 2003) . The following figure 
compares the portfolio mix of the two funds at the end of 2001: 
Figure 40: Comparison of Investment Portfolio Mix between GSIS and SSS (2001) 
                                                                                                                                                           
Commission shall manage and invest with skill, care, prudence and diligence necessary under 
circumstances with such matters would exercise in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character 
and with similar aims…in line with the basic principles of safety, good yield and liquidity, the 
Commission shall investment the funds to earn an annual income not less than average rates of 






Source: Palmiery (2002: 7) 
 
For SSS, the portfolio mix is more evenly distributed with private equities and securities 
the most dominant at 27%. The old investment adage applies of not putting all eggs in 
one basket. For GSIS, a high proportion of their investment portfolio is loans made to 
members at nearly 48%. Given the ceiling of a 40% housing loans, the 8% presumably is 
made of other loans. At the end of the GSIS interview, with some relief a representative 
stated “I am so glad you didn’t ask about our non-performing loans.” I asked rhetorically, 
“What about your non-performing loans?” However the issue of NPLs was peripheral to 
the research and pursuing this avenue was an option not exercised. 
In comparison, the next figure illustrates the portfolio mix of the Canadian Pension Plan 
Investment Board (CPPIB 2009) - the investment arm of the Canadian government’s 
pension fund. In 2009, the fund was valued at C$108B and is an example of a 
depoliticised, independent government pension fund from an OECD country: 






































The fund’s investments are in three areas: equities, fixed income and inflation-sensitive 
assets (CPPIB 2009b). At the end of 2008, most of the fund was invested in publicly listed 
and private equities at around 57.5% or C$USD62.7B of the total portfolio (CPPIB 2009c). 
The fund’s portfolio does not provide loans to its 17 million members and beneficiaries. 
(CPPIB 2009d) 
Interviewees acknowledge the conservative nature of their charter’s ceilings and inherent 
limitations in their investment decisions: 
“Most of our funds are invested in government securities (sovereign guarantee 
undertakings), [and are] protected from external [shocks]. There are also layers of 
authority with committees to approve investments. The Commission of Audit 
[will] look at whatever adverse conditions there are [such as what] crisis in Asia 
will bring. Our investments are relatively safe – we hold on to them. We have 
short-term government (Treasury bills) held for a maximum of 1 year, 364 days; 
Then we have 180 days, 90 days T-bills. For the long term, we invest in Treasury 
bonds: from 2 years to 25 years. We have [currency]-denominated long term 
bonds with the earliest [having a] maturity date of 2014 while the longest will 
mature in 2032.” – GSIS  
However, at the same time, investment cultures in both funds are also shaped by events 
and/or personalities. At GSIS, the impact of the East Asian crisis produced a conservative 
approach in making investments: 
“Crisis is our lifestyle. Basically the Philippine investments were pretty resilient to 
stay afloat. Government agencies and instrumentalities – we have remained safe. 



















have remained steadfast, but we have regained [from the crisis]. Some have been 
affected. The investment aspect of GSIS is very good. We managed to maintain 
our stability. GSIS manages the pension fund and the huge amount of money 
contributed by its members. The investment policy, therefore, is very, very 
conservative to staying afloat during the crisis. Post-1997, our expectations to 
recover are already here and have recovered under GMA. We thrive in crises.” – 
GSIS  
At SSS, the background of each SSS head influenced a different type of investment 
culture under their tenure: 
“The [discussion of] investments at the board level – it’s a matter of culture. At 
the time of President Corazon Aquino, Mr. Jose Cuisia was appointed (Phil Am 
Life, ex-BSP head). Since the Charter allowed flexibility, there was a little 
diversification, and the benefits started to improve. He was a businessman, so he 
looked at those things. [This was in contrast] with [a previous] administrator 
[who] promoted investment] in banks, [he was on the] very safe side; [compared 
to] Cuisia [who was] aggressive [in investing]. 
“There was significant improvement in our funds –our fund grew 6 times 
between 1979 and 1989. The fund management became more diversified when 
handled by bankers; then [someone from the] military was appointed then 
[someone from] the banking sector. [In the 1990s, there were] aggressive 
[reforms] with computerisation - and as far as [this head] was concerned, [he 
was] more of an operations person. With the change to De La Paz, the priority 
was to clean up SSS first when the cases94
Investment restrictions do have an effect on the organising of these pension funds. The 
next section looks at the long-term sustainability of the funds. 
 happened. She was more conscious of 
[restoring the reputation of SSS].” – SSS 
8.5.1 Actuarial Life 
 
The importance of meeting the fund’s actuarial requirements is also an important 
                                                     




consideration in investment decisions. In 2007, GSIS’s minimum return was an annual 
yield of 12%: 
“Before we proceed on government projects, the imprimatur of the board of 
trustees, we have existing limitations. We don’t investment if we expect a return 
lower than required. For the Clark [Air Base] project, we require that it will 
generate a minimum return of 12% which is our actuarial requirement. Anything 
below the 12% - which is the magic number - we can’t sustain the services and 
needs of our members. On an annual basis we need a 12% return on everything 
we have.  
“Our primary concern is always geared towards our members. GSIS has actually 
computed this magic number to sustain operations, benefits – future benefits. 
The fund should last 25-30 years so that we can ensure we have enough funds. 
12% is the magic number. We have reduced our housing loans as actuarially they 
don’t meet our yield requirements. For example with the Clark venture, any 
amount lower than 12%, we doubt that the Board of Trustees will give its 
imprimatur financially.” – GSIS  
For SSS, news in 1999 that the actuarial life had shortened as the payment of benefits 
exceeded member contributions threatened the viability of the Reserve Fund. A joint 
World Bank and ADB report highlighted the financial problems faced by the fund and 
mentioned the necessity to immediately address the problems of decreasing 
contributions and inappropriate misuse of funds: 
“…If the SSS does not increase its contribution rate or extend the contribution 
period, it is estimated that its resources will dry up by 2015…reported misuse of 
the fund also inflicted losses on the SSS.” (World Bank and ADB 2003 – see pp. 
xii, xv and 11) 
The crisis in the life of the SSS fund added to the conservative investment decision 
making culture in the organisation as the fund tries to recover and regain its ideal yield: 
“At the SSS the yield should be around 12% but at the moment it’s 7% so we [are 
trying] to get it higher. In 1999, there was an actuarial valuation and the big news 




actuarial fund is now expected to last until 2031. The new actuarial valuation this 
year [2007] is expected now to go up to 2038.”– SSS 
Ensuring these funds are financially sustainable to meet and provide income security for 
retired employees mean their investments must be prudent. The next section looks at 
the capital market investments by the funds. 
8.6 Capital Market Participation by GSIS and SSS 
 
In this research, the most relevant aspect of the investment portfolio of GSIS and SSS is 
with their investments in the capital market through private equities and securities. As 
institutional investors, their investments in publicly listed corporations give them the 
privilege and leverage to be active participants and influence decisions in companies 
they are erstwhile owners of. As substantial owners of publicly listed companies, GSIS 
and SSS become both a significant shareholder and stakeholder in the corporate 
governance processes of the organisation. From this section onwards, the corporate 
governance role and influence of GSIS and SSS are discussed. 
Capital market investments made by the pension funds occurred gradually. In GSIS, 
stock market participation occurred from the 1970s onwards; subsequent bull runs 
encouraged the GSIS participate more in the PSE: 
“Active participation of the GSIS in the stock market resumed in 1998 when the 
volume of transactions in the exchange started building up, partly triggered by 
the entry of foreign investors and strong interest of domestic investors.” 
(Palmiery 2002: 10) 
For SSS, their foray into the stock market did not occur until 1987. Participation of both 
GSIS and SSS in the PSE increased market confidence and encouraged share market 
participation. (Palmiery 2002: 12) Indeed, their marked can only contribute to the 
virtuous cycle of capital market and corporate governance development in the country. 
Through these funds, a member of either GSIS or SSS is indirectly a shareholder of a 
Philippine public corporation. Where Philippine retail investors are few on the ground 
and stock market speculation is still seen as an elitist activity, a significant proportion of 





8.6.1 Capital Market Investments 
 
Given the limitations in their charter for both funds, the funds’ investments in publicly 
listed companies are nominally restricted to the blue-chip corporations – that is 
corporations who have had a proven track record of three years profitability with 
payment of dividends at least once over the same period (see Appendix 6: Section 26 (i) 
of the SSS charter; Section 36 (h) of the GSIS charter). Thus when interviewed, the list of 
companies the funds invest or have invested in are generally the well-regarded ones. 
In 2007, GSIS was divesting in PSE listed corporations as they were looking at global 
investments given the limitations of the domestic market (this is treated more 
extensively in a later section in this chapter – GSIS’ search for a Global Fund Manager): 
“We currently now have investments in 20 companies on the PSE. We have sold 
SMC (which we held for 10 years) and sold our Ayala interests. Our biggest share 
holding is in the First Philippine Holdings. We have had big shareholdings on 
SMC, Meralco, PLDT, Basic Consolidated Incorporated. We have a board seat on 
Meralco, Basic Consolidated Inc. We are currently divesting as we are going to go 
global (with investments). In 2006 we had P33B worth of investments in the PSE 
listed companies, this year it’s down to P10B.”– GSIS  
Similarly with SSS, the profitability required by their charter is a fundamental 
consideration: 
“There are guidelines on where to put our investment in. PAL [Philippine 
Airlines] has not posted a return and there’s no track record of profitability. If we 
look into a company, they must be profitable for the last 3 years. PAL was 
affected by the [East Asian] crisis. The equities that we have are blue-chip stocks: 
infrastructure, utilities, SMC, PLDT, Meralco, banks, a bit of mining. We have a 
diversification issue – don’t put all our eggs in one basket. We have a set limit for 
equities. We used to be in PNB. On the PSE we have around 20 stocks. It’s the 
same amount over the past 10 years.” – SSS  





“We started becoming aggressive when Estrada came in. There was an increase in 
putting investments into equities. Now it’s very limited [as a result].” – SSS  
Capital market investments by the funds take into consideration the tensions within and 
outwith the organisation. 
8.6.2 Socially Responsible Investments 
 
With socio- environmental concerns at the fore, socially responsible investments (or SRI) 
have been a concern for institutional investors and fund managers in the past decade 
(Clarke and Dela Rama 2004).The notion of SRI has not gone unnoticed in the 
Philippines. 
For SSS, there is an emphasis that investments in the capital markets must also be done 
in a socially responsible way. A decision to invest or not invest in a certain company or 
sector must be justified especially if such investments may have detrimental social 
effects. When holding a major stake in a corporation, the SSS also exercises its leverage if 
the corporation decides to enter a less socially responsible sector: 
“There are very strict guidelines where we’ll put the funds of the SSS. It specifies 
those terms. There are specific investments, the types of investment, the yield. 
We can’t invest in gambling, other vices, cigarettes. Not investing in cigarettes is 
unwritten rather than written in the charter but it has been followed – to avoid 
investing in them unlike GSIS. And we don’t invest in [companies] that have 
profitability issues. 
“On not investing in cigarettes – there is a morality issue involved – the previous 
[presidential] administration has tried to put a limit on investing in them…[If we 
have major stake in a corporation and] they decide to enter gambling or [build] 
casinos, [our CEO] De La Paz will have something to say about it. The morality 
issue is a safety issues as well. When there is an investment in vices, there’s also a 
speculative element and yield. Vice investments are speculative. 
“We made an investment in Makati Medical Center. If we go into smoking, why 
are we funding hospitals? This kind of defeats the investments as they cancel 




the hospitals. [Our stance here] shows [our decision-making process with] what 
we do before we put our money.” – SSS  
Socially responsible investments also mean investing in areas where profitability may not 
be the premium consideration. The capital market success of some of the Philippines 
biggest listed corporations has influenced the organisation to take a more focused 
approach on other sectors of the economy that are not receiving as much investment 
attention: 
“The [investment in] equities allow us to lend or to give loans to private 
corporations. There is now less need to give it to huge corporations, so now we’re 
looking at SMEs. There is also the social side – [our loans] should generate jobs, 
so we look at tourism-oriented projects. We also invest to avert power crises – we 
have power subsidies, and also those involved in education and high schools. We 
give loans to schools and hospitals. We lend knowing that some would not make 
a profit but [this is less of a consideration] because of the social impact and 
benefit [their impact would have on communities]. For example [we are] 
investing in the housing sector– it is a bad [sectoral] investment and 
[investments are] hard to recover.” – SSS  
For GSIS, socially responsible investments and corporate social responsibility are closely 
connected: 
“If you’re talking about CSR, it’s a policy for our national government. Under the 
law there are types of industry [that we don’t invest in]. For example, there is a 
government policy prohibiting investing in nuclear power; also anti-terrorism - 
no investments to be made in the reproduction of armaments under the 
country’s terrorism laws.” – GSIS  
With a definite acknowledgement in the way investments are normally linked to the 
political wishes of the day: 
“SRI for GSIS depends on public policy. Policies of social responsibility are 
connected with government policies. If the government launches a new SME 
funding project, for sure it will ask GSIS to contribute in the form of direct 
lending, wholesale lending to our members, microfinance, and life in the country. 




While funds are well aware of their SRI obligations, the political environment means 
these two funds must navigate through this minefield and ensure they do not alienate 
powerful stakeholders. 
8.6.3 Nationalism, Parochialism and Global Investments 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are legislated limitations on the investment policy and 
strategy of both pension funds. Both are severely restricted in terms of their investment 
allocation guidelines. Most investments are focused on peso-based financial instruments, 
which according to one interviewee: 
“…is a very narrow basis. The conundrum is the peso has the lowest rating – a 
junk rating for a currency.” –private sector 1 
The parochialism towards moving the pension funds to invest in other foreign 
investments is a matter of nationalism: 
“This foreign resistance is not well advised. It is uninformed. It is matter of 
information and national resistance. Main Street USA has the same attitudes.” –
private sector 1 
The nationalistic reasons for not investing overseas have had a patched history with a 
start-stop approach at GSIS: 
“In pursuit of diversification, the GSIS in 1994 invested in foreign markets with a 
USD10M initial exposure. The venture became profitable but it had to pull out 
the funds after 2 years due to government and public pressures.” (Palmiery 2002: 
10) 
These restrictions are well-acknowledged by GSIS representatives. The limitations placed 
on the foreign investment expansion reflect the somewhat myopic and parochial nature 
of the organisation’s masters: 
“GSIS does not have any funds in the USA except in mutual funds...Global 
investments are just being developed now. Here, the view is that we should 
concentrate our investments in the Philippines. The feeling or the view is that 




I further probed this reluctance by discussing with my pension fund interviewees about 
this misunderstanding about investing overseas. I pointed out that Filipinos are great 
consumers of overseas goods. The tendency to buy a Western product can be seen as 
buying into a part of the Western lifestyle95
“[Filipinos] understand buying easily but not investing. Those [Western 
products] are things we use every day but if you talk about stocks – for them, the 
common person, you are investing overseas. It must be explained why this is 
thus, why investment [is going overseas]…there is a lack of investor 
understanding.” – GSIS  
. If Filipino consumers buy Coca Cola or 
Nestle products, surely it would be logical to buy into the Coca Cola or Nestle companies 
as shareholders; shareholders receive income in the form of dividends. Simply 
consuming a foreign product brings immediate gratification but no long term benefits; 
every Filipino buying a pair of Nike shoes are adding to the income of Nike, sustaining its 
shareholder value and contributing to its dividends. Wouldn’t it be better to buy into the 
company and receive dividends? 
Similarly, at SSS, while its charter gives it leeway or possibility to invest overseas, the 
political pressures are such that it is more prudent not to and err on the side of caution: 
“As for the SSS going global, our charter gives us the leeway to go global but it’s 
controversial. It’s a sensitive issue. Why are we investing elsewhere? Congress 
asks us why we’re going to invest overseas.  
“In the charter there is a leeway for us to invest up to 7.5% in foreign investments 
under section 26, subsection (2) (j) and (k). So that section does give us the 
ability to invest overseas but we currently don’t have any foreign investments. 
Our charter also allows us to invest in foreign currency but it must be non-
speculative, non-equity investments. 
“We will probably go global and the commission recently approved a direction to 
go into global foreign investment. But we have to be cautious about it. We know 
                                                     
95 The extensive shopping bazaar of Greenhills in Manila is also testament to the availability of 
counterfeited Western goods (at affordable domestic prices) in the country. Classen & Howes 





we can’t do it [yet]. It’s in the pipeline…we require a good yield at the moment.” – 
SSS  
Global investments remain a contentious issue for both funds. 
8.7 GSIS’ Search for a Global Fund Manager 
 
The small, domestic capital market of the Philippines places limitations for investment 
portfolio diversification for any investor yet investing globally to diversify the portfolios 
of both funds is also frowned upon. (Palmiery 2002: 15-16) 
While SSS was still conscious of its role in a politicised episode (see Politicisation of the 
Pension Funds in this chapter) and therefore took a more conservative and guarded 
approach to investing in both domestic and international equities, GSIS was free of any 
lingering legacy issues. Notwithstanding the existing stakeholder parochialism at the 
time of the GSIS interview, the organisation was engaged in the process of finding a 
global fund manager (GFM) to manage their foreign investments up to the tune of 
USD1B of the fund’s investable assets under the fund’s Global Investment Program (GIP). 
To meet the investment returns of the GSIS fund, the alternative to the small domestic 
market is to take advantage of going global and investing beyond one’s national borders. 
Thus, the search for the GFM was rationalised with a strong emphasis that unlike most 
appointments in the Philippines, this was not a political one. The search had an uneasy 
birth as it had to be vetted through the typical political obstacles. Given the political 
support for PGM Garcia, the timing for the Global Fund Manager was just right for the 
organisation. Nevertheless, a certain amount of political struggle had to be experienced 
before the go ahead was given for GSIS as the following statement relates: 
“Currently we are looking for a global fund manager to manage our international 
investments. We tried several years ago to introduce this but it was prevented 
and stopped by the then PGM, then by the Senate, then by Congress.” – GSIS  
For GSIS, the search for the GFM was also a way for the organisation to mitigate the 
political interference known only too well by governmental organisations given past 
experience; hence with GSIS’ international investments and political global fund 
managers, there could be little substance to allegations the process and investment 




“But now we are ready to introduce a Global Fund Manager. For this Global Fund 
Manager position, we have issued a tender and asked for proposals to be 
submitted by June 11. In late August, the board would have approved [the 
proposal] and by the end of the year there ought to be the Global Fund Manager. 
This is not a political appointment. The shortlist may include Lloyd’s, Merrill 
Lynch. It might be better to have two Global Fund Managers for a period of time 
– [so we do] not have all eggs in one basket. For example, for European 
investments [we have] a European Fund Manager; for American investments, [we 
have] an American Fund Manager.  
“The GFM is something new, [it’s] unchartered territory. Gains may come from 
investing overseas. [This is the] reason the PGM [states] why we’re going global is 
the local market here is already saturated. So we are looking at investing in other 
potential markets.” – GSIS interviewee 
Outsourcing the role of GFM is an acknowledgement that GSIS has little in-house 
technical expertise to manage global investments (Palmiery 2002: 17):  
"This will be the first time for the GSIS to invest abroad at this magnitude. We 
still do not have the necessary technical expertise to provide a good asset 
allocation consisting of global instruments," he said. "Foreign fund managers, on 
the other hand, have their ‘ears on the ground’ consistently and would be in a 
better position to propose an asset allocation." PGM Garcia (GSIS 2007 Press 
Release) 
The search for the GFM was done in a methodical way. GSIS sought the advice and 
experience of another institution which has been through the process before. From one 
pension fund to another, the PGM of GSIS went to the most well-known pension fund in 
the world, the Californian Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)(which had 
an investment portfolio valued at US$165B in February 2009 (CalPERS 2009), for 
direction in the process of finding or short-listing the GFM and managing global 
investments: 
“Our PGM went to CalPERS last month and tried to investigate [their actions] 
and they came up with parameters. [We have] request for proposals [which is] 




meeting with them is part of the requirements. We are using what were some of 
the CalPERS requirements for their GFM here at GSIS.” – GSIS interviewee 
Other pension funds GSIS reviewed for its GIP included “the California State Teachers' 
Retirement System, as well as the direction being taken by Asian neighbours such as the 
National Social Security Fund of China, the Government Pension Fund of Thailand and 
the Employees’ Provident Fund of Malaysia.”(GSIS 2008b) The search for the GFM was 
narrowed by the requirement that a proposing organisation have at least USD100B assets 
under management: the GFM of GSIS must have sufficient experience. Documents 
relating to the request for proposal for the GFM of GSIS were posted on the GSIS website 
to show that the process was done in a transparent way: 
“A total of 36 global fund managers and four global custodians submitted their 
proposals. The criteria for the selection and the relative weights of each 
parameter were also published in the website, as well as questions raised by the 
interested parties and the corresponding answers of the GSIS. This ensured that 
all participants have the same level of information needed to prepare their 
proposals to the GSIS," Mr. Garcia said.” (GSIS 2007b Press Release) 
An abridged version of the proposal questionnaire and the proposal evaluation matrix 
are outlined in Appendix 7. The evaluation matrix shows the weight of each issue as 
judged with the proposal. The questionnaire covers issues of the potential fund 
manager’s investment strategy, historical performance, risk management, organisation 
and investment philosophy and style.  
8.7.1 GSIS, the Global Fund and the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Timing is everything.  
In the latter half of 2007, the sub-prime crisis in the USA was unfolding which would 
eventually engulf the world in global financial crisis not seen since the Great Depression. 
By 2008 major collapses of certain developed economies, and government bailouts or 
nationalisation of financial institutions such as global investments banks occurred 
(Stiglitz 2010, Johnson & Kwak 2010). 
In the GFM questionnaire, the issue on risk management included a question relating to 




of global economic events such as the recent sub-prime crisis and weakening of the 
US$?” indeed, GSIS was proceeding ahead with full knowledge of market instability. 
For GSIS, going global as most developed economies were contracting provoked 
questions on the timing of such an initiative (Business Mirror 2009). Hence, after the 
first year of the GIP, the results for GSIS have been mixed. Financially, the annualised 
returns for its global investment portfolio are yet to meet the required target of 
8%.96
In 2007, GSIS explained their intention and investment strategy to appoint a global fund 
manager to manage their foreign investments. By 2009, this intention and strategy have 
been successfully executed. In 2009, GSIS is an institutional investor in geographically 
and sectorally diverse multinational corporations.
Organisationally, the appointment of global fund managers has been a success - 
investment decisions are made by a third party outside the politicised environment of 
the country. In 2008, GSIS announced a second round for its GIP (GSIS 2008c: 1) and in 
March 2009, American financial institution, JP Morgan was appointed as the custodian 
for GSIS USD1B global investment program (JP Morgan 2009).. 
97
The selection processes for the fund managers have been transparent. GSIS has European 
fund managers managing their European investments; and American fund managers 
managing their North American investments. On face value, the organisation is showing 
signs of confidence in the direction the organisation has proceeded with its foreign 
investments.  
 
                                                     
96 In the 2008 RFP, it is outlined: “For its global investments, GSIS seeks to obtain consistent 
positive investment returns with capital preservation and sufficient liquidity over a three-year 
period. The specific investment objectives are as follows: 
* 7.1 Target return. The return on the Fund in US dollar terms should be at least an average of 8% 
per year (net of management fee). 
* 7.2 Volatility. The Fund should have an average volatility of not more than 7%. 
* 7.3 Liquidity. There should be adequate provisions for an exit mechanism in case GSIS wants to 
liquidate the investment. (GSIS 2008c: 2) 
97 GSIS’ foreign portfolio include investments in the following corporations: “The pension fund’s 
stocks in large nonbank US companies, such as Pfizer Inc., Kraft Foods Inc., Newell Rubbermaid 
Inc., Sara Lee Corp. and FootLocker Inc…and stock investments in Spain’s Banco Santander; 
France’s BNP Paribas; Italy’s Intesa San Paolo and UniCredit Group; Ireland’s Allied Irish Bank 
and Irish Life & Permanent Plc.; Denmark’s Danske Bank; Sweden’s ForeningsSparbanken AB; 
Britain’s Cattles Plc. and Aviva Plc.; Israel’s Bank Hapoalim; Singapore’s DBS Group Holdings Ltd. 
and United Overseas Bank; and Indonesia’s Bank International, Bank Negara and Bank Rakyat, 




8.7.2 International Investment Experience of Other Pension Funds 
 
GSIS’ experiment into the world of international investing has a long way to go to match 
its developed country counterparts.  The Canadian pension fund, CPP Investment Board 
has been investing in infrastructure projects worldwide, including those owned by 
Australia’s Macquarie Group. The reputation of the CPP Investment Board is such that it 
attracts private sector talent to cross the divide and join the public sector fund and 
unlike GSIS and SSS, its government owners take a hands-off approach (Johnston 2009). 
The number of fund managers CPP Investment Board has on its books is also substantial: 
“CPP has more than 60 investment houses overseeing its private equity mandates 
and another 40 or so sharing its giant equity and property mandates,” (Johnston 
2009) 
Similarly, Australia’s Future Fund has an extensive list of fund managers for each asset 
class. As at May 2009, 11 asset classes were overseen by a 42 financial institutions (Future 
Fund 2009). If going global indicates a more independent and depoliticised GSIS, then at 
least in this regard, GSIS has achieved success. The sometimes drawn-out affair and 
piecemeal reform of allowing a government financial institution to function according to 
its mandate has clear advantages for both the organisation and the country. The GFM 
experience is testament to the wisdom of having a more independent GSIS. 
8.8 Politicisation of the Pension Funds: The Equitable PCI episode 
 
“How can you say no to the President of the Philippines?” -GSIS 
While the previous section highlights the advantage of depoliticised investment 
decisions, this is not the norm. Investment decisions for both funds are normally 
politicised. This section narrates an episode showing the heavy politicisation of both 
funds. 
Both pension funds have a history of being politicised and influenced by the government 
of the day. The breadth and depth of funds these two organisations hold are a 
temptation to divert and use them from their intended purpose allowing them “to 




Under the Marcos regime, GSIS (with DBP) were directed to fund “the construction of 
hotels as a result of the government’s bid to host the World Bank and IMF meeting in 
Manila. Most of these hotels were later privatised in the late 80s and late 90s. It was also 
during this period that the GSIS took over ownership of PAL, the Philippine flag carrier.” 
(Palmiery 2002: 9) According to Palmiery and substantiated by the SSS interview in the 
next section, SSS managed to remain unnoticed from the Marcos radar with investments 
made in relatively controversial-free financial instruments (Palmiery 2002: 11). 
A more recent case of politicisation which heavily impacted the pension funds occurred 
with the previous president, Joseph Estrada. According to a 2007 World Bank Report, it 
is estimated that Marcos embezzled between USD5B-USD10B during his lengthy reign; 
on the other hand Joseph Estrada, president between 1998 and 2001, managed to 
embezzle between USD78M and USD80M in the three tumultuous years he presided 
over the country. (Gill & Kharas 2007: 315) 
Under the Estrada presidency, the pension funds directly experienced politicisation with 
regards to their investment strategies. This reinforced the view that for government 
financial institutions, they must be prepared for every political crisis that besets the 
country and that the President’s self-interests are carried out sometimes to the detriment 
of the country. 
The case of Estrada’s interference with the pension funds occurred with share market 
speculation over financial transactions relating to a bank merger between the companies 
Equitable and PCI. There was a strong suggestion emanating from the Palace to invest in 
the bank PCI, which stands for the Philippine and Commercial Industrial Bank. 
Two of the major shareholders in the PCI bank were the Lopez and Gokongwei families 
and their combined shareholdings formed a block. This block was sold to Mark Jimenez, 
a stockbroker who was a member of Estrada’s inner circle (Coronel 2001). 98
                                                     
98 Coronel’s article also provides a detailed account of the extent of Estrada’s business dealings 
during his tenure as president. 
 There were 
three banks involved that were looking at acquiring the PCI block: BPI, Metrobank and 
Equitable. Two of the potential buyers, BPI and Metrobank, stated their intent to buy the 
bank was conditional upon the completion of their due diligence over PCI. The last 
buyer, Equitable passed on the due diligence part and sought GSIS and SSS’ financial 




friend.” (Coronel 2001) 
Therefore the three organisations had an equal split to buy into PCI: one third was with 
Equitable (and its owners the Go Family), the second third was with GSIS and the last 
third to SSS. While there was no direct, written order from Estrada to invest in into those 
shares, one interviewee pointed out the imprimatur of the Presidency: 
“…this is the President - what the President wants, the President gets. In 
Philippine culture, all presidents have exercised a degree of influence over the 
whole of government – agencies and organisations. You cannot deny the 
president’s wishes.” –public sector 1 
For both GSIS and SSS the political pressures from Malacañang Palace was sufficient 
enough for his wishes to be carried out. Both GSIS and SSS were suggested to invest in 
Equitable PCI: 
“When the purchase was made, it was above board. The board of trustees and 
management committee approved it, and ok’ed the purchase. It was nothing 
irregular at the time.”-public sector 2 
Combined, the pension funds - under presidential advisement (or some would argue 
duress) - bought P15B worth of Equitable PCI shares which represented 30% of the 
company: a hefty, substantial holding or “the biggest chunk.” For GSIS, they bought the 
shares at P90. The problem with undertaking this order was the enormous amount of 
money and volume in the share transaction involved. For GSIS, some P7B were invested 
in the Equitable PCI shares: 
“What was wrong was the shares became volatile after [GSIS’] purchase. There 
was so much insider trading involved that the shares dropped by more than 30%. 
It looked like we were losing on this transaction.” – GSIS 
From Coronel’s account, the volatility on the PSE had much to do with the excessive 
premium paid for the shares and the scale of the commissions involved (Coronel 2001). 
These shares were later disposed to another banking conglomerate, Banco de Oro (which 
later took over Equitable PCI) being sold at P92 after being held by GSIS from 2002-2006. 
For GSIS, it made some money – a gain of P2 per share over the 4 years it was a 




For SSS, the story has had a different outcome and a more profound effect. In 2007, eight 
years after the initial share purchase, the organisation was still involved in the intricacies 
of the Equitable PCI purchase. At the time of SSS’ purchase in 1999, the organisation was 
moving towards a different way of record-keeping – accounting adjustments to its books 
when it moved to mark-to-market for equity investments. Immediately after SSS 
purchased shares of Equitable PCI, the fund posted a loss of P75M as the shares 
decreased: 
“We had, during Estrada, continued buying until we doubled our investment; the 
share price doubled; twice the original share price. From 2 board seats [originally 
our new ownership saw] this increased to 5 seats in Equitable. Right now, we 
can’t close the sale of SSS’ Equitable PCI shares. We’re still under a Supreme 
Court restraining an order from selling the shares. The issue is still with the 
Senate. Once the Court rules, we will be able to sell them off. We’ve recovered 
[the sale of the shares] but the proceeds are at an escrow account. Once the 
Supreme Court lifts the order – at the higher price – we can post a profit. The 
share price [of the SSS sale] was posted in 2005.” – SSS  
The undue political pressure on SSS overrode the organisation’s charter and internal 
policies on equity investments: 
“There was a lack of due diligence and governance over these shares as the 
former Commissioner advised that Equitable PCI [shares] be bought.” – SSS  
While the direct order from the President to SSS to buy Equitable PCI shares was not 
officially recorded, the unwritten directive caused a great deal of harm as the public 
servants were caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place – how to justify these 
investment decisions within the parameters of their legal charters: 
“Whether or not there was political interference with the shares, the documents 
we have showed a hasty deal. No due diligence was done when SSS bought the 
shares. We just don’t invest in ordinary investments. There’s a process that needs 
to be followed. Questions at this time was over due diligence. But no due 
diligence was done. The merger happened between Equitable (the Go Family) 




used to aid the Go Family to help them buy PCI. If it were not for the funds of the 
SSS, the Go Family could not have bought PCI. 
“The respondents to our case said it was a good investment. But our charter did 
not say we had to own a bank. The SSS continued buying the shares. In 2002/2001 
– Erap (Estrada) was being impeached. During the impeachment, it was revealed 
that there was a Jose Villar account with Equitable but this was really Erap. That 
was a dummy account. The Equitable shares decreased and SSS bought more 
shares to prop-up the share price. 
“If one of the justifications for SSS was for it to control the bank, why didn’t SSS 
own a bank? We had a majority ownership of Unionbank at one time where we 
had 3 board seats but it was divested. Our share has now decreased to 10% in 
Unionbank. At Equitable PCI, it was the first time we had the controlling interest 
but no control at all. In 2001, when De La Paz took over, we had the majority of 
seats. Our Investments Group (IG) is an internal group that makes investment 
decisions in companies. But did they invest in Equitable PCI directly? It goes 
through the stockbrokers - that’s why the former Chairman [told them to 
invest].” – SSS 
SSS’ involvement with the Equitable PCI deal lingered on in 2007. For an organisation 
that managed to remain relatively unscathed under the Marcos years unlike the DBP; 
SSS’ capitulation to a president in the democratic era tested the organisation’s strength, 
mettle and well-being: 
“It’s still a controversial issue. [Commissioner] De La Paz joined SSS at the time 
and maintains a hands-off policy. It was ironic as she was also the chair of 
Equitable PCI. We had the largest shareholding in Equitable PCI [before its 
merger with BDO.] 
“We have recovered somehow. We are happy to get recognition from Social 
Weather Stations. On a survey of businessmen on which government institutions 
they think are making a conscious effort to fix graft and corruption – we got the 
#2 position after the Supreme Court. It’s a matter of getting over the corruption 
issue after the Estrada administration. It’s a credit to Ms. De La Paz’s leadership 




“Even in the Marcos era, SSS was clean and straight compared with GSIS during 
the era. The [SSS] administration at the time was very strict, very conservative. 
Why? Marcos let [us] be. [SSS] had one outside investment during that time – a 
loan to Philippine General Hospital for their facility. All earnings and 
contributions went into government securities. The biggest [investments were] 
handled conservatively. There was an ultra conservative investment policy [in SSS 
under Marcos]”. – SSS 
Why then did Estrada strongly request these two pension funds buy into the company? 
One proposition suggested he was looking for funding sources for the next election 
campaign which he had hoped to contest – building the election war chest so to speak: 
“The sale done on the holding – some said there were commissions that were 
paid to the government so they could be used to pay for the presidential 
campaign. It was pretty bloody. It’s the timing that came into question – whether 
or not there were funds that were exchanged over to private hands. There were 
commissions to be paid off to Estrada. The deal was overpriced by P1B. It was an 
overpriced deal.” – public sector 3 
It also helped Estrada’s cause that he had friends and associates within SSS who helped 
him embezzle the funds: officers in charge of the respondent funds; and the previous 
chairman, Carlos Arellano. Psychologically, SSS’ involvement with the Equitable PCI 
issue had a devastating impact on its organisational well-being: 
“Arellano got away scot-free from the [court] case. The lower court decided in 
SSS’ favour but since he was no longer in government, he is no longer part of the 
action. But the people left behind, those who stayed – there were suspensions.” – 
SSS  
This involvement has also seen much cause for soul-searching and reform within the 
organisation. While not on the scale as the rehabilitation of the DBP, this episode 
nevertheless has made for a more introspective SSS: 
“The present [SSS] board is more careful. There has been a precedent – fuelled by 
people inside. We are more careful as far as investments, deals and acquisitions 
are concerned. There has been an increase in due diligence and governance has 




governance reforms after what has happened. De La Paz is also strict with 
transparency and with unaudited financial statements.  
“The GSIS annual report is unaudited. [There’s] a hard feeling that [SSS is still 
reeling over the scandal while GSIS has moved on.] De La Paz is careful after she 
saw the deal with Equitable. After the Gos sold [their shares in Equitable PCI], 
things have improved after that sale was done with BDO. We will keep the board 
seats until the final sale is consummated. ” – SSS 
Estrada’s political interference with the pension funds had strong reverberations for the 
rest of the civil service. For one corporate governance regulator, this incident was a 
highly distasteful politicised episode: 
“We must make sure funds of these pension funds are not used by the incumbent 
president for political ends. Former president Estrada ordered GSIS and SSS to 
invest in certain corporations – money that went there went down the drain.”-
public sector 4 
The after-effects of Estrada’s suggestion to the pension funds to invest in Equitable PCI 
had lingering, long-term effects. Apart from destabilising the capital market with such a 
purchase, disposal of the Equitable PCI shares took several years. In the interim, the 
Estrada suggestion imposed on the pension funds considerable ownership of a company 
and with it, the associated responsibilities as substantial block holders. Politicised 
actions rarely have short-term outcomes. The short-term monetary gain to then 
President Estrada had long-term repercussions for the pension funds although the 
former’s penchant for capital market speculation contributed to his premature ousting. 
The next section expands on the ownership – and later, onerous - responsibilities 
imposed on these pension funds. 
8.9 Institutional Investor Influence and Leverage 
 
When GSIS and SSS make investments in publicly listed companies, such purchases are 
normally substantial rendering them significant owners. As the country’s foremost 
institutional investment funds, the buying and selling activities of GSIS and SSS on the 
relatively small capital market of the Philippines have tremendous impact. When they 




shallow and illiquid (Palmiery 2002: 16). The power and financial leverage of the funds 
are well-known: 
“SSS and GSIS have investment funds of about PhP250 billion [in 2003], large 
enough to dominate the local stock market and initiate a takeover of any 
company in the country.” (World Bank and ADB 2003: 11) 
 
“When we make investments, the market moves. Our investments have a 
significant impact on the stock market. We move the market. The GSIS starts 
trading when the market is languid. We initiate activity in the stock market.” – 
GSIS 
 
Thus the pension funds are in an enviable position of having enormous amount of 
financial resources at their disposal: 
 
“GSIS recently sold off shares so they have plenty of money to invest. They need 
to invest money. GSIS have investments in foreign countries – billions of pesos 
not only in Philippine instruments.” –public sector 1 
 
As substantial owners, the pension funds are normally entitled to representation on a 
company board. In most cases, both GSIS and SSS are passive investors. During my 
interview at GSIS, I read out the following passage on the behavioural perception and 
expectations of an active institutional investor: 
Table 35: Activist investors press companies for improved performance (Useem 
1998) 
Institutional investors press companies to… 
• Redesign the company to be more competitive 
• Improve short-term and long-term performance 
• Retain effective strategies, abandon failing strategies 
 
Institutional investors press companies by… 
• Occasionally voting against management proposals 
• Sometimes voting against company directors 
• Sometimes demanding different managers 
• Often telling companies to alter structure and improve performance 
• Frequently meeting with company executives 




• Almost always seeking more information on company plans 
• Increasingly demanding strong and independent boards of directors 
 
Afterwards, my respondents stated that the description was not the norm in the 
Philippines and they were ‘passive’ investors. The exception was the PCI case where both 
funds were vehemently active as related in the following section.  Nevertheless, Chris 
Mallin’s observation99
8.9.1 Institutional Investor Activism on the Equitable PCI Board 
 that active institutional investors can - and do - improve good 
corporate governance in companies that they invest in is yet to be realised in the 
Philippines. 
 
With regards to the funds’ representation on the board of Equitable PCI (similarly with 
other share ownership where the two pension funds have a large enough shareholding) 
entitlement to a board does not necessarily mean securing the majority voting rights. In 
the Philippine corporate governance environment where most corporations are family-
owned, the lingering effect of family ownership creates a certain amount of entitlement 
from the original owner whether that be financial, emotional or both. A majority stake 
may still mean the deciding votes are still with the now minority, but family owners. In 
which case, the power on the board is still with the owners and not the institutional 
investors themselves: 
“On Equitable PCI and other firms, our shareholding entitled us to a board seat. 
We always took advantage of our board seat, to see what was done. But our 
directorship was ex-officio, non-voting. Our [GSIS] President and General 
Manager (PGM) Winston Garcia was usually the director on those boards. If he 
was unavailable, he would designate the seat to someone else. “ –GSIS 
Occasions are rare when the pension funds work jointly together and exercising their 
leverage as institutional investors. When they do, such actions are notable: 
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economy as a whole, and so there are very good reasons for institutional shareholders to be 
interested in improving corporate governance in the companies in which they invest, whether 





“The only controversial actions that involved GSIS were with Equitable PCI. We 
worked with SSS to get the numbers of votes to let the owners of Equitable PCI 
know that we wanted director representation on the board. The owners are the 
Go Family and they wanted to protect their interest. This was a joint GSIS/SSS 
action in 2006 and the board was changed as a result. The board composition 
changed and another family, the Sy Family of SM Investments, finally got [onto 
the board of] Equitable PCI after GSIS sold its share [to them]. In short, this was 
the only record of us being very active.” – GSIS  
“Historically, we only became active in Equitable Bank.”- SSS 
The dispute over GSIS and SSS’ board representation on Equitable PCI spilled over into 
the public arena as the family owners of the company fought off its biggest investors: 
“There were 2 board seats for GSIS on Equitable PCI. They were really screaming 
at the boardroom – both [GSIS’] Garcia and Ferdinand Martin Romualdez [the 
third substantial investor in the company] at the Equitable PCI board. [In 1996] it 
was all over the papers, fighting with the [company’s] leadership. Garcia and 
[SSS’] De La Paz were also at odds.” – GSIS 
“The Go Family was in control. We never got control of Equitable PCI. GSIS and 
SSS had 2/3 of the shares. We had the greater share than the Gos. But the Gos 
had control…Equitable PCI issued no dividends at all; it was a losing thing.” – SSS 
For the GSIS representative on company boards, the PGM Winston Garcia, his feisty and 
headstrong character is well known. While it is not normally part of Philippine company 
board culture for a board member to be outspoken, Garcia breaks this mould: 
“With the character of PGM Garcia, he is very proactive. There are stories of him 
asserting GSIS’ ownership. I have sat on a number of board meetings and there 
are the usual board squabbles. He will not let a decision pass if he disagrees with 
it. He will not sit back on the bench if he feels the decision is incorrect and he 
will assert his one seat. He will walk out of a board meeting if he felt the 
decisions were made contrary to his inclination [or GSIS’s interests].” – GSIS  
Similarly, the SSS representative on company boards, then Commissioner De La Paz, also 




“[SSS has a seat] on PLDT, Meralco, and SMC – De La Paz sits on those boards. 
She is very vocal because she sees her role as representing SSS…[but] most of the 
time we are passive investors.” – SSS interviewee 
In a country that values smooth interpersonal relationships, the board conflict and 
drama over the Equitable PCI episode have ensured a more measured approach in future: 
“It is not normal to tell a board to do certain acts [in this country]. It will 
normally take a strong PGM to speak for the system [GSIS]. The board of trustees 
dictate [actions] unless the PGM [does]. It is doubtful if the Board of Trustees will 
enter so proactively [again in corporations]. There is not a policy adopted by the 
board on [being proactive].”-GSIS 
For the time being, the Equitable PCI experience has shown the limited experience of 
institutional investor activism in the country. Nevertheless, both GSIS and SSS can - 
political will and non-interference notwithstanding - may contribute to more effective 
corporate governance in public companies and towards the economic development in 
the country when they are allowed to run independently. (World Bank 1995: iv) 
8.10 Public Sector Boards 
 
In contrast to a board of directors in the private sector who are elected by the majority 
shareholder/s, all three government financial institutions in this chapter have board 
members who are directly appointed by the President. The three boards face a different 
set of challenges compared to their private sector counterparts where the appointer is 
the owner (who is usually the Chairman) in the private sector; the appointer in the 
public sector is the President. With this appointment come political considerations 
whereas in the private sector, family considerations are foremost. This section looks at 
board appointments, board removals and the particularities of the presidential 
appointment system. 
8.10.1 Presidential Appointments 
 
As outlined earlier in this chapter on Politicisation, the country’s President has extensive 
powers of appointment. Thus, for many government institutions, the powers of 
appointment are set out in both the Constitution and the Act of the organisation. The 




No.8291)100 and the Social Security Act (also known as the Republic Act No.8282)101
Table 36: Presidential Powers in the GSIS and SSS Acts 
 
containing explicit references and sections of oversight and powers of the President of 
the Republic over both organisations: 
GSIS Act (1997) or Republic Act No. 
8291 
SSS Act (1997) or Republic Act No. 8282 
Section 9: Computation of Basic 
Monthly Pension 
2. b) The basic monthly pension may be 
adjusted upon the recommendation of 
the President and General Manager of 
the GSIS and approved by the President 
of the Philippines… 
Section 35: Deposits and Disbursements 
…A maximum expense loading of twelve 
percent (12%) of the yearly revenues 
from all sources may be disbursed for 
administrative and operational expenses 
except as may be otherwise approved by 
the President of the Philippines on the 
basis of actuarial and management 
studies. 
Section 41: Powers and Functions of 
the GSIS 
r) to submit annually, not later than 
June 30, a public report to the President 
of the Philippines and the Congress of 
the Philippines regarding its activities in 
the administration and enforcement of 
this Act during the preceding year… 
Section 42: The Board of Trustees 
The corporate powers and functions of 
the GSIS shall be vested in and 
exercised by the Board of Trustees 
composed of the President and General 
Manager of the GSIS and eight (8) other 
members to be appointed by the 
President of the Philippines 
Section 3: a):  [the organisation to 
be]…controlled by a Social Security 
Commission composed of 
1. Secretary of Labour and Employment or 
undersecretary 
2. SSS president 
3. 7 appointed members : 
a.  3 represented by workers group; 
at least 1 of whom shall be a 
woman;  
b. 3 from the employers’ group, at 
least 1 of whom shall be a woman 
c. 1 from the general public whose 
representative shall have adequate 
knowledge and experience 
regarding social security, 
appointed by the President. 
The six members representing workers and 
employers shall be chosen from among the 
nominees of workers’ and employers’ 
organisations. The Chairman of the 
Commission shall be designated by the 
President of the Philippines from among its 
members.  
b) The SSS President shall be appointed by 
the President of the Philippines and shall 
receive a salary to be fixed by the Commission 
with the approval of the President of the 
Philippines, payable from the funds of the 
SSS. 
Section 4: Powers, duties of Commission 
and SSS; approval needed from the 
                                                     
100 “Republic Act No.8291: An Act amending Presidential Decree No.1146, as amended, expanding, 
and increasing the coverage and benefits of the Government Service Insurance System, instituting 
reforms therein and for other purposes.” From the Global Legal Information Network (2009) 
Republic Act No. 8291 http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=59905 accessed 26 April 2009; The 
link allows a PDF file containing a scan of the Official Gazette; an HTML version of the Act exists 
at http://www.chanrobles.com/legal4gsis.htm hosted by the Chan Robles and Associates Law 
Firm accessed 29 April 2009  




Section 44: Appointment, 
Qualifications, and Compensation of 
the President and General Manager 
and of other Personnel 
The President and General Manager of 
the GSIS shall be its Chief Executive 
Officer and shall be appointed by the 
President of the Philippines. 
Section 48: Powers of Insurance 
Commission 
The Insurance Commissioner or his 
authorized representatives shall make 
an examination of financial condition 
and methods of transacting business of 
the GSIS at least once every three (3) 
years and the report of said examination 
shall be submitted to the Board of 
Trustees and copies thereof be 
furnished the Office of the President of 
the Philippines and the two houses of 
the Congress of the Philippines within 
five (5) days after the close of 
examination. 
President 
a) The Commission 
1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to 
the approval of the President of the 
Philippines, such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out provisions 
and purposes of this Act 
2) To establish a provident fund…subject to 
such rules and regulations as it may 
promulgate and approved by the 
President of the Philippines 
6) To compromise or release, in whole or in 
part, any interest, penalty or any civil liability 
to SSS in connection with the investments  
authorised under Section 26…as it may 
prescribe and approved by the President of 
the Philippines… 
b) Social Security System 
To submit annually not later than April 30, a 
public report to the President of the 
Philippines and to the Congress of the 
Philippines covering its activities in the 
administration and enforcement of this Act 
during the preceding year including 
information and recommendations on broad 
policies for the development and perfection of 
the program of the SSS. 
 
For both organisations, the powers of presidential appointment with regard to the 
composition (or membership) of the board and chief executive are well-articulated in 
Sections 42 and 44 of the GSIS Act and Section 3 of the SSS Act. An operational power of 
the President is referred to in Section 9 of the GSIS Act while the Insurance Commission 
is also involved in the financial examination of the organisation in Section 48 of the same 
act. With regards to reporting, both GSIS and SSS are required to make an annual report 
to the President and Congress of the Philippines as set out in Section 41 for the former 
and Section 4 (6) for the latter. 
The issues of presidential appointees also cover the assessment of who can be the ideal 
director on a public sector board. Good corporate governance practice suggests that 
having a director who is independent in mind and in action would best serve the 




“For Philippine GOCCs, we have [attended corporate governance] seminars 
before, but there is a basic problem - how can we have independent directors if 
everybody gets appointed by the country’s president? The President has 
enormous power to relative appointments and the president does recognise that 
there must be good corporate governance. The President believes good corporate 
governance must prevail be they public, government-owned corporations or else. 
It is difficult to change the culture but we have to start.” – public sector  
The current presidential appointment system is disadvantageous to the pension funds as 
the structure impairs their “authority and independence”. (World Bank 1995: 19-20) 
8.10.2 Board Members 
 
The board of trustees at GSIS comprise of 10 members. The length of appointment 
depends on a trustee’s ability to remain on side with the current administration. The 
trustees represent different government bodies. There are only two permanent trustees 
on the GSIS board.  
For SSS, the board of directors comprise of 9 members. As a government owned entity 
dealing with private sector employees, three board members represent each of the three 
stakeholders groups: employees, employers and government. As covered in the SSS 
charter, it is a tripartite, stakeholder representative board as seen in the following chart: 





The charter was also amended in 1997 to cover gender representation stating that at least 
1 representative from labour should be a woman and at least 1 representative from the 
private sector (or management) should be a woman. The SSS directors have fixed terms 
of three years’ duration that may be renewed. While the appointments are made by the 
President, the directors must be recommended by each stakeholder group they 
represent.  
The same procedure is in place at the DBP. Directors are appointed through the 
Presidential Management Committee (PMC) based at Malacañang Palace. The PMC has 
a shortlist of potential board directors that recommends and screens possible 
appointees. Candidates are filtered by taking into consideration the performance of the 
person, qualifications and ensuring they have no criminal history. The DBP board has 9 
members and in 2007, the Vice Chairman was also the President of the Bank. The 
tripartite nature of public sector boards has also come under criticism. Representing a 
broad range of stakeholder groups may render an unyielding, under-performing board 
prone to political risk (Ghosh 2006: 136). 
Finally it is worth mentioning that issues of ownership and representation will 
continuously come up with any privatisation of Philippine government owned entities. 
Thus, much consideration and expectation is invested in presidential appointments on a 
The SSS Board
Labour (Employees)
1 Representative from the 
Trade Union Congress
1 Representative from the 
Federation of Freeworkers
Management (Employers)
2 Employees from the 
Confederation (1 Male, 1 
Female)
1 Representative from the 
Philippine Chamber of 
Commerce
Public (Government)
1 Secretary of Labour
Chairman (De La Paz 





public sector board. The departure of a presidential appointee before the end of one’s 
term tends to receive wide coverage as the following section relates. 
8.10.3 Removal of Board Members 
 
The political nature of these appointments has come under scrutiny as political 
appointments tend to bring its own problems such as the circumstances and the terms of 
their appointment, their political backers or sponsors and so forth.  
Several former trustees of the GSIS board were removed due to incidences that reflected 
poorly on the organisation. One was Jocelyn Bolante, accused of embezzlement (Alberto 
2008) and at least two others were removed because they were associated with the 
political opponents of the President.102
“[Directors] who get media mileage [about their resignation] are usually on the 
boards of government corporations. There is a great deal of media coverage 
there.” – ICD  
The removal of a public sector board member 
usually receives wide media coverage: 
In Philippine corporate governance, the public sector is ahead of the private sector in the 
frank disclosure of board director resignations. While private sector board director 
resignations are normally prefaced by ‘health reasons’, the reasons for public sector 
director dismissals or resignations are normally well-publicised. In some cases, the 
media is told in advance of the removal of the public sector director which may come as 
a surprise to the office-holder (see Case Study of De La Paz’s removal in this chapter; and 
the removal of the BIR commissioner in the next chapter). 
The following case study relates the departure of then SSS Commissioner, an experience 
not too uncommon among presidential appointees: 
Text Box 11: Removal of SSS Commissioner Corazon De La Paz 
The power to appoint or dismiss the executive head of the SSS by the President was 
exercised in the lightning removal in 2008 of the well-regarded, and highly esteemed SSS 
Commissioner, Corazon De La Paz. Like so many other presidential appointees, De La 
Paz served at the pleasure of the President - and removed at her displeasure: 
“De La Paz said that she only learned of Malacañang’s move when she received a 
call from Finance Secretary Margarito Teves on Tuesday night while she was 
                                                     
102 According to a well-informed source, two trustees close to Senators who were critical of the 




attending a business meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He called me up to tell 
me about the decision,” she said. De La Paz acknowledged that politics figured in 
her departure from the state pension fund for workers in the private sector, but 
said that she submitted her resignation to Malacañang last month. “If you are in 
government, there will always be politics,” she said in a telephone interview. 
(Lucas 2008)  
 
Her departure was not well-anticipated. During my fieldwork there was the widely held 
expectation that she would last until at least the next president, given the well-regarded 
career she had: 
“Our chairman, De La Paz, serves at the pleasure of the president so she’ll have 3 
more years as GMA’s term ends in 2010…Ms Dela Paz has a good reputation in 
the private sector. [She is known for having] integrity. She wasn’t chair of 
[PriceWaterhouseCoopers] and the audit committee for nothing. She has a clean 
image in industry. She sits on [other company boards] chairing their audit 
committees. These committees take advantage of her background.” – SSS 
 
Indeed, her removal was widely seen as another political move; a move which reflected 
less on De La Paz’s ability but rather more on the thwarted intentions of her critics: 
“There were just too many issues,” the [Malacañang] official said, referring to De 
La Paz’s dealings with anti-administration groups and organisations. “I think 
she’s too closely identified with the Makati Business Club and even the Black and 
White Movement…Bayan Muna Rep. Teodoro “Teddy” Casiño called the SSS 
appointment a bribe to keep [succeeding SSS Commissioner Romulo] Neri silent 
on the controversies hounding the Arroyo administration, including the National 
Broadband Network deal between the Philippine government and China’s ZTE 
Corp. This assures Arroyo she has an SSS head that will look the other way and 
keep silent as she and her minions plunder the pension funds of the private 
sector workers," said Casiño.”(Lucas 2008) 
 
Her insistence on standing up for the purposes and responsibilities for which the 
organisation stood for was another factor: 
“When they [politicians] ask me, I answer them the truth, I’m usually direct. So I 
said no. I have a very strict interpretation of the SSS regulations, and I have been 
trained for many years as an auditor. I speak my mind on what [type of funding] 
cannot be allowed,” De La Paz-Bernardo explains without going into detail about 
any specific incidents, which have caused the tensions between her and some of 
the President’s people. “I was just being true to myself to protect the funds of the 
SSS members.” She adds that even the agency’s commissioners supported her in 
rejecting those requests. Eventually, she heard some Palace officials were “not 
happy” with her. She also had a feeling that she would soon be asked to resign. “I 
knew they were going to do it, and there were many who said there were several 
politicians who didn’t make it in the last elections who wanted to sit at SSS. So 
even if they didn’t ask me to resign, I knew they would eventually.”(Arnaldo 
2008)  
 
The departure of De La Paz from SSS was keenly felt with one employee stating “She 
looked after us as a mother would look after her own children.”(GMANews.TV 2008) For 
De La Paz, her reputation and integrity is well-known nationally and internationally. 




career and contribution to her profession is widely recognised. In 2007, the government 
licensing agency for professionals, the Professional Regulation Commission bestowed 
upon De La Paz “Outstanding Professional of the Year” in the field of accountancy citing 
her “"outstanding achievement and high degree of professional competence in the field 
of accountancy exemplified by her excellent stewardship of the SSS as president and 
CEO."(Manila Standard 2007)  
 
De La Paz achieved many firsts in her career - as a woman and as a Philippine national – 
such as becoming the first female partner of Price Waterhouse International and board 
member of the Price Waterhouse World Board. In recognition of her outstanding career, 
the International Social Security Association (ISSA) re-elected De La Paz for a second 
appointment as ISSA president. De La Paz is the first woman and first non-European 
president of ISSA. (ISSA 2009) 
 
To commemorate May Day 2008 in the country, an open letter to then President 
Macapagal-Arroyo signed by 61 former public officials who at various times in their 
careers were appointed or removed by the chief executive of the country – “victims of 
bad governance” - as the current system allows. The letter was prompted by the NBN 
issue (see Chapter 10) and the list of signatories (and the government organisations they 
once represented) is testament to the negative effects of the extensive appointment 
powers in the hands of the country’s chief executive. (Newsbreak 2008) 
8.10.4 Views on the Presidential Appointment System 
 
The fickleness of the presidential appointment system makes most government 
organisations highly politicised creating a great deal of uncertainty. Uncertainty leads to 
instability and reinforces the lack of trust in government. Long-term relationships are 
difficult to sustain with ministers (or secretaries) who serve and are dismissed at the 
whim of a president: 
 “It’s like a revolving door. Secretaries come and go.”-private sector 1 
For a president keen to ensure the loyalty of his/her departmental heads, their allegiance 
to the incumbent rather than their competencies tend to play a greater role: 
“If you’re against the administration, you are removed.” – public sector 1 
“The [agency] is an interesting organisation. It is a regulatory authority but 




For many of my private sector interviewees, the revolving door of presidential 
appointments is a challenge. It raises the question of skills and competence: 
“There’s a tendency to put cabinet secretaries or ministers of GOCCs 
[government owned and controlled corporations] to be placed as directors on 
[their boards] as senior political appointees. This sends a strong signal. Change it. 
The cabinet secretary has no time, s/he is swamped, s/he has no breaks. [They] 
don’t attend meetings. The governance system doesn’t provide that continuity. 
[What is needed are directors who are] educated professionally for the 
appropriate [role].” – private sector 3 
“The Philippines simply doesn’t change as there are many rules such as a 
President with political appointments. The people in government do not realise 
their position is not of directors, but more of trustees.” – private sector 4 
There is also a waste of resources every time there is a new appointment 
“There is not a strong civil system here unlike the West. [With each new 
presidential administration] there are new heads of agencies appointed by every 
new president. The sustainability and stability priorities [of the organisation] are 
affected. Resources are limited in this country. When new heads come in, it is 
always an issue of competence. With every change over you don’t see much 
significant change in implementing programs. New sets of initiatives are set up. 
At the end of the day, there is not much accomplishment and a wasteful use of 
resources.” – private sector 5 
Behind each dismissal of a presidential appointee is a story of politics and how well 
connected a person or group is to the President: 
“The previous Commissioner was kicked out. He was asked to resign as he had 
alienated quite a few people and [so he was] forced out. There is a lot of politics 
behind it.” – private sector 6 
Not surprisingly there are calls for reforms to the presidential appointment system with 
more professional appointees: For the time being, altering the presidential power of 
appointment over government institutions, according to one is “politically risky” and the 




Philippines, the political environment is such that public sector organisations are 
minimally buffered from various vested interests. For the near future, dealing with highly 
politicised presidential appointments and appointees are a facet of doing business in the 
Philippines.  
8.10.5 Board-Management Issues 
 
Aside from the sensitive issues of political appointments, operationally-wise, the role of 
the public sector board is similar to the private sector board – the board oversees 
management. Reporting, strategic planning, performance and information disclosure are 
cited by the three organisations in this chapter as board-management issues. 
In every board meeting of the DBP, financial reporting, and accounting reporting of the 
bank’s financial performance are presented every month. For other matters, there’s a 
management committee composed of senior officers of the bank which meets every 
week. Departments within DBP that have different issues attend the management 
committee meeting. There is a regular reporting system at DBP. The board also 
schedules strategic planning meetings with management. This is done in-house held 
annually in October. 
In 2007, SSS had a very active board overseeing the management by way of performance 
reviews: 
“The current commission scrutinises all of our contracts and budgets. The 
current board specifies quarterly performance reviews against the targets set at 
the beginning of the year” – SSS  
The SSS board also requires quarterly references from management on accomplishments 
made at a departmental level. These references form the basis of the quarterly 
performance targets for the year. This process has seen a lot of board vetoes of 
management proposals.  
Echoing the experience of any board with its meetings with management, information 
held or being withheld by management and trying to mitigate this situation is one the 




“Like any other big corporation, the board doesn’t get to know everything from 
the ground. Management knows everything - they can react or initiate necessary 
changes. [They can] come out with a better policy or improve the system.” – GSIS  
In this regard, the issues mentioned above are not so dissimilar to one faced by any 
board – be they public or private. 
8.10.6 Public Sector Board Remuneration 
 
Remuneration in the public sector is unattractive compared to private sector rates. The 
joint 2003 World Bank-ADB report pointed out the compensation regime in the public 
sector does not attract nor retain the best or brightest talent (2003:107). The lower rates 
of remuneration hinder the hiring and retainment of highly-qualified directors. (Ghosh 
2006: 136) 
One interviewee spoke about his experience of mitigating the political risk of 
interference while he was a director on a government board that oversaw the 
privatisation of a government asset: 
“…we made sure any employee [we hired was] competent. [We made sure] there 
was no politically [sponsored person] who could come in for a position. [The 
board] made sure we didn’t go to the government or ask politicians for money 
from them for our budget. [We had to] generate cash flow internally. Had we 
asked for money from [the politicians] for our budget, they would want 1 or 2 
employees [they were sponsoring] at the organisation.” – private sector 1 
In an exchange, the same interviewee and I discussed the old adage of how power 
corrupts and how absolute power corrupted absolutely. He mused: 
“How can one ensure that people who get in are not immoral? People in 
government [can become] immoral with so much power.”-private sector 2 
Nevertheless, people who enter the public service and especially those who join public 
sector boards do so with a higher sense of duty. Directors who are not career bureaucrats 
join government boards because they have had a successful working life in the private 




public sector. As former Australian Prime Minister John Howard said in his farewell 
speech after his 2007 election defeat: 
“Public service is the greatest form of service that can come one's way in 
life.”(Eastley 2007) 
In a 2009 corporate governance symposium held in Sydney, Trevor Robertson, an 
executive at the Australian infrastructure company Downer EDI presented a summary of 
his postgraduate research on a comparative study of corporate governance in the public 
and private sectors. The table from this presentation is reduced below: 
Table 37: Remuneration in the Government Sector and the Private Sector 
(Robertson 2009) 
Government Sector Private Sector 
Set by Government: 
- Shareholder Ministers 
(Secretaries) 
- Departments 
- Board -> Remuneration 
Committee 
Market-Based: 
- Board Remuneration Committee 
- Shareholder Approval 
- Market Data – Sources vary 
(validity) 
Intangibles: 
- Sense of Public Duty 
- Non-Executive Director (NED) 
experience 
Options: for the future? 
Rewards: 
- Renewal of appointment -> set 
terms 
Salary Sacrifice for Shares: 
- Longer term incentives 
- Material 
- Escrow >term of appointment 
Performance: 
- Board / Chairman 
- Government / Minister 
Performance linked: 
- Company performance 
- Board performance 
- Shareholder 
 
In the Australian government sector, the remuneration is set out by the government 
with input from the Minister (or Secretary in the Philippine context), the governmental 
department where the board is located, and the remuneration committee. Private sector 
remuneration is market-based with approval needed from shareholders. For a director of 
a public sector board, joining a government authority is motivated by a sense of public 
duty and accumulating non-executive director experience (and increasing one’s network) 




It is advisable that before joining a Philippine public sector board one must be 
independently wealthy, not politically sponsored, disconnected and depoliticised from 
those who seek to politicise the government institution. The reasoning behind this was 
captured by Hutchcroft where he relates the advice dispensed by the then head of the 
Philippine Bank of Commerce to his protégé, a governor of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines, Jose Fernandez: 
“Don Pepe Cojuangco of the Philippine Bank of Commerce told Fernandez that 
he was ‘too young and too poor to be in government service’ and should join it 
only when he was ‘old and rich.’ In fact, he was being advised of the wisest path 
to power within a patrimonial oligarchic state: join the bureaucracy after 
developing a strong independent base outside the state apparatus.” (Hutchcroft 
1998: 172) 
This advice remains invaluable for potential members of Philippine public sector boards. 
8.11 Closing Remarks 
 
This chapter extensively looked at the experience of three government financial 
institutions in the heavily politicised environment of the Philippines. All three have 
experienced the harsh realities of decisions made under undue and partial influence. In 
this sense, it is almost a miracle that corporate governance in some form or other has 
entered the vocabulary and practice of these organisations despite the lack of 
transparency, lack of accountability and opaque disclosure. 
Politicisation of government institutions, especially those dealing with the financial 
aspects of government, can expect interference. Such interference usually has a 
detrimental effect on the country. Interference from the government executive must be 
held in check to curb the temptation to capture the government financial institutions. 
The bureaucracy needs to be strengthened and must be treated not as an extension of 
the executive or expression of presidential power but as representing autonomous 
functions to serve all, and not just a select few, citizens of the country. 
Until the problems and consequences of politicisation are widely recognised by the 
political representatives of the country, this problem will continue to affect the whole of 









CHAPTER 9: CORRUPTION 
 
Corruption was not originally in the scope of my research when I first started this 
journey. However, it became clear after my initial interviews that corruption is currently 
part and parcel of the business environment in the Philippines. Appendix 9 contains a 
table of corruption nodes analysed in NVivo. Unlike other chapters, the contents here 
have resulted from the inductive method of inquiry conducted during my research.  
Paraphrasing Sitglitz’s 2002 book, corruption and its disincentives is the main theme of 
this chapter and explores the following question: 
What are the effects of corruption in impacting the implementation of corporate 
governance reforms in the Philippines and society at large? 
Corporate governance must be seen in the prism of the business environment. In this 
sense, corruption is part of the business environment and it can clash with the 
governance tenets of transparency, accountability and disclosure. Can an organisation 
disclose certain information without the data being used against them by certain parties? 
To what extent can a company be transparent without compromising the viability of the 
business? To whom is a business ultimately accountable – its financial shareholders or 
political masters?  
Reading the newspapers or watching the numerous news programs on free to air 
television, the theme of corruption was ever present. “Kurakot” (corruption) of high level 
officials and their business counterparts was reported daily in the news media.  
This chapter describes all that is ill, and all that is wrong with a country riddled with 
corruption and the main areas and sources of corrupt activity are explored.  
Corruption is endemic and wholly affected the private sector representatives I 
interviewed. Corruption does not distinguish between a business that is big or small; 
listed or unlisted; local or foreign; ethnic Filipino or not. 
Corruption breeds resentment and distaste amongst the populace. Corruption brings an 
unfair advantage to those who are politically well-connected. Corruption reduces 
confidence. Corruption makes a mockery of laws and rules that govern behaviour. 




can be broken and must break for the country to progress. Corruption is a major socio-
psychological contributor to the ongoing poverty to the country and the flight of 
Filipinos to seek better lives elsewhere. 
9.1 Types of Corruption 
 
The following types of corruption and corrupt behaviour were mentioned by my 
interviewees: 
• Bribery: “It’s sensitive, bribery. In Filipino culture, you have to know somebody to 
be facilitated.” – public sector 1 
• Extortion: “The other corruption is extortion. If one wants to build up a place, all 
sorts of permits are required. In my local government unit, every step of the way 
is an act of extortion. You don’t pay the permit, you don’t get in. These are 
complicated issues. The Ayala CEO is right; you can’t grow big using ethical 
standards.” – private sector 1 
• Favouritism or Reciprocity103
• Fraud/Estafa
: “People want to stay in power. Favouritism, it’s 
one-sided. I scratch your back, you scratch my back. It’s corruption – being one 
of the most corrupt countries.” – private sector 2 
104
• Influence – peddling; undue “Marcos used to make such a living out of influence 
peddling…it made business out of politics. The politicians created a vital 
commodity and created incentives for rent-seeking.” – private sector 4 
: “Business fraud is a strategy by us to manage our risk. When we 
tell our clients to implement control, we are telling them to prevent the risk of 
fraud from happening…the perception is we can find all types of fraud but that 
may not be the case. The longer term strategy is to manage business risks in 
firms, and introduce transparency”  - private sector 3 
                                                     
103 A good discussion on the positive and negative aspects of gifts and reciprocity can be found in 
Komter (2007) As Frans de Waal (1996:136) observes: ‘Reciprocity can exist without morality; 
there can be no morality without reciprocity.’ Indeed, in the case of the Australian mining 
company, BHP Billiton, the acceptance of what constitutes (in)appropriate gifts is mentioned in 
their 2004 and 2008 Guides to Business Conduct: “BHP Billiton employees must exercise the 
utmost care when offering or accepting gifts and hospitality in order to protect their reputation 
and BHP Billiton’s reputation against allegations of improper behaviour and to ensure that 
bribery laws are not breached.” and “A golden rule here is disclosure. Ensuring your supervisor is 
aware of all gifts of any significance ensures transparency and avoids any suggestion of conflict of 
interest.” (2004: 40, 42) 
104 In the Philippines, there is a type of fraud known as estafa (swindling) which is the intention to 




• Kickbacks: “Corruption is pervasive not only in the public sector but also in the 
private sector. Doing business with private corporations, you also have to give 
kickbacks. Not to all of them but a number. For example, the [sector my business 
is in] is a duopoly. There is no proper regulation for the regulatory authorities [to 
oversee it]. For purchasing they ask you for kickbacks. Even banking executives 
ask for kickbacks for giving loans. That’s the environment.” – private sector 5 
• Rent-seeking:  “The history of the Philippines is bound in rent-seeking. It is a 
weak state controlled and manipulated by rent-seeking elites that would lean on 
government so they can extract monopoly and profits…the culture of rent-
seeking is to capture politicians – to capture the decision making so you’re not 
accountable.” –private sector 6 
These forms of corruption have a detrimental effect on the effective functioning of 
commerce in the country. 
9.2 Corruption in East Asia 
 
Several interviewees noted the incidences of corruption and corrupt behaviour in the 
region so the Philippines is not alone in dealing with this problem: 
“In Indonesia, if you want to have a press conference with the media, you have to 
give a backpack of goods to meet with them. Then they’d turn up. In a court case, 
you pay money upfront to file a case. How do you do business otherwise?” – 
private sector 1 
However, with the downfall of Marcos, corruption in the Philippines has now taken a 
more arbitrary form. With the loss of the central figure, corruption has now become 
more unpredictable and arbitrary as one of my interviewees pointed out: 
“[We have become] one of the most corrupt countries. [Even if we aren’t], the 
perception is there. Corruption has gotten worse. [Under Marcos] the corruption 
was already scandalous – you had a tyrant there, it was focused on him and his 
cronies. [But after his downfall] you uncork the tyrant, you uncork the bottle and 
all these little tyrants [have] come out.”-private sector 2 
Similarly, the unpredictability of corruption has made doing business particularly 




“In Indonesia and Vietnam, when you have to be in a position to bribe someone, 
what’s delivered is delivered. Here, what’s supposed to be delivered is not 
delivered. You can’t trust the person you’ve bribed.” – private sector 1 
As payment requests seem never-ending in the country, the question of corruption’s 
unpredictability in the country was a factor this interviewee noted: 
“Is it a question of organisation? Koreans are well organised. Many things happen 
here. What happens a lot here is at the time they make the commitment, 
something happens afterwards. Something they did not anticipate or another 
bribe that has to be paid.”-private sector 3 
While corruption is seen as part of the hazards of doing business in the region its 
unpredictable nature in the Philippines makes it doubly difficult undermining general 
business confidence. The next sections discuss the presence and mitigation of the two 
types of corruption – low level and grand or systemic corruption (see Chapter 2 
Literature Review). 
9.3. Low-level Opportunistic Pay-Offs 
 
This section follows from Chapter 2 (Literature Review) figure of Rose-Ackerman’s 4 
categories of low-level corruption: scarce public benefits; benefits to qualified but not 
monitored; delays in bureaucratic process, and imposition on costs for government 
programs. 
9.3.1 Scarce Public Benefits 
 
With regards to scarce public benefits in countering the presence of low-level 
opportunistic pay offs in the country the Makati Business Club, with the Ateneo School 
of Government, has taken a novel approach in monitoring the delivery of educational 
textbooks to schools in the country. For some years, school textbooks “were not being 
delivered as they were accounted for. Schools didn’t receive the books.” To address this 
problem, they requested that clubs of boys’ scouts count the ‘ghost delivery’ of 
textbooks. The boys’ scouts would watch the delivery and raise alarms if the books 
weren’t being delivered. Under the auspices of eagle-eyed scouts, the ghost delivery is 
down to zero and the prices of the books have come down from P90 to P46. As 




discretion from the official channels have allowed efficiency to reign again. Bypassing 
associated complexities of the simple delivery of textbooks have allowed, for at least this 
part of the distribution process in a core sector, to reach the audience they were 
intended for. 
9.3.2 Lack of Monitoring of Benefits to the Qualified and Unqualified 
 
Public service officers who have access to sensitive information such as personal records 
render them a certain amount of leverage over a client: 
“There’s a culture of service here. There may be some isolated cases such as petty 
graft, and grease money to speed up the transaction. On bribery [it’s present with 
those who deal with] records. You are dealing with personal records. Some have 
access to the database. There might be a case of where a person that has not 
received a loan yet and that information would be useful to a bank. [We are 
trying to address this with a] charter [and code of ethics] that covers 
confidentiality and sensitive issues. If you have access to a record, you would 
know how [much] they have.” – public sector  
The lack of monitoring or control over the officers or gatekeepers of information allows 
this form of pay-off to proliferate. 
9.3.3 Delays in the Bureaucratic Process or Queues 
 
This level of discretionary power amongst public officials is quite common. One source 
described how renewing his driver’s licence at a government agency became eventful. 
When he arrived he saw two queues. People in the queues were going back and forth 
from one queue to another. Once he arrived at the top of the queue, he realised the 
reason for this organised chaos: people were bargaining with each official about the 
payment to renew their licence. My source participated in this exchange and haggled 
with one official and the other. After an hour, he realised the opportunity cost – he 
haggled to save P500 to renew his licence. 
One public sector interviewee stated there are some “people [in the organisation] who do 
not want to queue up for services… [so this is a] governance issue we want to take 




graft and corruption, [we want to operationalise the law] so it can be specifically tackled 
here.” 
For a private sector interviewee, he reflects how it was more efficient in times past: 
“I’m a lawyer so I visit government offices. When I was a young lawyer 30 years 
ago, if you get your papers done, it gets through. These days, if you go there, even 
low-level government officials try to get some donations from you for their 
summer outing, an office picnic or other.”-private sector 1 
For another private sector interviewee, he related that as part of their contract, they had 
to build new offices for the regulatory authority which was overseeing them. There was 
some discussion over the bathrooms of the public officials (a high level public official 
usually has his/her private bathroom) - after due consideration the company decided to 
turn down requests for more expensive plumbing fixtures.  
9.3.4 Costs of Government Programs 
 
A generation or two ago, the Philippines was an exporter of rice. Today, the country is 
the world’s largest importer of rice. As a forerunner to the food crisis that affected the 
country in late 2007, Lalaban (2007) reported how a “big volume of government rice 
being distributed by the National Food Authority (NFA) through the so-called Bigasan 
ng Bayan (rice for the people)  end up in black markets …[as] some of the agency’s 
personnel connived with unscrupulous rice traders in diverting government rice to the 
black market…Favoured operators who have contacts inside the NFA could buy as much 
as 1,000 bags of rice but at a higher price. Rice are re-milled by the buyers and sold at 
much higher price.” 
One of the country’s tourist attractions are cascading rice terraces that rise on the side of 
steep mountains. These terraces have been tilled and toiled for thousands of years and 
are a symbol of an agrarian society’s triumph over a landscape famed for annual natural 
disasters. Labour cost is not an issue - but access to land is. Formerly rice paddy fields 
have been replaced with the increasing encroachment of commerce. The Philippines has 
the climate for rice production with its tropical clime and its seasonal extremes. Water is 
not a problem like in Australia where rice production is done on an industrial scale. So 




made for such a dire outcome? Are there issues of procurement? Processes? Lack of 
investment? Subsidies? Which groups of people are benefiting in the system from 
production to procurement?  
The worldwide food crisis badly affected developing countries in late 2007 due to a 
variety of factors (such as increased food prices with speculation on food commodities as 
possible substitute for fossil fuels) that created the perfect economic storm. According to 
the ADB, there was a combination of internal and external forces to the food crisis in the 
country. For the country, the food crisis highlighted its vulnerability as: “The Philippines 
is the world’s largest importer of rice, buying 10–15% of its consumption needs from 
abroad…The import bill for rice in the first half of 2008 was $858M, nearly four times as 
high as the prior-year period.” (ADB 2008:178) 
The Philippines saw food or rice riots and the country was one of the worst hit nations. 
The people rioted because of food insecurity (BBC 2008) Compounding low-level 
corruption contributes to the continued hunger and poverty of the populace as it distorts 
the efficient distribution, in this case, of staple foods. This in turn creates an unstable, 
divided society. The corrosive effects of corruption especially its impact on society was 
touched upon by then Dutch Ambassador to the Philippines, Robert Vornis, speaking at 
the 1997 Institute of Corporate Directors Annual dinner:  
“The response from the World Bank is there is no sustainability and substantial 
economic growth, poverty reduction in countries with wealth if there is 
institutional and rampant corruption. Rampant corruption decreases public trust 
which erodes the foundations of society. The very fabric of society is threatened 
[by corruption] which leads to the collapse of societies. This applies to both 
public and private sectors hence the partnership with the private sector. Good 
corporate governance becomes in essence futile, if confronted by weak public 
governance.” –Dutch Ambassador Vornis, ICD Annual Dinner, May 30, Shangri-
La Hotel, Makati 
As one of my interviewees pointed out: 
 “There are no rules when you are hungry.” 




9.4 Grand or Systemic Corruption 
 
The following sections look at how grand corruption permeates through Philippine 
society as exemplified by: 
1. The lack of confidence in the revenue-generating branches of the public sector  
2. The lack of confidence in the judiciary 
3. The dismay and lack of trust in the electoral system 
4. The lack of transparency in government contract bidding 
9.4.1 The Revenue-Generating Agencies 
 
“Corruption in the government’s two major revenue agencies, the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), has encouraged 
rampant evasion of personal and corporate income taxes. Corruption usually 
takes place during annual tax audits of companies by BIR examiners. The 
opportunities for corruption present themselves when companies are found to be 
cheating on taxes; some BIR examiners offer to settle for a lower tax assessment 
in exchange for a bribe. Efforts to stamp out corruption in these agencies have 
had only limited success.” (EIU 2008b) 
Throughout my four months in Manila, time and time again incidences in the bureaux of 
customs and revenue came up in my interviews and the popular media. As the main 
revenue generating arms of government, these two bureaux are the manifestation of 
corruption in the country. I never sought to interview these two bureaux as they do not 
regulate corporate governance in the country (although one Department of Finance 
agency, the Insurance Commission, does regulate corporate governance). However, 
unprompted, my interviewees would speak about their dealings with both bureaux 
impressing upon me how important they are in the (in)efficient functioning of 
commerce in the country. A decade earlier, Hutchcroft noted the politicisation in both 
bureaux and their problems reflected poorly on the country: 
“The amount of tax paid to the state is negotiable, and therefore highly 
dependent upon the current strength of one’s political connections.”(1998: 40) 




bureaux come under the purview of the Department of Finance105
Figure 43: Organisations under the umbrella of the Department of Finance 
 which has multiple 
responsibilities as the following figure shows: 
 
The Department of Finance (DoF) is organised with two main oversight responsibilities: 
1) bureaux and 2) agencies and corporations 
There are four bureaux under the DoF: internal revenue, customs, treasury and local 
government finance. Under agencies and corporations, the DoF has oversight over five: 
insurance, tax and tax appeals, deposits and export-import credit. 
9.4.1.1 The Finance Secretary, Gary Teves 
The Department of Finance head during my data collection was Margarito (Gary) Teves 
who like other departmental heads are appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the 
President of the Republic. The Secretary of Finance is a pivotal position in the Republic 
and paraphrasing Shakespeare, there is a feeling that uneasy lays the head that wears the 
mantle of Finance Secretary. 
For Teves, he sees his highly critical role as analogous to the main disburser of family 
budget where he must address a great deal of conflict management over competing 
interests (Business Mirror 2007d). For the most problematic organisations under his 
tenure, one major issue is the reality of public service compensation set against a public 
servant’s opportunism of profiting from the private sector: 
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• Bureau of Internal Revenue
• Bureau of Customs
•Bureau of Treasury




•National Tax Research Center
•Central Board of Assessment Appeal
•Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation




“You’re a low-paid BIR examiner on P15,000-P20,000 a month and you examine 
[multi-billion peso] companies. A friend’s bookkeeper is a BIR examiner 
entrusted with [examining] 200 companies. 50 [companies] are doing very well 
and the examiner gets P5,000 each from each company or P250,000.” – private 
sector 1 
"The bureaucracy is not properly compensated hence there are loopholes for 
corruption. There is a lack of discipline. It tempts the bureaucracy for corruption. 
Performance is neither appraised nor monitored. [Compensation is] not by 
meritocracy but done by seniority.” – private sector 2 
Teves takes the philosophical view on this: 
“In terms of human dynamics in any organisation, there are other factors outside 
a lateral attrition law that will either provide the motivation or decrease the 
motivation. Unfortunately both bureaux, like most government agencies, the 
compensation package is still relatively low compared to their overall 
responsibility of generating resources for the government. If we were to do it the 
way we do it in the private sector, we would probably have a leaner organisation, 
provide better compensation and a better system of reward and penalty. But it 
takes time in an organisation called the government.”-Teves in Business Mirror 
(2007d) 
Secretary Teves made an appearance at a monthly meeting of the Australia-New Zealand 
Chamber of Commerce (ANZCHAM) in Manila not so long after the sacking of the 
Internal Revenue Commissioner over a shortfall in the bureau’s tax collection target. The 
culture of personalisation in the Philippines is such that the departing Commissioner 
publicly made his feelings known over the terms of his removal: 
“There are higher authorities in the government’s financial institutions who 
would like to wash their hands of responsibility for the dire consequences of their 
unrealistic, failed and bungled policies, and who look for a sacrificial lamb and a 
scapegoat to which they can assign the blame. So be it. Their time to answer for 
their failure and incompetence will also eventually come.”-Former BIR Chief 




However, from most accounts, the turnover of finance secretaries is such that Teves’ 
tenure has been more successful than most. Since the end of the Marcos era, there have 
been 14 Finance Secretaries, each lasting an average of 18 months. Teves was coming up 
to his second year in 2007, an amazing feat, not repeated since another Finance 
Secretary, Bobby Ocampo in 2003. Teves is held in high esteem in his capacity as 
Secretary and is much admired for working within the constraints of the political 
pressure cooker of the country.106
For the most part, Teves is in favour of further economic liberalisation and privatisation: 
the latter to boost government revenues and for the former, to encourage long-term 
private sector competition: 
 Congress, after all, “is a difficult institution, governed 
by people who will be asking what is in it for them.” (ANZCHAM 2007) 
“The government will move out of business that we believe can be best placed in 
private hands… [On privatisation], there are two major considerations for selling 
[government] assets. One is a policy move because we believe the government 
should not be in the business, that this business where in the government has a 
stake right now can be placed in better hands in the private sector. Number two 
is to generate revenues.”(Business Mirror 2007d) 
He is in favour of creating an environment where there is “openness, transparency and 
consistency.” Questioned on the ownership limitations in key infrastructure sectors, he is 
also in favour of addressing them as the lack of infrastructure in the country is a main 
obstacle for further economic progress. (Business Mirror 2007d) 
For the Department, the goal is “to reach long-term prosperity and improved welfare of 
the country and its people.” (ANZCHAM 2007) While the Secretary has set out some 
noble and lofty goals for his Department’s agenda, the following sections on the two 
problematic bureaux are descriptive accounts of the challenges he faces. 
9.4.1.2 Bureau of Customs 
Opportunism is present at the Customs Bureau according to one interviewee: 
“I’ve had a PNP [Philippine National Police] General ring me up saying do this or 
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do that [in my operational capacity]; or Customs would ring me and say we have 
received a batch of products and ask whether I would like to receive a discounted 
price for it.” – private sector 1 
It was not known what the price of refusal was.  
The Customs Bureau also contributes to the unevenness of the playing field in the 
country according to another: 
“…unethical companies can abuse the domestic market, especially if corruption in 
government regulatory agencies continues unabated. Smuggling or non-payment 
of correct taxes, undermining of labour laws are areas that can be exploited to 
gain against competitors.” – private sector 2 
At the same time, political interference tends to undermine the operational effectiveness 
of the Bureau. In an incident when Customs tried to destroy luxury cars that were 
smuggled illegally into the country, some politicians swayed to prevent the bureau from 
completing this job: 
“Quezon Representative Danilo Suarez said he wanted to bid for the Porsche. 
“But I don’t want to criticise the plan. I don’t want the President to get mad at 
me,” he said.”-Lim Ubac & Orejas (2007) 
Was the Bureau’s ineptitude a sign of a deeper malaise? 
“It has gotten worse since 2002. COMELEC has gotten worse. The BIR, Customs, 
the Philippine Military, DPWS, Telecoms, Agriculture…I don’t understand the 
meaning of [all of this corruption].” – private sector 3 
For other public service organisations, it is with some relief that they are not as bad as 
Customs: 
“We have enjoyed a reputation of being relatively clean compared with other 
national government agencies such as the BIR, Customs and GSIS. Basically it’s 
because of the [organisational] culture.” – public sector 1 




“I hope that in 5 years’ time corporate governance would be seen as another facet 
[of operating] in the country…At the Department of Justice there is a lot of 
corruption, [there are payments needed] to be made to the Bureau of Customs 
and [there is harassment] from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. These are all very 
basic reforms” – private sector 4 
The revenue-generating arms of the Philippine government are bellwether indicators of 
the extent of corruption present in the country. 
9.4.1.3 Bureau of Internal Revenue 
If one could encapsulate what is wrong in the machinery of government, the exemplar 
would be the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Rightly or wrongly deserved as the 
whipping boy of the public service, the BIR is the black hole of lost hopes and causes. 
The BIR is akin to the canary in the mine, signalling any significant actions on reforming 
government organisations: 
“…BIR organisational reforms would constitute a litmus test of ability and 
willingness to undertake core institutional reforms.” (World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank 2003: 110-111) 
Like the infamous Goya painting of Saturn devouring his own son (Goya in Museo del 
Prado 2009) the Bureau eats idealistic people and spits out civil cynical servants. 
Recalling John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address dictum “ask not what your country can do 
for you, - ask what you can do for the country”107
“In the late 1980s, I knew this UP (University of the Philippines) fresh graduate 
who entered the BIR. She was full of enthusiasm. Five years later, I saw her. She 
had changed totally – the language, the body language.” – private sector 1 
, one is well-advised not to enter the BIR 
for fear of losing one’s patriotism: 
There is also a matter of institutionalised political patronage in the BIR. One interviewee 
recalled a visit he paid to the incumbent commissioner known for his reformist zeal. The 
then commissioner showed my interviewee his notebook which had a table: On the table 
contained the name of the BIR officials, the rank of the officials and the sponsor – the 
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political sponsor. This institutionalised corruption affects the effectiveness of the BIR to 
function well. This incident reinforces what Hutchcroft observed a decade earlier about 
the political patronage being systematically ingrained in the bureaucracy (1998:53). This 
political interference also places the BIR official in a bind: 
“If a BIR official is faced with a tax case, someone would go to a certain politician 
and the politician would intercede. For the poor BIR official, he can’t render a fair 
judgment on the tax case.” – private sector 2 
For taxpayers - organisations and individuals who do pay tax - the irony is by doing so, 
they are calling attention to their situation that they are capable of paying tax. Instead of 
pursuing tax evaders, having a ready list of willing taxpaying organisations and 
individuals make them easy targets for the BIR. (Remo 2007f) If one does not pay taxes, 
one does not get investigated as another complained to Secretary Teves at the 
ANZCHAM meeting: 
“I operate a small business. There is total corruption in the BIR. It’s not 
something we talk about. With tax, only the BIR go after are those honest people 
who do pay On the issue of tax collection, people who don’t pay tax don’t get 
investigated. We get targeted every year. It’s an uneven playing field. We work 
with other corporations and they don’t get taxed.” ANZCHAM (2007) 
Similarly from an interviewee: 
“Income tax is garbage in, garbage out. The grey markets believe that if they don’t 
report any income, they’re not traceable.” – private sector 3 
When one does follow the rules of the BIR, one does not necessarily feel satisfied by the 
recognition: 
“We won an award from the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the way we 
pay tax – that is indicative of the structure for years. Nobody pays taxes. The 
system here is pork-barrelling. Every politician controls the money. They don’t 
invest in the electorate, the money disappears.” – private sector 4 
One interviewee was more sympathetic. Value added tax or VAT was introduced because 





“There has to be some bitter pills one has to take to go forward. We have taken 
them such as VAT. The public don’t understand the necessity of it since 
corruption is an issue.” – private sector 5 
For public sector interviewees there is a skeptical attitude towards the BIR. According to 
a one interviewee, the BIR’s databases have not been harmonised with theirs for reasons 
of trust: 
“There is slippage with the BIR. It is very slippery. We can’t find [the right 
company information] through the BIR. What the companies file with the BIR 
and we compare with the financial statements - they are different. You can’t own 
a vehicle if the value is less than P150,000 and you pay no less than P10,000 in tax. 
Sometimes what [companies] file with the BIR and what they submit to us, well 
they are different.” –public sector 1 
The lack of progressive reforms within the Bureau signifies political unwillingness due to 
the task ahead of reforming the agency. 
9.4.1.4 Reforms in the Bureaux?  
So how does one reform the BIR and BOC? In the late 1970s there were plans to “reduce 
the corruption on the BIR” (Klitgaard 1988:13-97) but this dissipated as Marcos’ regime 
also became progressively oppressive and more corrupt. Thus, while local level 
institutional reforms can be implemented, they cannot be maintained unless they are 
part of a unified, current broader reform agenda. (Xin and Rudel 2004:297): 
“We need to have complementary [corporate governance] reforms in the BIR, 
PSE, and other regulators. It cannot be just the private sector.” – private sector 1 
In the post-dictatorship bureaux, there were moves towards decoupling the public sector 
pay in these two agencies. House Bill 5283 seeks to exempt employees in these two 
bureaux from the “Republic Act 6758 or Salary Standardisation Law” and instead use the 
tax and customs duties collected “as the basis for the salaries and bonuses of these 
agencies’ personnel.” (GMANews.TV 2008) While this bill did not find much support 
amongst the deputy commissioners of both agencies (Romero & Valdez 2009), the issue 
of adequate compensation consummerate with the supervisory and regulatory role of 




Applying existing laws was also subject pointed out in revenue collection: 
“[We would like] the implementation of existing laws, uniform treatment and 
consistent application of laws and collection of taxes. There is only a small 
percentage of companies paying taxes. The government isn’t efficient in 
collecting and they only look at the visible companies [i.e. listed ones].” – private 
sector 1 
Implementation has always been problematic for the Philippines. The reality is laws are 
enacted are rarely implemented in its entirety: 
“Laws are not implemented properly and fairly. The only way is to have less 
government and make sure the rules are implemented. The less of [government 
in business], the better.” – private sector 2 
According to former BSP Governor Singson, “We have good, beautiful rules, yet fail.” 
(Hutchcroft 1998:200) It does raise the question of usefulness of laws if they are rarely 
enforced and whether such laws should be removed to reflect the reality and inadequacy 
of legal enforcement.  
For the long-term outlook, the wish of many interviewees is improving public sector 
governance to complement private sector governance reforms. A strong private sector 
needs a strong public sector and vice versa. One cannot run efficiently without the other. 
9.4.2 The Judiciary 
 
While the judiciary does not generate revenues (as it is an ongoing expense for a society 
ruled by law), the Philippine legal system is the cause of much distress from my 
interviewees. Where justice is not being applied in an impartial manner, the confidence 
in the institutional function of a country’s legal system is undermined. 
Writing for Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Report, Judge Dolores 
Español expressed the view that “there are severe hindrances to the smooth delivery of 
justice in the Philippines: the lack of transparency in the judiciary; the backlog of cases; 
delays in resolving complaints against members of the judiciary, court officers and 
lawyers’ and inadequate salaries and facilities.” (Español 2007)  




USD32,545. By way of comparison an Indian Supreme Court judge is expected to receive 
USD7,992; a Turkish USD34,660; a Chilean USD98,616 and a British USD369,601. 
Accordingly the same report found “Where judges are paid a high salary, they are more 
likely to resist corrupting pressures.” (Transparency International 2007: 50) 
Table 38: The Philippine Judicial System (Transparency International 2007: 258) 
Legal system: Civil law, inquisitorial 
plural (with elements of Islamic law) 
Judges per 100,000: 2.7 
Judge’s salary at start of career: 
USD5,996 
Supreme Court judge’s salary: 
USD32,545 
GNI per capita: USD1,300 
Total annual budget: USD24.5B 
Percentage of annual budget: 0.6 
Are all court decisions open to appeal up 
to the highest level? Yes 
Institution in charge of disciplinary and 
administrative oversight: Not 
independent 
Are all ruling publicised? Yes 
Code of conduct for judges? Yes 
Sources: jbc.supremecourt.gov.ph, Supreme Court Finance Department 92005), World 
Bank Development Indicators 2005 and General Appropriations Act 2005 
 
The meagre salaries is a symptom of ‘chronic underfunding’ for the sector contributing 
to the “long delays in resolving cases. On average, it takes five to six years to resolve an 
ordinary case in a trial court. If it goes to appeal, a further six years could elapse before a 
final verdict is received.”(2007: 260) 
Español also notes the political interference of the judiciary “which sets a tone for the 
behaviour of the lower courts” and incidents of “executive encroachment on the judiciary 
for politicians rather than monetary gain.” An example of such encroachment was a 2004 
presidential order seeking to limit “fundamental freedom of speech, freedom of assembly 
and the freedom to seek redress and air dissent against abuses by the government.” 
While the Supreme Court declared this order unconstitutional, the Court did require 
“organisers to secure a permit for rallies in public places.”(2007: 259) 
In my interviews, there was overwhelming vehemence and vitriol against the 
inefficiencies of the judiciary. In one interview I conducted, the placid, rational and 
reasonable man before me was transformed immediately when the legal system was 
mentioned. His eyes fired, his cheeks puffed and slowly, plainly stated his opinion of the 
office bearers and dispensers of the nation’s justice: 
“The judicial system here is flawed. Slow. Corrupt. There are higher levels of 




law, public officials are responsible and personally liable for official acts. Your 
personal assets are on the line. In one case, former BSP Governor Fernandez had 
to adopt draconian measures for all banks. This action was challenged legally and 
Fernandez’s own estate was attached to the court action. The system’s corrupt, 
the stakes are high.” –private sector 1 
This echoes the experience of former BSP governor Jaime Laya’s view of the judiciary in 
Paul Hutchcroft’s book: 
“Former Governor Jaime Laya noted that even martial law “didn’t seem to stop 
the lawsuits against Central Bank personnel”. He actually laughed as he told me 
how the Central Bank legal office has ‘never won a case.’ But the former head of 
the bank supervision sector [Carlota P. Valenzuela], who has herself been sued 
doesn’t find it a laughing matter: “Why only in this country do the regulators go 
to jail, and the bankers go scot-free?” (Hutchcroft 1998: 8-9) 
The slow rendering of justice is also an important issue: 
“The judicial system here has been criticised because of the delay in rendering 
decisions. Judgement delayed is judgement denied. There are certain rules to 
follow after a decision has been made but it is not strictly implemented. The 
choice of judges are strongly influenced by politics [which in turn influences] the 
rendering of justice. The perception amongst the masses is only the rich can get 
justice in system. That perception has not changed.” –private sector 2 
This is supported by an ADB report which noted delays in justice administration were “a 
major, persistent challenge” (2009: 58) and other interviewees who themselves were 
involved in legal action and had firsthand account of the length of time it took for 
judicial decisions to be handed.  
“In 1994, we were hit by severe labour problems. [The plant we bought] had a 
militant union and [the previous owner] had closed off the plant. After 13 years, 
the Supreme Court found judgement in our favour.” – private sector 3 
“In 2001, I was one of the complainants … [In 2007] we’re still under a Supreme 
Court restraining order.”–public sector 1 




In 2007, the Ombudsman requested the Philippine Bar Association to investigate reports 
that its members were involved in corruption. (Acosta 2007) Overwhelming public 
displeasure at the judiciary is palpable. Then Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno 
linked this discontent with the democratic fabric of the country and the concept of 
liberty: 
“So long as the vote of even a single citizen is made a mockery of, we are not free. 
So long as the Filipino is hounded by lack of education, we are not free. A person 
is not free who does not understand his rights and responsibilities to society. So 
long as people are destitute and leave our country because of hopelessness in the 
future, we are not truly free.”-Puno in Coloma (2007) 
Continued reforms in the judicial sector, like other branches of government, will likely 
remain influenced and motivated by political will and commitment. (ADB 2009: 61) 
9.4.2.1 The rule of law – or lack thereof 
“The rule of law is the alternative model to the rule of terror, the rule of money and 
the rule of brute power. That is our justification as a profession.”  
-Former Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby in Marr (2009) 
An ineffective and inefficient judiciary undermines the rule of law. Enforcement of the 
law is a pre-condition for political and socioeconomic stability as it not only legitimises 
the rule of government but provides recourse for discontented citizens. (Rose-Ackerman 
2008: 329).  
A strong judicial system encourages social order. An environment without the certainty 
of the law is a recipe for chaos, distrust, pessimism and bitterness. As a former American 
colony, the liberal ideas of democracy are well-known and widespread but they are not 
present institutionally and in practice. This is reflected in many of my interviewees who 
felt a sense of anger, frustration, disillusionment and cynicism in the (lack of) 
enforcement of the law: 
“Rules are violated brazenly here by people in power. Show [us how] you can 
establish the rule in an environment of lawlessness. You can’t invoke the law in 
an environment of lawlessness. The law is brazenly and routinely violated by the 
government. There is no respect. If you complain, they charge you in courts. The 




place. If people are good, laws are useless. If people are bad [the laws are as 
equally] useless.”- private sector 1 
“The Philippines has a weak state and the elites feel [they are] above the law. The 
rule of law is not happening here.” – private sector 2 
The attitude seems to be that the law is a suggestion and an advice. Echoing the notion 
that corruption has two faces – the corruptor and the corruptee - the cause of the private 
sector is not helped when other private sector players actively break and influence the 
law: 
“There are a few players and it’s an uneven playing field. There is a huge 
competitive advantage for big corporations. They control the market. But [some 
of] the big business players don’t play by the rules with their taxes and lack of 
customs’ payment on goods which decreases their costs but that in turn affect 
others.” – private sector 3  
“Ethics and CSR is aimed at the board and not the management. The hope is the 
company can be educated in [such things]. If a board says no - [sometimes] the 
problem is the board itself. It’s the one that dictates corruption.” – private sector 
4 
The above comments support Rose-Ackerman’s observation that the short-term nature 
of corruption detrimentally affects private-public sector interaction leading to a race to 
the bottom (2008: 328). The disparity and the unequal playing field were apparent to 
some of my interviewees: 
“On corruption, part of the problem here is the private sector which has been 
using the state to strengthen themselves.” – academic 
Tony Kwok,108
“Here, lawmakers failed tremendously because the corruption law is terrible and 
 an anti-corruption consultant in the region and former Deputy 
Commissioner of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), 
was hired by President Macapagal-Arroyo as her anti-graft adviser. Kwok’s prospects for 
the Philippines to seriously attack the cancer of corruption are not optimistic: 
                                                     





inadequate.... Graft is still viewed as one of the country’s top problems. Shady 
practices hold back FDI and there is widespread tax evasion [thwarting] state 
efforts to significantly boost tax revenues.”-Kwok in Reuters (2007b) 
Kwok suggests that Manila “upgrade its anti-corruption laws and speed up the judicial 
process to really tackle the problem” but it is convincing the public that government is 
serious about tackling corruption which will be the main obstacle: “if people are cynical, 
there is no chance.” 
9.4.3 Elections 
 
After the disastrous and scandal-ridden administration of President Joseph Estrada109, his 
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the highest office in the land in 2001 
after another bloodless People’s Revolution that saw his ousting110
In 2005, there publicly emerged several wiretapped recordings
. The 2004 elections 
was one way to re-enforce Macapagal-Arroyo’s presidential legitimacy and to gauge 
popular support for her administration. The President won the election by a million 
votes. 
111
The conversations between the President-elect and the Electoral Commissioner, at best 
light, showed undue influence exercised by the executive on the bureaucracy. At its 
worst, it showed the illusion of Philippine democracy (David 2005, 2007). Now 
 of President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA), her husband Mike Arroyo and other supporters and members 
of her administration ringing up then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano 
during and after the 2004 Presidential elections (Coronel 2005, PCIJ 2009).  
                                                     
109 President Estrada and his manipulation of the Philippine Stock Exchange through the company 
BW Resources, is widely credited as the straw that broke the camel’s back which saw his eventual 
expulsion from the presidency: “The scandal would indubitably be etched in the annals of the 
Philippines securities market as the most brazen manipulative scheme with over 200 individuals 
(mostly friends of then President Estrada) involved.” (Santos 2007: 82) 
110 EDSA stands for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue which is a main orbital road around Metro 
Manila. The gathering for demonstrations is underneath a confluence of main roads. The ousting 
of Estrada was known as EDSA 2. EDSA 1 saw the ousting of dictator Ferdinand Marcos after he 
lost the 1986 elections to Corazon Aquino, widow of the assassinated (under Marcos orders) 
Benigno Aquino. EDSA 2 recalled the same bloodless overthrow of a president who had lost all 
credibility. See Philippine Daily Inquirer archives 
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/theestradawatch/archive.php accessed 19 March 2009 
111 This of course begs the question how such recordings were taped in the first place and who 




infamously known as the “Hello Garci” scandal112
In 2005, a Senate inquiry was told her husband “had flown twice to Mindanao in a 
private helicopter a couple of days before the 2004 presidential election to deliver boxes 
containing about P500M. It was in Mindanao where massive electoral fraud was allegedly 
committee to ensure the victory of Ms. Arroyo.”(Bonabente 2009) For the embattled 
Garcillano, his surreptitious departure from the country to avoid appearing before a joint 
committee after a summons became an international incident. Indeed the Singapore 
Government issued a note verbale that Garciliano did pass through Singapore for London 
resting rumours that he was still in the country as various machineries of government 
issued conflicting information over his whereabouts and his passport(s). (Philippine 
House of Representatives Report 2007). 
, the malleable foundations of the 
country’s democratic institutions were rocked by allegations of electoral fraud at the 
highest level. Credibility and legitimacy are fine things and this incident reinforced the 
fallibility of the government machinery in the face of a few powerful, political elites as 
the incident showed “the level of politicisation [in COMELEC] under the Arroyo 
government is perceived to be particularly grave.”(Hutchcroft 2008: 152, 154)  
The fallout from this scandal has tainted this administration since these recordings were 
uncovered. There is a feeling of helplessness and despair in the executive amongst 
interviewees: 
“The government is growing weaker. First of all, it has a lot to do with the 
credibility of government. That’s why elections are important as it gives the 
mandate to leaders. What happened in 2004 the institutions were not strong to 
begin with, and they have become weaker.” – private sector 1 
The incident also showed widespread lack of trust and loss of legitimacy: 
“There is the unpredictability of corruption. The ‘Hello Garci’ scandal. Why did 
the president get caught? They [government] were monitoring the commissioner 
whom they were counting on to work for them. [But they] couldn’t trust the 
commissioner due to the [unpredictability of corruption]. The president ended 
up calling the commissioner and gets caught up in the tape.” – academic  
                                                     
112 See the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s extensive coverage of the affair 
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?db=0&article=20051120-57109 




“Here, there was the case of Garci whose departure was denied. But Garciliano 
passed through Singapore. The Singaporean government testified to that. He was 
issued a [new] passport without the Singaporean mark. But it was a new one 
without any marks at all. What happened to the old one? COMELEC/Garci was 
asked by the President to cheat for her. The Hello Garci was to avoid scrutiny. He 
disappeared, was caught and was documented to have passed through Singapore 
on his way somewhere in the Middle East. The Singaporeans attest to that. 
Several months later he said he never left the country. He had a new passport. 
Clean one. It was a bogus passport.” – private sector 2 
“Now it’s centralised corruption – more so at lower levels as well. Now it’s so 
blatant, that if they [offenders] get slapped down [they say] I’ll give you back the 
money so you can let me go. There is no more morality. If the leader can say “I 
cheated”, it’s leadership by example.” – private sector 3 
Reforming COMELEC was called for by interviewees. Elections are the ultimate 
representation of popular democracy. If there is no trust in the government agency that 
oversees the electoral process, then democracy itself is under threat: 
“The most fundamental of all reforms is electoral reforms. If there’s no electoral 
reform, if there’s rampant cheating, there’s no accountability. It fosters division 
and divisiveness rather than unity.” – private sector 1 
Most my interviews conducted with the private sector did not occur until after the mid-
term elections of 2007. This was a pragmatic way of uncertainty avoidance on my 
interviewees’ part - to avoid violence that may erupt after the elections and to be 
indisposed to public officials seeking funds to furnish their election campaigns.  
The 2007 elections were a test of support for the current presidential administration. 
Again, Mindanao was a sore point with electoral fraud revealed in the province of 
Maguindanao. One academic interviewee was an electoral observer in the region: 
“There were major problems in the counting of votes as they were mostly false 
votes by the ruling family [in the region]. But it’s important to preserve that 
democratic space. During Maguindanao we were able to show what was going on 
with the elections [uncovering the fraud]. In that sense, there is that freer media 




that province.” – academic  
The other notable result  from these elections were the elections of notable opponents of 
the administration including that of a priest, Eddie Panlilio, who (voluntarily de-robed 
so he could participate) became governor in the President’s home province of Pampanga, 
defeating political dynastical clan incumbents and supporters of the president: 
“The [victory of the] priest in Pampanga shows that people want more upright 
people…people aren’t blind. Those perceived to be bad, lost. It’s a good sign. The 
people are harking to make the distinction between good and bad. So there’s 
hope. The momentum will continue. ” – private sector 2 
Panlilio revealed in October 2007 that he and fellow governors received a handout of 
P500,000 from Malacañang Palace. Compounding this amateurish and blatant way of 
disbursement, the bundles of money came in brown paper bags as the photo below 
shows (Orejas 2007). 
Exhibit 11: Photo of Pampanga Governor Eddie Panlilio 
 
Left: Governor of the province of Pampanga, 
former priest Eddie Panlilio shows the bundle of 
money he received from Malacañang Palace at a 











The other notable addition to the Philippine political scene was the former military 
officer Antonio Trillanes who was elected as senator whilst still in detention over his role 
in a 2003 coup against the President. His selection despite his detention was seen as a 
symbolic popular defiance of a graft-ridden administration. (Farolan 2007, Ramirez 
2007) 
In November 2007, Trillanes was again part of a short-lived coup against the President. 




the previous bloodless coup he was involved in, ended in surrender. (Philippine Daily 
Inquirer 2007b) At the time of writing Senator Trillanes remains detained and unable to 
discharge the duties of the position to which he was elected. (Alave 2008) Indeed many 
things need to be addressed to salve the integrity of elections and their outcomes in the 
country: 
“Only here in the Philippines can we celebrate that only 100 people were killed 
during these elections. So much economic power depends on political power. 
Reform has to be broader – change the whole structure, electoral reform. There 
must be a higher sense of nation rather than specific interests.” – private sector 3 
“We claim to be a democracy, but how practical is that? In these elections?” – 
private sector interviewee 4 
Newspaper editorials on the election captured the pessimism and cynicism of the 2007 
results, while the unusual nature of Philippine politics meant that the former Electoral 
Commissioner Garcillano who was cleared of perjury in 2006 nevertheless boldly ran for 
office in the 2007 elections but was defeated (Gomez 2007). Or as Rose-Ackerman 
bluntly puts it: 
“Corrupt governments lack political legitimacy. This loss of legitimacy can lead to 
violence in the form of anti-government riots by people who are frustrated by the 
venality of public officials.” (2008:332) 
Speaking to those who have interacted with the President, one spoke about her 
obstinacy when deluged by a barrage of attacks113
A legacy of her presidency is the sad indictment and nature of political clans. Macapagal-
Arroyo’s father was a former President of the Philippines and a fierce opponent of 
Ferdinand Marcos. For the administration to be seen to be engaging in the same corrupt 
behaviour that her father’s enemy was actively preoccupied with, it is with some regret 
the circle had made a full revolution. 
. For another, one recalled her 
ostracism at a function of pro-American supporters after she pulled out Philippine troops 
from Iraq in 2004. Anecdotal evidence also suggests a high transaction cost if one wishes 
to conduct a face-to-face meeting. 
                                                     
113 On the issue of the NAIA Terminal, she was described as “not taking [my] advice. She’s a pig-




9.4.4 Bidding for Government Contracts 
 
For my private sector interviewees, the bidding and tendering process for government 
contracts is rife with opportunistic behaviour from public officials. For example, in the 
tender for toll roads, there is a formal process to handle unsolicited bids which seems to 
be uniquely Filipino: 
“When you have unsolicited bids for toll roads that go to tender, you have the 
processing of unsolicited bids. This is the only country I know where there is a 
whole different process for unsolicited bids. So when you commission a feasibility 
study you need to ask what are the other issues that have to be addressed” – 
private sector 1 
And so are ‘Swiss challenges’ where third parties are allowed to make better and 
unsolicited offers (or challenges) for a tender during a designated period (Hodges 2003: 
2-3). The Swiss challenge currently creates a great deal of uncertainty amongst original 
bidders. In the following passage, a public sector interviewee relates how their 
organisation wishes to redevelop the land and building it is currently occupying but a 
Swiss challenge has delayed the process and created unpredictability: 
“We are still waiting the clearance from NEDA [National Economic Development 
Authority] which will be a built, operate and transfer procedure. The initial 
proposal is from the developer and it has to undergo a bidding process but it is 
part of the bidding rules. We have renegotiated contracts that are unsolicited 
bids. In announcing it, we are seeking other proposals of the initial bid (a Swiss 
challenge), so there could be a public bid.”-private sector 2 
For a country known for an opaque bidding system, rules that are changed midstream 
deter investor confidence rather than instilling it. A corrupt process manifested in the 
bidding process either corrupts participants or drives away genuine bidders with 
‘honourable’ intentions. (Tort 2007) 
In the case of one infrastructure project dealing with Manila ports, one bidder was 
disqualified in the screening process because it refused to have a waiver that would give 
the government immunity from legal suits if there was an irregularity in the bidding 




well-connected company (Pascual 2007) which undermined the integrity of the bidding 
process. This was backed by off-the-record evidence during my data collection.  
9.4.4.1 Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3 
Questions over the integrity of executing a government contract in the Philippines have 
its exemplar in the well-documented debacle that was Manila’s Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3 (Kinloch 2004, Gavieta 2006). Construction 
began in 1997 won by a consortium that included Germany’s Frankfurt airport 
construction arm called PIATCO-Fraport AG. The terminal was completed by the foreign 
investor consortium in 2002. However, it was only in 2008 that it finally opened up. The 
intervening years between its completion and opening was spent arguing over the 
validity of the contract as the Arroyo government voided it due to the corruption of the 
previous administration. The Supreme Court ruled the contract invalid but required the 
Arroyo government to pay compensation before granting the government control over 
the terminal. (Kinloch 2004: 16, PDI 2008). At the height of the dispute between the 
government and the private sector contractors, the government expropriated the airport 
(Yasay Jr. 2008). 
Expropriation is a highly hostile act and a strong deterrent to investment. Upon 
receiving a German government investment guarantee “as protection against political 
risks for its equity investment made in the Manila project”, the executive board chairman 
of Fraport AG, Dr. Wilhelm Bender, expressed his bitterness over what happened: 
“The unlawful behaviour of the Philippine government will not pay off. We will 
not accept the expropriation done and we will get our money back for our 
engagement in the Philippines.” (Fraport 2008) 
While in situ in Manila, it was strange to see a newly built terminal that remained closed 
due to ongoing legal battles while arriving passengers (including this one) were herded 
into the several decades old airport giving an underwhelming first impression of the 
country. The Terminal 3 incident exemplifies high levels of political risk present in the 
country. (Kinloch 2004: 15) 
Doing business is rather hazardous in the country when formal processes are not 
followed and the opaque manner in which transactions are completed is a main source of 




confidence is undermined. For one Japanese foreign investor, Takenaka Corporation, its 
contract with the government to complete and repair the Terminal was terminated.114
For my interviewees, Terminal 3 was symbolic of the difficult business environment in 
the country and the ever present vested interests that interfere with any prompt 
resolution: 
The 
role of the judiciary in the case was critical as the courts gave the impression of being 
highly politicised and unable to make an impartial judgement solely based on the merits 
of the case. (Chen 2004: 12-13) 
“The Philippines has a very bad reputation: the management of the economy, 
political instability, politicking over the airport terminal…it has resulted in a very 
bad reputation of corruption and uncompetitiveness.” – private sector 1 
“Foreign and local chambers [of commerce] give a high priority for Terminal 3. 
It’s the symbol of the inability to do anything [in the country]; it’s a critical thing 
for the first impressions of the Philippines. It is a very poor impression. [The 
President] knows everyone’s pushing her on it…There’s the matter of who’s going 
to run it. Lucio Tan wants 18 to 24 gates. Tan’s PAL has Terminal 2. Terminal 2 is 
intended for the domestic terminal but Tan controls it.” – private sector 2 
Another interesting outcome from the NAIA Terminal 3 issue was what can be inferred 
the price of unpredictable corruption in the execution of a government contract. In one 
newspaper article, it was reported the company sought to recover $425M eventhough 
documents showed a construction cost of $121M. (Gagni 2007b) The discrepancy between 
the construction cost and the claim amounts to $304M or 71.5% of the total claim. Was 
this the financial price of corruption? 
As an infrastructure project, ownership laws come into play and the local owner must 
have funds funnelled through them. Also the ongoing legal costs are another source of 
                                                     
114 For the Filipino government arm dealing with the contractor, the reason behind the 
termination was straightforward: “We had been negotiating with them to complete the 
construction of the terminal and issue a guarantee for a very long time now. We waited for two 
years pero paikot-ikot lang kami (we kept going in circles.)” For Takenaka, the response was: “I am 
sorry, this is a very crucial time. Please ask your government.” From the Japanese Export Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) representative in the country: “It’s complicated, it’s so difficult to give an 
opinion. We only read it in the papers, but similar to the overall sentiment, we would like to see 




contention. As in any legal dispute, overstating costs are also par for the course as a 
court nominally reduces any amount. 
Nevertheless, the worrying trend of the way business is done in the Philippines is echoed 
in the next section over another government contract, this time over a proposed national 
broadband network. 
9.4.4.2 National Broadband Network (NBN)  
Apart from the NAIA Terminal, another notable government contract came under 
scrutiny over questions of the bidding process. 
This case was of a proposed broadband network for the country. (Bonabente 2009) Given 
the country’s poor record in telecommunications infrastructure, this was a way for a 
technological leap forward for the country. 
However, in 2007, questions were raised over the contract process and the opaque way 
the award given to a Chinese company. The position taken by the government that it was 
a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) signed by the President upon her visit to China to 
drum up foreign investment for the country. A contract related to the MoA also went 
missing (Del Mundo 2007). Indeed two academics questioned the intent and wisdom of 
the proposed network given there were more pressing infrastructure needs in the 
country: 
“University of the Philippines School of Economics Raul Fabella and Emmanuel 
de Dios reported that getting a foreign loan to fund a third IT backbone should 
be the last of this resource-strapped government's priorities... In the IT sector, 
private business has proven to be quite aggressive in making costly investments 
for infrastructure, and could be relied on to keep doing so…Professors Fabella 
and de Dios had an eloquent way of zeroing in on the problem: what we lack is 
not in fibre optic; it's in fibre politique - or moral fibre, if you wish.”-Business 
Mirror (2007e) 
This sentiment was echoed by one interviewee: 
“There is a lack of moral fibre. This is not an honest country.” –private sector 1 




NBN issue became emblematic of the problems of the Arroyo administration. 115
The next sections look at other issues on corruption that came up during my fieldwork: 
its impact on gender, its effect on investment and quality of investors, poverty and the 
OFWs. 
The 
manner in which the way government contracts are tendered – or not tendered – 
questions the nature, sincerity and delivery of future infrastructure projects in the 
country. 
9.5 Gender Representation and Corruption 
 
One male interviewee raised the issue of gender in terms of mitigating the risks of 
corruption: 
“[In terms of] the value system here, I’d hire a woman over a man. They work 
harder, are less corrupt. The women [in my organisation] would work 10% more 
than the men and they also do the household work. The women would do the 
budget and they’d also be the breadwinners but ensure the man’s ego.  
“These are cultural aspects – the boys get pampered, the women are the workers. 
Given the choice in this office environment, I’d discriminate in favour of women. 
Most of [the men] are macho guys with a girlfriend on the side. It’s a 
generalisation that applies but women work hard here. Culturally, Filipinas were 
brought up to take decisions, and there are powerful women up the corporate 
ladder. They are very accomplished so there’s not much discrimination in place. 
The women were brought up here to take responsibility in the family 
environment.”-private sector 1 
The perception of the integrity of a gender has had past examples including the 
following observation from a 1942 Time magazine: 
“The Filipino is a stubborn gambler even for the Orient, an unbusinesslike 
dweller in the Far East of shrewd traders. His wife handles the money of the 
household because otherwise he gives it away, loses it, bets it, or spends it.” –
Time (1942) 
                                                     
115See the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism blog on the issue 




There is some support for this notion that females are the less-corrupt gender in the 
literature. Anand Swamy and colleagues found that females were “less likely to condone 
corruption”, “less involved in bribery” and “provides some support for the idea that, at 
least in the short or medium term, increased presence of women in public life will reduce 
levels of corruption.” (Swamy et al 2001: 26) 
However caution must be taken as the authors suggest “it is conceivable that our results 
reflect gender differentials in acknowledgment of corruption, rather than in incidence of 
corruption.” (Swamy et al 2001: 27).  Similarly, Rose-Ackerman suggests that 
“Governments with more female participation in politics are less corrupt, and this is 
consistent with survey evidence suggesting that women are more disapproving of 
corruption than men.” (2008: 335)  
According to a Grant Thornton International survey cited in The Economist, the 
Philippines lead the world in having the highest percentage of women represented in 
senior management with around 50%, followed by Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa 
– well ahead of the global average which is around 22%. With two female presidents 
since the downfall of Marcos the survey “reflects the tradition of wide participation in 
society.”(The Economist 2007)  
Proportionally, half of the government institutions I accessed were interviews conducted 
with women while only 20% of my private sector interviews were conducted with 
women. Further research into this particular area of corruption studies may help 
determine the extent gender does play a role in mitigating the spread of corruption. 
9.6 Corruption Discourages Investment 
 
Corruption is a major obstacle and disincentive to economic growth deterring both 
internal and foreign investment (Rose Ackerman 2008: 332). Interviewees supported this 
notion: 
“Here we have expensive property. There is no power, no water, and no 
transportation. We don’t have roads, [so we] fund them independently. The 
money supposedly spent on roads and bridges here you could have paved the 




Coupled with restrictive foreign ownership controls which mean the local partner has 
the control but not the financial leverage, the incentive to invest in the country is further 
discouraged when other countries in the region are more open and business-friendly: 
“In Vietnam, we have invested and we’d love to do the same here. But in 
Vietnam, we are allowed to have an 80% shareholding in the business. It is hard 
to be competitive when you own less than the majority.” – private sector 2 
One interviewee pondered the macroeconomic implications of corruption and its 
disincentives for the country: 
“If you talk about corruption everywhere – whether it was done a little different 
in the last 10 to 20 years, [the evidence is] a lot of money has left. Perhaps the 
business environment was better 50 years ago. In the Philippines, all the money 
has gone overseas. If the money stayed in the country, it could have been used. 
You can see this in other countries where the money has stayed in the country. It 
has been used in the country because they have huge infrastructure 
developments. You can see where it has gone. Here in the Philippines, the money 
has gone overseas.”-private sector 3 
This echoes Hutchcroft’s observation about the lack of loyalty shown to the nation state 
by some private sector actors: “Unlike their counterparts in South Korea and Taiwan, 
Philippine entrepreneurs could quite easily take the money and run; there was little 
sense of quid pro quo to a state so utterly incapable of promoting long-run 
developmental objectives.” (1998: 86) 
Thus, corruption discourages both local and foreign investment. In 2009, the umbrella 
body for institutional investors worldwide and whose members control $10 trillion of 
capital (Durkin 2009) and one-fifth of the US equity market (Burgess 2009), the 
International Corporate Governance Network, published its statement and guidance on 
anti-corruption. The network’s stance on corruption is reproduced in the following 
excerpt.  
Text Box 12: Why Corruption Matters to Investors (ICGN 2009: 5) 
“While making a corrupt payment can enable a company to win profitable business in 
the near term, it ultimately destroys value, both at a macroeconomic level and at an 




efficiency by distorting competition and depriving buyers of economically superior 
products at the most competitive prices. Examples abound of deficient, unsafe or poorly 
specified products being delivered at vastly-inflated prices to governments that can ill-
afford such waste. 
 
“Corruption destabilises the political process and promotes conflict. It also raises the 
cost of doing business and deters investment. For investors with exposure across the 
market, this reduces overall returns by interfering with the allocation of capital to its 
“highest and best use”. For investors in individual companies that have been 
disadvantaged by the corrupt actions of competitors, this directly reduces returns, even 
in some cases threatening commercial survival. For investors in bribe-paying companies, 
the damage is more insidious, and is felt over the longer term.  
 
“Although corrupt actions can go undetected and unpunished, when they do come to 
light they can trigger extremely costly and disruptive corrective actions, including legal 
and forensic investigations, fines, disgorgement of ill-gotten profits, corporate 
restructuring, dismissal of executive teams, imprisonment, debarment from client 
procurement lists, employee morale problems, staff defections, recruitment difficulties 
and reputational damage.  
 
“Companies with a reputation for weak anti-corruption controls, or which are found to 
have “skeletons in the closet” during pre-merger due diligence, can find that deals are re-
priced or even called off. They also will face hurdles when accessing the capital markets 
of countries where anti-corruption enforcement extends extra-territorially, such as in the 
US and increasingly other OECD countries, because past actions outside those countries 
will become within reach of enforcement authorities, thereby raising those companies’ 
cost of capital.  
 
“Finally, whether or not corruption is detected and punished, a corporate culture that 
tolerates corrupt payments is also one that is much more likely to tolerate, or fail to 
prevent, financial fraud, theft of company assets and other actions that will directly harm 
shareholders. Corruption corrodes corporate culture and undermines the quality of 
management.” 
 
The ICGN’s position is an acknowledgment of the effect and cost of corruption on 
investment decisions. 
9.7 Corruption Attracts the Best of the Worst 
 
According to the 10th Principle of the UN’s Global Compact: “Businesses should work 
against corruption in all its forms including extortion and bribery.” (UN and 
Transparency International 2009) With Transparency International, the UN’s Global 
Compact has issued a reporting guidance on anti-corruption measures. This is an 
encouraging sign that there is now a great deal of openness to discuss the detrimental 




In the Philippines, it is hard to do business in the country without engaging in some 
form of corruption and corrupt behaviour. Below are poignant thoughts on corruption 
and its effect on the Philippine business environment from some of my interviewees:  
“The Philippines has one of the most difficult business environments in the 
world. Aside from the façade of speaking English and being friendly, it is difficult 
to do business here. In order to be successful here, it is very difficult. Unless 
you’re corrupt.” – private sector 1 
“The problem is legitimate companies are forced to behave unethically because of 
corruption. Corruption has two faces: the corruptor and corruptee. Corruption is 
a product of poor, public governance.” – private sector interviewee 2 
“In this business environment, the businesses who comply with the law are at a 
disadvantage. Ethical standards will not survive in the local business 
environment. Here, if you will not cheat, you will lose the business. If you don’t 
abide, you go by the tide. If people are good, laws are useless. If people are bad, 
it’s useless.” – private sector lobby group 
What attracts a foreign investor to do business in a nation-state known to be corrupt, 
difficult and unpredictable? Are they themselves corrupt, immoral, unethical or do the 
financial opportunities outweigh the less desirable elements of a business transaction? 
Does a corrupt environment corrupt the potential investor or is the investor already 
well-versed in doing business in an opaque way? Does the investor take the liberty of 
lowering their internal ethical standards in a corrupt business environment? The quality 
of foreign investors attracted to the Philippines was a point that I came across 
intermittently with people I spoke to and interviewed. Asking a well-informed source 
about press coverage of a multi-billion dollar (USD) investment in the country on 
whether the foreign investor would have had to make some unofficial payments, the 
response - with a withered look that implied this question was redundant and I was 
being naive - “Of course they would have.” 
One academic was more articulate and blunter about the quality of foreign investors 
who are present in the country: 
“Many MNCs will come in to this country and become bad people. Many of these 




Is it a coincidence? A product of the environment? Poor corporate governance is 
not a monopoly, monopolised by Filipinos. It is everywhere. When you enter the 
country, it’s the rule of the same. The foreigners can be as bad as the Filipinos 
can be good outside the country.”-academic 
An example of how undesirable a foreign investor can be is related in Text Box 13 which 
looks at the heavy promotion of breastmilk powder substitutes in a country where access 
to clean water is a major challenge. Fundamentally, the issue of promoting breastmilk 
powder is down to ethical investment. However, in a country where government 
regulations are selectively enforced, the onus of responsibility on investors to exploit this 
weakness is undeniable: 
Text Box 13: The Breastmilk-Substitute/Powdered Milk Industry in the 
Philippines 
“Gina’s newborn girl has just contracted pneumonia. A few years ago, she lost twins to 
premature birth. Her baby looks malnourished and small for her age. Despite her family’s 
poverty, Gina stopped breastfeeding and opted to feed her baby with infant formula after 
getting convinced by TV ads. Hours of TV exposure led her to believe her baby would grow 
healthy and intelligent if she is fed with breastmilk substitute. By failing to breastfeed, 
which is also a natural way to limit pregnancy, Gina is again on the way.” (Jimenez 2007) 
 
During my field research, one of the more notable socioeconomic issues the country was 
facing was the promotion of powdered milk to newborns and infants. Watching the 
television, listening to the radio or reading the newspaper, I would come across the 
heavy promotion of these products. Every ad break featured some happy mother with an 
equally happy child whose cheeks were bursting with happiness because s/he had grown 
up in a household where powdered milk was consumed with the word “Gold” at the end 
of the product’s name - or “Platinum” to indicate the product was P250 dearer.  
 
While there is a certain amount of parochialism and xenophobia that I felt were present 
in some of my interviewees, there was little concern about the promotion by these milk 
companies who were usually subsidiaries of MNCs. Wasn’t Nestlé’s powdered milk 
promotion in 1970s Latin America a Harvard Business School case? (Austin 1990) How 
could this situation still exist in any country in the world today?  
 
Only 7% of Manila’s population is connected to a sewer system, far lower than 
Kathmandu (20%) and Dhaka (30%). Sanitation and sewerage infrastructure are heavy 
financial burdens for the government (PDI 2007c). An estimated 16,000 Filipino children 
under 5 die because of their mothers’ failure to breastfeed and improper feeding; P4B is 
the amount spent every year by the powdered milk industry to promote bottle feeding; 
P21.5B is spent annually to buy infant formula or 13% of a monthly income of an average 
Filipino family which goes to buying the product (Jimenez & San Juan 2007). 
 
In 2004, the Department of Health (DoH) started to strengthen the implementation of 




country. The Department introduced the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations 
(RIRR) which specifically targeted the advertising and promotion of breastmilk 
substitutes, labelling of the substitutes, incorporating health warnings such as banning 
the nutritional claims of the products. The breastmilk substitute industry in the country 
was galvanised and opposition to the RIRR reached the transnational-political levels. 
According to the industry’s lawyer, at stake was USD208M in revenues the industry 
stood to lose if the RIRR went ahead. (AP 2007) 
 
In a country where access to clean water for the majority of the population is a daily 
challenge, it was unsurprising UNICEF research found “poor and near-poor families who 
use formula incur 39% more medical care expenditures and 99% more in medical 
charges than non-formula users.” (Monsod 2007) The initial ban was overturned on 
appeal. A vocal critic of powdered milk promotion was the UNICEF Philippine country 
representative, Nicholas Alipui, who received a complaint from the International 
Formula Council (IFC) which represents global milk companies such as Nestle, Abbot 
Laboratories, Wyeth and Mead Johnson. The lobbying efforts of the IFC overwhelmed 
Alipui: 
 
“I was surprised. I didn’t know that we would instantly become the subject of international 
scrutiny of the sort. I think that was when I first realised the enormity of the challenge that 
we’re facing and how big the opposition from milk companies was going to be. The nerve of 
milk companies comes from the fact they do have lobbyists around the world who have an 
exaggerated impression about themselves and what they can actually achieve in terms of 
influence within various organisations and child-rights groups….the fact that they are able 
to penetrate [Philippine government] organisations to the point of trying to undermine 
[UNICEF] representatives is an indication that they have enough influence within these 
organisations to challenge individuals who represent them in their respective 
countries.”(Alipui in Jiminez 2007)  
 
Similarly, the CEO and President of the powerful business lobby group (which represents 
3 million businesses116
 
) Washington DC-based United States Chamber of Commerce, 
Thomas Donohue, exercised his organisation’s wide influential leverage on the country 
writing to the President of the Republic on the 11th of August 2006 requesting a 
reconsideration of the RIRR’s implementation: 
“Dear Madam President, I recall with fondness our encounters over the last years and the 
US Chamber has been watching with great interest the recent developments in your 
country [however] it has been brought to my attention that a recent regulatory decision by 
an agency of your government would have unintended negative consequences for investors’ 
confidence in the predictability of business law in the Philippines. In particular we are 
concerned about the effects this decision will have on the pharmaceutical industry. 
… 
“First the [RIRR] prohibits all marketing of infant formula to children up to three years of 
age…[secondly the RIRR] also treats infant formula as a potential hazard by requiring 
warning labels without any scientific justification, a step which would needlessly alarm 
potential consumers and is not required either by Philippine law or international norms. 
… 
                                                     
116 US Chamber of Commerce (2009) About Us http://www.uschamber.com/about/default.htm 




“If regulations are susceptible to amendment without due process, a country’s reputation 
as a stable and viable destination for investment is at risk. We know you would want to 
avoid such a situation occurring. The US Chamber of Commerce values highly the 
mutually beneficial trade relationship between our two countries…We would therefore be 
very grateful if you could re-examine this regulatory decision in light of these 
concerns.”(Donohue in PCIJ 2009) 
 
With political pressure exerted from the highest level in the land, the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision on October 2007 and did not deliver an unequivocal victory on 
either side of the milk product substitute debate (Rempillo 2007). There was not a total 
ban on the marketing of breast milk substitutes but the Court reiterated the Department 
of Health’s “power to regulate, screen and decide on the advertising and promotion 
materials of these products.” (Soe 2007)  
 
The Supreme Court decision was widely anticipated in the region. The breastfeeding rate 
in the country was 16% in 2003 but the rate was worse in Thailand (5.4%) and Vietnam 
(15%).(AP 2007) In comparison, 84% of Australian babies are breastfed on hospital 
discharge, 61% at three months and 49% at 6 months.(Australian Breastfeeding 
Association 2000) An Australian expatriate related that when she gave birth to her son in 
a Manila hospital in the 1980s, she had to be vocal against the nurses’ promotion of milk 
powder and insist upon breastfeeding her child.  
 
Writing for the British medical journal, The Lancet, Rene Raya ruefully stated:  
 
“Scientists and policy makers have declared, urged and exhorted countries to exert every 
effort to increase breastfeeding rates. 25 years of scientific evidence have accrued since the 
signing of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes in 1981...the UN’s 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has warned that powdered infant-formula is 
not a sterile product.  
 
“Aggressive marketing practices for breastmilk substitutes have been blamed for the 
decline of breastfeeding in the Philippines where only 16.1% of Filipino infants aged 4-5 
months are exclusively breastfed…there have been suspicions that violations of the Milk 
Code have occurred in the past with over-zealous sales techniques. Mothers receive various 
gifts and are targeted to attend classes where infant formula milk is promoted [and] much 
remains to be done and the struggle goes on to restore the culture of breastfeeding in the 
Philippines.” (Raya 2008) 
 
Akin to the climate change debate, there is overwhelming scientific evidence supporting 
the superiority of human milk against breastmilk powder substitutes for infants. Yet the 
lucrative profits companies make from this product is a sad indictment of exploitation by 
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MNCs may behave in impeccably in their home countries. However, their operations in 
developing countries which  have malleable laws and known corruptibility of public 
officials may render a more flexible behaviour. 
Subsidiaries of American listed companies operating in the Philippines have two relevant 
legislations they need to consider when the delicate matter of corruption rears its head: 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)117 and Section 404 on Internal Control of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 118
“Major foreign corporations such as the American ones follow SOX. Some are 
quite strict and rigid about it. On the other hand, there are other listed 
[corporations] who follow SOX but have a practical approach to what is being 
done here. Even major corporations have to bend the rules a bit. The big issue is 
 Both laws focus on the financial reporting of a company’s 
operations: 
                                                     
117 US Department of Justice (2009) US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ accessed 3 March 2009 
118 Institute of Internal Auditors (2008) Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404: A Guide for Management 
by Internal Controls Practitioners 2nd Edition, 10 March 




to maintain proper accounts. There is a blind-eye to the activity that goes on 
whether it’s a gift fee, marketing fee, canvassing fee, contractor fee, consulting fee, 
referral fee where proper commissions are paid. There are all sorts of 
arrangements.” – private sector 3 
The following figure from Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Report 
highlights the grey areas in between legal and outright illegal behaviour of a business 
transaction: 
Figure 44: Influence on Tender Procedures (Transparency International 2007: 340) 
 
For the majority of Australian companies present in the country, most are active in the 
infrastructure or mining sectors. For one Australian mining company, Lafayette Mining 
Limited (ticker symbol: LAF.AX), their foray to operate a mine on Rapu Rapu Island in 
Albay Province was both a natural and public relations disaster.(Oxfam 2009) For one 
business commentator, Lafayette’s action immediately after an incident was a warning 
on how not to do business in the country: 
“They had a [cyanide] spill. It was done very badly. The whole thing could have 
been handled but they ignored the people who were complaining. They didn’t 




thought [keeping quiet] was a better strategy. But here, it is the opposite. You 
need relationships especially in government to correct the situation very 
quickly.”-private sector 4 
For development agencies in the country, the challenge is how to distribute aid in a way 
that does not promote corrupt practices. How do they bypass corruption? One observer 
points out this conscious approach: 
“Ausaid is building up expertise and skills to create change rather than [give] aid 
itself. They are developing capabilities [which counters] the likelihood of 
situation for [corrupt] practices.”-private sector 5 
A corrupt environment attracts the type of private sector players who are more willing to 
bend the rules and engage in the informal ways of an uncertain environment. 
9.8 Corruption Contributes to Poverty 
 
During my 4 months of living and travelling around the capital of Manila, grinding 
poverty is never far away. A visitor can see the extensive slums from an airplane window, 
and on the ground be confronted by all manner of attempts to alleviate one’s 
circumstance; street kids who have no childhood nor schools to go to beg for money and 
food; housing that is made of three cardboard walls and a plastic sheeting for a roof; 
adults trying to eke out an income by any means necessary.  
Not surprisingly, poverty was an issue that was touched upon by many of my 
interviewees.  
For one interviewee who confronted a lot of corruption in his dealings with public 
officials, his ability (or inability) to create further employment was an issue he and his 
peers internally struggled with. In a moment of introspection, he reflected: 
“I went through phases here in the Philippines. You want to change something, 
make a difference to the world, to the poverty here. It goes up and down. You 
want to change but can’t make a change. You start off full of enthusiasm and 
then reality hits you. What can you do? You become discouraged and you find 
[ups and downs and then] a neutral phase.” –private sector 1 




through economic development and how to address current income inequality: 
“My point is we really need a new paradigm. [We must have] development-
inclusive growth, and managing [the wealth] divide effectively. Yes to opening 
ownership limits but caution on different levels of development. [We must] take 
into account poverty levels, [and] align investments with that.” – private sector 2 
In 2007, GDP growth was the highest for 30 years. However, optimism was tempered by 
the reality of poverty and economic growth had not translated to the best part of the 
population: 
“The stock market levels are high, the peso is high, and GNP is high. The 
Secretary of Economic Planning says there is growth in the corporate and 
financial sectors growth. But hunger is also higher and so is suffering.” – 
academic  
“Improvements in the economy should be matched with corresponding efforts to 
attack poverty at the roots and ensure that economic growth translates to a 
better quality of life for Filipinos living in abject poverty." – Business Mirror 
(2007f) 
Corruption keeps on punishing those who are already economically impoverished and 
disenfranchised. Tackle corruption in the country, and poverty will be addressed as well. 
9.9 Overseas Filipino Workers  
 
“The poor leave for lack of money, the wealthy leave for lack of hope. But we are 
not the first, nor are we alone in this tragedy.” (Pangalangan, 2007) 
Poverty creates a feeling of hopelessness. A dysfunctional political economy creates 
feelings of discontent and helplessness. This has meant for many Filipino families, 
including mine, the alternative is to seek new lives abroad forming the abundant 
diaspora.119
                                                     
119 For a succinct paper on the effect of international diasporas, see Fullilove (2008)  
 The term diaspora is based on the Greek word meaning “to scatter and to 
sow.”(Ember et al 2005: xiii) And so Filipinos have scattered and sowed through all four 
corners of the earth making new lives and integrating successfully (and for some, not so 




generations being indicative of the reluctant displacement (Ember et al 2005: xiii) and a 
schizophrenic relationship to one’s place of birth:  
“Homeland remains fresh in the minds of migrants. However, many remember it 
mainly as a corrupt and unjust society made up of mostly poor people with no 
opportunity for achieving a better life, and a few rich people who exploit them. 
As James Fallows wrote, “The Philippines is a country full of people who would 
rather live elsewhere.”’ (Anderson 2005: 817) 
Unlike other countries in the region whose economic development relied upon policies 
promoting export-oriented industrialisation, the lack of coordinated political vision and 
will to lift the country out of its continued politico-economic quagmire and dismal 
financial performance now several decades old (Anderson 2005: 809). This has meant the 
best of its workers have left for abroad; aggregated - the significance of having 10% of the 
country’s population living and working overseas is staggering: 
“People are the Philippines’ main export. Last year more than 1M Filipinos left to 
work abroad as maids, nurses, sailors and in all sorts of other difficult but low-
paid jobs. Labour migration is huge, and growing, in South-East Asia, as workers 
are sucked out of its poorer countries, increasingly to their better-off neighbours, 
even though these are still themselves sending workers to the rich world. Many 
of these wandering wage-earners eventually return. In the meantime they send 
home huge sums—in the Philippines' case, the equivalent of over 10% of GDP. 
This compensates for the opportunity cost of having, at any one time, 8M of its 
best workers abroad.” (Economist 2007b) 
For many of my interviewees and the press of the time, one segment of the Filipino 
diaspora, the Overseas Filipino Worker (or OFW), is an important group economically 
especially because of the value their remittances provide to the country (Schiller 2005: 
578-579). Within a generation, the perception of the OFW has changed from that of 
shame to a source of pride: 
“In the late 70s, early 80s, OFWs were a source of shame. It’s a massive change. In 
those days, they would not talk about remittances as they were ashamed of it. 
Foreigners avoided talking about it. Now, it’s not regarded as a source of shame 




Today the significance of the OFWs has implications for the country: economically 
through their remittances, socially because of the brain drain and politically due to the 
potential power they may exercise in the future. 
9.9.1 Economic Impact of Remittances 
 
Economically, the OFW is a formidable segment of the consumer market. Below shows 
the increased value of remittances being sent to the country from USD5B in 2005 to 
USD8B by 2008. In a global economic downturn, the remittances provide the means for 
which the country can keep afloat (ADB 2008: 179-180) as the following figure shows: 
Figure 45: Value of OFW Remittances from 2005 to 2008 (ADB 2008: 179) 
 
The OFWs and their families are the new middle class able to exercise financial leverage 
and capable of leapfrogging the pre-existing class, power and wealth structure of the 
country. They are used to first-world services and demand or expect such services to be 
present in the country. They are providing a much needed supply of steady income and 
investment (Schiller 2005: 576-577). As the OFWs with their remittances to their families 
provide a steady supply of consumers, this new market means the private sector is also 
targeting their services around this group who spend most of the year in one land, and a 
few weeks in the country because of Christmas, Easter or local fiestas: 
“OFW remittances are equal to US12/US13B per year. In this economy, [that 
amount of money means] real estate and buildings. The first thing they do or 
what a family wants is shelter. This means a lot for those in the real estate 


























development] projects. So after this middle class family have housing, they would 
buy products to fill the house - a fridge, a car, and so forth. The 20-30% 
difference in income buys a lot of goods. As long as people don’t get jobs or paid 
here, they will go overseas.” – private sector 1 
“We are seeing a significant shift. Remittances are increasing [which means] 
education [is being funded], the investments [are present] to build a small home 
or start a small business. As long as the opportunities here are not as good as 
they are overseas, people will leave. Job creation is not keeping up with the 
population” – private sector 2 
Indeed, during my time in Manila, there were a lot of advertisements for real estate 
developments from apartments to McMansion villages (with the ubiquitous Tuscan-style 
villa) not so dissimilar from those being promoted in Australia or America. The growth 
in the real estate sector from 2005-2007 was largely due to OFWs and their increased 
consumer spending (Cuisia 2007; see Chapter 6). 
While doing my fieldwork, the apartment I rented belonged to an OFW who lived in 
Australia. For Ayala Land a substantial portion of their real estate sales come from OFWs 
and their marketing strategies mean an extensive website120 tapping the overseas market 
and property roadshows in the USA.121
Similarly, the business opportunities overseas abound where a substantial OFW 
community is located. In this case, following the money by following the OFW: 
 
“We’ve plans to acquire business in the USA. In the USA we’re looking at 
establishing a nurses’ development agency – if it’s going to be big, if we push 
through the plans that will be one of our investment opportunities.” – private 
sector 2 
The value of remittances mitigated the effects of the global financial crisis in the country. 
But for the 20M people living on less than USD1.25/day, they still face “significant risk of 
seeing poverty reduction reversed (AusAid 2009). Thus dependence on OFWs highlights 
the nation’s economic dependence (Nonini 2005: 568). If the remittances should dry up 
                                                     
120 Ayala Land (2009) http://www.ayalaland.com.ph/ accessed 28 March 2009 
121 Ayala Land (2009) Events, Promotions and Updates: Ayala Land Representatives will be in LA, 





whether through unfavourable labour laws or economic downturns in host countries, the 
Philippines will be vulnerable: 
“… the credit crisis hasn't really hit the Philippines as hard as may have been 
initially thought. The banks are doing business as usual with no drastic change to 
their policies. Maybe there's something to be said about being "under the radar" 
of sorts. But the thing that worries people here is the fact that we rely so much on 
remittances from  our overseas workers, and if they lose their jobs then not only 
will the remittances be severely reduced, we are also in no position to absorb the 
influx of unemployed workers. That makes for a pretty worrisome situation I 
should think.” – regulator interviewee 2009 coda 
“We only have a small share of FDI. So we’re not growing. The growth is not 
robust, so we are relying on the remittances of OFWs. The remittances are the 1% 
difference between GDP and GNP. The remittances are the money that’s allowing 
people to shop. Basically, the OFWs have helped the economy to be on an even 
keel. We’ve exported our labour problem of unemployment, and not mitigated 
the social impact. Our labour costs are not cheapest anymore, and we are more 
expensive than Vietnam or Thailand." – private sector 3 
The reliance and dependence on remittances are a reflection on the lack of trust and lack 
of confidence in the local politico-economic system while taking advantage of the 
benefits of the global financial system (FT 2009) by bypassing home country restrictions. 
Remittances are a more effective tool for poverty reduction than foreign aid given to 
governments:  
“When money is shipped directly to the individuals who need it the most, rather 
than being funnelled through corrupt and inefficiency government bureaucracy, 
then it can have the greatest impact.” -Woolsey (2009) 
Unlike its neighbours in the region which have sought the opposite by creating a 
facilitative business environment, the lack of employment opportunities means the OFW 
phenomenon is a pitiful reflection on the failure of the country’s policies to actively 
promote employment. Indeed the disappointment of diasporas with their home 
countries was touched upon by Werbner (2009: 548) and some soul-searching from one 




“There is a problem of confidence because of the personalities involved. Who do 
we blame? Do we blame the private sector and corruption in government? Where 
do we find solutions? The option will always be in the domain of the middle class 
and to leave the country. It is very sad.”- private sector 4 
The contribution of existing government policies in forcing people to leave the country 
to eke a living cannot be underestimated given the success of Filipinos to make a living 
overseas. The median Filipino household in the USA at US$65700 - some $10,000 higher 
than other American Asian households (US Census Bureau 2007: 4,17) Given the 
phenomenon of India’s ‘licence raj’ and the problems of Philippine corruption, these two 
countries known for their reluctance to liberalise economically have produced citizens 
that are most motivated in doing economically well abroad.  
The lack of opportunities in their home countries that have prevented economic growth 
to take place have unleashed their entrepreneurial spirits abroad.  There is a sense and 
somewhat perverse turn of patriotism in the country where current policies are reluctant 
to open up the country to trade, economic liberalisation and with it the inflow of foreign 
investment that will create jobs in the country and for its citizens. Thus, the positive 
economic effects of remittances have been somehow justified to actively promote the 
OFW phenomenon which by necessity means the break-up of families – in a society that 
places the family in the centre. 
9.9.2 The Brain Drain  
 
The social impact and expectations of OFWs is changing Filipino society and the 
structure of families. While OFWs have institutionalised the ‘balikbayan’ culture 
combining the flow of social goodwill and trade (Nonini 2005: 568), the continual drain 
on the populace has long-term effects: 
“It’s not a good sign – this OFW phenomenon. It’s kind of like a double-edged 
sword. It’s keeping our boats afloat, but on the steer it’s a brain drain, families are 
breaking up, we’re losing expertise. It’s not because we’re creating enough jobs, 
there’s something more fundamentally wrong [here].” – private sector 1 
“In the past we used to have a very high level of loyalty [from employees]. But 




start all over again. All the nurses are leaving the country. There are hospitals no 
longer. There is on average 1 nurse for 50 patients in the provinces. The sad thing 
is a lot of educated people are leaving for overseas.” – private sector 2 
The above comments echo Lawless’ point on the brain drain the country is experiencing 
and will continue to experience unless major structural arrangements are made: 
“…the problem of the so-called ‘brain drain’ stems from the basic inability of the 
Philippine economy to absorb the domestic supply of professionals, especially 
physicians, scientists and engineers.” (Lawless 2005:250) 
Nearly every Filipino family is affected by having a loved one or someone close to them 
leave for the fertile shores of another country. The self-congratulatory mode of praising 
those who have left overlooks the dire situation which has motivated their departure. 
Instead of addressing the motivations for such departure, the political machinery has 
sought to congratulate those who have left as if this was a somewhat sustainable and 
healthy self-image of country: 
“The Philippine Women’s League of Japan…lambasted Philippine officials ‘for 
their failure to address properly the unemployment problem, politicians back 
home have resorted to flattering the egos of Filipino workers stranded abroad 
with such accolades as ‘unsung heroes’, ‘saints’ etc even when many of them are 
ending up in foreign jails.’ (Lawless 2005: 249) 
Indeed the presence of endemic corruption is a major motivation in the brain drain as 
“corruption simply drives technically oriented people out of the country 
altogether.”(Ades & DiTella 1997: 1040) Going abroad may allow some professional 
OFWs to have their skills recognised and rewarded than in a country where personal 
connections count more. This freedom to work and promoted based on one’s merits 
liberates people: 
“Filipinos working abroad seem miraculously released from the many deleterious 
labour routines and practices that restrain their energy, industry, innovation and 
idealism at home. In Japan they manifest an ability to work diligently and 
innovatively, for which they earn admiration.” (Anderson 2005: 816) 




(Anderson 2005: 816), a sense of self-displacement (Schiller 2005: 578) or experiencing 
the conditions of the modern-day trade in slavery if OFWs find themselves in a country 
where human rights are not so well recognised122
9.9.3 Political Activism  
. 
 
Political activism by Filipinos abroad or in exile has had a long history.123
During the main political upheavals in the country’s history such as the fight for 
independence from Spain and under the Marcos dictatorship, political exiles 
proliferated
 According to 
Schiller, there are “four different political stances adopted by long-distance nationalists 
toward their homeland: 1) anti-colonialism, 2) separatism, 3) regime change and 4) 
participation.” (2005: 574) 
124
The phenomenon of political activists abroad is not new and in some countries 
encouraged formally with a new form of transnational politics evolving (Schiller 2005: 
578). In Australia, a net intake of immigrants, the country’s large Italian community has 
seen some of their more politically active members stand for Italian parliament (Edwards 
2006). With the election of a select few members of the worldwide Italian diaspora to the 
. During my research journey, I spoke with those who were politically 
active and who at one point or other sought exile. At the University of the Philippines 
and Ateneo de Manila University, plaques and memorials commemorate opponents to 
the Marcos regime who paid the ultimate sacrifice. I also came across the children of 
those who were politically active during the 1980s and they spoke of harrowing tales of 
their parents’ flight overseas or to the jungles of Mindanao to escape Marcos’ security 
forces. 
                                                     
122Cases of sexual exploitation and international trade in prostitution abound. While in Manila, I 
happened to come across an international conference held by a UN body on the latter issue. One 
newspaper article I came across described the slave conditions of 51 Filipinos nationals that were 
forcibly worked in Iraq (David 2007b). One of the more infamous cases of modern-day slave 
conditions was the story of Flor Contemplacion, a domestic worker who was put to death in 
Singapore. (see Rannveig Agunias and Ruiz 2007)  
123 See Lawless for a brief history of the Philippine diaspora who mentions the more interesting 
diasporic communities such as the St. Malo Manilamen of Louisiana in the late 19th century 
124 The country’s national hero, Jose Rizal was one of them: “Intellectuals living in Spain but with 
roots in the Spanish colony in the Philippines helped forge the vision of an independent Filipino 
nation.” (Schiller 2005: 574-575) while many of Marcos’ opponents including Benigno Aquino, 
lived for a time in exile in the USA:“In the third form of long-distance nationalism, activists 
advocate regime change. Their quarrel is not with the territorial boundaries of the state in which 
they live, but with the individual or political party that controls. Filipinos abroad helped 




Italian Senate, this new group has seen the nascent ‘political enfranchisement’ and 
empowerment of the scattered. 125
Thus, in the Philippines, some now see OFWs as a light of hope for change and to trigger 
political reform that would address the longstanding economic and social inequality in 
the country:  
(Panichi 2008) 
“OFWs are creating a new subsector of the Philippine economy. The social 
character of the economy is the overseas family investors and workers. We rely 
on them so much it’s creating a subsector. They are also addressing the social 
justice issues. There is now this whole segment of [the country] which is getting 
access to education because of overseas money. [They are] not as bound to the 
land as before. [They are] not as bound to the old relationships. [The OFWs are] 
creating a new middle class after [the previous flights of] the middle class. 
Because of the money coming in, there is [now] a new generation that can 
challenge the traditional oligarchies. It’s happening. It’s not static. The fact that 
you have many cases of corruption [coming out], [the] cheating in election, 
[means society has become] much more vigilant. [They do] not accept it as a 
right or take it for granted.” – academic 1 
A substantial middle class is also seen as the way to reduce the power of the oligarchy in 
the country: 
“The middle class has to grow. Business has to be broader. We are still very 
oligarchical.” – academic 2 
“The only way now to reduce the control of the oligarchs is through the strong 
and large middle class. There are two ways to do it: revolution or the dominance 
of the middle class.” – private sector  
Perhaps in the near-future, the Philippines may look towards its diaspora and encourage 
their return and participation in the future political development of the country. 
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9.10 Addressing Corruption: Leadership by Example 
 
The most effective way to address corruption and to show that it is being tackled 
seriously is by leadership from the top. If the leader of a nation-state behaves in a 
manner that is intolerant of corruption and discourages corrupt behaviour, this flows 
through the administration, bureaucracy, organisations and ultimately, the country and 
society at large. This is not an easy task. The following passages contain lessons that can 
be learnt from the experiences of Colombia, Singapore and the World Bank Group. 
9.10.1 The Transformation of Colombia 
 
In a 2009 Lowy Institute presentation, the American-educated Colombian Minister of 
Trade, Industry and Tourism, Luis Guillermo Plata, spoke about the transformation of 
the country in recent history His presence in Australia was part of a whirlwind world 
tour seeking foreign investment for the country in essence capturing renewed investor 
confidence for the country (Plata 2009). For Mr. Plata, he related his family’s story 
departure from the country after a militant group stormed the Supreme Court of 
Colombia and assassinated the justices. Sick of the violence, sick of the narco-trafficking, 
his family left the country - a tale repeated by many others. However, in 2009, the 
country had changed under the reformist zeal and transformational leadership of 
Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. In 2008, the rescue of a group of hostages 
including the Franco-Colombian politician, Ingrid Betancourt, from the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (or FARC) received worldwide recognition, domestic 
confidence in increased security and in its President. (McDermott 2008) 
Mr. Plata noted that the recipe is simple for a country to transform: Democratic Security 
equals Confidence equals Investment equals Growth.(Plata 2009) In 2009, the so-called 
“Uribe effect” (The Economist 2007c) has seen investment as proportion of GDP at 30%, 
GDP growth at 3.5% and more importantly, murders continue to go down. Citing, the 
Doing Business 2009 World Bank Report, Colombia ranked second behind Chile in terms 
of being the most business-friendly country in Latin America. (Plata 2009) 
Colombia is also going its own way. Diplomatically speaking there are conflicts with its 
neighbours such as Ecuador, though they are still “brothers” in the same continent; the 
different economic route taken by other countries in the same continent such as 




trade agreements and great economic cooperation with countries in the Pacific region. 
While Mr. Plata does not underestimate the continued challenges his government faces, 
the pro-activism shown by Uribe’s cabinet shows how the political will to succeed can 
happen if it is encouraged and followed through. 
9.10.2 Singapore’s Story 
 
Amongst interviewees, the success story of Singapore – under the leadership of Lee Kuan 
Yew - was frequently cited as a model that the Philippines should or ought to emulate. 
However, the struggles to get rid of corruption in the country have received less 
coverage. In his autobiography, From Third World to First, Lee charts the rise of the 
island-state from a colonial backwater notorious for its past history of piracy, into a 
beacon of economic development in the region.  
The Singaporean success story from Lee’s view was a constant battle of promoting what 
was good for the country and less so for self-interest. For Lee’s Singapore, Confucian 
values that promoted economic well-being and social cohesion were emphasised, while 
disavowing the less savoury aspects such as nepotism and corruption to fester (2000: 
647-648). 
For Singaporean statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, appearing and behaving to be intolerant of 
corruption was a paradigm shift in the external perception of the country and a major 
reason for that country’s transformation and economic development from a backwater 
colonial island to a global city-state. Previously known as a haven for pirates, Singapore’s 
transformation did not come about because of mere luck or because the fortune of good 
governance gifted the country. Rather, the post-war, post-colonial geopolitics of the 
region meant practising a delicate negotiated process of appeasing the major powers of 
the time to provide a legitimate and stable political base. From this base Lee exercised 
extraordinary political will and determination to shape the country into one of the 
region’s economic dynamos. This fundamentally meant tackling the internally-generated 
cancer of corruption as he became disillusioned with other Asian leaders who toppled 
their colonial masters but practised the same lèse majesté (2000: 157). 
This burning fire of patriotism swept the region immediately after the devastations of 
World War Two and local political leaders incited a wave of nationalism against their 




leaders who matured in the post-war environment, ready to take on the mantle of 
leadership (2000: 158). 
Lee related an environment not so dissimilar to what is present in the Philippines today: 
queues at airports because customs officers were asking arriving passengers for a suitable 
recompense for their meagre wages (this happened to the author); traffic police would 
stop drivers because of an alleged offence such as speeding (and indeed anyone who has 
travelled in peak-hour Manila would know what an achievement it is to speed); 
negotiated taxi fares; inducement provided at hospitals’ admissions to allow an ill person 
to ‘jump the queue’ so to speak and receive prompt medical attention. Indeed the 
appearance and general acceptance of corrupt behaviour at the operational levels of 
society was - and is - indicative of a more serious systemic malaise (2000: 159). 
Tackling corruption, Lee’s government empowered the Corrupt Practices Investigations 
Bureau (CPIB)126
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index “ranks countries in terms of 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians….where 10 is highly clean and 0 is highly corrupt.”(Lambsdorff 2007: 324, 330) 
In 2006, Singapore scored 9.4/10 placing it #5 in the world after Finland, Iceland, New 
Zealand and Denmark; and above Australia (#9), UK (#11) and the USA (#20). On the 
other hand, the Philippines scored 2.5/10 ranking equal #121 with other luminaries such 
as Benin, Honduras, Nepal and Russia. (Lambsdorff 2007: 325, 329) 
 which was set up by the former British colonial rulers in 1952 to deal 
with corruption. The effective powers of the Bureau were progressive: for petty or ‘small’ 
fish type of offences, procedures were simplified and personal discretion was removed 
with the publication of transparent guidelines. With major incidences of corruption, the 
laws were tightened in stages (2000: 160). According to Lee, the introduction of the 
lifestyle check (which is present in the Philippines today) assesses whether an official is 
living beyond one’s means without reasonable legitimate explanation for how such 
means can be funded. This was the biggest innovation in tackling corruption. (2000: 160) 
Fines were increased and offences became subject to imprisonment. Organised and 
major corruption was now being tackled. When leaders behave in a transparent manner, 
this naturally flows through the levels of bureaucracy (2000: 160) 
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While Lee can be praised for ridding the island-state of corruption, he has been less 
successful in disengaging from the perception of nepotism.127
Nevertheless, Lee’s crusade against corruption was successful although it had come at a 
tremendous personal cost to him when fellow colleagues were revealed to be corrupt. 
One colleague committed suicide because he had lost face when he was found to 
culpable of corrupt conduct and this deeply affected Lee. (2000: 163) 
 As some interviewees 
pointed out, Singapore epitomises the ultimate example of a family business. 
Lee also was damning of his fellow Asian leaders that had liberated their people from the 
oppression of colonialism but once they had ascended to power acted in a manner that 
contributed to the detriment of their societies: 
“The percentage, kickback, baksheesh, slush or whatever the local euphemism is 
a way of life in Asia: People openly accept it as a part of their culture. Ministers 
and officials cannot live on their salaries to the standard of their office. The 
higher they are, the bigger their homes and more numerous their wives, 
concubines or mistresses, all bedecked in jewellery appropriate to the power and 
position of their men. Singaporeans who do business in these countries have to 
take care not to bring home such practices.” (2000: 163) 
If the Philippines wishes to follow the footsteps of Singapore, corruption must be tackled 
by its political leaders. 
9.10.3 Paul Wolfowitz’s Departure from the World Bank 
 
During my fieldwork, the local Manila papers gleefully covered the saga concerning 
former World Bank Group President Paul Wolfowitz’s personal life. (Business Mirror 
2007g, Valino 2007, Sta. Ana III 2007) As in many developing countries, pronouncements 
by the World Bank hold significant institutional cachet in the Philippines. Like Louis 
XIV’s ‘l’etat c’est moi’ – Wolfowitz was the Bank. This is true for any person who carries 
the mantle of leadership – the role, and what it represents, is above the individual. 
Wolfowitz was widely reported as conducting a personal relationship with a fellow 
World Bank employee. The impression that his objectivity was impaired was 
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compounded when it was revealed “he had violated his contract by breaking ethical and 
governing rules in arranging the generous pay and promotion package” for his 
companion which contravened Staff Rule 3.01, Paragraph 4.02 on conflict of interest. 
(World Bank 2007, Weisman 2007)  
The protracted departure of the august institution’s President was met with dismay. The 
Bank was losing credibility in developing countries the longer he stayed. Anecdotal 
evidence suggested staffers in World Bank offices in developing countries sorely felt the 
brunt of this episode. The turmoil over Wolfowitz was a chance for long time opponents, 
such as disempowered developing countries, to bite back at the hypocrisy: 
“Wolfowitz’s relationship with Riza provided the perfect opportunity to accuse 
him of favouritism and nepotism, rendering him unsuitable to lecture other 
nations on the need to clean up their act.” (Baxter 2007) 
Iteratively, the institution’s staff association noted that the action of its senior executive 
exposed the Bank to actions of bad faith – it chided developing countries for their lack of 
good governance but failed to keep its own house in order: 
“Senior Management has put forward a call for good governance, both within the 
Bank and among our partner countries. Good governance is founded in a respect 
for rule of law, transparency and accountability. In order to be credible, Senior 
Management must model the behaviour it espouses.” (World Bank Staff 
Association 2007) 
To be seen and to appear to be seen as practising precepts of good governance is crucial 
especially if you head the leading dispenser of aid and advice in countries where poor 
governance is a daily part of life: 
“Mr Wolfowitz did not behave corruptly but he exercised exceedingly poor 
judgement. Bank officials did not behave corruptly but they behaved cravenly 
from beginning to end. It’s enough to make you want to wash your hands of the 
whole thing. But the bank still matters as an institution that helps the world’s 
poor.”(Washington Post 2007) 
His departure restored the Bank’s reputation. The Bank showed its responsiveness: for 




The signal was clear – the preservation of the institution’s integrity was bigger than one 
person.128
9.11 Countering Corruption 
  
 
There are two stakeholder groups in Philippine society who are promoting greater 
transparency and actively fighting against corruption: non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the media. The last part of this section looks at the stance of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in addressing and countering corruption in the country and 
the region. 
9.11.1 Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can “represent one important path through 
which macro-scale societal changes can lead to micro-scale political reforms” (Xin and 
Rudel 2004: 306) According to Whaites (1998) where there is a weak state, there is a 
relatively strong civil society. While the public sector in the country is disempowered, 
the third sector in the Philippines is vocal and active. According to Domingo, NGOs have 
a long history in the country going back to Spanish colonial rule and they are “one of the 
most vibrant in Asia.”(2008: 277) 
In an International Finance Corporation (IFC) backed report which scrutinised the 
prevalence of socially responsible investments in the Philippines, the country is said to 
“benefit from a huge third sector NGOs, people’s organisations (POs) and cooperatives 
who work to raise awareness and conduct projects” on environmental and community 
awareness (ASRIA 2003: 10-11). Furthermore, “The Philippine case is unique in that many 
CSOs are really voluntary organisations of a wide array, covering very diverse groups 
with different natures, agendas and historical contexts.” (ASRIA 2003: Appendix 1) 
It is estimated that the country’s non-profit sector “vary from 60,000 to almost 96,000 
registered non-profit, non-stock corporations… [in addition to] 35,000 cooperatives 
registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). These figures do not 
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include the…undetermined number of unregistered organisations. Recent estimates 
suggest that while many civil society organisations operate on relatively small annual 
budgets of less than P2M, there are also a few big NGOs (also known as BINGOs) and 
foundations with annual budgets of P30M and above.” (ASRIA 2003: 11) 
Español highlights the importance of many active civil society organisations in the 
country that are advocates for change. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as 
the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN) and Transparency International 
Philippines (TI Philippines) are important in fighting judicial corruption as they “play 
crucial roles in scrutinising and enhancing judicial accountability.”(2007: 262)  
For the influential private sector lobby group, the Makati Business Club, the fight against 
corruption means funding projects that tackle this issue through a network of NGOs, 
volunteers and people’s organisations. Tackling the legislative process to make effective 
changes in the country is akin to handling “an elephant” therefore, from the group’s 
perspective, grassroots movements are more effective in improving transparency. 
Aside from supporting the boys’ scouts to tackle textbook ghost deliveries (see section on 
Low level opportunistic pay-offs), MBC supports the National Citizens Movement for 
Free Elections (NAMFREL) which is a volunteer group that monitors elections. MBC 
finds it encouraging that there is already an active citizenry and that they need only be 
galvanised to act: 
“We walk the talk. It’s not our specialisation. We work with NGOs; we work on 
the community level. In villages, we have the Church watching how government 
revenues are spent. We are building up a movement on the grassroots level that 
is a counter-corruption culture. They’re idealistic and are ready to do it. We 
provide training, merienda [tea], capability and capacity building, so they can 
learn the process.”-MBC 
The success of the grassroots movements was commented upon by one interviewee: 
“There are more grassroots groups watching the pork-barrelling of expenditures 
of congressmen. For example, on infrastructure, the groups discovered roads not 




As an example of NGO activism (with backing from religious and business groups), after 
the 2007 elections, a full page ad appeared calling for “Reform for our electoral system 
now!” in the Philippine Daily Inquirer129
“"Despite the many flaws in the process and administration of the May 14 
elections, it appears the popular will of the electorate was generally able to 
manifest itself in the final results of the election. Much of the credibility in the 
outcome can be attributed to the courage of the media in reporting anomalies in 
spite of personal risks to the reports and to the vigilance, volunteerism and 
coordinated action of the citizenry. 
. The ad stated: 
"Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of COMELEC, whose lack of political 
will and determination to safeguard the electoral process contributed to the 
proliferation of electoral fraud, election-related violence, voter 
disenfranchisement, irregularities in procedure and other anomalies that degrade 
the character of Philippine democracy."-PDI ad 
The ad was funded by a heterogeneous group which included the Bishops-Businessmen’s 
Conference for Human Development, Cebu Business Club, Financial Executives Institute 
of the Philippines (FINEX), Management Association of the Philippines (MAP) and MBC. 
The ad further commended the following NGOs for their role in the elections: 
NAMFREL, National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), Parish Pastoral Council for 
Responsible Voting (PPCRV), Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan (SLB), Catholic Media 
Network and the Legal Network (LENTE). 
The Philippines has nurtured a strong civil society (symptomatic of a weak government) 
at times filling in the gap where public services should be available for the populace. But 
they are not - and can never be - a substitute for a strong, legitimate state. (see Whaites 
1998: 344)  
9.11.2 Media 
 
Compared to the rest of the region, the Philippine media is relatively free. A frequent 
user of libel suits, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew is derisive of this “free media”: 
                                                     




“Western liberals have argued that a completely unfettered press will expose 
corruption and make for clean, honest government. Yet uninhibited and 
freewheeling press and television in India, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, 
South Korea and Japan have not stopped the pervasive and deeply embedded 
corruption in these countries…” (2000: 166) 
Nevertheless, the Philippine fourth estate plays an important role in exposing corruption 
and “a new breed of investigative journalists, seemingly fearless in their desire to expose 
corruption, emerged after the country’s transition back to democracy.” (Hutchcroft 2008: 
143) 
One beacon, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism130is highly regarded.131
“Freedom of speech and a free press are generally considered important human 
rights and powerful controls against government malfeasance. An independent 
press is probably one of the most effective institutions to uncover trespassing by 
government officials…and an important check on corruption.” (Brunetti and 
Weder 2003: 1801, 1821)  
 A 
free, independent and effective media can be a powerful deterrent to corruption (Huther 
& Shah 2000: 4):  
Some of my interviewees understood this advantage and liability: 
“We have bad press because we’re free. You read the tabloids because the issue of 
corruption.” – private sector 1 
“I get panicky if I receive a query from Fitch, Standards and Poor’s at 8:30am over 
an article in Business World, and I must reply by 9am” – private sector 2 
“The press is a constant watchdog and is at your back. It’s easier to implement 
transparency, accountability [when they are there].” – public sector  
And the importance of the media in preserving the democratic space: 
“You have Filipinos who want to reform the state and build capacity. It still 
makes a difference if it’s not an authoritarian regime. [The Philippines] is not a 
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genuine democracy but it is not authoritarian either. There are human rights 
violations but still it is different – there is a freer media now. I lived through the 
Marcos years - our own office (at the university union) was raided by the military. 
There’s some democratic space and we need to maintain that democratic space.” 
– academic  
Nevertheless, the media for all its ills, chismis (gossip), parochialism and nationalism 
(sometimes coupled with xenophobia), the journalists in the country have shown “that 
beneath the rule of men entirely great, then pen is mightier than the sword.”132
9.11.3 Asian Development Bank 
 The 
profession of journalist remains highly risky in the country with 62 murders of reporters 
in the 7 years leading to 2008 (International Federation of Journalists 2008: 2) and the 
worst massacre of the profession during peacetime with some 30 journalists killed in 
Maguindanao Province, Philippines in late 2009 (CPJ 2009). 
 
International financial institutions and multilateral agencies play an influential and 
important role in most developing countries. They provide long-term loans to heavily 
indebted governments and are a link to the outside world of financial global players.  
The Philippines, which has hosted the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) since 1966, is one of these countries133
For the ADB, whose raison d’être is a smaller version of a regional World Bank, the 
country’s existing political environment has given it an uneasy existence with its host 
country. Not so long ago there was discussion that the ADB should move its 
headquarters to some other Asian country, preferably on the continental Asian land 
mass. 
. While most of East Asia has managed to 
transform themselves from largely agrarian producers to industrialised exporting 
manufacturers, the Philippines has been left behind. 
The ADB compound is in Ortigas, one of the CBDs that form Metro Manila. It is a 
heavily secured compound almost to the same level as the American Embassy. It is an 
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intimidating fortress to deter detractors who would wish to do physical harm on what 
the institution represents. Inside, however, are dedicated, idealistic and frustrated people 
who more than anything – would wish that their host country lift itself out of poverty. 
Inside one of their boardrooms is a floor to ceiling poster: “A Philippines free of poverty.” 
The ADB’s objective: to lift the most populated part of the world out of the depths of 
poverty – has largely been met in East Asia. Except for the Philippines. In some ways this 
is a sad reflection that the country that hosts the regional economic development bank 
should be the least developed.134
In September 2007, the ADB President Haruhiko Kuroda paid a visit to Sydney’s Lowy 
Institute for International Policy (Lowy Institute 2007). Below is the public exchange I 
had with him on corruption in the country and his response on the institutional 
boundaries the ADB has when it comes to addressing corruption in the Philippines: 
 
“Question: Mr. President, Marie dela Rama, University of Technology Sydney. I have 
just spent 4 months doing corporate governance research in Manila. One of the biggest 
problems facing the country is corruption which is endemic. Not only is it endemic, it is 
the unpredictability of corruption there that is deterring both local and foreign 
investment, and hence employment and growth. 
“For foreign investors, one of the obstacles is the foreign ownership limits in the critical 
area of infrastructure. As you are well aware, the new Terminal 3 of Manila’s 
international airport was completed 3 years ago but remains unopened due to disputes 
between the government and the foreign investors. The terminal is a symbol of the 
country’s development quagmire. What is the Bank doing to address such problems as 
these in places like the Philippines and elsewhere? Thank you. 
“Response: The economy of the Philippines has improved, the quality of its 
performance, growth rate which is at 6 or 7%. It is not high compared to China’s 9%. But 
it is one of the highest in the region. Not only in growth but inflation is significant at 2%. 
The Philippines used to be one of the high-inflation countries. Its fiscal deficit is 1% with 
a 45% current account surplus due to remittances. The macroeconomic conditions have 
greatly improved. Alas, the microeconomic environment for investment has not 
                                                     
134 The ADB has published a fact sheet on its presence and relationship with the Philippines 




significantly improved in recent years. FDI has improved for example in the minerals 
sector due to global commodity prices.  
“On government and corruption: as aptly described, corruption’s unpredictability is 
hurting the country.  The ADB needs to help fight corruption in 2 ways: 
1. Increase effective sector-specific governance improvements with the World 
Bank Group. Reform the power sector - as you know electricity costs is too 
high, extremely high. These are problems under governance. The ADB and 
the World Bank can help government improve power through program loans. 
This is a very important component of the governance agenda. Other sector 
specific governance [approaches undertaken in other countries include] 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam. In sector specific governance 
improvement – we have hope with that. The sector-specific approach [we] 
hope to be successful. The countrywide assistance by the ADB and the World 
Bank has not always been so successful [but on the] sector specific approach 
as in power – we have provided. 
2. Managing the judicial system. The judicial system is not famous for efficiency 
and effectiveness. With assistance this might be improved. 
“Corruption and governance issues have many facets. At the end of the day, it must be 
squarely addressed by the government and people rather than external multilateral 
institutions. We hope that governance can be improved not only in the Philippines but 
also in the rest of Asia. This is very important.” 
The ADB is a seat of influence but does not intervene in domestic affairs. The 
organisation has found it difficult to address this issue in a country whose leaders are 
deaf to criticisms especially on the systemic, unpredictable and endemic nature of 
corruption which poisons, guts and abruptly retards the economic growth of the nation. 
9.12 Corporate Governance and Corruption 
 
As the most important emergent theme of my research, in this chapter I have discussed 
the different varieties and ways corruption affects the business environment and the 
implementation of corporate governance reforms in the country. However, the 




following questions: what role does corporate governance play in a corrupt 
environment?  
The people I interviewed were the most enthusiastic supporters of corporate governance. 
While not the silver bullet to cure the ills of the country, introducing corporate 
governance is a major paradigm shift in a business environment which thrives on 
opacity. Corporate governance is seen as an external force in enhancing private sector 
development. Foreign investors demand corporate governance, and local firms cannot 
expand without the addition of foreign capital. Therefore, corporate governance 
practices needs to be supplied. By increasing transparency, accountability and improving 
disclosure, these governance tenets also address corruption: 
“Corruption is very narrow and is a short-term perspective. In the long term, 
corruption is also bad for the private sector. In the short-term there is rent-
seeking. Part of the pressure in the private sector is the need for foreign capital. 
Part of that pressure is to add corporate governance mechanisms consistent with 
Western standards. There is a realisation that global and foreign capital demands 
corporate governance standards. [These standards] moves them [private sector] 
in that direction.” – academic  
This sentiment is echoed by Sullivan in his 2009 treatise, “The Moral Compass of 
Companies Business Ethics and Corporate Governance as Anti-Corruption Tools”: 
“The private sector can be a force in developing solutions to the corruption 
problem, and companies around the world are taking charge. They are doing it in 
a multiplicity of ways. Some engage in collective action to reform the business 
climate to make it more transparent. Others push for ethical standards and fair 
practices in dealing with the government, as is the case with industry initiated 
integrity pacts. These private sector solutions to corruption however are not only 
external in nature and so many companies are also beginning to look inside, 
seeking ways to ensure that they are not unwittingly contributing to the climate 
of corruption. One way of addressing this dilemma and others is the 
establishment of strong corporate governance. It is increasingly emerging not 
only as a tool that increases efficiency, improves access to capital, and ensures 
sustainability — it is also emerging as an effective anti-corruption tool. Simply 




to conceal. At the decision-making level, it injects transparency and 
accountability, so that it is very clear how decisions are made and why.” (2009: 2) 
In turn private sector development is crucial in addressing poverty. This development 
cannot occur unless corporate governance becomes a norm and is part and parcel of 
doing business in the country. The following passage from an interviewee links the 
practice of good corporate governance to poverty reduction: 
“I hope it [corporate governance] would ultimately impact on poverty and 
development. The biggest antidote to poverty is jobs. For more jobs, there needs 
to be more [independent] companies operating more [corporate governance; 
accountability]. The flash and pan companies do well but in the end they don’t 
contribute to the economy. It is stable, better governed companies, that would 
increase profitability, increase stability, increase opportunities to address case of 
poverty.  
“It’s a chain, you have [good corporate governance] in companies, companies 
create jobs, jobs are the antidote to poverty. That’s the direction we’re headed. In 
the Institute of Corporate Directors and Institute for Solidarity in Asia, we’ve 
been able to help and develop a roadmap for Philippine business. For the 
roadmap, we have aimed to be global, responsible citizens and ethical.  
“An expression of this vision is to help the country address these issues. 
Corporate governance is one way of bringing this about - to make us competitive. 
More FDI means we’re able to bring in FDI because of confidence in the system, 
increase jobs, decrease poverty. It’s crucial because a third of our people live like 
animals.” –Rex Drilon 
If the value of corporate governance reforms can ever be assessed in the country, it will 
be their contribution in addressing corruption, improving private sector development 
and alleviating poverty in the country. How corporate governance contributes to 





CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
“Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have 
elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No 
country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich 
themselves or if police can be bought off by drug traffickers. No business wants 
to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top or the 
head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where 
the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. That is not 
democracy - that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an election in there. 
And now is the time for that style of governance to end. In the 21st century, 
capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success -- strong 
parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges; an independent press; a 
vibrant private sector; a civil society. Those are the things that give life to 
democracy, because that is what matters in people's everyday lives.” 
– USA President Barack Obama’s Address to the Parliament of Ghana (2009) 135
The Philippines is a wonderful country. She is the pearl of the Pacific. However, she has 
many challenges ahead of her. Her people are crying out because of the poverty and the 
corruption. What does corporate governance mean for the country if it does not improve 
the quality of life for the majority of her people? As President Obama stated in his 
speech to the Ghanan parliament, the time has come for “capable, reliable and 
transparent institutions.” Corporate governance reforms are a way for such institutions 
to exist in the Philippines. The tenets of corporate governance and its emphasis on 
transparency and accountability are the foil to corruption and irresponsibility. A state 
has no public confidence if its institutions are corrupt. A company has no legitimacy if it 
is irresponsible. This is the main contribution of my research – my research findings 
support strong public institutions to facilitate strong private sector development. The 
two go hand in hand. 
 
                                                     
135 Address by US President Barack Obama to Parliament of Ghana, 11 July 2009, Accra 
International Conference Center, Ghana http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-




10.1 Recommendations: Implications of the Research for Policy and Practice 
 
In August 2007, I was asked to present to the Ayala Group of Companies comparing and 
contrasting Australian corporate governance with Philippine corporate governance. At 
the end, I had three slides on the future of Philippine corporate governance and what my 
research meant for policy and practice. I believe what I said then still remains relevant at 
the time of writing. 
The first slide looked at what needed to be done to improve corporate governance 
processes. They are: 
• Instil confidence in the country’s economy. 
• Continually support and strengthen the reforms in corporate governance 
regulatory institutions.  
• Rethink whether importing SOX is the best way for Philippine corporate 
governance. Consider a principle based approach instead of a prescriptive 
based one. Joint PSE & ICD (and other interested advocacy groups) initiative 
to develop Principles for the Philippines. Principle-based reforms can 
complement current black letter law requirements but would prevent a total 
black letter law approach. 
• Enforcing existing legislation is already difficult. How will a Philippine SOX 
be enforced? 
• Increase the foreign ownership limits to a majority interest especially in the 
infrastructure areas. 
• Improve the judicial processes in the country 
• Review the political appointment system 
• Increase transparency in areas of public-private interaction 
• All GOCCs to have their own Principles of Corporate Governance. 
The next two slides looked at two scenarios for the Philippines – firstly, if there is inertia; 
secondly, if the reforms continue. For the worst case scenario I had as follows: 
• Resources continue to be used inefficiently 
• Regulatory institutions wracked by internal politicking and vested interests. 
Resources for these institutions are diverted. Lack of confidence in 




• Justice continues to be delayed; justice continues to be denied 
• Corporate governance stalls and remains the domain of the few corporations 
that ‘rise above the legal environment’ 
• Private and public sectors wracked by unpredictable corruption. The 
dysfunctional weak state continues.  
• Political risks of coups, revolutions.  
• Cycle of poverty, corruption, the Filipino diaspora and underdevelopment 
continues 
• There is despair. 
For the better case scenario I had as follows: 
• Resources are being used for their intended purpose. 
• Regulatory institutions are strengthened. Political support is received. 
• Judicial reform is apparent. 
• The practice of corporate governance becomes the norm and spreads to ALL 
listed companies and is encouraged in the unlisted ones.  
• Unpredictable corruption becomes predictable. Predictable corruption is 
scrutinised and is deterred. 
• The state becomes functional; less weak and less prone to threats of coups and 
revolutions. 
• A new cycle brings investors and creation of employment; poverty and hunger 
decreases. The Filipino diaspora trickles. 
• There is hope. 
The above bulleted lists are nothing new. They were the outcome of my interview data. 
This is what my interviewees wanted to see in the Philippines – a better, more robust 
country that could finally economically integrate with the rest of Asia.  
Corporate governance reforms aren’t superficial despite their external imposition. The 
introduction of these  reforms are exposing institutions and firms to standards of 




deterring unseemly and opaque behaviour. However, as repeated often enough in this 
thesis, these reforms have been implemented in consideration of the existing business 
environment which is difficult, problematic and challenging for anyone doing business 
in the country. 
10.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
This research was motivated by the overarching question: 
What is the impact of post-1997 corporate governance reforms in 
Philippine institutions and Philippine firms? 
The simple answer to my research question is: the impact was extensive. 
My ethnographic approach allowed me to chart the extensive impact of the reforms on 
regulators and firms. In so doing, this also allowed me to document the limitations and 
weaknesses in introducing and imposing these reforms in both form and substance, 
while exposing the importance of the pre-existing environment in the operation of these 
reforms. 
This research managed to chart the impact of external reforms and its effects on those 
who were directly affected by them: the individuals who in their capacity as regulators or 
private sector representatives who had to impose them – in the case of the former – and 
to comply with them – in the case of the latter. 
This section briefly discusses each chapter’s particular contribution to knowledge while 
each results chapter in this thesis contribute to the development of existing theory. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter looked at three main sources of corporate governance literature: 
introduction of reforms, corporate governance theories of the firm, and the general 
business environment. The first was specifically on how the reforms were introduced, 







Chapter 3: Methodology 
My ethnographic approach in this research combined deductive and inductive inquiries 
both in the hypothesis development and testing and in collecting data mainly through 
interviews and media articles. On data collection, I have given an insight into how I 
managed to access my sample of interviewees contributing to elite studies while my data 
analysis showed my pre-occupation with node saturation In the use of the NVivo 
computer program as the principal data analysis.  
Chapter 4: Business and Corporate Governance Environment 
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge of culture and institutional theory. 
Extending on Hofstede’s collectivism, my research findings pointed out that its polarity - 
exclusivity – also go hand in hand in a stratified culture like the Philippines. Similarly, 
the limitations of institutional isomorphism are also exposed – there are unintended 
consequences when there is coercive and mimetic isomorphism. Indeed, in the 
Philippines corporate governance regulators were negatively affected by the imposition 
of the World Bank’s ROSC. Another contribution to isomorphism was the need to 
legitimise corporate governance reforms by co-opting local players. Eventually, corporate 
governance reforms have been moulded to suit the environment locally. This chapter 
also tested hypotheses 1 and 2 which were supported. 
Chapter 5: The Regulators 
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge of institutional isomorphism and 
highlights the detrimental effects of politicisation in government organisations. This 
chapter also provides an insight into the resources of each regulatory organisation and 
their capacity to enforce existing laws. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were also supported in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 6: Business Groups – The Owners of Companies 
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge of business groups and business families. 
In particular, this chapter contributes to business group development as a factor to 
counter a weak, authoritarian or predatory state. While my research findings disproved 
traditional agency theory and unequivocal lack of support for hypothesis 3, this chapter 




theory of the resource-based view of the firm and the macro-organisational perspective 
of resource dependence theory. The results in this chapter reveal the use of the 
conglomerate ownership structure by business groups in a predatory or weak state is way 
to counter the latter’s inclination to expropriate. On business families, the research 
findings in this chapter support existing literature on the common challenges faced by 
family businesses: succession, financing, professionalisation of management and the 
inherent relationship the family has with the business. 
Chapter 7: The Board and Management – Controllers of the Company 
This chapter looked in-depth at the board structure of a company. It contributes to 
current understanding and knowledge of boardroom dynamics while new knowledge has 
been generated on the profound impact a particular Western corporate governance 
reform, that of the independent director, has had on Philippine corporations. Similarly 
like its twin 6A, hypothesis 2 was supported while hypothesis 3 was disproven. 
Chapter 8: Government Financial Institutions 
This chapter documented the detrimental effect politicisation has on government 
institutions. This builds upon findings in Chapter 4 but this chapter gives specific 
examples of the long-term effects of undue influence by the executive on the 
bureaucracy. Hypothesis 1-3 were tested in the DBP section of this chapter; similar to 
other results in the previous results chapters, both hypotheses 1 and 2 were proven, while 
hypothesis 3 was disproven. 
Chapter 9: Corruption 
This chapter contributes to existing knowledge of corruption and provides evidence of 
how anathema it is to all private sector players I interviewed. This chapter also points 
out a corrupt environment deters and repels some investors but attracts others who are 
willing to engage in unethical behaviour. Corruption is a cancer in the country and this 
chapter charts its extensiveness and its lingering influence in the functioning of the 
business environment in the country.  
10.3 Limitation of this Research 
 




control the Philippine Congress. I interviewed the business and bureaucratic elites but 
not the politicians. It never really occurred for me to do so and I had no appetite to 
interview them. In one informal gathering, one interviewee stated that I should speak to 
them, and my response to it was along the lines, of what is the use as I doubt I would 
change their minds very much. I explained that if I were a politician and would take trips 
overseas and see the livelihoods of millions of my fellow citizens as OFWs, I would be 
ashamed of myself that I did not do more for my people – that I have not given them 
more opportunities and reasons to stay in the country and to help economically develop 
the country rather than encouraging their flight.  
Indeed, this limitation gives rise to bias where most of my data generated was critical 
against the politicians that run the country. Future research may look at the way political 
elites and their actions have an effect on corporate governance in the country to 
overcome this limitation and bias. 
10.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Since collecting my data in 2007, the Philippines has elected a new President, Benigno 
“Noynoy” Aquino III, the son of Corazon Aquino - who ascended to the presidency in the 
wake of the Marcos dictatorship - and Benigno Aquino Jr. the assassinated senator and 
Marcos’ most vocal opponent. President Aquino campaigned on the stance of “Kung 
Walang Corrupt, Walang Mahirap” (If there is no corruption, there is no poor).136
This thesis described a sliver of the business context in the Philippines and I 
demonstrated how corporate governance reforms were introduced, adopted and 
implemented in institutions and firms in the Philippines. Corporate governance in the 
country, like its institutions, is a work in progress.
His 
administration inherits the challenges of an oligarchical political elite and a heavily 
politicised bureaucracy. However, they are not unsurmountable. The problems in the 
Philippines are not uncommon nor are they are unique. They are solvable and the 
solutions are waiting to be implemented. It rests on the imprimatur of political 
leadership and the will to see these reforms through to finally address these challenges. 
                                                     




APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
My interview questionnaire was semi-structured and open-ended for both sets of 
interviewees. For company interviewees, the questionnaire was structured around 
specific categories: East Asian Crisis, Ownership and Control, Impact of China, 
Regulation and Government, Communication and Disclosure, Shareholders and 
Stakeholders, Chairman and CEO, The Board, Culture and Other (which asked for other 
comments and their perspective on the future). For non-company interviewees, most 
gave an opening statement on how they saw the role they played in Philippine corporate 
governance and questions were modified or omitted accordingly. 
East Asian Crisis 
1. How did the East Asian crisis impact the corporate governance of your company? 
2. Have major corporate governance taken place in the company since 1997? 
Ownership and Control 
3. What percentage of the company is owned by a dominant family and who are the 
other major shareholders? E.g. institutional investors, foreign investors, other. 
4. If family-owned company: What are the advantages and challenges for being a 
largely family-owned company? 
5. Do the major shareholders play a role in the day to day management of the 
company? 
China 
China’s growth has an enormous effect on the economic health of the region and the 
world’s. However, the system of corporate governance in China is different due to the 
ownership structure of the country’s state owned enterprises.  
6. Is your company currently involved with Chinese SOEs through joint ventures 
etc? If the answer is yes, what are the corporate governance challenges that the 
company has faced? 
7. What is the company’s view of a growing China and its effect on the Philippines? 
Regulators and Government 
8. Do you believe that Philippine government institutions dealing with corporate 
governance have been effective? 
9. Do you have any suggestions or improvements for government institutions so 





10. How do you communicate with shareholders? 
11. What kind of shareholder rights exists in the company? 
12. Does the firm emphasise shareholder value? How does the company balance its 
short-term vs. long-term shareholder value needs? 
13. Does your organisation have minority investors or foreign investors? Do they 
have any say in the functioning of the company? If they have any concerns, what 
is the procedure? 
Stakeholders 
14. Which groups are your major/minor stakeholders? 
15. What is your opinion of your stakeholders? 
Disclosure 
16. How and when does the company disclose sensitive company information? 
The Board 
17. In Anglo-American countries, there has been increased emphasis on the 
separation of the role of Chairman and CEO. In your company, the role of Chair 
and CEO is combined/separated; what are the reasons for the 
combination/separation? 
18. How are board members appointed to the board? 
19. How does the board monitor management? 
20. What role does the board play in providing strategic guidance? 
21. Are there any independent directors on the board? How are they nominated? 
22. How is the board accountable to the company and its shareholders? 
Culture 
23. In your view, what are the specific elements of the business culture in the 
Philippines that influence the formulation and implementation of corporate 
governance? 
Other 
24. What other comments would you like to make regarding the corporate 
governance environment of the Philippines? 




APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED AND 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
I am profoundly grateful to representatives from the following organisations that I 









Dun and Bradstreet Philippines 
Far Eastern University 
Irving Ackerman and Co. 
Lazbertiu and Associates 












Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central 
Bank) 
Development Bank of the Philippines 
Government Service Insurance System 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Social Security System 
 
Other Organisations 
Asian Institute of Management 
Asian Development Bank 
Ateneo de Manila University (various 
schools and departments) 
Corporate Governance Institute of the 
Philippines 
Makati Business Club 
Management Association of the 
Philippines 
Institute of Corporate Directors 
Institute of Internal Auditors 
University of the Philippines, Diliman 
 





APPENDIX 3: EVENTS AND INFORMAL MEETINGS 
 
This table documents the events and informal settings I attended during my field trip in 
Manila from May-September 2007. Attendance of these gatherings contributed to better 
understanding and contextualising of my research. 
Date Event Notes 
May 30th Institute of Corporate Directors 
Annual Dinner 
Speeches made by Netherlands 
Ambassador to the Philippines, 
Philippine Stock Exchange Chair; 
networked and managed to set up 
interviews as a result 
June 13th Australia-New Zealand 
Chamber of Commerce 
(ANZCHAM) Monthly 
Membership Meeting 
Networked and met up with Australian-
Kiwi expatriates. Speech by Australian-
Kiwi ambassadors on economic 
prospects and bilateral relationship 
between Philippines and ANZ. 
Introduced by ANZCHAM President to 
Australian Ambassador; set up 
interviews as a result of meeting. 
June 15th Management Association of the 
Philippines (MAP) Corporate 
Governance Workshop 
Attended all-day workshop on 
corporate governance. Most attendees 
were from the small-medium sized 
enterprises of the country. Managed to 
set up interviews as a result of 
introducing myself to speakers at the 
workshop 
June 21st Joint MAP and American 
Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM) Monthly Members’ 
Meeting 
Attended meeting of joint MAP-
AMCHAM meeting with guest speaker 
was then American International Group 
(AIG) Global CEO Martin Sullivan. 
Introduced myself briefly to him and 
asked a question from the floor on his 
views on corporate governance. 
Networked and introduced myself to 
others.  
June 25th Informal meeting with private 
sector interviewee 
Post-interview meeting with private 
sector interviewee. We discussed 
further issues as a result of the 
interview. 
July 3rd Informal meeting with 
development bank 
representatives 
Informal meeting with development 
bank representatives to discuss the state 
of the country from their perspective. 
July 4th Informal meeting with wife of a 
former Philippine ambassador 
to the USA 
Informal meeting with a friend’s friend 
who is the wife of a former Philippine 
ambassador to the USA. She spoke 




impact of the Marcos dictatorship. 
Coincidentally, I had introduced myself 
to her husband at the June 21st MAP-
AMCHAM meeting and our paths were 
to cross again as he sat as a board 
member of an organisation I 
interviewed. 
July 10th ANZCHAM Monthly Members 
Meeting 
Further opportunity to meet, greet and 
network with expatriates in the country. 
Guest speaker was Finance Secretary 
Margarito Teves. Asked him a question 
from the floor on corruption in the 
country. Spoke to a number of people 
employed by Australian companies with 
local subsidiaries in the Philippines. 
July 21st ANZCHAM Bledisloe Cup 
Event, Australian Ambassador’s 
Compound 
Attended the showing of the Bledisloe 
Cup (an annual traditional rugby match 
between Australia-New Zealand) that 
was held at the venue of the Australian 
Ambassador’s compound. High security 
to access that part of Makati. New 
Zealand won. The Kiwi ambassador was 
happy. 
July 23rd Informal gathering at the 
Institute of Philippine Culture 
(IPC), Ateneo de Manila 
University 
Farewell lunch to administrator at the 
IPC. Introduced myself and networked 
with fellow academics. 
July 27th Informal gathering with private 
sector interviewees 
Post-interview meeting with private 
sector interviewees to discuss further 
the state of corporate governance in the 
country. 
August 9th Informal gathering with private 
sector interviewees 
Post-interviewee meeting with private 
sector interviewees discussing research. 
August 
14th 
ANZCHAM Monthly Members 
Meeting 
Last opportunity to meet, greet and 
network with expatriates in the country. 
Guest speaker was former SSS 
commissioner and CEO of then AIG 
Philippine subsidiary, PhillamLife Jose 
Cuisia.  
August 16th Informal gathering with 
Australian embassy 
representative 
Informal meeting with Australian 
embassy representative from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (Austrade) to discuss my research 
progress. 
August 21st Informal gathering with 
representatives from 
development bank and private 
sector 
Brought together people I had met 
during the course of my interview, in 
particular brought development bank 
representative to meet up with some 





August 23rd Presentation to private sector 
group 
Presentation on corporate governance 
to the Ayala Group of Companies 
comparing Philippine corporate 
governance with Australian corporate 
governance. 
August 27th Informal gathering with private 
sector interviewee 
Informal meeting with private sector 
interviewee to discuss research. 
August 30th Informal gathering with private 
sector interviewees 
Organised an informal gathering 
bringing together different private 
sector interviewees and representatives 
to meet and greet each other. 
September 
3rd 
Informal gathering with private 
sector interviewees and 
representatives 









Guest speaker was Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda, 
President of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and Chair of the ADB’s Board of 
Directors. Asked him from the floor a 




APPENDIX 4: LIST OF MEDIA ARTICLES COLLECTED AND 
ANALYSED BY PUBLICATION 
Business Mirror 
 
Friday-Saturday, 18-19 May 2007 Vol. 2, No.424 
de Leon, Max V.: Foreign chambers plan first joint jobs fair, say labour crunch hinders 
expansion, p.A1 
Gonzalez, Mia M.: After 7 years, JP Morgan Corporate Access Days is back, pp. A1, A4 
Palace holds Ong's SC posting; JBC probes, pp.A1, A5 
Isla, Paul Anthony A.: Power sector to have open access, retail competition 
Hot money inflows increase 40% in April, p.A8 
Balaba, RM: View China as opportunity, not a threat, p.A8 
de Leon, M.V.: GMA eyes deal with BHP Billion, p.A8 
Jimenez, C.: Forwarders bungle job for COMELEC, p.A8 
Investors/jobs expo, pp.A1, A8 
Editorial: Development and the private sector, p.A10 
Editorial: World-class mess, p. A10 
Valino, Raul.: Don't cry, Wolf; Riza won't resign, p.A11 
Gagni, Lito U.: Fraport's Achilles heel, p. A11 - NAIA Terminal 
Cartoon by Albano 
 
Monday, 4 June 2007 Vol. 2, No.435 
Balaba, R.M.: Despite crisis, globalisation's impact, East Asia keeps rising, pp. A1, A4 
BSP is GSIS-SAGA Awardee, p.A2 
Editorial: Growth should uplift the poor, p.A6 
Acosta, R: Ombudsman wants lawyers probed p.A8 
Enhanced financial literacy in the college level, p.C2 
 
Wednesday, 6 June 2007 
Tort, Marvin A.: Sustaining economic growth, p.A7 
 
Monday, 18 June 2007 
Quimpo-Espino, Margie: Koreans invade the Philippines - not all good news accompany 
their increasing number, pp.B2-1, B2-2 
Lacorte, Germelina A.: Korean businesses are bullish in Davao: investing millions in real 
estate, tourism projects. p.B2-2 
Cabreza, Vincent & Moulic, Gobleth: Who's afraid of Korean businesses in Baguio - 
Records show only 10 have working visas but...p.B2-3 
 
Tuesday, 19 June 2007, Vol. 12, No. 446 
Vallecera, Jun: RP Trading costs too high - WBG - Customs bureau's new impositions for 
scanners worsened business woes, p.A1, A5 
Bloomberg: RP share sales may reach a record P80B. 
Jimenez, Cher & San Juan, Joel: Breastfeeding champions step up call on eve of hearing, 
pp. A1, A4 
AP: Globe tower attacked, p. A8 





Friday-Saturday, 3-4 August 2007 
Tort, Marvin A.: Back to step one for North Harbour,  
Editorial: Treasure map, p.A10 
Lectura, Lenie: PAL to exit from receivership - Bautista - on improved financial condition 
and favourable industry outlook, p.B1 
 
Monday, 6 August 2007 
Madrilejos-Reyes, Honey: Chemrez exports paint colorants to Russia, p.A2 
Cabuag, VG: South Harbour operator gets contract extension, p.C4 
 
Tuesday, 7 August 2007 
Arnaldo, Ma. Stella F.: Race Relations - Philippine Racing Club minority shareholders in 
a David vs. Goliath battle, p.C1 Perspective 
 
Thursday, 9 August 2007 
Ordinario, C.: Rich getting richer faster than the poor, p.A1, A7 
Gonzalez, Mia M.: Palace replaces insurance chief - Malinis back at Commission's helm; 
Ermita hints at NTC's head's relief, pp.A1,A6 
Editorial: The tangled lies on NBN, p.A10 
Mangun, John: PSE investors: part of the problem? p.A10 
Lectura, L.: More LRT riders, p.A12 
Perez, Emeterio Sd.: Due Diligencer, p.B1 
Jimenez, Cher S.: Profit vs. public health - when infant formula tastes sour, perspective, 
p.C1 
 
Tuesday, 14 August 2007 
Mocon, Claudeth: Tertiary school owners prefer permanent CHED head, not caretaker, 
p.A7 
Editorial: A government of secret and shady deals, p.A10 
Mangun, John.: Looking at the longer view, p. A10 
Valino, Raul: What ails business? p.A11 
Gagni, Lito U.: Loren's trust profile, p.A11 
Madrilejos-Reyes, Honey: Ayala Corp 1st half net profit up 57%, p.B1 
Perez, Emeterio Sd.: Making life difficult for CPAs, B1 
Business Mirror Perspective: As always a tough balancing act for the Secretary of 
Finance, pp.C1-C2 
 
Wednesday, 15 August 2007 
LNPL: Benpres net income slides, p.S1/7 
Rubio, Ruby Anne M.: SEC penalises bourse for noncompliance, p.S1/7 
 
Friday-Saturday, 17-18 August 2007 
Cunanan, Jacob: RP is best value, best place to invest in Asia - GMA, p.A3 
Marasigan, Fernan: House leader files new version of antipolitical dynasty bill, p.A7 
Reyez, Rizal Raoul: Woman on Top, p.C1 
 
Tuesday, 28 August 2007 





Madrilejos-Reyes, Honey: Splash to issue corporate bonds - personal care firm is raising 
P1B through debt securities, p.B1 
Edep, Jesse with Pena, Romy Antonette: BM Perspective: A Strong Foundation - 
Companies are increasingly shifting their CSR programs to improve quality of education 
in the country, p.C1 
Ramos, R.B.: Legacy - a sense of history, p.C1 
 
Friday-Saturday, 31 August-1 September 2007 
Ordinario, Cai U.: GDP surges to 7.5% in 2nd quarter, p.A1, A6 
Gonzalez, Mia M.: Make it last, GMA tells officials; chides skeptics, pp.A1,A4 
Mayuga, Jonathan L.: SSS posts P15B in total revenues in first 7 months, p.A3 
Estopace, Dennis: Organised Pinoys key to building dream cities, p.A16 




Monday, 21 May 2007 
Gulane, Judy T.: Government concerned about San Miguel's business plans, p.S1 
Bangko Sentral to further relax forex sale rules, p.S1 
Arcilla SJ, Jose S.: Before 1600, p.S4 
Sta Ana III, Filomeno: Wolfowitz and the World Bank, p.S4 
Khan Jr., Ismael G.: Catch the small fry, p.S5 
More funds earmarked for infrastructure, health, education, p.S5 
Estavillo, Maricel E.: Rail firm, SoKor group agree on negotiated deal, p.S6 
Tan, Reagan D.: Staying on list of 'top emerging' markets not a mere promotions 
problem government told, p.S6 
Reuters: China firm eyes Philippine ethanol plants, p.S6 
Gulane, Judy T.: Customs targets to offset shortfall in collections, p.S6 
How, Paul C.H.: Levi's maker loses in lawsuit, p.S7 
eTelecare may list at the local bourse, p.S7 
AFP: US Immigration reforms to test to test Asian family values, p.S9 
 
Tuesday, 22 May 2007 
Advertisement from business associations post-elections: Let us move forward, p.A17 
 
Friday-Saturday, 25-26 May 2007 
AFP/BTN: RP still faces problems despite 'greater promise', p.S1/1-2 
Teodoro, Luis V.: Too easily pleased, p.S1(4) 
Rubio, Ruby Anne M.: New accounting rules spurring debt, equities markets - SGV, 
pS2/3 
 
Thursday, 14 June 2007 
Estavillo, Maricel E.: Takenaka mum as government seeks offers, pp.1,2. 
Monsod, Solita C.: What's best for baby, pp.3-4 
Cordero, Marie Jeannette P.: Customs official faces graft charges, p.S12 
 
Friday-Saturday, 15-16 June 2007, Vol. 20; Issue 227 
MEIC: Insurance industry denies delinquency, p.S2/1 




BTN: Chinese firms start surveying lands, p.3 
Coloma, Sonny: Proud to be Filipino? pp.4-5 
Bobadilla, Cherry C.: Father figure, p.S2/9 
 
Tuesday, 19 June 2007 
Editorial: Better jobs for those with jobs, p.A6 
Gagni, Lito U.: Unfinished business of 13th Congress, p. A7 
Cellona, Jonathan: Crown jewel, p.S1 
Rubio, Ruby Anne M.: Atlas plans overseas shares offering, p.S1/8 
 
Thursday, 21 June 2007 
Cagoco, Josefa L.: Tax chief axed over poor take: Bunag says he was made a 'scapegoat', 
calls for Finance department revamp, p.S1,S2 
Incumbent Board of Directors of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation Advertisement: Is the 
Senate Protecting the Marcos Cronies in the Philcomsat Row, p.5 
Cagoco, Josefa L. & Romero, Alexis Douglas B.: State corporate execs given deadline to 
resign, p.6 
Calderon, Maria Eloisa I.: Emilio Yap strengthens hold in PBCom, p.7 
Nisperos, Benedict G.: Bongbong Marcos seeks court OK to reclaim Pasig property - 
18.4HA estimated at P15-P18B, p.S1/12 
 
Monday, 6 August 2007 
Cagoco, Josefa L.: Mixed scorecard for Arroyo govt, p.S1, p.S3 
 
Thursday, 9 August 2007 
Salvosa II, Felipe F.: Ownership caps hampering trade, p.S1-S2 
English Skills no longer enough, pp.S1-S2 
Calero, J.J.: Maria Victoria Rufino, p.S1/5 
Cagoco, Josefa Therese L.: Palace orders data sharing on taxpayers, p.S1/6 
 
Tuesday, 14 August 2007 
Lee, Lovely Nica P.: Ayala net income up 57% in 1st half, pp.S1,S2 
Sicangco Cruz, Elfren: The rise and fall of corporations, pp.S4 & S5 
Rubio, Ruby Anne M.: Ortigas opposes intervention bid of Marcoses in Payanig sa Pasig 
dispute  S1, p.7 
 
Wednesday, 15 August 2007 
Shoptalk: Aces up their sleeves, p.S1/5 
 
Friday-Saturday, 17-18 August 2007 
de la Cruz, J.A.: Why is Teves bent on privatising at whatever cost, p.7 




Tuesday, 26 June 2007 
Photo: Together towards poverty reduction, p.1 
Kabiling, Genalyn D.: Dream is to make RP rise to the level of Singapore, pp. 1,6 







Thursday, 19 July 2007 
Pension fund head named outstanding pro, p.A7 
Austria, Jennifer B.: First Holdings raises stake in Meralco to 30%, p.B1 
 
Philippine Daily Inquirer 
 
Tuesday, 15 May 2007, Vol.22 No.156 
Editorial: Worst practices, p.A14 
Sanchez-Lacson, Elizabeth: Net foreign stock buying up 73.2% to P33.8B - PSE chief says 
foreign investors' interest in RP market growing, p.B5 
RP Tourism on fastest rise, p.B5 
Private sector shares cost of saving..., p.B6 
Tuesday, 22 May 2007 
Remo, Michelle V.: Govt fails to sell bank stake, p.B1 
Ho, Abigail L.: Foreign firms urged to invest in oil, gas p.B6 
 
Friday, 1 June 2007 Vol 22 No. 173 
Remo, Michelle V.: Biggest growth in 17 years what growth means to ordinary folk p.A1 
Gross Domestic Product p.A1 
Contreras, Volt: AFP Accountant with P35M in unexplained wealth sacked p.A2  
Dumlao, Doris C.: Banks to be given freer investment hand - BSP to initiate new wave of 
financial liberalisation, pp.B1, B2. 
Remo, Michelle V.: Political risks seen to weigh heavily on long-term growth prospects, 
pp.B1, B3 
 
Friday, 8 June 2007 Vol. 22, No.180 
Dizon, Nikko: GMA wants RP to be part of China's development plan, pp. A1, A12 
Magistrado, Manuel A.: Letters to the editor - Questions for the GSIS, p.A16 
Advertisement from PIRA - Insurance Industry reforms 
Pabalinas, Steven: Comic Strip - Divine Comedy p.F2 
Pangalangan, Raul C.: The gentrification of the OFW 
Sanchez-Lacson, E.: SMC fund sells PSE stake to UK firm, p.B2 
Remo, Amy R.: Aussie mining firm to invest $600M, p.B2 
AP: Strong peso eroding many families' income, 'boom' seen causing much pain', p.B3 
Remo, Michelle V.: BIR advised to link data with PHIC, p.B12 
 
Thursday, 14 June 2007 
Remo, Michelle V.: Revalidation flushes out fraudulent certificates, pp. B1, B2 
AFP: BIR, Customs tasked to collect P1.4T, pp.B1, B2 
Banal III, Conrado R.: Breaktime, pp.B2 
 
Saturday, 16 June 2007, Vol. 22 No. 188 
Lucas, Daxim L.: OFW remittances surge 26% to $4.7B; dip in deployment noted in Jan-
April, pp. B1, B2 
Remo, Michelle V., 'Hot money' inflows rise to $5.9B, pp. B1, B5 




Lim Ubac, Michael: Cha-cha on hold as Joe de V declares moratorium,pp.A1, A6 
Cartoon on breastfeeding debate, p.A12 
 
Monday, 18 June 2007, Vol. 22 No. 190 
Editorial: Crime rising, p.A14 
Lomborg, Bjorn: The art of the possible in Latin America, p.A15 
Farolan, Ramon J.: Senator Trillanes IV: random thoughts, p.A15 
Dinoy, Orlando: Wave of bombings forces company to stop bus trips, p.A18 
Cardinoza, Gabriel: New vice mayor's arrest sought for estafa cases, p.A18 
Sino Cruz, Irene R.: Advantages of open skies seen at Cebu air travel meet, p.A20 
Esguerra, Christian V.: GSIS chief files libel suit vs. solon, p.11 
Sanchez-Lacson, Elizabeth: PSE cites surge in foreign buying - Investments from abroad 
up 86.2% to P46.56B in first 5 months, p.B1, B7 
Sanchez-Lacson, Elizabeth: Ayala to prepay P7B in bonds, p.B2 
Remo, Michelle V.: Life insurance companies expect to meet capitalisation requirement, 
p.B4 
Remo, Michelle V.: Insurers opposing IC's surety bond rule, p.B4 
Dumlao, Doris C.: Asian currency unit shaping up, p.B5 
 
Thursday, 21 June 2007, Vol. 22, No. 193 
Labog-Javellana, Juliet, Lim Ubac, Michael & Remo, Michelle V.: BIR chief blames firing 
on GMA's economic team, pp.A1, A6 
del Mundo, Fernando: RP China papers on controversial $329M deal stolen, pp.A1, A7 
AP: Recovery of Asian regional economies remains uneven, pp.A1, A8 
Stay put, labour leader urges GSIS head, p.A2 
Contreras, Volt: Bongbong stakes claim on prime land - Marcos eyes 18.4HA Pasig 
property, p.A17 
Tulfo, Ramon: On Target, p.A18 
AFP: RP stocks continue record-breaking run; positive economic outlook fuels heavy 
buying, p.B1 
Remo, Michelle V.: BIR probes big firms' tax payments, pp. B1, B2 
 
Wednesday, 18 July 2007 
Salverria, Leila B.: Co siblings swap claims over Green Cross, p.A4 
 
Thursday, 19 July 2007 
Dizon, Nikko & Esguerra, Christian V.: Miriam swears in son: party disgusted, p.A1 
 
Friday, 20 July 2007 
Reyes, Carmela: One for the books: Boy lost life saving 4 kids in Pagoda tragedy, pp.A1, 
A10 
Lucas, Daxim L.: Rich Pinoys lose millions in new financial scandal, pp.A1, A18 
Fullpage advertisement: Reform our electoral system now!, p.A15 
 
Wednesday, 25 July 2007 
Ocampo, Ambeth R.: How many islands does the Philippines have?, p.A15 
Junia Jr., Antero: Letters to the Editor - Scrap elections, auction off public offices 
Domingo, Ronnel W.: Business groups draw up legislative wish list: aim is to boost 





Friday, 27 July 2007 
Cruz, Neal H.: GMAland vs. the real Philippines, A.12 
Doronila, Amando: A Faustian bargain, p.A13 
 
Saturday, 4 August 2007 
Government Ad: The National Broadband Network (NBN Project of DOTC is Valid 
Reuters: Anticorruption fights an uphill battle, p.A9 
David, Randy: Overseas Filipino slaves in Iraq, p.A12 
Editorial: Unacceptable, p.A12 
 
Monday, 6 August 2007 
Pangilinan, Manuel V.: Strategic CSR: Managing the competitive context - PLDT's big 
boss cites benefits, pp.B1-B3 
 
Thursday, 9 August 2007 
Ramirez, Monica Dianne: Letters to the Editor - Voting as the people's tool against graft 
 
Thursday, 16 August 2007 
Mercado, Juan L.: Divergent paths, p.A10 
Labalan, Bobby Q.: Government rice go to black market in Bicol, p.A15 
Dumlao, Doris C.: ADB says gap between rich, poor widening - notes weakness in 
pattern of growth. pp.B1, B4 
Remo, Amy R.: Maynilad signs deals with government, creditors: Firm eyes early exit 
from rehabilitation, p.B3 
 
Saturday, 25 August 2007 
Labog-Javellana, Juliet & Lim Ubac, Michael: 4 cabinet men on graft list - Palace denies 
sitting on 90 cases; it's only 35, Ermita counters, pp. A1, A6 
Editorial: Purge or whitewash, p.A10 
David, Randy: Hello Garci and Philippine democracy, p.A10 
Mangahas, Mahar: Popular flavours for democracy, p.A11 
Sanchez-Lacson, Elizabeth: PSE adopts mining code: Regulations set strict reporting 
standards. p.B2 
 
Friday-Saturday, August 31-September 1, 2007 




Saturday, 28 July 2007 
Magno, Alex: Public Interest, p.16 
 
Thursday, 2 August 2007 
Pascual, Jr. Federico D.: Who's favoured to bag North Harbour contract? p.8 
Magno, Alex: Hostile witness, p.8 






APPENDIX 5: SEC REQUIREMENTS FOR A COMPANY DIRECTOR AND AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
 
The first column lists the requirements of an ordinary director while the second column contains of who can/not be an independent director. 
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 
II The Board Governance137
 4.   Qualifications of Directors 
 
Every director shall own at least one (1) share of the 
capital stock of the corporation of which he is a 
director, which share shall stand in his name in the 
books of the corporation. The Board may provide for 
additional qualifications of a director such as, but not 
limited to, the following: 
a.   Educational attainment 
b.   Adequate competency and understanding of 
business 
c.   Age requirement 
d.   Integrity/probity 
e.   Assiduousness 
5.   Disqualification of Directors 
The following shall be grounds for the disqualification 
of a director: 
a.    Any person who has been finally convicted by a 
competent judicial or administrative body of the 
SEC Securities Regulation Code (SRC) 
Rule 38 – Requirements on Nomination and Election of Independent Directors138
1. This Rule shall apply to companies mentioned under Sec. 38 of the Code and to 
companies with secondary licenses that adopted in their Manuals on Corporate 
Governance the practice of nominating and electing independent director/s in their 
Boards. Said entities shall be referred to in this Rule as “covered companies”. 
 
2. As used in Section 38 of the Code, independent director means a person who, apart 
from his fees and shareholdings, is independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, 
materially interfere with his exercise of independent judgment in carrying out his 
responsibilities as a director in any covered company and includes, among others, any 
person who: 
A. Is not a director or officer of the covered company or of its related companies or any 
of its substantial shareholders except when the same shall be an independent director of 
any of the foregoing; 
B, Does not own more than two percent (2%) of the shares of the covered company 
and/or its related companies or any of its substantial shareholders; 
C. Is not related to any director, officer or substantial shareholder of the covered 
company, any of its related companies or any of its substantial shareholders. For this 
purpose, relatives include spouse, parent, child, brother, sister, and the spouse of such 
                                                     
137 Source http://www.sec.gov.ph/notices/draft/code_corporate_governance-ii.htm accessed 18 September 2009 
138 SEC (2004) Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, February 13 




following:  (i) any crime involving the purchase or sale 
of securities, e.g., proprietary or non-proprietary 
membership certificate, commodity futures contract, 
or interest in a common trust fund, pre-need plan, 
pension plan or life plan; (ii) any crime arising out of 
the person’s conduct as an underwriter, broker, dealer, 
investment company, investment adviser, principal 
distributor, mutual fund dealer, futures commission 
merchant, commodity trading advisor, floor broker; 
and (iii) any crime arising out of his relationship with a 
bank, quasi-bank, trust company, investment house or 
as an affiliated person of any of them. 
b.   Any person who, by reason of any misconduct, 
after hearing or trial, is permanently or temporarily 
enjoined by order, judgment or decree of the 
Commission or any court or other administrative body 
of competent jurisdiction from: (i) acting as an 
underwriter, broker, dealer, investment adviser, 
principal distributor, mutual fund dealer, futures 
commission merchant, commodity trading advisor, or 
a floor broker; (ii) acting as a director or officer of a 
bank, quasi-bank, trust company, investment house, 
investment company or an affiliated person of any of 
them; (iii) engaging in or continuing any conduct or 
practice in connection with any such activity or 
willfully violating laws governing securities, and 
banking activities. Such disqualification shall also 
apply when such person is currently subject to an 
effective order of the Commission or any court or other 
administrative body refusing, revoking or suspending 
child, brother or sister; 
D. Is not acting as a nominee or representative of any director or substantial shareholder 
of the covered company, and/or any of its related companies and/or any of its 
substantial shareholders, pursuant to a Deed of Trust or under any contract or 
arrangement; 
E. Has not been employed in any executive capacity by the covered company, any of its 
related companies and/or by any of its substantial shareholders within the last five (5) 
years; 
F. Is not retained, either personally or through his firm or any similar entity, as 
professional adviser, by that covered company, any of its related companies and/or any 
of its substantial shareholders, within the last five (5) years; or 
G. Has not engaged and does not engage in any transaction with the covered company 
and/or with any of its related companies and/or with any of its substantial shareholders, 
whether by himself and/or with other persons and/or through a firm of which he is a 
partner and/or a company of which he is a director or substantial shareholder, other 
than transactions which are conducted at arms length and are immaterial. 
3. No person convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment for 
a period exceeding six (6) years, or a violation of this Code, committed within five (5) 
years prior to the date of his election, shall qualify as an independent director. This is 
without prejudice to other disqualifications which the covered company’s Manual on 
Corporate Governance provides. 
4. Any controversy or issue arising from the selection, nomination or election of 
independent directors shall be resolved by the Commission by appointing independent 
directors from the list of nominees submitted by the stockholders. 
5. When used in relation to a company subject to the requirements of this Rule and 
Section 38 of the Code: 
A. Related company means another company which is: (a) its holding company; (b) its 
subsidiary; or (c) a subsidiary of its holding company; and B. Substantial shareholder 
means any person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten 




any registration, license or permit issued under the 
Corporation Code, Securities Regulation Code, or any 
other law administered by the Commission or Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas, or under any rule or regulation 
promulgated by the Commission or Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, or otherwise restrained to engage in any 
activity involving securities and banking. Such person 
is also disqualified when he is currently subject to an 
effective order of a self-regulatory organisation 
suspending or expelling him from membership or 
participation or from associating with a member or 
participant of the organisation. 
c.   Any person finally convicted judicially or 
administratively of an offense involving moral 
turpitude, fraud, embezzlement, theft, estafa, 
counterfeiting, misappropriation, forgery, bribery, false 
oath, perjury or other fraudulent act or transgressions. 
d.   Any person finally found by the Commission or a 
court or other administrative body to have willfully 
violated, or willfully aided, abetted, counseled, induced 
or procured the violation of, any provision of the 
Securities Regulation Code, the Corporation Code, or 
any other law administered by the Commission or 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, or any rule, regulation or 
order of the Commission or Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, or who has filed a materially false or 
misleading application, report or registration 
statement required by the Commission, or any rule, 
regulation or order of the Commission. 
e.   Any person judicially declared to be insolvent. 
 
6. Qualifications and Disqualifications 
A. An independent director shall have the following qualifications: 
(xi) He shall have at least one (1) share of stock of the corporation;  
(xii) He shall be at least a college graduate or he shall have been engaged or exposed to 
the business of the corporation for at least five (5) years; 
(xiii) He shall possess integrity/probity; and 
(xiv) He shall be assiduous. 
B. No person enumerated under Section II (5) of the Code of Corporate Governance shall 
qualify as an independent director. He shall likewise be disqualified during his tenure 
under the following instances or causes: 
(i) He becomes an officer or employee of the corporation where he is such member of 
the board of directors/trustees, or becomes any of the persons enumerated under 
Section II (5) of the Code on Corporate Governance;  
(ii) His beneficial security ownership exceeds two percent (2%) of the outstanding 
capital stock of the company where he is such director; 
(iii) Fails, without any justifiable cause, to attend at least 50% of the total number of 
Board meetings during his incumbency unless such absences are due to grave illness or 
death of an immediate family. 
(iv) Such other disqualifications which the covered company’s Manual on Corporate 
Governance provides. 
 
8. Nomination and Election of Independent Director/s 
The following rules shall be applicable to all covered companies: 
A. The Nomination Committee (the “Committee”) shall have at least three (3) members, 
one of whom is an independent director. It shall promulgate the guidelines or criteria to 
govern the conduct of the nomination. The same shall be properly disclosed in the 
company’s information or proxy statement or such other reports required to be 
submitted to the Commission. 




f.    Any person finally found guilty by a foreign court 
or equivalent financial regulatory authority of acts, 
violations or misconduct similar to any of the acts, 
violations or misconduct listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) 
hereof. 
g.   Any affiliated person who is ineligible, by reason of 
paragraphs (a) to (e) hereof to serve or act in the 
capacities listed in those paragraphs. 
h.   Conviction by final judgment of an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding six 
(6) years, or a violation of the Corporation Code, 
committed within five (5) years prior to the date of his 
election or appointment. 
 
The Board may also provide for the temporary 
disqualification of a director for the following reasons: 
a.   Refusal to fully disclose the extent of his business 
interest as required under the Securities Regulation 
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. 
This disqualification shall be in effect as long as his 
refusal persists. 
b.   Absence or non-participation for whatever reason/s 
for more than fifty percent (50%) of all meetings, both 
regular and special, of the Board of directors during his 
incumbency, or any twelve (12) month period during 
said incumbency. This disqualification applies for 
purposes of the succeeding election. 
c.   Dismissal/termination from directorship in another 
listed corporation for cause. This disqualification shall 
be in effect until he has cleared himself of any 
a stockholders’ meeting. All recommendations shall be signed by the nominating 
stockholders together with the acceptance and conformity by the would-be nominees. 
C. The Committee shall pre-screen the qualifications and prepare a final list of all 
candidates and put in place screening policies and parameters to enable it to effectively 
review the qualifications of the nominees for independent director/s. 
D. After the nomination, the Committee shall prepare a Final List of Candidates which 
shall contain all the information about all the nominees for independent directors, as 
required under Part IV(A) and (C) of Annex “C” of SRC Rule 12, which list, shall be made 
available to the Commission and to all stockholders through the filing and distribution 
of the Information Statement, in accordance with SRC Rule 20, or in such other reports 
the company is required to submit to the Commission. The name of the person or group 
of persons who recommended the nomination of the independent director shall be 
identified in such report including any relationship with the nominee. 
E. Only nominees whose names appear on the Final List of Candidates shall be eligible 
for election as Independent Director/s. No other nominations shall be entertained after 
the Final List of Candidates shall have been prepared. No further nominations shall be 
entertained or allowed on the floor during the actual annual 
stockholders’/memberships’ meeting.  
F. Election of Independent Director/s 
i. Except as those required under this Rule and subject to pertinent existing laws, rules 
and regulations of the Commission, the conduct of the election of independent 
director/s shall be made in accordance with the standard election procedures of the 
company or its by-laws. 
ii. It shall be the responsibility of the Chairman of the Meeting to inform all 
stockholders in attendance of the mandatory requirement of electing independent 
director/s. He shall ensure that an independent director/s are elected during the 
stockholders’ meeting.  
iii. Specific slot/s for independent directors shall not be filled-up by unqualified 
nominees.  




involvement in the alleged irregularity. 
d.   Being under preventive suspension by the 
corporation.  
e.   If the independent director becomes an officer or 
employee of the same corporation he shall be 
automatically disqualified from being an independent 
director. 
f.    If the beneficial security ownership of an 
independent director in the company or in its related 
companies shall exceed the 10% limit. 
g.   Conviction that has not yet become final referred to 
in the grounds for the disqualification of directors. 
shall call a separate election during the same meeting to fill up the vacancy. 
v. The covered companies shall amend its by-laws in accordance with the foregoing 
requirements as soon as practicable. 
9. Termination/Cessation of Independent Directorship 
In case of resignation, disqualification or cessation of independent directorship and only 
after notice has been made with the Commission within five (5) days from such 
resignation, disqualification or cessation, the vacancy shall be filled by the vote of at 
least a majority of the remaining directors, if still constituting a quorum, upon the 
nomination of the Committee otherwise, said vacancies shall be filled by the 
stockholders in a regular or special meeting called for that purpose. An independent 
director so elected to fill a vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired term of his 




APPENDIX 6: COMPARISON OF MANDATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, INVESTMENT FUNDS AND CEILINGS 




SSS139 Sub-Section of Section 26140 SSS 
Ceiling 




Investment of Funds 
a) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of the Government of the Philippines, or in 
bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness to which the full faith, credit and unconditional 
guarantee of the Government of the Philippines is pledged. 
- a) In interest-bearing bonds or other 
evidence of indebtedness of the 
Government of the Philippines; 
Domestic 
infrastructure 
b) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of the Government of the Philippines or any of 
its agencies or instrumentalities to finance domestic 
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, ports, 
telecommunications and other similar projects; Provided that 
the instruments issued by an agency or instrumentality of the 
government shall be guaranteed by the Government of the 
Philippines or any government financial institution or 
acceptable multilateral agency; provided further the SSS shall 
30% - 
                                                     
139 Adapted from Social Security Act of 1997/Republic Act 8282 (2006) 
140 Section 26 of the SSS Act states: “No portion of the Investment Reserve Fund or income thereof shall accrue to the general fund of the National Government or 
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as may be allowed under this Act.” 
141 Section 36 Investment of Funds of GSIS Act: “The funds of the GSIS are which are not needed to meet the current obligations may be invested under such 
terms and conditions and rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Board; Provided, that investment shall satisfy the requirements of liquidity, 
safety/security and yield in order to ensure the actuarial solvency of the funds of GSIS; Provided, further, that the GSIS shall submit an annual reports on all 




have priority over the revenues of the projects; provided that 







c) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of the government financial institutions or 
government corporations with acceptable credit or guarantee; 
provided that such investments shall not exceed 30% of the 
Investment Reserve Fund 
30% 
Banks  d) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of any bank doing business in the Philippines 
and in good standing with the BSP to finance loans to private 
corporations doing business in the Philippines including 
schools, hospitals, small and medium scale industries, 
cooperatives and NGOs; in which case the collaterals or 
securities shall be assigned to the SSS, under such terms and 
conditions as the commission may prescribe: provided that in 
the case of bank deposits, they shall not exceed at any time 
the unimpaired capital and surplus or total private deposits of 
the depository bank, whichever is smaller; provided further 
that said bank shall first have been designated as a depository 
for this purpose by the Monetary Board of the BSP; provided 
that such investments shall not exceed 40% of the Investment 
Reserve Fund 
40% b) In interest-bearing deposits or 
securities in any domestic bank doing 
business in the Philippines; Provided: 
that in the case of such deposits, 
these shall not exceed at any time the 
unimpaired capital and surplus or 
total deposits of the depository bank 
whichever is smaller: Provided 
further; that said bank has prior 
designation as a depository for the 
purpose by the Monetary Board of 




e) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of shelter agencies of the national Government 
or financial intermediaries to finance housing loans of 
members; and in long-term direct individual or group 
housing loans giving priority to the low-income groups, up to 
a maximum of 90% of the appraised value of the properties to 
be mortgaged by the borrowers; and in short and medium 
35%; 
10% 
c) In direct housing loans to members 
and group housing projects secured 
by first mortgage, giving priority to 
the low income groups, and in short-
and medium-term loans to members 
such as salary, policy, educational, 




term loans to members such salary, educational, livelihood, 
marital, calamity and emergency loans; Provided that not 
more than 35% of the Investment Reserve Fund at any time 
shall be invested for housing purposes: provided further that 
no more than 10% of the Investment Reserve Fund shall be 
invested in short and medium term loans” 
other similar loans; Provided that no 
less than 40% of the investable fund 
of the GSIS Social Insurance Fund 
shall be invested for these purposes. 




f) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of educational or medical institutions to finance 
the construction, improvement and maintenance of schools 
and hospitals and their equipment and facilities: provided 
that such investments shall not exceed 10% of the Investment 
Reserve Fund 
10% d) In bonds, securities, promissory notes 
or other evidence of indebtedness of 
educational or medical institutions to 
finance the construction, 
improvement and maintenance of 
schools and hospitals 
Real Estate g) In real estate property, including shares of stocks involving 
real estate property, and investments secured by first 
mortgages on real estate or other collaterals acceptable to the 
SSS: provided that such projects and investments shall in the 
determination of the Commission, redound to the benefit of 
the SSS, its members as well as the general public: provided 
further, that investment in real estate property including 
shares of stocks involving real estate property shall not exceed 
5% of the Investment Reserve Fund: provided finally, that 
investments in other income-earning projects and 
investments secured by first mortgages or other collaterals 
shall not exceed 25% of the Investment Reserve Fund 
30% e) In real estate property including 
shares of stocks involving real estate 
property and investments secured by 
first mortgages on real estate or other 
collaterals acceptable to GSIS: 
Provided, that such investments 
shall, in the determination of the 
Board, redound to the benefit of the 








h) In bonds, securities, promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of any prime corporation or multilateral 
institution to finance domestic projects: provided that the 
issuing or assuming entity or its predecessors shall not have 
defaulted in the payment of interest on any of its securities 





institutions years next preceding the date of acquisition by the SSS of such 
bonds, debentures or other evidence of indebtedness, the net 
earnings of the issuing or assuming institution available for its 
fixed charges, as defined in this Act, shall have been not less 
than 1 and ¼ times the total of fixed charges for such ear: 
provided further that such investments shall not exceed 30% 





i) In preferred or common shares of stocks listed or about to be 
listed in the stock exchange or options or warrants to such 
stocks, or subject to prior approval of the BSP, such other risk 
management instruments of any prime or solvent corporation 
or financial institution created or existing under the laws of 
the Philippines with proven track record of profitability over 
the last 3 years and payment of dividends at least once over 
the same period. Provided that such investments shall not 
exceed 30% of the Investment Reserve Fund. 
30% f) In debt instruments and other 
securities traded in the secondary 
market; 
g) In loans to, or in bonds, debentures, 
promissory notes or other evidence of 
indebtedness of any solvent 
corporation created or existing under 
the laws of the Philippines 
h) In common and preferred stocks of 
any solvent corporation or financial 
institution created or existing under 
the laws of the Philippines listed in 
the stock exchange with a proven 
track record of profitability over the 
last 3 years and payment of dividends 





j) In domestic or foreign mutual funds in existence for at least 3 
years: provided that such investments shall not exceed 20% of 
the Investment Reserve Fund: provided further that 
investments in foreign mutual funds shall not exceed 1% of 
the Investment Reserve Fund in the first year which shall be 
increased by 1% for each succeeding year but in no case shall 
it exceed 7.5% of the Investment Reserve Fund 
20% 
(7.5%) 
i) In domestic mutual funds including 
investments related to the operations 







k) In foreign currency deposits or triple A foreign currency 
denominated debts, prime and non-speculative equities, and 
other BSP approved financial instruments or other assets 
issued in accordance with existing laws of the countries where 
such financial instruments are issued. Provided that these 
instruments or assets are listed in bourses of the respective 
countries where the instruments or assets are issued. 
Provided further that the issuing company has proven track 
record of profitability over the last 3 years and a record of 
regular dividend payout over the same period. Provided 
finally that such investments shall not exceed 1% of the 
Investment Reserve Fund in the first year which shall be 
increased by 1% for each succeeding year, but in no case shall 
it exceed 7.5% of the Investment Reserve Fund. 
7.5% j) In foreign mutual funds and in 
foreign currency deposits or foreign 
currency-denominated debts, non-
speculative equities and other 
financial instruments or other assets 
issued in accordance with existing 
laws of the countries where such 
financial instruments are issued: 
Provided; that these instruments or 
assets are listed in bourses of the 
respective countries where these 
instruments or assets are issued: 
Provided further, that the issuing 
company has a proven track record of 
profitability over the last three (3) 
years and payments of dividends at 
least once over the same period. 
Secured 
Loans 
l) In loans secured by such collaterals like cash, government 
securities or guarantees of multilateral institutions. Provided 







m) In other BSP approved investment instruments with the same 
intrinsic quality as those enumerated in paragraphs a) to l) 
hereof, subject to the policies and guidelines which the 





APPENDIX 7: PROPOSAL QUESTIONNAIRE AND PROPOSAL EVALUATION MATRIX FOR GSIS’ GLOBAL FUND 
MANAGER  
 





1. What is your proposed asset allocation? Discuss the portfolio allocation in terms of asset class, region, 
sector, and currency that would meet the GSIS return objective indicated in this RFP. 
2. Explain how asset allocation decisions will be taken. How do you propose to implement the absolute-
return strategy for the GSIS? 
3. Provide an estimate of the expected return and expected volatility of your proposed portfolio. Describe the 
best and the worst case scenario for the strategy you suggest to implement. 
Historical 
Performance 
1. Indicate the years of experience of the individual members of your investment team: 
1.1 in fund management; and 
1.2 in managing absolute return portfolio (in particular). 
7. State whether your company has been affected by the recent sub-prime crisis? If yes, please state the extent of your 
exposure (in absolute amount) and its relation in percentage terms with this asset class. 
Risk 
Management 
1. Describe your firm’s philosophy and risk management framework. 
2. Describe your firm’s risk management policies and controls with regard to the management of third party assets 
under management. 
3. Is your risk management process, including compliance monitoring and investment procedures created for clients’ 
portfolio, subject to periodic review of an independent third party? If yes, please explain. 
4. What were the actions instituted to reduce the negative effects of global economic events such as the recent sub-
prime crisis and weakening of the US$? 
5. What are the risk reports provided to clients? What is the frequency of such reporting? 
6. What risk measures do you use to track and control downside risk? 
7. What are the market conditions that would favor your suggested approach to the absolute-return strategy and what 
                                                     




conditions would be detrimental to it? 
8. From among your independent risk division or Risk Oversight Committee, please provide the curriculum vitae 
(Attachment 9) of at least three (3) risk management officers. 
Organisation 1. Describe your firm’s ownership structure and provide an organisational chart (please include a diagram of ownership 
structure). Identify affiliated or subsidiary organisation(s). 
2. Describe the firm’s management and organisational structures (please include a diagram of management and 
organisational structures). Where are investment management operations located and which location would be 
responsible for the proposed mandate? 
3. Who regulates the firm in the course of its investment management business? 
4. Describe any restructuring or organisational changes that have occurred within the firm over the past three years. 
Discuss any planned organisational changes that could be implemented in the near future. 
5. Explain any legal judgments or proceedings associated with your firm or any officer or principal within the last three 
years. Specify whether your firm is involved in any pending litigation or investigations. 
6. If there are any SEC actions, state regulatory actions, professional organisation or other actions against your 
organisation, any owners, principals, or other personnel, describe them in detail. 
7. What is the extent of your Errors and Omissions cover or similar insurance cover, if any? Provide confirmation of 




1. Describe your investment philosophy, strategy, discipline and investment style. 
2. Describe your investment process and the responsibilities of the different units in your organisation. 
3. Describe the investment decision making and portfolio construction processes for this mandate. What are your 
criteria in selecting potential investments? 
4. What quantitative model(s) do you use in your process and indicate whether it is proprietary or not? 
5. Describe how both internal and external research is utilized and incorporated in the portfolio. Please indicate sources 
of external information. 
6. What is the percentage contribution to decision making of quantitative (fundamental and technical) and qualitative 






Table A7.2: GSIS’ GFM Proposal Evaluation Matrix 
Parameters Maximum Points 
A. Proposed Investment Strategy 30% 
B. Historical Performance 25% 
C. Risk Management 20% 
D. Organisation 15% 
E. Reporting 5% 






APPENDIX 8: LIST OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NODES IN NVIVO 
 
Node Sources References 
Corporate governance - accountability 25 34 
Corporate governance - accreditation 5 6 
Corporate governance - advantages of 22 36 
Corporate governance - advocates of, champions of, 
promoters of 
31 73 
Corporate governance - American influence and practices 9 15 
Corporate governance - applicability of 43 109 
Corporate governance - Australian influence 15 35 
Corporate governance - awareness 48 145 
Corporate governance - behaviour 33 65 
Corporate governance - better practices ; exemplars 23 52 
Corporate governance - capacity - lack of 11 18 
Corporate governance - capital markets -  link with 22 64 
Corporate governance - challenges 33 74 
Corporate governance - competitive advantage 16 35 
Corporate governance - control system 20 30 
Corporate governance - cost of 7 10 
Corporate governance - demands 26 51 
Corporate governance - disclosure 36 95 
Corporate governance - disclosure - information 
asymmetry 
8 11 
Corporate governance - disincentives 14 15 
Corporate governance - documents 7 8 
Corporate governance - documents - BSP CG manual 4 10 
Corporate governance - documents - CG charter 2 3 
Corporate governance - documents - code of conduct 6 10 
Corporate governance - documents - code of corporate 
governance 
3 6 
Corporate governance - documents - code of ethics 4 7 
Corporate governance - documents - SEC CG Manual 9 12 
Corporate governance - drivers of 33 69 
Corporate governance - effect on SMEs 10 22 
Corporate governance - enforcement 18 38 
Corporate governance - executive compensation 4 4 
Corporate governance - external cooperation pressures 10 14 
Corporate governance - fairness 3 4 
Corporate governance - form and substance 11 19 
Corporate governance - formalisation 27 53 
Corporate governance - future of 18 28 
Corporate governance - harmonisation 
internationalisation globalisation of 
19 36 




Corporate governance - implementation of 30 72 
Corporate governance - improving improvements 31 62 
Corporate governance - invoking for propaganda 4 5 
Corporate governance - limitations of 10 15 
Corporate governance - operationalising 34 77 
Corporate governance - organisations international etc 4 12 
Corporate governance - origins in the Philippines 
introducing 
13 18 
Corporate governance - perception 38 100 
Corporate governance - performance 6 11 
Corporate governance - portability or transferability 10 18 
Corporate governance - principles of 17 34 
Corporate governance - professionalism 26 51 
Corporate governance - promotion in the Philippines 30 73 
Corporate governance - promotion to suppliers 2 2 
Corporate governance - qualitative assessment intangible 
perception 
5 10 
Corporate governance - quality of 14 17 
Corporate governance - recognition - lack of or reward 12 17 
Corporate governance - regulators 38 100 
Corporate governance - regulators - Financial Sector 
Forum 
6 8 
Corporate governance - regulatory cooperation 6 7 
Corporate governance - relationship based 16 19 
Corporate governance - reporting 25 45 
Corporate governance - ripple effect of 11 15 
Corporate governance - risk management 21 43 
Corporate governance - rules based 5 5 
Corporate governance - succession planning 18 36 
Corporate governance - tiered view segregated 4 7 
Corporate governance - transparency 38 87 
Corporate governance - value of 30 54 
Corporate governance - weakness of 15 20 
Corporate governance as a tool - misuse of 6 6 
Corporate governance as a trend 11 17 
Corporate governance as business sense 32 58 
Corporate governance as compliance 37 95 
Corporate governance as leverage 14 21 
Corporate governance as practice pragmatism 40 98 
Corporate governance as protection or improving 
reputation 
15 25 
Corporate governance data - dearth or paucity 2 2 
Corporate governance practice as attracting investment 29 57 
Corporate governance ranking 5 10 
Corporate governance reforms 36 102 
Corporate governance scorecard 5 11 




APPENDIX 9: LIST OF CORRUPTION NODES IN NVIVO 
 
Node Sources References 
Corruption 37 68 
Corruption - addressing or countering 20 46 
Corruption - arrangements for activities 8 10 
Corruption - arrangements for activities - overseas 4 4 
Corruption - bribery 7 11 
Corruption - cheating 6 7 
Corruption - corruptor - corruptee 6 7 
Corruption - culture of 10 12 
Corruption - East Asia outside Philippines 10 16 
Corruption - effects on country 19 33 
Corruption - effects on personnel 12 18 
Corruption - effects on SMEs 2 3 
Corruption - embezzlement 6 6 
Corruption - endemic  entrenched 9 13 
Corruption - extortion 3 7 
Corruption - favouritism or reciprocity 13 16 
Corruption - feeling towards 22 53 
Corruption - fraud - Ponzi schemes pyramid 
investment scams 
8 12 
Corruption - gifts 4 4 
Corruption - graft 10 27 
Corruption - influence peddling 9 14 
Corruption - institutionalised organised centralised 12 21 
Corruption - kickbacks 2 4 
Corruption - long term 8 8 
Corruption - major 7 8 
Corruption - petty 4 5 
Corruption - pork barrelling 2 2 
Corruption - presence with servicing the public 
discretionary 
8 11 
Corruption - presidential 16 22 
Corruption - private sector role 11 14 
Corruption - rent-seeking ; short-term 17 32 
Corruption - smuggling 2 2 
Corruption - soft and hard 2 2 
Corruption - theft 5 6 
Corruption - theory theoretical 1 2 
Corruption - undue influence 5 7 
Corruption - unpredictability 8 12 
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